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Howard H. Baker, Jr. and the
Public Values of Cooperation and Civility:
A Preface to the Special Issue
Theodore Brown, Jr.1
 The principal articles published in this Special Issue of the Journal are expanded 
versions of papers presented by a distinguished group of scholars, journalists, and 
other commentators at a two-day conference, “Howard H. Baker, Jr.:  A Life in 
Public Service,” sponsored by the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy in 
November, 2010, in connection with the observance of Senator Baker’s eighty-fifth 
birthday.  That conference and this Special Issue represent, collectively, the products 
of the initial major initiative of the relatively new Baker Studies Program at the 
Baker Center.
 To enhance the topics addressed by the principal articles, the editors have 
included in the Special Issue a selection of speeches, remarks, and articles by and 
about Senator Baker and a collection of photographic and cartoon images from 
various stages in his lengthy career in public service.
 The author of one of the principal articles, Steve Roberts, who covered Capitol 
Hill for The New York Times during Senator Baker’s tenures in the Unites States 
Senate and as White House chief of staff, recently observed that “Senator Baker 
reflected certain values—bipartisanship, a respect for the institution, a sense of 
civility, a belief in the value of compromise—values that are far less visible today” in 
Washington than when he was there.2  I think it is fair to say that this summation 
of the qualities that so distinguished Senator Baker’s career in public service set 
the tone and established one of the primary themes of the conference at the Baker 
Center that provided the impetus for this Special Issue of the Journal.
 The desirability and use of cooperation and civility in our interactions with 
one another are, indeed, public values that are central to understanding both the 
effectiveness of Howard Baker as a public servant and the abiding esteem and 
affection with which he is regarded by those who worked with him during his 
career in public life.  The sociologist Richard Sennett reminds us that the task of 
conflict management in the context of making a complex society work requires 
both cooperation and civility.  The capacity for cooperation, or the ability to 
engage in an “exchange in which the participants benefit from the encounter,” in 
turn requires a number of skills, including those of  “understanding and responding 
to one another in order to act together” for a common objective, of listening well, 
of behaving tactfully, of finding points of agreement and managing disagreement, 
of recognizing the interests of each of the participating parties and the value of 
compromise, and of avoiding the frustrations that often occur during difficult 
1 Editor of the Baker Center Journal and Director of the Baker Studies Program, The Howard H. Baker Jr. 
Center for Public Policy.
2 E-mail message, Steven V. Roberts to the author, July 10, 2010.
1
discussions or negotiations.3  These were among the skills that comprised the 
hallmark of Senator Baker’s career.  It thus should not be surprising to find that 
Baker’s rules for Senate leadership—the so-called “Baker’s Dozen” found in his 
now famous speech, “On Herding Cats,” delivered in 1998 and the text of which is 
provided in the Appendix—include the following recommendations:  listen more 
often than you speak, have a genuine and decent respect for differing points of view, 
be patient, tell the truth whether you have to or not, and be civil and encourage 
others to do likewise.
 What of civility?  How are we, and especially those who hold positions of 
political leadership, to “be civil”?  One of the definitions of the term found in the 
Oxford English Dictionary is “[b]ehaviour or speech appropriate to civil interactions; 
politeness, courtesy, consideration.”4  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
includes “decent behavior or treatment” as one of the meanings of the term (albeit 
designated, interestingly, as an obsolete one).5  Sennett refers to civility as “treating 
others as though they were strangers and forging a social bond upon that social 
distance” and concludes that he does “not think people now need await a massive 
transformation of social conditions or a magic return to the past in order to behave 
in a civilized way.”6
 Whatever its definition, the concept of civility as a desirable ingredient in our 
political discourse contemplates the behavioral setting within which cooperation 
might occur.  Civility thus addresses how we treat those fellow human beings with 
whom we are expected to live and work as we strive to manage—and perhaps 
resolve—the conflicts that inevitably arise within and as a result of that social 
relationship.  The management of such conflicts is often a political task, a task that 
regrettably is becoming more and more difficult and challenging with the increasing 
ideological balkanization of the American political process.
 To perform such a difficult, challenging political task, Senator Baker reminds 
us that “there is a need for greater civility in our political discourse.”7  How does 
one go about creating a behavioral setting that cultivates and facilitates effective 
conflict management in the political context?  To Senator Baker, certainly, civility 
in our political discourse seems to incorporate the simple concept found in the 
admonition of the Golden Rule, but, as the principal articles in this Special Issue 
and the documents in the Appendix suggest, his concept of civility contemplates 
3 See Richard Sennett, Together:  the Rituals, Pleasures and Politics of Cooperation x, 5-6 
(2012); Richard Sennett, The Fall of Public Man 264 (1976); Terry Eagleton, On Meaning Well, The 
Times Literary Supplement, Apr. 20, 2012, at 8.  Sennett notes that cooperation can be both positive (e.g., 
conflict management that “sustains social groups across the misfortunes and upheavals of time”), which he calls 
“hard cooperation,” or negative (e.g., “destructive cooperation of the us-against-you sort” or cooperation “degraded 
into collusion”).  Sennett, Together at 6.
4 “Civility,” Oxford English Dictionary, available at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/ 33581?redirecte
dFrom=civility#eid.
5 “Civility,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged, available at http://
collections.chadwyck.com/searchFulltext.do?id=Z200897621&divLevel=2&queryId=../session/1340381277_
12395&trailId=1377A746390&area=mwd&forward=textsFT.
6 Sennett, Fall of Public Man, supra note 3, at 264.
7 See, e.g., Howard H. Baker, Jr., “On Herding Cats,” July 14, 1998 (see Appendix).
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something more than that.  Perhaps reflecting his East Tennessee upbringing, 
Senator Baker’s version of civility calls for rather regular infusions of healthy 
doses of what President Reagan once characterized as his Chief of Staff ’s “gentle 
Tennessee wit”8 as well.
 Tennessee has a long-standing tradition of sending representatives to the 
United States Senate who subsequently, either there or elsewhere within the 
federal government, played significant roles in the political history of the United 
States.  One thinks, for instance, of Andrew Jackson, Andrew Johnson, Cordell 
Hull, Estes Kefauver, and the two Albert Gores.  No such list would be complete, 
however, without the name of Howard H. Baker, Jr.  Senator Baker served as vice-
chairman of the Senate Watergate Committee, as Senate Minority Leader, as 
Senate Majority Leader, as White House Chief of Staff to President Reagan, and, 
more than a decade and a half after his departure from the Senate and the White 
House, as U. S. Ambassador to Japan.  It is our hope that the primary articles, 
the speeches and remarks and other documents, and the photographic and cartoon 
images published in this Special Issue of the Journal will help to provide a better 
understanding and appreciation of Senator Baker’s rich legacy and of his significant 
and lasting contributions to the life and history of the Nation.
8 Ronald Reagan to Howard H. Baker, Jr., June 18, 1988, Howard H. Baker, Jr. Papers (unprocessed), Modern 
Political Archives, Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy, the text of which is reproduced in the Appendix.
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Howard H. Baker, Jr.: 
A Life in Public Service
An Overview
J. Lee Annis, Jr.1
 A quarter of a century ago, Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, the chroniclers 
of the authoritative Almanac of American Politics, 1984, declared that there was but 
“one giant in the Senate” of the United States in the early 1980s and that he was the 
five-feet-six-and-one-half-inches tall Howard H. Baker, Jr., of Tennessee.2  Here 
is no small tribute, in that the same body also included at that time several men 
now acclaimed by scholars as legislative lions, like Edward M. Kennedy (D. Mass.), 
Bob Dole (R. Kan.), Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D. N.Y.), Orrin Hatch (R. Utah), 
Robert Byrd (D. W. Va.), and Barry Goldwater (R. Ariz.), not to mention Nancy 
Landon Kassebaum (R. Kan.), the first woman ever elected to a full six-year term 
in the Senate without previously having been married to a member of Congress. 
Yet between 1980 and 1984, when senators, staffers, or congressional reporters 
were asked which member was the best, the most influential, the most effective or 
the most persuasive, Baker invariably finished first.  In retrospect, one can find the 
conciliatory hands of Howard Baker permeating legislation covering such diverse 
realms as legislative reapportionment, fair housing, the monumental Clean Air and 
Water Acts of 1970,3 mass transit, the Panama Canal Treaties, revenue sharing, 
and the Reagan budget and tax cuts of 1981.  Baker’s pragmatic, often eclectic, 
approach to the legislative process, shaped in studies in both law and engineering, 
allowed him to sift through the heart of highly complex issues before virtually any 
of his colleagues had done so.  While long evident to congressional insiders, this 
knack was one that the broad general public first noticed in the summer of 1973 
when he framed the nature of the involvement of a President of his own party in the 
Watergate scandal as the central question of the entire Watergate investigation.
 It thus is confounding that no commemorations of an academic nature 
covering the highlights of Howard Baker’s career had ever been held prior to the 
occasion of his 85th birthday in November of 2010, some fourteen years after he 
had become the first United States Senator to marry another member of the Senate 
when he wed Nancy Kassebaum.  In part, the lack of any such observance reflects 
the modesty of the man himself, for Baker deflected all such suggestions from Alan 
Lowe, the inaugural director of the Baker Center for Public Policy, about holding 
any conference of the sort, even one covering the monumental Watergate hearings, 
which launched the young Tennessee senator’s rapid emergence as a national figure. 
1 J. Lee Annis, Jr., is Professor and Chairman of the History and Political Science Department at Montgomery 
College in Rockville, Maryland.  He is the author of Howard Baker: Conciliator in an Age of Crisis (1995) and 
the co-author, with former U.S. Senator Bill Frist, of Tennessee Senators, 1911-2001:  Portraits of Leadership in a 
Century of Change (1999).
2 Michael Barone & Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics, 1984, at xxxi  (1983).
3 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676; Water Quality Improvement Act of 
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, Pt. 1, 84 Stat. 91.
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Indeed, Carl Pierce, the Baker Center’s current director, found that the only way he 
could host such an event was to schedule it without Baker’s knowledge for the two 
days after his birthday.
 The resulting conference, “Howard H. Baker, Jr.: A Life in Public Service,” 
occurred at the Baker Center on November 16-17, 2010, and featured papers 
presented by seven distinguished scholars and journalists.  Expanded versions of 
these papers are presented in this special issue of the Baker Center Journal of Applied 
Public Policy.  Highlighting the conference proceedings were addresses by two 
men who actually had worked closely with Senator Baker:  George Washington 
University professor Stephen V. Roberts, the longtime congressional correspondent 
for The New York Times, and noted Washington attorney James Hamilton, whose 
first venture into the national spotlight came during his service as deputy majority 
counsel to the Senate Watergate Committee.
 In his paper, Hamilton notes in Baker a kindness that is uncommon among 
politicians, a quality that was best exemplified when Baker, a Republican, was the 
only member of the Ervin Committee to visit him, a top Democratic lawyer, while 
he was recuperating in the hospital after having had a kidney stone removed.
 Roberts makes the civility of the Senate that Baker led the focal point of his 
paper, reminding us that civility—contrary to the current political atmosphere, 
largely driven by cable television hosts and producers who encourage loud, 
increasingly shrill confrontation at the expense of analysis—was the norm rather 
than the exception in the Senate of the early 1980s.  Like his predecessors in Senate 
leadership positions such as Senators Mike Mansfield (D. Mont.) and Everett 
M. Dirksen (R. Ill.) or, for that matter, House leaders like Representatives Hale 
Boggs (D. La.), Gerald R. Ford (R. Mich.), and Tip O’Neill (D. Mass.), Howard 
Baker respected his colleagues and treated them as friends, regardless of party.  In 
those bygone days, Roberts notes, members of Congress worshipped together, 
golfed together, dined together, and got to know each other, something increasingly 
unlikely in the early part of the 21st century when many members opt not to move 
their families to Washington.  These days, members often come to the Senate 
from a House of Representatives increasingly polarized by the gerrymandering of 
congressional districts for the purpose of electing the most intransigent partisans 
beholden to the most demanding special interests in their area.  In recent years, 
legislators first elected from such districts have often led the chorus of complaint 
when even respected members of their caucuses like Edward Kennedy or John 
McCain have sought to find common ground with those on the other side of the 
partisan divide.  Is there a better way?  Professor Roberts argues emphatically in the 
affirmative and cites the Baker example as a model for the future.
 Brown University political scientist Wendy Schiller, a onetime aide to 
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Governor Mario Cuomo, both New York 
Democrats, echoes Roberts’s findings in a lively paper examining Baker’s service 
as Senate minority leader and majority leader.  Contrary to general opinion, she 
asserts, Senate rules are situational rather than set in stone.  In turn, congressional 
leaders succeed by molding them to fit given circumstances, thus dispelling any 
reasonable implication that they are using the rules for the purpose of stifling 
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debate.  No better example does Schiller find to document her point than Howard 
Baker’s model, crafted while formulating legislative strategy for the Reagan budget 
and tax bills of 1981.  Faced with a growing conservative bloc within his caucus, 
Baker adapted to circumstances and built a consensus around the notion that the 
best way to guarantee that the Reagan Administration would be a success was to 
secure the approval of its economic program before proceeding to consider the 
more controversial social issues on the Reagan legislative agenda.  In as personal 
and inclusive a brand of leadership as has ever been seen in the Senate, Schiller 
demonstrates, Baker did what he could to resolve struggles over legislative turf 
before they erupted, consulted dozens of senators prior to key decisions on both 
procedure and substance, and limited parliamentary challenges to those maneuvers 
by other senators that might delay progress on Ronald Reagan’s economic recovery 
program.  How well Baker fared, she points out, can be seen from the fact that the 
presidential campaign of Bill Clinton copied the Baker mantra of the early 1980s 
in identifying the Democratic presidential ticket’s core theme (“It’s the Economy, 
Stupid”) during the presidential election of 1992.
 Two other thoughtful political scientists, Charles E. Walcott of Virginia Tech 
and David B. Cohen of the University of Akron, assess Baker’s role as chief of staff 
in restoring faith in the Reagan White House in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra 
scandal.  Professor Walcott paints a portrait of an executive branch in disarray on 
Thursday, February 26, 1987, the day former Senator John Tower (R. Tex.), the 
chairman of a commission examining the debacle, declared that President Reagan 
had been “poorly advised and poorly served” and “not aware of a lot of things that were 
going on.”4  Tower and his colleagues distributed blame for the operation in many 
directions but especially targeted the “personal control” of Donald Regan, Baker’s 
predecessor as the President’s chief of staff, over his subordinates and his failure 
to insist upon an orderly process of review.  First Lady Nancy Reagan particularly 
feared that Regan’s brusque manner had alienated potential allies in the news media 
and in Congress.  Her eyes and her husband’s lit up when they heard former Senator 
Paul Laxalt (R. Nev.), their close friend, suggest a considerably humbler Baker, who 
would soon be joking that his wife Joy was perpetually reminding him that “Ronald 
Reagan is the President and you are not.”  In the narrative that Professor Cohen 
continues, the fortunes of the Reagan Administration revived once Baker joined the 
President’s White House team.  Deeming himself the leader of the staff of the man 
who had been elected President as opposed to serving as a “prime minister” as Regan 
had done, Baker saw his principal duties as restoring credibility to a White House 
that had been devastated by the Iran-Contra debacle and then, as Baker’s deputy 
Kenneth Duberstein put it, giving “Reagan reality.”  Immediately, Baker prompted 
Reagan to come clean about his own role in the Iran-Contra matter and to furnish 
all relevant documents to congressional committees and to the special counsel who 
had  been appointed to investigate the matter.  In liquidating this distraction, Baker 
allowed Reagan what the influential GOP operative Tom Korologos called the 
4 The White House Crisis:  The Three Panel Members Give Their Views; Excerpts from the Tower Commission’s 
News Conference, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1987, at A8.
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luxury of a “third term.”5
 Even so, Howard Baker would be the first to concede that not all went as 
planned on his watch as chief of staff, with the prime example being the Senate’s 
rejection of Reagan nominee Robert Bork for the seat on the Supreme Court of 
the United States that had been vacated by Justice Lewis Powell.  After a second 
nominee, Douglas Ginsburg, was forced to ask that his nomination be withdrawn, 
the Senate eventually confirmed a more moderate conservative jurist, Anthony 
Kennedy, to succeed Powell.  In a well-argued presentation, Princeton University 
political scientist Keith Whittington points out that the rejection of Bork continues 
to have ramifications even today.  The Senate’s rejection of Bork not only resulted 
in interest groups’ handling of future Supreme Court confirmation battles as the 
functional equivalent of political campaigns for elective office, but also effectively 
resulted in the elevation to the Court of a moderate justice who today holds the 
crucial “swing vote” that at times he casts with the Court’s four more liberal justices 
and that at other times he casts with the four more conservative justices led by 
Chief Justice John Roberts.
 Howard Baker has a more obscure connection with the Supreme Court as 
well.  In the fall of 1971, President Richard Nixon had Attorney General John 
Mitchell offer Senator Baker the seat on the Court that eventually went to William 
Rehnquist.  Baker contemplated the offer and determined, after having met with 
Justice Potter Stewart, that he would prefer to remain in the Senate but that he 
would be willing to accept the nomination out of loyalty to Nixon if that was what 
the President wanted.  Aware that Nixon had changed his mind, Mitchell suggested 
to Baker that it was best for all parties if Rehnquist were chosen.  In a fascinating 
counterfactual essay, George Washington University law professor Jeffrey Rosen, 
the astute Supreme Court correspondent for The New Republic, speculates as to 
how history might have changed had Baker assumed the seat on the Court rather 
than Rehnquist.  What has to be pointed out, however, is that Baker subsequently 
has often said that had he taken the seat, he would have resigned after a few years 
as a result of sheer boredom.  Funeral homes, he later told Orrin Hatch, “are livelier 
than the Court.”6
 Still, what is most likely to define Baker’s place in the histories penned in 
future decades, even centuries, is his performance as vice chairman of the Senate 
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, popularly known as the 
Watergate Committee.  From this perch, he focused all inquiries at the time (and 
many that were raised in the future) with his oft-repeated question:  “What did the 
5 The New York Times, The Tower Commission Report xiii, xviii (1987); Interview by J. Lee Annis, 
Jr., with Kenneth Duberstein (Oct. 26, 1992); Douglas Harbrecht & Richard Fly, With Baker Leaving the White 
House, It’s Over Before It’s Over, Bus. Wk., June 27, 1988, at 41.
6 J. Lee Annis, Jr., Howard Baker: Conciliator in an Age of Crisis 52 (1995); see Howard H. 
Baker, Jr., No Margin for Error: America in the Eighties 21 (1980); Ethan Bronner, Battle for 
Justice: How the Bork Nomination Shook America 200 (1989).
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President know and when did he know it?”7  In the seminal address of the Baker 
Center conference, James Hamilton, the Committee’s deputy majority counsel, 
was quick to note that the preliminary work of the Committee began in a highly 
charged partisan atmosphere that resulted in at least one fistfight between majority 
and minority Committee staffers.  Yet, while there were some underlying tensions, 
Hamilton found that the panel conducted an exemplary congressional probe in 
that it spawned a bevy of reforms and provided a model of how to seek truth in 
a responsible, nonpartisan manner.  For this, he credited the partnership of the 
Committee’s chairman, Sam J. Ervin, and vice chairman, Howard Baker, their obvious 
mutual respect for one another, and their determination to run the Committee in a 
nonpartisan manner.  Echoing the view that Senator Ervin expounded in the first 
interview with him that this writer conducted for his biography of Senator Baker a 
generation ago, Hamilton noted that only one vote of the Committee was divided 
along party lines.  Moreover, the motion to subpoena nine White House tapes was 
made not by a Democratic member of the Committee but, rather, by Baker; it had 
not been a Democratic staffer but, rather, a Republican staffer, Donald Sanders, 
who posed the question behind the scenes that revealed the existence of those 
tapes; and it had been chief minority counsel Fred Thompson, not counsel for the 
majority, who posed that question in public.  Perhaps not going so far as Ervin, 
who once told Baker that he would “support him for President if he’d only run 
on the Democratic ticket,” Hamilton expressed his hope that Baker’s example in 
the Watergate Committee probe would influence even the most “shortsighted and 
reckless partisans on both sides of the aisle” to understand that the public interest 
was more important than any short-term political gain.8
7 Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972, Watergate and Related Activities, Phase I: Watergate Investigation, Bk. 
4: Hearings Before the S. Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 93rd Cong. 1467 (1973) (examination of 
John Dean by Senator Baker).  During his presentation at the Baker Center conference, James Hamilton declared 
that he understood that Baker’s immortal line had been fed to him by chief minority counsel, Fred D. Thompson. 
Yet Thompson in At That Point in Time, his memoir of the work of the Senate panel, maintains that Baker needed 
little help from staff in framing his questions.  Baker himself in a 1993 interview asserted that he had arrived at his 
line of inquiry after telling his press secretary at the time, Ron McMahan, that the panel had been “chasing rabbits” 
and that it needed to find the “central animal.”  Annis, supra note 6, at 68 (citing Interview of Howard H. Baker, 
Jr., on Capitol Notebook, May 30, 1993); Fred D. Thompson, At That Point in Time: The Inside Story of 
the Senate Watergate Committee 51 (1975).
8 Interview by J. Lee Annis, Jr., with Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (May 27, 1981).
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We Must Not Be Enemies:
Howard H. Baker, Jr., and the Role of Civility in Politics
Steven V. Roberts1
During his eighteen years in the United States Senate, Howard H. Baker, Jr., 
was known as the “Great Conciliator.”  In a capital poisoned by over-wrought and 
under-thought partisanship, it is hard to remember a time when “conciliator” was 
actually used as a compliment.  If he were running for re-election to the Senate today, 
Baker might be challenged in the Republican primary by a hard-right rival branding 
him a heretic for working with Democrats.  That is precisely why an examination 
of Baker’s career, and the premium importance he placed on civility, is so useful. 
He knew that compromise is not an act of betrayal, or a selling out of principles. 
Rather it is an essential part of public life.  The United States is a vast country, 
reflecting a wide range of ethnic, religious, racial, geographical, and economic 
interests.  Without civility, without a degree of tolerance for our differences, and 
without a decent respect for the institutions they serve and the values they share, 
Americans cannot govern themselves.  Without civility, Washington starts to 
resemble Baghdad or Bosnia.  The “city on a hill” becomes just another village in a 
valley, divided by sectarian strife and tribal rivalries.  To alter slightly the lyrics of 
an old Paul Simon song, “Where have you gone, Howard Baker?  A capital turns its 
lonely eyes to you . . . .”2
I have spent close to fifty years as a political reporter and college professor, 
and there are few figures in public life I admire more than Howard Baker.  He 
was already a two-term senator when I first started covering Congress for the New 
York Times in 1978, and three years later, when I was assigned to Capitol Hill full-
time, Baker was just taking over as majority leader.  He retired from the Senate 
after the election of 1984, but I hung around the Hill for two more years, before 
being transferred to the White House in early 1987.  Just a few months later, Baker 
became President Ronald Reagan’s chief of staff, and since he brought key members 
of his Congressional staff with him, I went from being the worst-connected to the 
best-connected reporter in the place, virtually over-night.  In many conversations 
with the senator over the years, one quality I remember most is his sense of humor 
(often directed at himself ), and I want to share two of my favorite Baker stories that 
I have re-told many times.
The first occurred early in his career.  One of his local supporters called in on 
election night and said, “Good news. You carried my county by,” say, “2,000 votes” 
(I don’t recall the exact figure or the county).  Baker replied, “That’s great, but I 
was hoping for 4,000 out of your county.”  The supporter paused and finally said, 
“Howard, I’ll call you back . . . .”  The second story I heard in Baker’s White House 
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office, right after Al Gore had announced his candidacy for president in 1987.   “I 
was thinking,” Baker told me, “that I should mark this day somehow.  I served in 
the Senate with Al’s father and have known this young man since he was a boy.  I 
thought about calling Al directly but then realized, I couldn’t do that on a White 
House phone.  I thought about calling his father, but Al Sr. talked too much.  So I 
called his mother, Pauline” (who was always known for her quick wit).  “Howard,” 
she said immediately, “I know why you’re calling me.  I’m the only Gore in town you 
can count on to keep her mouth shut.”
Humor was an essential ingredient in Baker’s leadership style, a point made by 
Trent Lott who served as Senate Republican leader in the late ‘90s.  Introducing 
Baker in 1998, at a convocation honoring his career, Lott put it this way:3
There is nothing in any political science textbook that explains the unique 
way that he led the Senate, but those who were part of it at the time 
remember.  They remember his cool and his patience, even under personal 
attack.  They remember how, seemingly nonchalant, he would let a policy 
battle rage for days on the Senate floor, with each Senator exercising fully 
their right to debate.  And then, when the voices calmed and the tempers 
died down, there would be an informal gathering in his office.  After a 
while, I am told, the anxious staffers outside would hear laughter, probably 
the result of an anecdote aptly timed to break the ice and bring about a 
civil consensus.
When Baker took the podium that evening and described his style in his own 
words, humanity was as important as humor:4
Very often in the course of my 18 years in the Senate, and especially in the 
last eight years as Republican Leader and then Majority Leader, I found 
myself engaged in fire-breathing, passionate debate with my fellow Senators 
over the great issues of the times: civil rights, Vietnam, environmental 
protection, Watergate, the Panama Canal, tax cuts, defense spending, the 
Middle East, relations with the Soviet Union, and dozens more.  But no 
sooner had the final word been spoken and the last vote taken than I would 
usually walk to the desk of my most recent antagonist, extend a hand of 
friendship, and solicit his support on the next issue for the following day.  
People may think we’re crazy when we do that.  Or perhaps they think 
our debates are fraudulent to begin with, if we can put our passion aside 
so quickly and embrace our adversaries so readily.  But we aren’t crazy and 
we aren’t frauds.  This ritual is as natural as breathing here in the Senate, 
and it is as important as anything that happens in Washington or in the 
country we serve, for that matter.  It signifies that, as Lincoln said, “We are 
not enemies but friends.  We must not be enemies.”
3 Address by Howard H. Baker, Jr., July 14, 1998, available at http://www.senate.gov/ artandhistory/history/
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Baker never treated his rivals as enemies, and he never denigrated Congress as 
a way of pandering to voters.  Today people run for Congress by tearing down the 
very institution they want to join, and then they wonder why its reputation is so 
dismal.  (In September 2011, only 13 per cent of Americans approved of the job 
Congress was doing, according to a survey of polling data by Real Clear Politics.5) 
Baker’s deep respect for Congress flowed in part from his family heritage.  His father, 
Howard H. Baker, Sr., served in Congress for  thirteen years until his death in 1964 
and in a great act of courage—and civility—refused to sign the Southern Manifesto 
of 1956 rejecting the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education.6  The 
younger Baker’s stepmother, Irene Bailey Baker, ran for the seat, finished out her 
late husband’s term, and then retired from Congress to become director of public 
welfare in Knoxville, Tennessee.  Baker’s first wife, Joy Dirksen, was the daughter of 
Sen. Everett Dirksen of Illinois, and their children might well be the only Americans 
in our entire history to have three grandparents who served in Congress.  After 
Joy’s death in 1993, Baker married Sen.  Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R. Kan.), the 
first woman elected to the Senate who did not succeed her husband into politics. 
Kassebaum, too, was a model of civility during her eighteen years in the Senate, 
working often with Democrats like Sen. Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts on 
health insurance legislation and foreign policy issues.
I know something about political families.  My father-in-law, Hale Boggs, 
served in the U. S. House of Representatives with the elder Baker, and, after his 
death in 1972, Hale was succeeded by my mother-in-law, Lindy Boggs.  Lindy’s 
maiden name was Claiborne and her ancestor, W. C. C. Claiborne, traveled from 
his home in Virginia as a teenager to serve as an enrolling clerk when the early 
Congresses met in New York and Philadelphia.  He aspired to a career in politics 
and planned to return to Virginia, but the clerk of the House, John J. Beckley, gave 
him some good advice:  Go to Tennessee; it’s the frontier.  Claiborne followed that 
advice and moved to Sullivan County in Tennessee in 1794 to start a law practice. 
He was appointed to the state’s supreme court in 1796, the year Tennessee became a 
state, and a year later was elected to Congress after the first House member elected 
from Tennessee, Andrew Jackson, resigned.  When the presidential election of 
1800 was thrown into the House, Claiborne helped elect Thomas Jefferson and 
as a reward was made governor of the Mississippi Territory in 1801.  In 1812, 
Claiborne was elected governor of the new state of Louisiana.  Claiborne County, 
Tennessee, is named for him.7  (So is my grandson, Claiborne Hill Hartman.)
This history gives me an unusual background for a political reporter.  I’ve lived 
inside a political family since 1966 and, as a result, I have a special appreciation for 
a life dedicated to public service.  John McCain used the phrase “Country First” 
as a campaign slogan, but Howard Baker lived by that motto, always putting the 
national interest above personal or partisan advantage. Two examples make this 
5 See http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/congressional_job_approval-903.html.
6 John Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day:  The Generation before the Civil Rights 
Movement in the South 622 (1995); see 102 Cong. Rec. 4459-60 (1956) (statement of Sen. George).
7 For a biographical profile of William Charles Cole Claiborne, see James W. Ely, Jr., & Theodore Brown, 
Jr., eds., Legal Papers of Andrew Jackson 363 (1987).
SPECIAL ISSUE ROBERTS 11
point clearly:  he helped bring a president of his own party to justice for the crimes 
of Watergate, and he guided the Panama Canal treaties through Congress over the 
steadfast opposition of Republican conservatives.  And he acted with such good 
humor and warm humanity that he was beloved on both sides of the aisle.  Here, 
for instance, is what Wikipedia8 has to say about his career:
Known in Washington, D.C. as the “Great Conciliator,” Baker is often 
regarded as one of the most successful senators in terms of brokering 
compromises, enacting legislation, and maintaining civility.  A story is 
sometimes told of a reporter telling a senior Democratic senator that 
privately, a plurality of his Democratic colleagues would vote for Baker for 
President of the United States.  The senator is reported to have replied, 
“You’re wrong.  He’d win a majority.”
Baker employed those talents as a “conciliator” after taking the job as President 
Reagan’s chief of staff.  I wrote a story for the New York Times in which Sen. Robert 
Byrd of West Virginia, the Democratic leader, called him an “excellent choice” who 
had a “good working relationship with those of us in the Senate.”9  A few weeks later, 
I wrote about Baker’s lobbying efforts to shore up the President’s veto of a highway 
spending bill.  After he convinced Sen. Bob Packwood (R. Ore.) to reverse his vote 
and to sustain the veto, Packwood explained how he had done it:  “Howard is not 
a pressure person. . . . He just said, ‘I hope you can help me,’ and that’s typical. . . . 
He’s a decent man trying to do a tough job under difficult circumstances. . . . And 
you like to help a friend if you can.”10  McCain added:  “People take Baker’s word, 
they believe him.”11  But it is also instructive to note that Baker did not last long 
in the job, a little over a year.  He and his staff quickly realized that Reagan was 
a very different political animal, far more eager for confrontation with Congress 
than they were, and they found themselves acting against all their instincts and 
experience.  I wrote about Baker that “he has acquired some painful bruises and 
disappointed some old friends in his first six months in office.”12  Republican Sen. 
Bill Cohen of Massachusetts told me, “Baker was brought in to calm the waters. 
. . . But underneath the surface, all the currents and conflicts are still there.”  A 
Republican strategist added,  “Howard was a charmed figure on Capitol Hill. . . . 
But now he’s in a situation where confrontation is inevitable, so of course it’s a little 
uncomfortable.  The first punch in the nose always hurts the worst.”13
I was a witness to one of those punches.  Reagan nominated Robert Bork to 
the U. S. Supreme Court in July of 1987, and as opposition mounted on Capitol 
Hill, Baker tried to ease tensions with his former colleagues.  But the White House 
8 Howard Baker, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Howard_Baker.
9 Steven V. Roberts,  President Termed Unready to Yield on Iran Arms Deal, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2,1987, at A10.
10 Steven V. Roberts,  How Baker Gets Help From His Friends in Congress, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1987, at A28.
11 Id.
12 Steven V. Roberts, Grumbles and Moans About Baker, N.Y. Times, Aug.13, 1987, at A22.
13 Id.
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speechwriting shop was stocked with true blue conservatives who loved Bork (and 
mistrusted Baker), and one day, when the president was traveling to New Jersey, the 
speechwriters did an end run around the chief of staff and released to the traveling 
press corps a red meat speech defending Bork.  Team Baker was so appalled that 
they pulled the speech back after it was distributed and substituted a hastily-written 
alternative that took a much milder line.  Reagan, who was an actor after all, read 
the conciliatory lines that were put in front of him.  I wrote about what happened 
next:14
President Reagan acknowledged today that Judge Robert H. Bork would 
almost certainly not win confirmation to the Supreme Court, but he vowed 
to appoint a new nominee who upsets Democrats ‘‘just as much’’ as Judge 
Bork did.
 The President’s off-the-cuff comment, at the end of a political speech 
to Republican contributors, upset a calculated strategy of conciliation 
toward Congress promoted by some of his aides.
 These aides rewrote another Presidential speech, given here earlier 
in the day to the New Jersey Chamber of Commerce, to tone down Mr. 
Reagan’s attacks on Judge Bork’s critics.  The change reflected a concern 
among some that if the President inflamed emotions in the Senate now, he 
could ‘‘poison the atmosphere’’ in the Capitol, as one put it, and hurt the 
chances of Mr. Reagan’s replacement for Judge Bork.
 But Mr. Reagan allowed his feelings to show in the nearby town of 
Whippany this afternoon when, at the conclusion of his speech to the 
Republicans, a woman in the audience called out, ‘‘We want Bork, too.’’
 The President snapped back:  ‘‘You want Bork.  So do I.’’
  He went on to describe the confirmation process conducted by 
Democrats in the Senate as ‘‘a political joke.’’  Urged on by a cheering 
audience, the President added, ‘‘If I have to appoint another one, I’ll try to 
find one that they’ll object to just as much as they did to this one.’’
Poof!  In one combative comment, Reagan torpedoed all of Baker’s peacemaking 
efforts.  The erosion of civility in Washington has many causes, and both parties 
must share the blame.  But the bitter fight over the Bork nomination—despite 
Baker’s best efforts to tone it down—stands as one of the key moments in the 
capital’s long, steady slide into its current state of partisan acrimony and ideological 
rigidity.  So, today, a sitting vice president feels free, on the floor of the Senate, 
to tell a senator from the other political party to perform a physical act that for 
14 Steven V. Roberts, Reagan Vows New Appointment As Upsetting to His Foes as Bork’s, N.Y. Times, Oct.14, 
1987, at A1.
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most of us is impossible.  A member of Congress interrupts a State of the Union 
address to shout at the President, “You lie!”  Almost one of five Americans chooses 
to believe—in the face of all evidence—that President Barack Obama is a Muslim, 
and they do not mean that as a compliment.  Republican candidates for president 
insist on questioning Obama’s eligibility for office and allege that he is shaped 
more by Kenyan values than by American values.  The Speaker of the House calls 
proponents of the president’s health care plan “un-American.”  One Democratic 
lawmaker accuses Republicans of wanting Americans to “die quickly,” and a party 
official authorizes a fund-raising letter that refers to Republican activists as “fire 
breathing Tea Party nut jobs.”  Robert Bixby, director of the Concord Coalition, 
which encourages a bipartisan approach to budget issues, described the current 
climate this way:  “Compromise is in very short supply—it just doesn’t exist.  It’s 
24-7 campaign mode, and the point of campaigns is not to come together.  It’s to 
beat the other side.”15
President Obama has talked often about the “erosion of civility,” perhaps 
because he has been the object of so much vitriolic derision.  At the National Prayer 
Breakfast in February, 2010, he went on at length:16
[W]e shouldn’t over-romanticize the past.  But there is a sense that 
something is different now; that something is broken; that those of us in 
Washington are not serving the people as well as we should.  At times, it 
seems like we’re unable to listen to one another; to have at once a serious 
and civil debate.  And this erosion of civility in the public square sows 
division and distrust among our citizens.  It poisons the well of public 
opinion.  It leaves each side little room to negotiate with the other.  It 
makes politics an all-or-nothing sport, where one side is either always right 
or always wrong when, in reality, neither side has a monopoly on truth.
I agree with the President that politics has become “an all-or-nothing sport” 
where only one gladiator can leave the arena alive.  Washington is not heeding 
the Lincolnian adage that Howard Baker loved to quote:  “We must not be 
enemies.”  New members come to Congress and say, “I cannot compromise, I have 
my principles.”  Well, there are 534 other elected representatives who also have 
principles, who also have voters to please and promises to keep and districts to 
reflect.  How can this vast and diverse nation govern itself effectively if everyone 
stands on principle and refuses to compromise?  If political rivals are viewed as 
infidels?  The answer is a simple one.  It cannot.  And the “Great Conciliator” knew 
that truth in his bones.  Today most members of Congress get up and go to work 
and ask one question:  How can I score political points today?  How can I screw 
the other guy and the other party?  Who is asking, as Howard Baker did when he 
15 William Douglas, Is Compromise Dead in DC?  Gang of Six’s Unraveling Suggests So Miami Herald, May 
18, 2011, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/05/18/v-fullstory/2223280/is-compromise-dead-in-
dc-gang.html.
16 Obama at National Prayer Breakfast:  The Transcript, Wash. Post, Feb. 4, 2010, available at http://voices.
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backed the Panama Canal Treaty, what is right for the country?  Who is asking, as 
Nancy Kassebaum did when she worked with Ted Kennedy on health insurance 
reform, how can I find a partner on the other side of the aisle to work with?  How 
can I get something done and share the credit?
Obama is certainly correct in saying we should not “over-romanticize the past.” 
I do not want to imply that once upon a time, there was a peaceable kingdom in 
Washington where Republican lions and Democratic lambs held hands on the Mall 
and sang “Kumbaya.”  Fierce partisanship has always been part of our politics and 
should be.  Voters want and deserve choices, and the two political parties represent 
different priorities and value systems.  When Rep. Joe Wilson (R. S.C.) yelled, “You 
lie!” to President Obama during his health-care speech before a joint session of 
Congress in 2009, at least he didn’t hit anybody with his cane. That did happen 
on the floor of the Senate in 1856, when Rep. Preston Brooks of South Carolina 
beat Sen.  Charles Sumner of Massachusetts so badly he almost killed him.  But 
the president is also right when he says things used to be different, and they were 
different not so long ago.
Former Sen. Evan Bayh (D. Ind.) decided to retire after two terms and wrote 
an article for the New York Times explaining his decision.  Here’s one passage that 
reinforces the president’s point:17
While romanticizing the Senate of yore would be a mistake, it was certainly 
better in my father’s time.  My father, Birch Bayh, represented Indiana in 
the Senate from 1963 to 1981.  A progressive, he nonetheless enjoyed 
many friendships with moderate Republicans and Southern Democrats.
One incident from his career vividly demonstrates how times have 
changed.  In 1968, when my father was running for re-election, Everett 
Dirksen, the Republican leader, approached him on the Senate floor, put 
his arm around my dad’s shoulder, and asked what he could do to help.  
This is unimaginable today.
Bayh is a Democrat, but remarkably similar feelings were expressed a few months 
later by a Republican, Sen. Susan M. Collins of Maine, who wrote her own essay on 
the same theme in the Washington Post:18
I don’t know who first described politics as the  “art of compromise,” but that 
maxim, to which I have always subscribed, seems woefully unfashionable 
today.  It’s a tough time to be a moderate in the U. S. Senate.  Sitting down 
with those on the opposite side of a debate, negotiating in good faith, 
attempting to reach a solution—such actions are now vilified by the hard-
liners on both sides of the aisle.  Too few want to achieve real solutions; too 
17 Evan Bayh, Why I’m Leaving the Senate,” N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/02/21/opinion/21bayh.html.
18 Susan M. Collins, Why divided government would be less divisive, Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 2010, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/08/AR2010100802663.html.
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many would rather draw sharp distinctions and score political points, even 
if that means neglecting the problems our country faces.
Gerald Ford also believed that “something is different now.”  When my father-in-
law, Hale Boggs, was the Democratic whip of the House in the 1960s, Ford, the 
House Republican leader, was one of his best friends.  Just before he died, Ford 
told my wife, Cokie Roberts, that he and Hale would often get in a cab together, go 
downtown to the National Press Club or some other forum, and debate the issues 
of the day.  The words were sharp, Ford said, the disagreements between them were 
real, but when the session was over, they’d go back to the Hill together and resume 
their relationship.  As Baker said, Boggs and Ford were not “crazy” and were not 
“frauds.”  Their mutual respect and affection was “as natural as breathing,” but that 
seldom happens today.
This is not just a question of comity or politeness (although both of those 
qualities are desperately needed and sorely missed.)  The relationships between 
Boggs and Ford, Kassebaum and Kennedy, Baker and dozens of Democrats, had 
very real and beneficial effects on the legislative process.  My favorite example is 
the Nunn-Lugar measure passed by Congress in 1992.  Senators Sam Nunn, a 
Georgia Democrat, and Richard Lugar, an Indiana Republican, co-sponsored a bill 
providing funds for the dismantling of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. 
There is no bigger threat to American security interests than the possibility of those 
devices falling into the hands of terrorists.  As a result of their joint effort, to cite 
just a few figures, more than 7,500 nuclear warheads have been destroyed and sixty 
sites secured.19  Civility and cooperation are not impossible.  It has happened before 
and it can happen again.  Nunn and Lugar prove that.  But, as Collins says, that 
sort of bipartisan cooperation today is “vilified by the hard-liners on both sides of 
the aisle.”  In fact, Lugar faces a primary challenge from a conservative opponent 
in 2012, in part because he helped Obama pass the START treaty with Moscow 
aimed at further reducing nuclear stockpiles.
I cherish a photo taken in 2001, after Congress enacted President George W. 
Bush’s landmark “No Child Left Behind” legislation.  The president was taking a 
victory lap, visiting different cities and thanking lawmakers who had helped him. 
Sitting next to Bush, smiling broadly and basking in his praise, was Sen. Edward M. 
Kennedy of Massachusetts.  Like Nunn-Lugar, this was an example of Democrats 
and Republicans working together on a common project of national significance. 
A similar effort occurred in 2005, when the “Gang of 14,” seven senators from 
each party, stepped in and defused a showdown over judicial nominations that 
threatened to car bomb the Senate.  “Our deal,” wrote Collins, a prime architect 
of the compromise, “restored trust and helped preserve the unique culture of the 
Senate.  It showed that the two parties could come together and reach an agreement 
in an atmosphere of mutual respect and good faith.  Oh, how times have changed.”20
Yes, they have.  Consider, for instance, what happened to two incumbent 
19 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nunn%E2%80%93Lugar_Cooperative_Threat_Reduction.
20 Collins, supra note 18.
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senators, Republican Bob Bennett of Utah and Democrat Blanche Lincoln of 
Arkansas, in 2010.  Bennett was a reliable conservative with impeccable credentials, 
his father had been a senator, and his grandfather and father-in-law both had served 
as president of the Mormon Church.  But he committed an unpardonable sin in the 
eyes of Tea Party activists in Utah:  he actually thought Democrats had heads and 
hearts and teamed with Sen. Ron Wyden, Democrat of Oregon, in co-authoring 
a health care reform bill.  He also voted (along with thirty-three other Senate 
Republicans) for the bank bailout bill that was signed into law in 2008 by that 
well-known liberal, George W. Bush.  In 2010, both acts of heresy were thrown in 
Bennett’s face during the Republican state convention in Utah, which denied him 
re-nomination to the Senate.  As a teary-eyed Bennett told the Associated Press 
after the vote, “The political atmosphere obviously has been toxic and it’s very clear 
that some of the votes that I have cast have added to the toxic environment.”21
Senator Lincoln committed a similar sin, angering orthodox liberals by 
opposing the idea of a public option in the health care debate by supporting 
President Bush’s tax cuts, and by voting like a senator from Arkansas, not New 
York or California.  Out-of-state activists and union bosses supported a primary 
challenge against Lincoln from Arkansas’ Lt. Gov. Bill Halter.  She barely survived 
the primary but suffered fatal wounds and lost badly in the general election.  In 
describing her defeat, the Associated Press summed up the dilemma facing many 
centrists in either party today: “Conservatives said Lincoln, who won her first two 
Senate elections comfortably, was too close to Obama, while liberals said she wasn’t 
loyal enough.”22
Why is Washington “broken,” in the president’s word?  What has caused this 
“erosion of civility”?  There are many interlocking reasons, but start with the one 
highlighted by the demise of Bennett and Lincoln.  The parties are becoming 
dangerously polarized, we are approaching in America a European model, with a 
liberal party called the Democrats and a conservative party called the Republicans. 
On Capitol Hill, the center is disappearing.  “Over the years,” former Senate 
Republican leader Trent Lott recently told the National Journal, “there is no 
question that the middle in the Senate has shrunk considerably.”  Statistics support 
Lott’s  assertion.  A massive study of voting records by Ronald Brownstein in the 
Journal23 turned up this stunning fact:  For only the second time in thirty years, 
since the Journal started keeping records, every Senate Democrat compiled a voting 
record that was more liberal than every Republican.  Nebraska’s Ben Nelson, the 
Senate’s most conservative Democrat, finished slightly to the left of the three 
most progressive Republicans, George Voinovich of Ohio (who had the luxury of 
retiring) and the two Maine women, Susan Collins and Olympia Snowe.  In other 
words, not a single senator posted a voting record that overlapped with the other 
party.  Not one.  Compare that record to 1982, when Howard Baker was majority 
21 Sen. Bob Bennett ousted at Utah GOP convention, USA Today, May 9, 2010, available at http://www.
usatoday.com/news/ politics/2010-05-08-bennett-loses-utah_N.htm.
22 John Boozman Defeats Blanche Lincoln in Arkansas Senate Race, Huffington Post, Nov. 3, 2010, available 
at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/02/john-boozman-defeats-blan_n_ 765862.html.
23 Ronald Brownstein, Pulling Apart, Nat’l J., Feb. 24, 2011.
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leader:  fully sixty Senators, three out of five, were in that middle ground.  That 
year, thirty-six Democrats were more conservative than the Senate’s most liberal 
Republican, Lowell Weicker of Connecticut, and twenty-four Republican senators 
voted more liberally than the most conservative Democrat in the Senate at the 
time, Edward Zorinsky of Nebraska.  The reason is clear:  the sharp decline of two 
distinguished traditions in American politics, conservative Southern Democrats 
and liberal Northern Republicans.
The Senate Democrats who voted to the right of Weicker included “New 
South” moderates like Sam Nunn of Georgia and David Boren of Oklahoma, old 
guard mossbacks like John Stennis of Mississippi and Harry Byrd of Virginia, even 
suburban centrists like Bill Bradley of New Jersey.  The Republicans in the Senate 
who voted to the left of Zorinsky included such distinguished New Englanders 
as Bill Cohen of Maine, Warren Rudman of New Hampshire, Robert Stafford of 
Vermont, and John Chafee of Rhode Island.  Those Southern and border state 
Democrats, like Blanche Lincoln, have been largely replaced by Republicans; even 
Richard Shelby of Alabama who was first elected as a Democrat in 1986 switched 
to the Republicans after 1994.  The disintegration of the Republican Party in the 
Northeast has been even more pronounced.  Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania 
felt so uncomfortable in an increasingly conservative Republican Party that he quit, 
became a Democrat, and then lost the primary in 2010.  Senator John Chafee’s son 
Lincoln, who succeeded his father in the Senate in 1999, also quit the Republican 
Party and was elected governor of Rhode Island as an independent.  Representative 
Mike Castle, a highly-regarded moderate during the eighteen years he represented 
Delaware in the House, was defeated in the Republican Senate primary in 2010 
by a Tea Party favorite, Christine O’Donnell, who then lost badly in the general 
election.
The same pattern has changed the complexion of the House.  In 1982, the 
National Journal reports, 344 congressmen occupied the middle ground between 
the most liberal Republican, Representative Claudine Schneider of Rhode 
Island, and the most conservative Democrat, Representative Larry McDonald of 
Georgia.  By 2010, that number had shriveled to only nine, and only one of them, 
Republican Representative Walter Jones of North Carolina (whose father had been 
a Democratic congressman) remained in office at the beginning of 2011.  Many 
Blue-Dog Democrats, moderates who counterbalanced the liberal leadership of 
former Speaker Nancy Pelosi, either retired or were defeated.  As the New York 
Times reported after the 2010 election, “Southern white Democrats in Congress 
have become as rare as a Dixie blizzard.”24  Vic Fazio, a former member of the 
Democratic House leadership, described the trend this way:  “The two parties 
increasingly are at polar opposites.”25
As a result, few lawmakers are left in either chamber to do the deals, to do 
the hard but essential legislative work that Susan Collins described as “[s]itting 
24 Campbell Robertson, White Democrats Lose More Ground in South, N.Y.Times, Nov. 6, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/07/us/07south.html.
25 Brownstein, supra note 23.
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down with those on the opposite side of an issue, . . . negotiating in good faith, and 
attempting to reach a solution.”26  What is maddening to many is that this extreme 
polarization in Congress does not represent the American people, who are far more 
centrist than their representatives.  In the 2008 election, only twenty-two per cent of 
voters called themselves liberals and thirty-four per cent identified as conservatives. 
By far the largest group, forty-four per cent, was self-described moderates.27 
Matthew Bennett, the head of Third Way, a centrist Democratic group, looks at 
those numbers and says that moderates “are the most underrepresented category of 
voters at the moment.”28 Jim Leach, a former Republican congressman from Iowa, 
made a similar point in a speech at St. Ambrose University in September 2010.29 
“Today, the great under-represented group is the American center,” he said.  “What 
is happening in Washington today is that people have no reason to compromise.  It 
is bizarre, the harshness of feeling out there.”30
The second reason for the decline of civility is linked to the first: congressional 
redistricting.  Yes, we saw a lot of seats change hands in 2010, and that’s healthy, 
but that was a huge wave election.  In normal years, incumbents are almost entirely 
insulated from any serious challenge.  Using high-powered computers, politicians 
draw district lines with such precision that most seats are entirely safe for one party 
or the other.  This perverts the essential nature of the House of Representatives.  By 
mandating the members to run every two years, the Founders wanted one chamber 
of Congress to be directly accountable to the voting public.  But if you don’t have 
to listen to the voters who disagree with you, if you are at no risk of losing, that 
accountability is lost.  In fact, for many lawmakers—House members and senators 
alike—their biggest threat often comes in the primary, from a rival who thinks the 
incumbent is not doctrinaire enough.  “There is more of a demand in each party for 
a degree of purity or inflexibility that was not there before,” says John Danforth, a 
former Republican senator from Missouri.  “You really need to toe the line. . . . That 
affects people’s thinking—both Democrats and Republicans.”31
It surely does affect their thinking.  Lawmakers look at what happened to 
Bennett and Lincoln and become more fearful of straying from the party line 
and reaching across the aisle.  One case study in intimidation is illustrative.  John 
McCain once posted the thirty-ninth most conservative voting record in the Senate. 
He joined with Democrat Russ Feingold of Wisconsin in reforming the federal 
26 Susan M. Collins, “Governing Across the Divide,” Remarks delivered by Sen. Susan M. Collins at the 2010 
Ignatius Program, Washington, D.C., Oct. 11, 2010, available at http://collins.senate.gov/public/continue.
cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.Articles&ContentRecord_id=9d6a1cce-802a-23ad-4f0d-f409fcba5ec1&Region_
id=&Issue_id=.
27 CNN National Exit Poll / President/ Vote by Ideology, Nov. 4, 2008, available at http://www.cnn.com/
ELECTION/2008/results/ polls/#val=USP00p1.
28 Brownstein, supra note 23.
29 Kurt Allemeier, Leach Bemoans Loss of Civility in Politics, Quad City Times, Sept. 25, 2010, available at 
http://qctimes.com/news/local/government-and-politics/article_01585c8a-c85c-11df-8dad-001cc4c03286.
html.
30 Id.
31 Brownstein, supra note 23.
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campaign finance laws and formed a strong working relationship with Senator 
Hillary Clinton of New York on foreign policy matters.  But as he ran for re-
election in 2010, McCain faced a strong challenge from a conservative opponent, 
former Congressman J. D. Hayworth, and his voting habits veered sharply to the 
right.  As a result, in the last Congress, McCain tied for the most conservative 
voting record among all Republican senators.32  And while McCain survived the 
Hayworth challenge, it is hard to imagine that he will return to the role of bipartisan 
dealmaker that he played for so long.
The third factor in the decline of civility in the Senate is the breakdown of 
an old custom, the refusal of lawmakers to campaign against their colleagues.  Ev 
Dirksen throwing his arm around Birch Bayh reflected a much deeper point about 
the nature of the Senate.  Personal relationships, of the kind that Baker cultivated 
so assiduously and successfully, are the threads that tie the institution together. 
When lawmakers campaign directly against each other, those relationships fray and 
fragment.  Susan Collins made that precise point in her Washington Post essay:33
When I was a freshman senator in 1997, Sen. John Chafee of Rhode Island, 
as fine a gentleman as has ever graced the Senate chamber, advised me never 
to campaign against those with whom I served.  The Senate is too small a 
place for that, he counseled.  Campaign for your fellow Republicans and 
go to states with open seats but do not campaign against your Democratic 
colleagues.  It will poison your relationship with them.
Back then, most senators followed the “Chafee rule,” but that soon changed.  
Now many enthusiastically campaign against their colleagues across the 
aisle. . . .
This year’s elections have shown just how far the destruction of collegiality 
has progressed, with some lawmakers campaigning against senators in 
their own caucus by endorsing their primary opponents.  Such personal 
campaign attacks have detrimental effects that last long after Election Day.
A fourth factor is both a cause and symptom of diminishing civility.  Leaders 
in both parties, and both chambers, increasingly use autocratic tactics to suffocate 
the voice of the minority.  As a result, resentment increases, trust decreases, and the 
gulf between the parties grows wider.  In the House, most bills are brought to the 
floor under “closed rules” that preclude amendments.  In the Senate, a particularly 
pernicious practice called “filling up the amendment tree” has the same effect.34 
32 Id.
33 Collins, supra note 18.
34 The amendment trees have developed over decades of practice in the Senate as a way of visualizing 
certain principles of precedence that govern the offering of, and voting on, amendments in that chamber.  
These principles of precedence are reflected in four charts published in Riddick’s Senate Procedure, 
the official compilation of Senate precedents.  The four Riddick charts depict the maximum number 
and type of amendments that may be offered to a bill and simultaneously pending under various 
circumstances during its consideration.  Which of the four charts will be applicable at a given point 
during consideration of a measure is dictated by the form of the first amendment that is offered . . . .
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Aggrieved minorities then resort to other tactics in retaliation.  In the Senate, the 
practice of secret “holds” allows a single member to bury bills and nominations 
without any public accountability.35  And the filibuster has become a routine part of 
Senate life, requiring the majority to get sixty votes for any measure of consequence.36 
According to one study, the number of filibusters mounted during the last Congress 
exceeded the number employed during the fifty years between World War I and the 
moon landing.37  Collins describes the dynamic at work today:38
During the past two years the minority party has been increasingly shut 
out of the discussion, even in the Senate which used to pride itself on being 
a bastion of free and open debate.  Procedural tactics are routinely used to 
prevent Republican amendments.  That causes Republicans to overuse the 
filibuster, because our only option is to stop a bill to which we cannot offer 
amendments.
[T]he same principles of precedence are often depicted in four line diagrams whose component 
parts resemble the trunk of a tree (representing the legislative measure being considered) with limbs 
(representing the various possible amendments to the measure) growing out from the trunk.  These 
diagrams are widely and colloquially referred to as “amendment trees.”
 
An amendment tree may be said to be “filled” when all of the possible amendments permitted by 
these principles of precedence have been offered and are pending. . . .
When an amendment tree is filled, the amendment process is, in effect, frozen—no additional floor 
amendments  may be offered to the measure until action is taken to dispose of one or more of the 
amendments that are already pending.
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Memorandum on Measures on Which Opportunities for Floor 
Amendment Were Limited by the Senate Majority Leader or His Designee Filling or Partially Filling the 
Amendment Tree: 1985-2010, Mar. 18, 2010, reprinted in Hearings on the Filibuster Before the Committee on Rules 
and Administration of the United States Senate, 111th Cong., 2d Sess. 223-224 (2010); see also Elizabeth Rybicki, 
Filling the Amendment Tree in the Senate, available at www.apsanet.org/~lss/Newsletter/jan2010/Rybick.pdf.
35 A “hold” is simply “a request by a Senator to his or her party leader to delay floor action on a measure or 
matter. It is up to the majority leader to decide whether, or for how long, he will honor a colleague’s hold.”  Walter 
J. Oleszek, “ ‘Holds’ in the Senate,” CRS Report No. 98-712 at ii (2008).  Holds are “a potent blocking device 
because they are linked to the Senate’s tradition of extended debate and unanimous consent agreements,” and 
because a hold requires no public utterance by any member of the Senate,  they are sometimes referred to as a “silent 
filibuster”  Id. at 1.
36 The filibuster has been described as” one of the Senate’s most characteristic procedural features.”  Richard S. 
Beth  et al., “Filibusters and Cloture in the Senate,” CRS Report No. RL30360 at i (Feb. 22, 2011).  Filibustering 
includes
any use of dilatory or obstructive tactics to block a measure by preventing it from coming to a vote.  
The possibility of filibusters exists because Senate rules place few limits on Senators’ rights and 
opportunities in the legislative process.  In particular, a Senator who seeks recognition usually has a 
right to the floor if no other Senator is speaking, and then may speak for as long as he or she wishes.  
Also, there is no motion by which a simple majority of the Senate can stop a debate and allow the 
Senate to vote in favor of an amendment, a bill or resolution, or any other debatable question. . . . .  
Senate Rule XXII, however, known as the ‘cloture rule,’ enables Senators to end a filibuster on any 
debatable matter the Senate is considering.  Sixteen Senators initiate this process by presenting a 
motion to end the debate.  . . .  [F]or most matters, it requires the votes of at least three-fifths of all 
Senators (normally 60 votes) to invoke cloture.”
Id.
37 Record Use of the Filibuster, Pol. Wire, Mar. 1, 2010, http://politicalwire.com/archives/ 2010/03/01/
record_use_of_the_ filibuster.html.
38 Collins, supra note 18.
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Collins is right but only up to a point.  Heavy-handed tactics by the Democratic 
leadership are not the only reason that use of the filibuster has exploded.  As I say, 
procedural warfare is both a symptom and a cause of incivility.  The underlying 
problem is the one identified by former Sen. Danforth when he decried the “degree 
of purity or inflexibility” demanded by both parties and their leaders.  In this climate, 
each battle becomes a jihad, a Holy War, and it is that sense of self-righteousness 
which justifies the use of procedural tactics that throttle the opposition.  Most days 
on Capitol Hill, few if any members are listening to President Obama’s warning 
that “neither side has a monopoly on truth.”  As a result Congress, at its worst, 
can resemble the Middle East, where the great curse is memory.  Everyone has a 
grievance, everyone has a grudge, everyone has martyrs to revere and myths to recite, 
and everyone blames the other side for starting the cycle of mistrust and reprisal.
There is a fifth reason for the decline of civility that does not get enough 
attention:  the increasing unwillingness of lawmakers to bring their families to 
Washington.  There are many causes for this trend.  For instance, many congressional 
spouses now have careers back home, air travel is easier and subsidized by Congress 
and Washington real estate is expensive.  But there is also the view, propounded 
mainly by conservatives, that Washington is an inherently evil and corrupting place, 
Gomorrah-on-the-Potomac, filled with special interests and influence peddlers and 
all manner of demons and dragons.  We saw this attitude on display during the 
midterm elections of 2010, when practically every candidate in both parties—even 
the incumbents—was running against the capital.  So, once they win their seats in 
Congress, many lawmakers don’t want to move their families to Washington.  And 
even if they do, they’re trapped by their own over-heated rhetoric.  How do you tell 
the folks back home that you actually want to live in Gomorrah and raise your kids 
there?
Ellen McCarthy grew up in Washington, the daughter of the late Sen. Eugene 
McCarthy of Minnesota.  As a senior staff member of the House Administration 
Committee, her job is to brief new legislators on life in the capital.  She always 
urges them to move their families to town, but most now spurn her advice.  In an 
interview that I did with her in 2009 for Bethesda Magazine,39 McCarthy said that 
this trend does “terrible things in terms of the fabric of Congress.”  Most members 
race back home every weekend and, therefore, “don’t spend any time with each other, 
they don’t get to know each other as people, and I think that’s a loss to the country.”
She’s right, it is a huge loss.  If, on the weekend, you  stand next to a congressional 
colleague  on a soccer field or sit next to him or her in church, are you less likely to 
vilify that colleague on the floor of Congress during the week?  The answer is clearly 
yes.  Evan Bayh emphasized this point in the farewell column that he wrote for the 
New York Times:40
When I was a boy, members of congress from both parties, along with their 
families, would routinely visit our home for dinner or the holidays.  This 
39 Steven V.  Roberts, Second Home, Bethesda Mag., Jan.-Feb. 2009, available at
http://www.bethesdamagazine.com/Bethesda-Magazine/January-February-2009/Second-Home/.
40 Bayh, supra note 17.
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type of social interaction hardly ever happens today and we are the poorer 
for it.  It is much harder to demonize someone when you know his family 
or have visited his home.
In 2010, more than 130 former members of Congress from both parties issued 
a statement decrying the loss of civility on Capitol Hill.  “Congress appears gripped 
by zero-sum game partisanship,” they wrote.  “The goal often seems to be more to 
devastate the other side (the enemy, no longer the honorable adversary) than to find 
common ground to solve problems, much less to have a spirited but civil debate 
about how to do so.”41  A leader of that effort, former Rep. Dave Skaggs of Colorado, 
told NPR that shifting living patterns were a major cause of rising animosity among 
lawmakers.  “Over the last 30 years or so, . . . the practice of a new member of 
Congress moving his or her family to Washington has really gone away,” he said. 
“When a member from one side of the aisle and another encountered each other 
with their young children in their arms—suddenly that became the commonality 
and the basis for getting along, and other things kind of became secondary, as they 
ought to be.”42
When my wife, Cokie, was growing up in Bethesda, in the house we still live in, 
one of her best friends was Libby Miller, the daughter of the late Rep. Bill Miller (R. 
N.Y.), who ran for vice president with Barry Goldwater in 1964.  Cokie’s dad was 
a Louisiana Democrat, Libby’s a New York Republican, but because the families 
lived near each other and sent their daughters to the same school, they got to know 
and like each other.  The Boggs’ next door neighbors were Ab and Sylvia Hermann, 
both prominent Republican officials.  But my father-in-law and Ab were great pals, 
they would walk through the neighborhood on warm nights and share a convivial 
beverage or two, and that relationship would never have been possible if Hale had 
kept his family back in New Orleans.  The Hermanns’ daughter, Jo Ann Emerson, 
is now a Republican member of Congress from Missouri, and, like Evan Bayh, she 
mourns the loss of relationships that only develop when political families live in 
Washington.  “There was so much more closeness among all members of Congress,” 
she told me.  “We did things socially, you hardly see any more of that anymore.”43
I cannot exempt my own profession.  The news media are partners in this 
process, the sixth reason for the decline in civility.  One of the great powers we have 
is who we give our microphones to, who we take seriously as sources and analysts. 
And all too often, we amplify the loudest, shrillest, most sensational voices around. 
We relish outsized personalities and colorful conflict and, therefore, increase the 
incentives for people to say outlandish things, because that’s the way they get 
noticed—and invited back.  There’s no better example than Donald Trump, who 
was always a reality TV star playing a presidential candidate.  Against all evidence 
to the contrary, Trump kept questioning whether Barack Obama had actually been 
41 Charles Pope, More than 130 retired lawmakers urge a return to civility in politics, Oregonian, Oct. 4, 2010, 
available at http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2010/10/ more_than_130_retired_lawmaker.html.
42 All Things Considered:  Civility War:  Ex-Congressmen Ask Peers to Play Nice, (NPR broadcast, Oct. 10, 
2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130472194.
43 Roberts, supra note 39.
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born in the United States.  For weeks he got so much media attention that he shot 
to the top of public opinion polls measuring possible Republican candidates for 
president.  And the White House, in exasperation, released Obama’s official birth 
certificate from Hawaii.
Trump’s candidacy was always a sham, a public-relations stunt that was 
designed to raise his visibility and boost audiences for his television program.  But 
the media went along because Trump produced eyeballs—for television programs 
and internet searches.  And eyeballs translate into advertising revenues.  Google 
has developed a metric for measuring how often users search for specific terms, 
and in a month-long period from mid-April to mid-May of 2011, Trump averaged 
thirty-seven in popularity on a scale of one to one hundred.  By comparison, Sarah 
Palin was at eleven during the same period and Mitt Romney at three.44  As Robert 
Lichter, director of the Center for Media and Public Affairs at George Mason 
University told USA Today, referring to Trump,  “He’s good copy. . . . There’s an 
unspoken collusion between journalists who are happy to have someone like this 
to sell papers and increase clicks and Trump [who is] happy to raise his image, 
which he leverages to make more money.”45  Trump’s prominence in news coverage 
came as no surprise to anyone who followed the 2010 elections.  According to the 
Project on Excellence in Journalism, the Republican candidate who received—by 
far—the most press attention was Christine O’Donnell, the Republican nominee 
for the Senate in Delaware.46  O’Donnell wound up losing badly in November, but 
she generated as much attention as Trump did and for the same reason:  she said 
outrageous things and thus attracted eyeballs to television outlets and Web sites.  In 
particular, she ran a commercial that began, “I am not a witch,” aimed at deflecting 
a previous admission that she had “dabbled into witchcraft” as a younger woman.47 
At a time when enormous issues were facing the country—a slumping economy, 
rising health-care costs, two foreign wars—it is an astounding indictment of the 
news media that they lavished so much attention on such a sideshow.
It’s actually worse than that.  The television shows (particularly those that air 
on cable) and Web sites don’t just focus on colorful but irrelevant characters like 
Trump and O’Donnell; they exaggerate conflict and over-simplify issues because 
they think that’s what the public wants.  Entertainment values often eclipse news 
judgment.  Hosts like Bill O’Reilly on the right and Chris Matthews on the left 
are more showmen than they are serious analysts; they have more in common with 
Jay Leno than they do with Jim Lehrer.  And according to the former members of 
Congress who issued the statement in 2010 on the subject, these shows contribute 
heavily to the deterioration of civil discourse.  “The divisive and mean-spirited 
44 Catalina Camia, Is Donald Trump the first Google trends candidate? USA Today, Apr. 20, 2011, available 
at http://content.usatoday.com/communities/onpolitics/post/2011/04/donald-trump-presidential-race-google-
trends-seo/1.
45 Id.
46 Pew Research Center, Project for Excellence in Journalism, The Midterms’ Media 
Mainstays, http://www.journalism.org/ numbers_report/midterms%E2%80%99_media_mainstays.
47 Dan Farber, Christine O’Donnell TV Ad:  “Im Not a Witch . . . I’m You,” CBS News Political 
Hotsheet, Oct. 4, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20018526-503544.html.
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way debate often occurs inside Congress is encouraged and repeated outside: on 
cable news shows, in blogs and in rallies,” they wrote.  “Members who far exceed 
the bounds of normal and respectful discourse are not viewed with shame but are 
lionized, treated as celebrities, rewarded with cable television appearances, and 
enlisted as magnets for campaign fund-raisers.”48
I know what they are talking about first-hand.  I used to do a lot of television 
interviews but grew increasingly uneasy with the whole scene.  Bookers would call 
me and say, “We’re thinking of doing a show on [fill in the topic].  What side are 
you on?”  If you said, as I did, that I was an analyst and had no side, they could not 
get off the phone fast enough.  Dr. Richard Land, a leading voice among evangelical 
Christians, recently told me the story of being called by a producer on the eve of a 
visit to the United States by the Pope.  Asked his view of the Holy Father, Land said 
that Pope Benedict XVI was a man of great spirituality who he admired greatly. 
Sorry, the producer responded, we’re looking for someone who will say the Pope is 
the head of a “false religion.”  Land was appalled but not surprised when the producer 
finally did find someone who would make that statement on the air.  Never mind 
that the guest reflected a tiny minority view among evangelical Christians.  His 
inflammatory words made “good TV,” and that’s what the producer wanted.
In my view, many of these cable shows have become the political equivalent of 
pro wrestling matches.  The world is divided into good guys and bad guys, and the 
staged fights are exaggerated for effect.  Some of the cable hosts might as well put 
on capes and masks and drop the pretense that they’re doing or saying anything that 
is remotely serious.  But they are having an impact on the loss of civility and the 
coarsening way in which Americans talk about politics.  During the 2010 campaign, 
for instance, I was addressing a luncheon hosted by a local radio station, and a beefy 
character grabbed the microphone and challenged me to say one good thing about 
Obama’s health care plan.  I replied that I was an analyst, not a partisan or defender 
of the plan, but that one argument made sense to me.  Sick people would seek 
medical care, and if they lacked insurance, they would go to emergency rooms, the 
most expensive form of care.  Since we taxpayers would ultimately get stuck with 
the bill for such emergency-room visits, it was in our “national interest” to provide 
health insurance for those people and thus reduce the financial drain that they place 
on the system.  “The national interest?” my questioner shot back.  “That sounds like 
fascism.”  Fascism?  Talk about a loss of civility.  But I knew where he had learned 
that language.  He had heard it countless times from Glenn Beck and other talk 
show hosts who toss around incendiary words for one simple reason:  to keep their 
audiences stirred up and tuned in.
The seventh and final reason for the loss of civility is the growth of outside 
interest groups.  Often in collaboration with aggressive and highly-partisan Web 
sites, these groups have become the guardians and enforcers of the “purity [and] 
inflexibility” that John Danforth warned about.  The case of Blanche Lincoln that 
I mentioned earlier is a perfect example of how this works.  Liberal blogger Jane 
Hamsher, the founder of FireDogLake, went on the Rachel Maddow Show on 
MSNBC, a platform for left-wing propaganda, and threatened Lincoln with a 
48 Pope, supra note 41.
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primary fight.49  Hamsher called Lincoln a “corporationist” who was “committed…
to whatever the insurance industry wanted that day” and insisted that “people 
on both sides of the aisle were sick of Lincoln’s cozy relationship with banks, 
insurance, drug companies and agribusiness.”  Hamsher then joined forces with 
Glenn Greenwald, a columnist at Slate.com, to form Accountability Now, a PAC 
devoted to purging Democrats who strayed from an orthodox liberal line.  And 
they made Lincoln their first target.  Anti-Lincoln forces garnered help from many 
sources:  left-leaning Web sites like the Huffington Post and Daily Kos, activists 
like the Progressive Change Campaign Committee, and unions that poured $10 
million into the campaign of Lincoln’s challenger, Bill Halter.  The senator fought 
back, saying her positions would not “be dictated by pressure from my political 
opponents, nor the liberal interest groups from outside Arkansas that threaten me 
with their money and their political opposition; the multitudes of e-mails and ads 
we have received, unbelievable types of threats about what they are going to do 
and how they are going to behave.”50  She failed.  She won the primary against 
Halter, but the battle left her broke and exhausted, and she lost in November to 
John Boozman, a strong Republican conservative.  The result:  one less centrist in 
the Senate, one fewer lawmaker willing to cross party lines, one more hardliner who 
only adds to the polarization of that body.
If anything, Republican interest groups are even more adamant in purging 
anyone who dares to deviate from party orthodoxy.  In the spring of 2011, their 
prime targets were two Republican senators who had joined the “Gang of Six” 
to negotiate with Democrats over a massive deficit-reduction package.  One key 
player was Grover Norquist, the president of Americans for Tax Reform, who 
insists that any Republican even mentioning new revenue should be burned at the 
political stake.  In an interview with National Review Online, a popular outlet for 
conservative views, he attacked Sen. Tom Coburn of Oklahoma for simply talking 
to the Democrats.  “Coburn is negotiating with President Obama’s best friend in 
the Senate, Dick Durbin,” Norquist fulminated.  “They are playing Coburn like 
a Stradivarius.  Durbin is walking him down into the alley where he is going to 
get mugged.”51  One can only imagine what Howard Baker would think of such 
language, but it worked.  Coburn eventually left the negotiations, and with him 
went virtually the last hope for a bipartisan solution to the debt crisis.  Sen. Saxby 
Chambliss of Georgia, the Republican leader of the Gang of Six, faced similar 
pressure from the right to abandon his attempts at bipartisanship.  Erick Erickson, 
a radio host in Chambliss’ home state, posted a column on his blog, RedState.com, 
saying, “There Is Time to Take Out Saxby Chambliss.”  Erickson explained to the 
Washington Post, “I get calls on my show on a daily basis that he’s stabbing us in the 
49 Jane Hamsher, How Blanche Lincoln Tempted Fate—And Lost, Huffington Post, May 19, 
2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jane-hamsher/how-blanche-lincoln-tempt_b_581820.html.
50 Jane Hamsher, Thanks, Blanche Lincoln!, FDL Action, Dec. 9, 2009, http://fdlaction.firedoglake.
com/2009/12/09/thanks-blanche-lincoln/.
51 Robert Costa, Norquist to Coburn:  Drop Out, Nat’l Rev. Online, Apr. 21, 2011, http://www.
nationalreview.com/corner/ 265416/norquist-coburn-drop-out-robert-costa.
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back—that he’s being Mr. Centrist instead of the conservative he says he is.”52  In 
the world of hyperventilating ideologues like Erickson and Hamsher, “Mr. Centrist” 
is probably the worst thing you can call anybody.  Talking across party lines is the 
equivalent of “stabbing us in the back.”
At a press conference after the midterm elections, President Obama raised the 
possibility that divided government could actually enhance civility and bipartisan 
cooperation:53
No one party will be able to dictate where we go from here.  We must find 
common ground in order to make progress on some uncommonly difficult 
challenges. . . . I do believe there is hope for civility.  I do believe that there 
is hope for progress and that’s because I believe in the resiliency of a nation 
that has bounced back from much worse than what it is going through 
right now.
The American people share the president’s hope.  In a study commissioned 
by the Center for Political Participation at Allegheny College in 2010, more than 
two-thirds of the study’s participants who were asked, “Which of the following 
best describes your view of the recent debate over health-care reform?” responded 
by saying that “Americans should be ashamed,” rather than proud, “of the way our 
elected officials dealt with the issue.”54  More than three out of four respondents 
(77%) “somewhat” or “strongly” agreed with the statement, “Right now, Washington 
is broken.”55  Daniel Shea, the director of the center, told USA Today:  “Americans 
believe in civility . . . and in compromise; they believe in middle-ground solutions.”56 
Yes, they do.  But it is hard to share the President’s optimism.  The forces polluting 
the air over Washington are stronger than the forces trying to clean it up.  If any 
leader, in either party, is serious about restoring a sense of civility to our public life, 
however, the role model for doing so is right there in front of them.  It is there in the 
life and work of Howard H. Baker, Jr., of Tennessee.
52 Philip Rucker & Lori Montgomery, ‘Gang of Six’ on Verge of Collapse as Republican Sen.  Coburn Withdraws 
Wash. Post, May 17, 2011.
53 Sam Stein, Obama Doubles Down on ‘Civility’ in Somber Post-Election Remarks, Huffington 
Post, Nov. 3, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/03/obama-doubles-down-on-civ_n_778380.
html.
54 Center for Political Participation, Allegheny College, Nastiness, Name-calling & 
Negativity:  The Allegheny College Survey of Civility and Compromise in American Politics 15, 
41 (2010), available at http://sitesmedia.s3.amazonaws.com/cpp/files/2010/04/ AlleghenyCollegeCivilityReport 
20102.pdf.
55 Id. at 23, 42.
56 Susan Page, USA fed up with political incivility, USA Today, Apr. 22, 2010, available at http://www.usatoday.
com/ news/washington/2010-04-21-civility-poll_N.htm.
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Howard Baker’s Leadership 
in the U.S. Senate:
Lessons in Persuasion, Civility, and Success
Wendy J. Schiller1
 Watching the U.S. Senate in recent years has been frequently frustrating.  It 
seems as though the 21st-century Senate has succumbed to unprecedented partisan 
warfare, gridlock, and bickering.  The leaders of the opposing parties in the Senate 
do not work together, and strong party organizations on both sides of the aisle 
stand as guards against any real hints of bipartisan cooperation.  The days when 
senators could just come to the floor and offer amendments are fast disappearing 
because the majority leader has learned to manipulate his privileges to the point 
of prohibiting amendments to most major legislation.2  Senate floor debates are 
designed for YouTube and summarized in 140 characters on Twitter.  The job of 
both party leaders in the Senate has become far more about message management 
and far less about legislative productivity.  The extent of obstruction by all members 
on any given bill has reached a point where senators are actually discussing the 
imposition of a limit on the right to filibuster.
 If one stands back a bit and reexamines history, however, one sees that the 
Senate has always been plagued by partisanship and unruly members who want to 
go their own way.  The job of a party leader—minority or majority—was to forge 
agreement either for or against legislation.  That much has not changed, but the 
goalpost for agreement seems to have been moved literally off the playing field.  Has 
the Senate really ceased to function, or is its current state of affairs due more to the 
decline of leadership itself?  I will argue that it is the latter and that if Americans 
want real change in the Senate, they need to look at the examples set by former 
Senate leaders, especially that of Senator Howard H. Baker (R. Tenn.).  To start, I 
begin with a discussion of the rules of the Senate.
Legislative Strategy:
The Rules of the Game in the Senate
 Unlike the House of Representatives, where the procedural design of the 
institution has evolved to give the majority party control over individual members 
and the minority party, the Senate grants each senator the right to speak on the 
chamber floor.3  Consequently, the Senate often operates as a mutual consent 
institution.  Senate leaders rely on unanimous consent agreements to structure 
floor action on legislation; the leader has to make deals with individual senators and 
1 Wendy J. Schiller is Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Brown University.
2 See Steven S. Smith, The Senate Syndrome, in The Brookings Institution,  Issues in Governance, No. 
35 (2010).
3 Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process 26-34 (8th ed. 2011).
28
constantly weigh the cost of such arrangements against the cost of cooperation.4 
Given the rules of the Senate, however, any senator can violate such an informal 
agreement at any time.  There are few, if any, guarantees that the majority leader 
can provide to one senator that every other senator will give up the same amount of 
power over a particular policy.  Since every senator can conceivably “defect” on any 
given bill, Senate leaders face a continuous collective action problem.  Individual 
senators look to party leadership to solve the ever-present collective action problems 
in the Senate and, for that purpose, will endure actions on the part of leadership 
that limit senators’ own individual rights on the floor.  The end result is that there 
are circumstances under which senators will settle for suboptimal policy outcomes 
in order for the collective group to accomplish a particular goal.
 The use of procedure by leadership varies with individual senators and with 
the conditions under which they operate.  In other words, entirely apart from 
their individual styles, leaders have more or less of an opportunity to be informal 
depending on certain conditions.  When leaders are in power with a president of 
their own party, and there is general agreement within their party on policy, then we 
should not see the use of restrictive floor procedures.  When leaders are in power 
with a same-party president and there is discord within the party, we should see 
leaders resort to restrictive floor procedures to advance the president’s agenda and 
more importantly, to demonstrate the capacity to govern as a majority party in the 
Senate.  The Democrats’ use of the reconciliation procedure to pass health-care 
reform in the 111th Congress serves as a recent illustration of how to use procedure 
to advance policy.  The degree to which party leaders will feel pressured to advance 
their president’s agenda is likely to vary with the overall perceived popularity of that 
president.  When party leaders work with a president of the opposing party, there 
is less incentive to impose restrictions on senators in their party.  In this scenario, 
opposition senators are more likely, ceteris paribus, to be united against a president 
who differs on policy matters.
 Party leaders do have unique floor powers, however, that enable them to run 
the business of the Senate.  The majority leader is recognized first, before all other 
senators; he has the right to bring a bill to the Senate floor; and he has the right to 
adjourn, recess, and open the Senate.5  Senate majority leaders are granted these 
special privileges in order to allow them to control and expedite Senate business. 
But they can also manipulate these privileges to structure the debate on a bill to the 
point where they can limit the individual powers of senators to amend and debate 
the bill.  Resorting to such a tactic can be risky in terms of future cooperation from 
senators.  A leader who frequently infringes on individual rights may subsequently 
face senators who retaliate by refusing to grant consent to pending business on the 
floor.
4  Id. at 21; Scott Ainsworth & Marcus Flathman, Unanimous Consent Agreements as Leadership Tools, 20 
Legis. Stud. Q. 177–95 (1995).
5 Floyd M. Riddick  & Alan S. Frumin,  Senate Procedure 1091-97 (1992).
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Leadership Enhancements:
the Evolution of the Senate Majority Leader’s 
Floor Powers
 The practice of granting first recognition to the majority party leader is not 
a written rule in the Senate but rather stems from the interpretation of Rule 
XIX, which governs Senate debate.  Senate Rule XIX(1)(a) provides, “When a 
Senator desires to speak, he shall rise and address the Presiding Officer, and shall 
not proceed until he is recognized, and the Presiding Officer shall recognize the 
Senator who shall first address him.”6  As Gerald Gamm and Steven Smith explain, 
the practice of first recognition was the culmination of tendencies to consolidate 
responsibility for managing the Senate, initially in the hands of a president pro 
tempore, who acted as chair, and then in the hands of party leaders.7  Until the late 
1930’s, the question of managing the Senate and floor recognition did not emerge 
as a particularly contentious issue because Rule XIX was generally observed, and 
first recognition of party leaders was used primarily in the morning and the evening 
to open and recess or adjourn the Senate.
 As the 1930’s ended, however, senators became increasingly embroiled in 
disputes over speaking rights on the floor and recognition practices.  This was 
particularly evident in the debates surrounding the anti-lynching bill in 1937.8  On 
August 11 of that year, after some attempts to attach the bill as an amendment to 
other legislation, Senator Robert F. Wagner (D. N.Y.) moved to proceed to the bill, 
despite the fact that the majority leader had already announced an ordered list of 
senators who were scheduled to be recognized in order to bring up legislation.  At 
that time, the Senate operated under the custom whereby senators who wished to 
speak made their desires known to their respective party leaders, each of whom kept 
a list and allocated time in advance.  The list was given to the presiding officer, who 
was expected to follow it.  Organizing floor time in this manner allowed senators 
to conduct other business, outside the chamber, and even outside the Senate, while 
retaining a guarantee of floor time.  When Majority Leader Alben W. Barkley (D. 
Ky.) pointed out that the time of the Senate had already been allocated, the chair 
(Vice President John Nance Garner) responded that despite the existence of a 
prearranged speaking list:
the Chair looked around and tried to find either one of the Senators 
referred to standing.  None was standing, but the Senator from New York 
[Mr. Wagner] was on his feet and demanding recognition.  That is the 
reason why the Chair could not recognize any other Senator.
. . . .
6 S. Rule XIX(1)(a); see U.S. Senate Rules Committee, Senate Manual:  Containing the Standing 
Rules, Orders, Laws & Resolutions Affecting the Business of the United States Senate, 106th 
Cong., S. Doc. No. 106-1, at 18 (1988).
7 Gerald Gamm & Steven S. Smith. Last Among Equals: The Presiding Officer and the Struggle for Order 
in the 19th Century Senate.  Paper presented at the Conference on Civility and Deliberation in the Senate, 
Washington D.C., 1999.
8 See 81 Cong. Rec., 8,694-97, 8,839 (1937).
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The Chair wants not only the Senator from Kentucky but the entire 
membership of the Senate to understand that it is the duty of the Chair, as 
he understands it in this body, differing from what it is in the other body, to 
recognize the Senator who is addressing the Chair. When three Senators 
are on their feet demanding recognition, the Chair has the privilege of 
choosing the one to recognize; but when only one Senator is standing and 
demanding recognition, the Chair has no choice.9
Just two days later, the chair  (again, Vice President Garner) went further in his 
clarification of the practice of recognition by making it clear that when any number 
of senators were seeking recognition, it would be the decision of the chair to 
recognize the majority and minority leaders prior to recognizing any other senator. 
Moreover, the chair would pay heed to a recommendation by the majority leader to 
recognize specific senators who were seeking time on the floor.  Although the chair 
retained the right to recognize senators, he acknowledged that deference might be 
paid to a floor leader in making the choice to recognize a specific senator.  Vice 
President Garner stated his reasoning as follows:
 The Chair recognized the Senator from Kentucky because he is the 
leader of the Democratic side of the Chamber.  He would recognize the 
Senator from Vermont [Mr. Austin], acting Republican leader, in the 
same way.  When the Senator from Kentucky yielded to the Senator from 
Nevada, the Senator from Nevada was on his feet.  Had the Senator from 
Kentucky informed the Chair that he wanted the Senator from Nevada 
to be recognized, as he was on his feet, the Chair would have recognized 
him.  So the procedure is the same.  The Chair would have recognized 
the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCarran] because the Senator from 
Kentucky had suggested to the Chair that he would like to have the 
Senator from Nevada recognized, and that Senator being on his feet and 
other Senators on their feet the Chair would have recognized the Senator 
from Nevada.  So the result is about the same.
 . . . .
 . . . The Senator from Wisconsin is absolutely correct that the Senator 
from Kentucky cannot farm out his time.  However, the Chair would have 
recognized the Senator from Nevada upon the suggestion of the Senator 
from Kentucky.10
This decision was not just a codification of more informal practices; it cemented the 
party leaders’ floor powers by giving them the right of first recognition whenever the 
Senate was in session, as well as the power to recommend the recognition of other 
9 81 Cong. Rec. 8,694 (1937).
10 81 Cong. Rec. 8,840 (1937).
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senators to the chair.
 Nearly eight years later, on July 17, 1945, a new dispute erupted about the 
keeping of the list and recognition to speak on the floor, and the chair, in the person 
of the Senate’s president pro tempore, Senator Kenneth D. McKellar (D. Tenn.), 
announced that he would use a strict interpretation of Rule XIX and no longer 
observe a prearranged list.11  On August 1, 1945, Senator James M. Mead (D. N.Y.) 
objected to the new interpretation on the ground that it concentrated too much 
power in the hands of the chair (and by implication, the majority party) at the 
expense of individual senators:
 Mr. President, in the interest of democratic rules . . . it occurs to me 
that we should go back to the practice which was in vogue here for a long 
time [of using a list].  To do otherwise . . . concentrates too much authority 
in one man to recognize a Senator or pass him up, an authority to pick 
out one Senator who happens to be in the Chamber, or one who has sat 
here patiently all day. . . . [W]e should spread rather than concentrate the 
authority in this body, so that a Senator, no matter that he be a member of 
the majority or the minority, or whether he comes from the largest State in 
the Union or the smallest State, may have an opportunity to participate on 
an equality with his fellow Members in this Chamber.12
The importance of these remarks is that they reflect concerns that the right of first 
recognition was becoming increasingly a majority party tool to control senators’ 
opportunities to be heard on the Senate floor.
 By 1960, senators’ determination to strictly follow Rule XIX waned in large 
part as a response to the increase in the scope of Senate business as well as increased 
time pressures on individual senators.  In response, senators’ returned to the use of 
a list as a way to govern floor time in the Senate.  In one instance, Senator Richard 
Russell (D. Ga.), after having put his name on the list but having been denied 
recognition, reiterated the point that precedent had been established which gave 
the majority and minority leaders preferential treatment with respect to recognition 
but that all other senators had equal rights to the floor.13
 In 1963, a more substantive fight over recognition occurred when the Senate 
was considering changes to the requirements for invoking cloture.  During a debate 
when the majority was trying to invoke cloture, Senator Jacob K. Javits (R. N.Y.) 
sought recognition to make a point of order, and the chair recognized Senator Mike 
Mansfield (D. Mont.), the majority leader, who, instead, promptly made a successful 
motion to adjourn.  Senator Javits brought the issue up several days later to make 
an objection that he should have been recognized to make his point of order before 
the majority leader made a motion to adjourn.  Vice President Lyndon Johnson had 
been in the chair throughout the debate and had recognized the majority leader 
11 91 Cong. Rec. 7,626 (1945).
12 91 Cong. Rec. 8,299-8,300 (1945).
13 106 Cong. Rec. 5,709 (1960). 
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above all other senators.  In his defense, Vice President Johnson pointed to the 
long-standing practice of recognizing the majority leader:
The Chair heard Senators from the Democratic side, and Senators 
from the Republican side, but the Chair felt that Senators from 
neither side had yet been raised to the stature of taking over the 
duties of the majority leader, and that the majority leader was 
entitled to recognition if seeking it.14
Of course, having served as majority leader himself, Johnson was vested in the 
practice of guaranteeing the majority leader’s right of first recognition, and in this 
case, he was aiding his own party.  Whatever his motivations, his ruling reinforced 
the power of the majority leader to retain control over speech making, and by 
extension, floor procedure in the Senate.
 These separate examples over a period of more than twenty-five years are 
designed to illustrate the relatively short evolution of a powerful right afforded to 
party leaders in the Senate.  The right of first recognition to party leaders arguably 
evolved out of a desire for a more managed and orderly Senate floor, and senators 
viewed it as a tool to manage the schedule of the Senate.  Over time, though, the 
right of first recognition to party leaders, notably the majority party leader, has 
evolved into a much more powerful tool than senators could have anticipated.
Context:  The Changing U.S. Senate
 Howard H. Baker, Jr., of Tennessee entered the Senate in 1967 at a time of 
social and political turmoil.  For Baker, who was in the Republican minority in the 
Senate led by his father-in-law, Senator Everett M. Dirksen (R. Ill.), politics was a 
family profession, with his father and step-mother both having served in Congress. 
Baker was fortunate to have an excellent role model and guide in Senator Dirksen, 
but more than that, he used his familiarity with politics to forge connections and 
friendships with senators on both sides of the aisle.  He first rose to national 
prominence during the Watergate hearings as an active but respectful inquisitor of 
President Richard Nixon’s role in the scandal.  That reputation—one of character, 
commitment, and honesty—would serve Baker very well through the remainder 
of his political life.  The remaining portion of this paper discusses Baker’s career 
as Senate minority and Senate majority leader and will illustrate the ways he used 
the floor setting powers previously discussed to try and advance his personal and 
partisan policy goals.
Taking the Reins:
Baker as Senate Minority Leader, 1976-1980
 When Howard Baker was elected Republican leader in late 1976, it was not 
his first attempt at winning a party office.  In both 1969 and 1971, he challenged 
Senator Hugh Scott (R. Penn.) for the minority leader position and narrowly lost 
14 109 Cong. Rec. 2,094 (1963).
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each time.15  The 1976 contest for leadership against Senator Robert Griffin (R. 
Mich.) was just as close, with Baker emerging the victor by just one vote.  At the 
time, Baker’s victory was attributed to his appeal as a public spokesperson for the 
party in the Senate.  During his time as minority leader, the Republicans were 
laboring under a significant numerical deficit; in the 95th Congress (1977-1979) 
there were 61 Democrats and 38 Republicans, with Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia 
serving as an Independent Democrat.  In the 96th Congress (1979-1981), there 
were 58 Democrats and 41 Republicans, with Senator Harry Byrd maintaining his 
status as an Independent Democrat.
 Robert Peabody has outlined five jobs that the minority leader performs:
(1) coordinating the organizational components of the Senate 
Republican Party;
(2) cooperating with the majority leader on the scheduling of 
legislation;
(3) implementing, modifying, and occasionally thwarting the 
programs of the majority party;
(4) contributing to policy innovation; and
(5) working to convert his party from a minority to a majority.16
The minority leader still has a job to do as an individual senator, including fulfilling 
committee obligations, and Senator Baker sat on the Environment and Public 
Works Committee, the Commerce Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, 
and the Committee on Rules and Administration.
 One could make the strong argument that starting during the Clinton 
Presidency, and continuing ever since, the minority party leadership in the Senate 
focuses on only a subset of those activities, namely thwarting the majority party’s 
policy program and trying to regain majority control of the chamber.  The elections 
of 2010 showed that this strategy can pay off for the minority party, which gained 
five seats in the Senate, narrowing the Democratic control of the chamber to a 
margin of 51-47, with one Independent Democrat and one Independent, each of 
whom caucus with the Democrats.
 Still, there are lessons to be learned from how Howard Baker handled the wider 
range of minority leadership responsibilities, especially in choices to cooperate 
and oppose major legislation during his time as minority leader.  For example, 
he supported the Panama Canal Treaty but only after he had played a key role in 
crafting some of its provisions and only after he had consulted with almost all of 
his Republican colleagues.  At the time, James “Scotty” Reston wrote, in a column in 
The New York Times, that:
Howard Baker of Tennessee is a serious man who knows all the cards in 
the political deck.  All he has to do now is shuffle them and decide how to 
15 Robert L. Peabody, Senate Party Leadership:  From the 1950’s to the 1980’s in Understanding 
Congressional Leadership 81 (Frank H. Mackaman ed., 1981).
16 Id. at  83.
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play his hand.  It will not be easy, but he is the most prominent of the new 
generation of Republican presidential hopefuls, and how he deals with this 
question of Panama may very well influence what happens not only to the 
treaty, but what happens to him at the Republican Presidential nominating 
convention of 1980.17
 As minority leader, dealing with an opposite party president, Baker engaged 
in a high level of diplomatic negotiations both in the Senate and directly with the 
Panamanian leader, General Omar Torrijos, to craft an agreement that would pass 
the Senate.  Baker’s influence on the Senate’s ratification of this treaty was compared 
to that of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R. Mass.) on the Senate’s rejection of the 
League of Nations treaty in the early part of the twentieth century.
 The Panama Canal Treaty (PCT) was ratified in two parts:  the Canal Treaty 
was ratified in March 1978 by a vote of 68 to 32, and the Neutrality Treaty was 
ratified by the Senate in April 1978 by a vote of 68 to 32.18  Senator Baker was 
given considerable credit for this narrow victory because of his support for the 
PCT.  The New York Times ran a story with a subheading that read, “His victory 
was in displaying that he could do more than oppose.”  He was also singled out for 
being willing to work closely with the then-Senate majority leader, Robert Byrd (D. 
W. Va.).  In his article for the Times, Adam Clymer wrote that:
Mr. Baker’s role with Mr. Byrd in shaping the leadership amendments to 
the treaties provided a shield for other senators. Without him, as both 
leader and as lightning rod, at least five of the sixteen of the Republican 
senators who voted “aye” on Thursday would almost surely have been in 
opposition.” 19
The Panama Canal Treaty illustrated the way that Baker handled his job not only 
as party leader, but also national leader.  He believed in the merits of the treaty and 
successfully persuaded at least some of his fellow Republicans that it was in the 
national interest to approve it.
 The only visible distraction from his leadership role in the Senate for Howard 
Baker came when he decided to seek the Republican Party nomination for president 
in 1980.  He faced a crowded field, with Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush 
also vying for the nomination, and he was not viewed by the increasingly active 
conservative wing of the party as one of them.  Baker’s support of the Panama 
Canal Treaty and his opposition to a constitutional ban on abortion denied him 
the opportunity to win support from this group of Republican voters.  Baker came 
in third in both Iowa and New Hampshire, and he announced that he was ending 
his presidential bid on March 6, 1980.
 Baker returned to the Senate and picked up right where he left off, after the late 
17 James B. Reston, Baker and Panama, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1978, at D19.
18 For a video report on this vote, see http://abcnews.go.com/Archives/video/panama-canal-
treaty-1978-9920775.
19 Adam Clymer, Baker “Won” on Canal Treaty, but Not Big, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1978, at E4.
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Senator Ted Stevens (R. Alaska) had served as acting minority leader in his absence. 
As the year progressed, Baker worked hard to capitalize on the growing national 
support for Republicans to ensure that it would translate into Senate campaign 
victories.  As it became more probable that the Republicans would take control of 
the Senate in 1980, fueled by a new crop of more conservative Republican senators, 
Baker and Byrd each recognized that the window of opportunity for cooperation 
on controversial issues was rapidly closing.
Republican Ascendancy:
Baker as Senate Majority Leader, 1980-1984
 When Howard Baker assumed the mantle of Senate leadership in 1981, 
alongside a newly elected Republican president, he had already set the stage for 
party unity among Republicans. Between 1977 and 1980, Republican Party unity 
averaged 70 percent with a steady increase as the 1980 election year approached.20 
Senator Baker had spent the prior four years as minority leader cultivating 
relationships with his colleagues.  He was selected as majority leader by his 
colleagues because they were familiar with his persuasive and consensus approach 
to leadership.21  Having shared the experience of being in the minority with these 
senators for most, if not all, of their careers, Majority Leader Baker used the fact 
that the Republicans had regained the Senate after having spent two decades in the 
minority to emphasize the importance of governing as a majority.22
 As skilled as Baker would turn out to be, the senatorial landscape that existed 
in early 1981 was not without dangerous obstacles to party unity.  Think for 
a minute about reconciling the views represented within a political party in the 
Senate that included Ted Stevens, Jesse Helms, Strom Thurmond, John Chafee, 
Lowell Weicker, John Heinz, and Mark Hatfield, and adding Dan Quayle, Charles 
Grassley, Al D’Amato, and Arlen Specter, among others.  In 1981, there was a much 
wider spectrum of ideology and policy preference in that Republican Party than 
exists today, with no shortage of strong personalities.
 As the new majority leader, Baker had the distinct advantage of coming to 
power with a very popular president and eighteen freshmen senators of his own 
party.  The challenge for Baker was that many of these new Republican senators 
were much more conservative than he was, as was President Reagan.  In addition, 
the same groups that had worked against Baker in the presidential primaries, e.g., 
the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), did not view 
him be one of them, and Paul Weyrich, who had quickly emerged as a key player 
in Republican politics, urged Republican senators not to elect Baker as majority 
leader.  When Weyrich was quoted as saying that Baker was “a roll-over-and-play-
dead-type leader,” Baker responded by saying, “If they think Howard Baker’s going 
20 Roger H. Davidson, Senate Leaders: Janitors for an Untidy Chamber, in Larry Dodd & Bruce Oppenheimer, 
Congress Reconsidered 247 (Fig. 10-2) (3d ed. 1985).
21 Bill Keller, GOP Tennessean Likely to Lead Senate: Baker Expected to be New Majority Leader, Cong. Q. 
Wkly. Rep., Nov. 8, 1980, at 3304.
22 Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The Emergence of a Senate Leader 48-57 (1991).
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to roll over and play dead for them, they’re mistaken.”23
 Although these freshmen were more conservative than Baker, there were two 
reasons to expect that they might cooperate with him.  First, they were elected with 
President Reagan and perceived a connection between the success of his program 
and their own electoral fortunes.  Second, they were inexperienced and were most 
in need of leadership favors, e.g., good committee assignments.
  To the benefit of all senators, Baker made changes to how the Senate operated, 
bringing more predictability and transparency to the Senate schedule.  A firm 
schedule and somewhat reduced Senate workload would allow senators to engage 
in fundraising and trips back home to shore up their reelection prospects.  A 
disproportionate number of Republicans came from the Midwest and western 
states, so these changes were especially important to them in terms of advance 
travel planning.  He also was careful to try to resolve jurisdictional disputes across 
committees behind closed doors, so that key legislation could proceed without 
getting bogged down.  Committee chairs knew that their concerns would be heard, 
and all senators knew that although they might not win their battle every time, they 
believed they were treated fairly.  As Senator Orrin Hatch (R. Utah) put it several 
years later:  “The hallmark of his leadership has been fairness and consideration. 
You can rely on his word.”24
 Still, balancing a group of senators who had just regained the majority and 
who did not always agree on issues such as debt ceilings, tax cuts, school prayer, 
and abortion, and managing such a large freshman class was a significant test of 
leadership skills.
Carrying Presidential Water
 Just as his predecessor had done, Senator Baker assumed the post of majority 
leader with a same-party president, Ronald Reagan, who promised a new set of 
policies designed to limit the size of government and energize the economy.  As 
a majority leader with significant experience, Senator Baker played a key role in 
recommending that the president focus primarily on economic issues and not get 
sidetracked by social or moral issues in the early part of his presidency.  He also 
provided an invaluable link to the president by informing him where members 
of the party stood on issues.  As majority leader, Baker had control over the 
Senate schedule, and he could ensure that key pieces of legislation made it to the 
Senate floor.  But he was not dictatorial, even though he had the greatest share of 
responsibility for enacting the president’s policy agenda.  Senator Baker was careful 
to consult regularly with committee chairs, as well as other influential Republican 
senators, about their agendas and policy preferences.25
 Given his strong position, Baker rarely resorted to the kind of severe procedural 
tactics, e.g., filling the amendment tree, that Senator Byrd had used as majority 
23 Keller, supra note 21, at 3304.
24 Diane Granat, Ruling Rambunctious Senate Proves to be Thorny Problem for Republican Leader Baker, Cong. 
Q. Wkly. Rep., July 16, 1983, at 1432.
25 Davidson, supra note 20, at 238-39.
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leader because he had created strong internal party unity.26  One reporter wrote 
that, under Baker, “the Senate has been transformed into a tightly knit unit that 
sees itself as only one platoon in a Republican army.”27  And Baker extended this 
governing style to his dealings with the Democrats and Senator Byrd, who was then 
minority leader.  According to Baker:
When I became Majority Leader I figured the best thing I could do was 
to try to strike a deal [with Senator Byrd] that neither of us would ever 
intentionally surprise the other, to which he readily agreed.  We never 
did—which made for a great personal relationship.28
 Senators Baker and Byrd did maintain a relatively peaceful coexistence.  During 
the years 1981 through 1984, there were few floor fights between the two men.  It 
was in Byrd’s interest to behave this way because of the political configuration of 
Congress and the Presidency.  Senator Byrd was in the minority in the Senate with 
a Republican president in the White House and a Democratic-controlled House of 
Representatives; if the Democratic House managed to pass legislation, Byrd needed 
to be in a position to bargain with Baker and the White House.  Antagonizing 
Baker would have compromised the probability of bipartisan cooperation.  For 
Byrd, the strategy was to protect the Senate minority, stall parts of the Republican 
agenda that Democrats opposed, and look for opportunities to form coalitions with 
the more moderate Republican senators in the majority.
 The end of 1981 brought a peak in Republican Party unity in the Senate, 
reaching 85 percent.  However, by the end of 1981, and escalating in 1982, the 
conservative flank of the Republican majority had become less cooperative.  It 
became more difficult for Senator Baker to rely on his considerable powers of 
persuasion.  Having successfully enacted President Reagan’s economic agenda, the 
conservatives wanted to enact their social agenda as well.  Moreover, individuals 
like Senator Jesse Helms (R. N.C.) took advantage of senatorial rights to offer 
amendments on abortion and school desegregation, which were so divisive that 
they threatened the underlying unity of the Republican Party in the Senate.  As 
Baker acknowledged, he had not done enough to stop senators like Helms:
I had hoped that we could do the president’s program . . . and 
then turn to a free-standing debate on these social issues . . . . That 
was my plan.  The president supported that plan.  But that hasn’t 
worked.29
26 Wendy J. Schiller, Trent Lott’s New Regime: Filling the Amendment Tree to Centralize Power in the U.S. 
Senate.  Paper  presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Sept. 2000).
27 Irwin Arieff, Abortion Fight: Taste of Things to Come?, Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep., Sept. 12, 1981, at 1745.
28 Letter from Howard H. Baker, Jr., to the author and Curtis Kelley, Governmental Studies Program, The 
Brookings Institution (May 5, 1993) (on file with the author).  The author and her colleague, Curtis Kelley, had 
written to Senator Baker to comment on his April 27, 1993, Washington Post Op-Ed commentary, entitled “Rule 
XXII: Don’t Kill It!” on the use of procedure in the Senate and to send him a draft Op-Ed article that they had 
written on the same subject.  For Baker’s Op-Ed commentary, see Howard H. Baker, Jr., Rule XXII: Don’t Kill It!, 
Wash. Post, Apr. 27, 1993, at A17.  Baker responded with a brief letter, cited here.
29 Arieff, supra note 27, at 1744.
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 Because the party was far less unified on these issues than they had been 
on economic issues, Majority Leader Baker found himself fighting controversial 
amendments and filibusters generated or threatened from within his own party. 
The majority of these contentious debates occurred on abortion, desegregation, and 
school prayer.  In 1981, Baker filed only one cloture motion against members of 
his own party, but just one year later, he filed eleven cloture motions,  ten of which 
were against members of his own party.  In 1983 and 1984, the number of cloture 
motions filed against Republicans alone dropped, but Baker found himself filing 
motions to stop bipartisan filibusters instead (see Table 1).
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Table 1
Levels of Activity by Senate Majority Leaders, 1981-1994
Majority Leader Amendments Cloture Motionsa Tabling Motions
Baker
1981 19 1 (1 R) 5 (2 R, 3 D)
1982 24 11 (10 R, 1 D) 17 (7 R, 10 D)
1983 22 9 (2 R, 5 RD, 2 D) 21 (9 R, 12 D)
1984 89 14 (1 R, 6 RD, 8 D) 15 (3 R, 12 D)
Dole
1985 55 10 (4 R, 3 RD, 3 D) 13 (4 R, 9 D)
1986 70 11 (2 R, 5 RD, 4 D) 1 (1 D)
Byrd
1987 73 12 (10 R, 2 RD) 1 (1 D)
1988 112 10 (9 R, 1 RD) 0
Mitchell
1989 24 6 (2 R, 4 RD) 2 (2 R)
1990 9 3 (3 R) 0
1991 25 7 (6 R, 1 R) 0
1992 7b 11 (9 R, 1 RD, 1 D) 0
1993 14 5 (5 R) 0
1994 21 3 (3 R) 0
__________________
a Duplicate cloture motions on the same bill were counted as 1 cloture motion to measure the number of filibusters, 
threatened filibusters, and general conflict on a single bill.  Numbers in parentheses are the motions listed according to the 
party affiliation(s) of the member(s) against whom they were filed.
b One of these amendments actually consisted of 192 minor amendments offered en bloc to a housing market reform 
bill.
Sources:  Congressional Record Index, 1981-1994; Congressional Record Daily Digest, 1981-1988; 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports, 1981-1994.
 Despite the discord within the party on social issues, the main focus of the 
Republicans, and President Reagan, was still on economic and budgetary issues. 
Because the economy remained the priority, Baker did not believe that the benefits of 
imposing restrictive floor procedures on his party outweighed the costs of derailing 
action on the economy.  In other words, social issues were simply not important 
enough to President Reagan, or to Baker, to risk future cooperation on issues 
that were more important, e.g., the budget.  And Baker was right in making this 
calculation; even in the most contentious moments of these later years, Republican 
Party unity remained around 80 percent during this time in large part as a result of 
his leadership skills.
 In fact, the strongest use of leadership prerogatives that Baker ever made was 
to limit the practice of observing the “hold.”  A hold is permitted by a custom, not a 
written rule of the Senate, and occurs when a senator raises an informal objection to 
the majority leader to the consideration of a bill on the Senate floor.  The majority 
leader keeps the identify of the objecting senator secret for a period of time to see if 
a compromise can be worked out to allow the bill to proceed.  Rather than allowing 
senators to casually obstruct major legislation in this way, Baker forced them to 
state their objections in person.
 Baker also eliminated the practice of stacking roll-call votes, even on separate 
measures, all on one or two days, which senators had liked because it allowed them 
to spend more time off the Senate floor.  Baker’s rationale was to keep back-to-
back roll-call votes on the same or related measures but to abandon such votes on 
unrelated matters because too often the Senate was empty when senators knew 
there would be no roll-call votes on a given day or on multiple days.
 As majority leader, Howard Baker also took advantage of his right of first 
recognition to offer a lot of amendments on behalf of his own party members and in 
some cases used that recognition to fill an amendment tree, but he did so only after 
amendments had been offered by other Republican or Democratic senators.  One 
example is the Fiscal Year 1985 Continuing Resolution.  Senator Byrd had offered his 
so-called “Grove City” initiative, a civil rights measure intended to overturn the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Grove City College v. Bell (1984)30 as an amendment to 
the Continuing Resolution, and Baker used his right of recognition to offer several 
subsequent “killer amendments” (anti-gun control, anti-busing, and tuition tax 
credits) to the Continuing Resolution on behalf of Senator Hatch.  Using this tactic 
is referred to as “offering killer amendments.”  A “killer amendment” is one that, 
if adopted, is expected to cause the underlying bill or amendment to fail because 
the content of the amendment is opposed by the supporters of the underlying bill 
or amendment.31  In this case, however, Baker’s tactics were not directed solely at 
30 465 U.S. 555 (1984).  In Grove City, the Supreme Court held that a  private college which did not receive 
any direct federal funding but a substantial number of whose students were the recipients of federally funded 
scholarships was subject to the anti-gender-discrimination requirements of Title IX of the Education Amendments 
of 1972.  Charles Tiefer, Congressional Practice and Procedure 514, 672 (1989); The 98th Congress: A 
Review, The Crisis, Dec. 1984, at 32.
31 See James M. Enelow & David H. Koehler, The Amendment in Legislative Strategy:  Sophisticated Voting in the 
U.S. Congress, 42 J. Pol. 396, 401 (1980); John D. Wilkerson, “Killer” Amendments in Congress, 93 Am. Pol. Sci. 
Rev. 535 (1999).
42 BAKER CENTER JOURNAL OF APPLIED PUBLIC POLICY
the minority party because the coalitions that had formed on the issue included 
members of both parties on each side.32
 As majority leader, Baker relied more on persuasion and informal compromise 
to run the Senate, but he was clearly not afraid to exert his leadership powers 
to streamline Senate business and enact his party’s policy agenda.  For example, 
when Baker took action on the hold, he considered it a prerogative of the leader to 
recognize or not recognize the hold; today, it seems that all senators view it as their 
individual right, not a privilege bestowed by the leadership.  In 2011, this was a major 
issue in the Senate, with proposals from several senators, notably Tom Udall (D. 
N.M.) and Claire McCaskill (D. Mo.), to do away with the “secret” hold altogether 
and return to a practice similar to the one Baker had imposed.33  At the start of 
the 112th Congress, the Senate agreed to limit the practice of allowing senators to 
put “secret” holds on bills; now, when they want to keep a bill from coming to the 
Senate floor, senators must publicly announce their intent to filibuster it.34  At the 
same time, in an effort to limit the number of filibusters and cloture votes, Majority 
Leader Harry Reid struck a deal with Minority Leader Mitch McConnell to stop 
the practice of filling the amendment tree (which Reid had used a record 44 times 
as majority leader) if McConnell would stop objecting to the consideration of bills 
on the Senate floor.  These sorts of compromises reflect the wisdom that Howard 
Baker brought to his tenure as majority leader more than thirty years ago in an 
effort to make the Senate a more productive institution.
Majority Leader as a Policy Initiator
 The role of the majority leader in times of unified government typically 
emphasizes a party agenda crafted in conjunction with the White House, so there 
is not much room for individual policy innovation.  Howard Baker recognized, 
however, that there were elements of Senate governance that should be changed, 
notably opening up the Senate to television cameras.  In 1981, two years after the 
House had decided to allow television cameras into its chamber,  Baker introduced 
S. Res. 20, a resolution allowing the Senate’s proceedings to be televised.  Baker’s 
rationale at the time was that, by adopting this change, the Senate would place more 
emphasis on quality deliberations and that senators would have a greater incentive 
to adhere to a schedule of legislative business.   Baker also believed that if the public 
could actually see what happened on the Senate floor, they would have more—not 
less—respect for elected officials.
 The majority leader, however, faced strong resistance on this question from his 
Senate colleagues.  Senators Russell Long (D. La.), who was ranking member of the 
Senate Finance Committee, and Minority Leader Byrd led the opposition and used 
the amendment procedure to attach specific rules changes that would set limits and 
32 See Cong. Rec. S27487-97 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1984).
33 Dan Friedman, Senate’s Returning Democrats Unanimously Favor Filibuster Reform, Nat’l. J., Dec. 22, 2010, 
available at http://nationaljournal.com/congress/senate-s-returning-democrats-unanimously-favor-filibuster-
reform-20101222?print=true.
34 Sean Lengell, Senate OKs Small Reforms to Filibuster, “Hold” Rules, Wash. Times, Jan. 27, 2011, available at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/27/senate-oks-small-reforms-to-filibuster-hold-rules/.
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conditions on the use of television in the Senate chamber.  Proposing rules changes 
to make televised coverage of the Senate’s proceedings possible was a clever strategy 
on the part of Long and Byrd because they relied on senators’ general resistance to 
rules changes to build a broader resistance to television in the Senate than would 
likely have been the case without such changes.35  The proposal to televise the Senate 
was brought up in 1982 and 1984, and a majority of Republicans in the Senate 
supported it each time, but a majority of the Senate’s Democrats opposed it, and 
it was successfully filibustered both times.  It was not until 1986 that the measure 
passed, which was two years after Senator Baker had left the Senate.  Ironically, 
it was Senator Byrd who became the chief proponent of the proposal after Baker 
left.  Byrd said that he changed his mind after having seen how much coverage the 
House received after it began televising its proceedings and that he did not want to 
see the Senate subsumed under the House mantle in the eyes of the public.
 In the twenty-five years since television came to the Senate, scholars and 
media experts could argue indefinitely about the medium’s impact on that body’s 
deliberations, on voter evaluations of the Senate, and on public policy making 
generally.  But in an age in which Americans can watch their government in action 
on their cell phones, television in the Senate makes government at least appear to be 
more accessible, even if in reality it may not be.  And Senator Howard Baker had the 
foresight and prescience to see how communications and politics were changing, as 
early as 1981.  He knew that the Senate could not maintain its position of power in 
the legislative branch, and the federal government more generally, if the institution 
resisted modernization.
Conclusion:
Lessons Learned from Howard Baker’s 
Leadership in the Senate
 There are a number of important lessons that leaders in the Republican and 
Democratic parties in the 112th Congress can learn from Howard Baker’s example.
(1) Tone down partisan rhetoric.
 The topic of political discourse has received new and intense attention after the 
attempted assassination in January 2011 of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords (D. 
Ariz.) and the death of six others who were attending a congressional town meeting 
with her.  Politicians, pundits, Washington observers, and the congresswoman 
herself had previously pointed out that the tenor of political discourse was nastier 
and more likely to incite violent activity than in prior decades.  Whether that is 
true or not is, of course, a matter of debate, but what is true is that Howard Baker 
succeeded as majority leader by setting an example of civility and open discussion 
that today’s congressional leaders would do well to emulate.  Notably, Senator Baker 
did not ever let his frustrations get personal, at least in public, and understanding 
how to draw the line between the political and the personal is increasingly a lost 
art in the Senate.  In Baker’s day, members of opposing parties would socialize in 
35 Randall L. Calvert & Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Strategy and Sophisticated Voting in the Senate, 56 J. Pol. 349-76 
(1994).
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some way, or perhaps lunch together in the Senate dining room, or work out in the 
congressional gym together.  Now, those interactions seldom occur, and the vast 
majority of the interactions among senators from opposing parties takes place on 
the floor or in committee, each of which is structured by partisan division.  The 
conventional view of the Senate today is that it simply does not work anymore or is 
ill-suited to the needs and demands of twenty-first century legislating.  Barring an 
unlikely reform in the structure of the Senate, through Constitutional amendment 
or internal rules changes, public confidence in the Senate as an institution may 
continue to decline, which poses a threat to the efficacy of members of that body on 
both sides of the aisle.
 Senate leaders can, however, take incremental steps to diffuse these intense 
partisan tensions, starting with the decisions like that of Senator Mitch McConnell 
(R. Ky.) in 2010 to abide by the “no compete clause.”  The Senate’s majority leader, 
Harry Reid, faced a tough reelection campaign in Nevada in 2010, running 
against a Tea Party/Republican candidate named Sharon Angle.  Despite calls for 
McConnell to travel to Nevada and actively campaign against Reid, he refused, 
citing the informal tradition whereby leaders do not actively campaign on behalf 
of their counterparts’ opponents.  Indeed, within recent memory, only one leader, 
Majority Leader Bill Frist (R. Tenn.), actively violated this norm when he went to 
South Dakota to campaign on behalf of the Republican Senate candidate in that 
state, John Thune, who went on to defeat the sitting Senate Minority Leader, Tom 
Daschle, in 2004.  McConnell’s step may seem trivial in the broader scheme of 
Senate relations, but it is an important symbolic gesture that follows in a Baker-like 
tradition of leading the Senate.
(2) Recognize federal legislative responsibilities.
 The spillover effects of the intensely partisan division that plagues the U.S. 
Senate today can be seen in the inability of the Congress to pass basic appropriations 
bills, and more recently, in the repeated struggles of the Congress to pass increases 
in the debt ceiling.  In 1981, Senator Baker had to work hard to persuade the more 
conservative members of his new majority party to support a bill to raise the debt 
ceiling, which essentially allows the federal government to borrow more money to 
fund its operations.  Newly elected conservatives had run on a platform of limited 
government and promised to cut spending, so voting for increasing the debt ceiling 
flew in the face of their campaign promises.  Baker nevertheless was successful 
in getting these senators to support their president, which was essential for both 
Baker and Reagan in the first year of Republican control of the Senate and the 
White House.36
 In the summer of 2011, Republican leaders in the House and Senate, especially 
the Speaker of the House, John Boehner (R. Ohio), faced similar challenges in terms 
of internal opposition to additional federal spending.  Republican members of the 
House and Senate who were elected in 2010 ran on clear platforms supporting 
spending reductions and a smaller federal government.  The key difference between 
2011 and thirty years ago was that the opponents of raising the debt ceiling did not 
36 Davidson, supra note 20, at 244.
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owe any allegiance to the sitting president, but they did face the same enormous 
pressure not to allow the government to default on its financial obligations.
 Indeed, the Senate minority leader, Mitch McConnell (R. Ky.), acknowledged 
that his party caucus members had to choose responsible governing over partisan 
politics when he stated that “we’re certainly not going to send a signal to the markets 
and to the American people that default is an option.”37  In order to get the most 
conservative members of his party to approve a debt ceiling increase, Senator 
McConnell worked with Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and Speaker Boehner 
to shepherd a deal that outlined a series of cuts to federal spending over ten years 
and created the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, which consisted of 
twelve members divided equally between the two parties and the two chambers. 
This deficit reduction committee was charged with the responsibility of specifying 
those cuts and was given a November 2011 deadline to arrive at a plan.  Absent any 
agreement, the cuts will go into effect automatically as of January 2013.  Ultimately, 
the deficit reduction committee failed in its mission, leaving the prospect of dramatic 
across the board spending cuts looming over Congress for the remainder of the 
112th Congress.  The failure of the deficit reduction committee also had spillover 
effects on the appropriations process; at the end of 2011, the Senate struggled to 
enact appropriations bills, separately and bundled, to fund the government for the 
remainder of FY 2012.
(3) Defend the power of the Senate in a separation-of-powers system.
 As majority leader, Howard Baker was highly cognizant of the dual 
responsibilities he had to govern effectively as the leader of the Republican Party 
in the Senate and to help enact President Reagan’s policy agenda.  In forging that 
path, Baker had to manage the internal expectations of members of his party, the 
president’s needs, and the desires of strong interest groups that exerted pressure on 
both the legislative and executive branches of government.  At the same time, he had 
to deal with an opposite-party House led by Speaker Tip O’Neill (D. Mass.), who 
was a forceful and outspoken advocate of the Democratic agenda.  In maintaining 
the focus on economic recovery on all sides, Baker managed to retain and enhance 
the influence of the Senate in the policy-making process, even while enacting parts 
of the president’s agenda.  His firm resistance to the more conservative social agenda 
put forth by party activists held internal division at bay for the first few years of his 
leadership tenure and enabled him to consolidate unity in his own party and to 
work more closely with Democrats in the Senate and the House.
 More broadly, by ensuring that the Senate was a functional and productive 
chamber, Baker avoided negative comparisons to the majority-driven House 
of Representatives.  Because the House is majority-centered, and there is little 
extensive debate on the House floor, the Senate is the chamber that is expected 
to discuss the pros and cons of legislation in more depth and give the public and 
the media a broader picture of what is included in legislation that comes before 
37 Lori Montgomery and Paul Kane.  McConnell Outlines New Proposal on Debt Ceiling, Wash. Post, July 12, 
2011. available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/debt-talks-show-growing-gap-between-
white-house-gop/2011/07/12/gIQAbKuiAI_story.html.
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it.  In that way, the Senate has the opportunity to portray itself as a deliberate 
and responsible chamber within the legislative branch of the federal government. 
Abusing the right of obstruction or employing convoluted parliamentary procedures 
has the effect of reducing the Senate to nothing more than a roadblock, rather than 
according the institution its rightful role as an equal partner in the crafting and 
debating of legislation.  The year 2011 produced far too much of this behavior from 
both party leaders in the Senate.  So much so that Senator Michael Bennett (D. 
Colo.) was driven to make a presentation on the Senate floor entitled “Congress 
Hits Rock Bottom” in which he argued that the failure to work together in the 
Senate to respond to voters’ basic needs was dissolving support for the Senate and 
the House.38  Perhaps then it is no coincidence that in 2011 Congress experienced 
some of its worst public approval ratings in its history; only 12 percent of the 
American public approved of its job performance.39
 As both minority and majority leader, Howard Baker recognized that the 
Senate’s influence in a separation-of-powers system with a bicameral legislature 
would be severely curtailed if it were viewed solely as an obstructionist institution. 
Modern leaders of the Senate should understand that the inability of the Senate 
to function as a deliberative chamber is something that can be remedied with a 
bipartisan effort.  For an excellent blueprint on how to accomplish that goal, they 
should study Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.’s record as a Senate leader and follow 
more closely in his footsteps.
38 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/16/senator-bennet-discusses-_n_1098230.html. Senator Bennett 
went on to say that the day had come when the Internal Revenue Service, an historically vilified federal agency, had an 
approval rating four times as high as Congress.
39 http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/congressional_job_approval-903.html.
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Justice Howard Baker
Jeffrey Rosen1
 Thank you so much.  It’s a great pleasure to be here in this distinguished 
company and an honor to address a fascinating counterfactual in American history: 
How would the Supreme Court of the United States have been different if Howard 
Baker, rather than William Rehnquist, had succeeded Justice John Marshall 
Harlan?  On October 19, 1971, Howard Baker was offered a Supreme Court seat 
by President Richard Nixon.  And on October 21, after having dithered for a day, 
Senator Baker decided to accept the seat, but by that time President Nixon had 
changed his mind and offered the nomination instead to William Rehnquist.  This 
is a good reminder of the importance of decisiveness, although Senator Baker was 
ambivalent about the offer from the beginning.
 I’d like to review the remarkable human story of Nixon’s search for a successor 
to Justices John Marshall Harlan and Hugo Black, who resigned at around the same 
time.  Like much in the Nixon White House, the story has an element of farce.  And 
after that, I want to think through with you how the Court and the country might 
have changed if Senator Baker had accepted Nixon’s offer one day earlier.
 The narrative that follows is taken from the definitive account of Nixon’s 
struggle to replace Harlan and Black, The Rehnquist Choice, by John Dean.  As Dean 
reports, Nixon considered no fewer than thirty-six candidates to fill the vacancies 
left by two retiring justices, Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan; they included 
Spiro Agnew, Robert Byrd, Arlen Specter, William French Smith, and Caspar 
Weinberger.  Initially, Nixon wanted to replace Justice Black with Representative 
Richard Poff, a moderate conservative from Virginia, whom Dean, then White 
House counsel, respected.  But Poff took himself out of the running because he 
feared the ensuing publicity would force him to tell his son, then 12, that he had been 
adopted.  (A few weeks after Poff withdrew, a newspaper column by muckraking 
Jack Anderson forced him to tell the boy anyway.)2
 As White House aides scrambled for candidates to replace Poff, Nixon made 
a determined effort to put the first woman on the Court.  He decided to nominate 
Mildred Lillie of the California Court of Appeals.  But the American Bar Association 
committee, led by Lawrence Walsh, rated Lillie not qualified, adding that she was 
probably as good as any of the women in America who could be considered.  This 
was 1971 after all.
 Dean wants to take the credit (and the blame) for being the first to float 
the name of William Rehnquist, then an assistant attorney general in charge 
of vetting the other Supreme Court candidates with whom Dean had worked 
when he himself had been an associate deputy attorney general.  But as the other 
1 Jeffrey Rosen is Professor of Law at The George Washington University Law School in Washington, D.C. 
He is the author of The Supreme Court:  The Personalities and Rivalries that Defined America (2007), The Most 
Democratic Branch:  How the Courts Serve America (2006), The Naked Crowd:  Reclaiming Security and Freedom in 
an Anxious Age (2004), and The Unwanted Gaze:  The Destruction of Privacy in America (2000) and serves as the 
legal affairs editor of The New Republic.
2 See Jeffrey Rosen, Renchburg’s the One, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 2001.
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candidacies collapsed, the man Nixon called ‘‘Renchburg’’ won his heart for his 
extreme conservatism and obvious ability.  Then finally, when Senator Howard 
Baker dithered one day too many before accepting the nomination, Nixon decided 
on Rehnquist, largely because he was the last person standing.
 That’s the outline of this great story, now let’s enjoy the details.  Here is the 
chronology.  On September 17, 1971, Justice Black announces he’s going to resign, 
and on September 23, Justice Harlan announces his own resignation.  On October 
2, Richard Poff withdraws from consideration.  On October 12, Nixon says he will 
announce his selection for both vacancies the following week.  On October 18, 
Attorney General John Mitchell asks Lewis Powell if he will accept Hugo Black’s 
seat, and on October 19, he asks Howard Baker if he will accept Harlan’s seat.  On 
October 20, Richard Moore convinces Nixon to consider Rehnquist, not Baker.  On 
October 21, Baker calls Mitchell back to accept the seat, but by that time, Nixon 
has changed his mind, withdraws the offer, and appoints Rehnquist instead.
 The first mention of Senator Baker occurs after Richard Poff ’s withdrawal 
on October 2, 1971.  Happy with the media reaction to Poff ’s withdrawal, Nixon 
and Mitchell agree that his replacement should be someone from the border states. 
“Baker,” says Nixon.  “No, I’m talking about [West Virginia’s Senator Robert] Byrd,” 
says Mitchell.  Nixon stresses that he wants to make clear to the Senate that “if you 
turn down one of our [Southern] congressmen, we’ll give them another.3
 So that is Baker’s entry into the game for the first time.  Then, on October 17, 
Leonard Garment, the White House counsel, gives Nixon a memo recommending 
two people, Howard Baker and Caspar Weinberger:  “In the case of Baker and 
Weinberger, you have personal knowledge of their intelligence, level of energy, 
ability to organize and present information and ideas, and argue a case.”4  Nixon is 
intrigued.  “Howard [Baker wouldn’t] be bad,” suggests the President’s chief of staff, 
H. R. Haldeman, and Nixon replies, “Howard would be fine,” although “he’s never 
going to be the leader in the Senate.”5
 As the conversation continues, Nixon has further praise for Baker.  Agreeing 
that Senator Byrd would “get the burn,” Nixon likes the fact that Baker is in his 
forties and says that “Howard is a fine individual. . . . he’s a very persuasive political 
guy and you know that Court is political as hell.  He’s a good leader.  He’d be a 
God damn persuasive judge.”  Nixon’s only hesitation about Baker is that the 
Republicans might lose a Senate seat.6  Still, he likes Garment’s idea, and the two 
men are basically agreed on the possibility of it, but Mitchell doesn’t know how 
Baker would react to an appointment.
 October 19 thus is the crucial day when Baker is offered the seat but hesitates 
before accepting it.  Nixon is convinced that the combination of two Southerners—
Nixon and Powell—would have a big political impact and assumes that because of 
senatorial comity, Baker would be confirmed.  But Nixon still doesn’t know much 
3 John W. Dean, The Rehnquist Choice:  The Untold Story of the Nixon Appointment that 
Redefined the Supreme Court 134 (2001).
4 Id. at 189.
5 Id. at 190.
6 Id. at 193.
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about Baker and wants to know how long he’s practiced law.  Someone tells Mitchell 
to get out the Congressional Directory.  Haldeman comes in with a Congressional 
Directory and reports that Baker is forty-five, went to the University of Tennessee 
College of Law, was in the Navy, and worked at a law firm in Knoxville.7  Satisfied 
with the response, Nixon dispatches Mitchell to tell Baker he is being considered 
for the Court.
 Nixon calls Mitchell, who reports that Baker is sitting in his office.  As soon 
as Baker leaves, Mitchell calls Nixon to report that “[w]e sort of knocked Howard 
off his feet with surprise” and that Baker is concerned about the justices’ low salary 
(then $60,000 a year), and also about his eyesight.8  Nixon instructs Mitchell to 
pursue Baker, nevertheless.
 By the next day, October 20, Baker has not called Mitchell back, to the 
Attorney General’s frustration.  Nixon, sympathetic to Baker’s financial concerns, 
suggests to Mitchell that “sixty thousand for the rest of his life, even these days . . . 
ain’t bad, huh?”9  After lunch, in the late afternoon, Nixon asks for the latest report, 
and Mitchell says that Baker still hasn’t called.  By this point, Nixon is becoming 
impatient with Baker’s dithering.  “He just can’t screw around forever.”10  A few 
minutes later, Richard Moore, a Nixon political aide, comes into Nixon’s office and 
talks up William Rehnquist.  Nixon assumes Baker will accept the nomination and 
likes the fact that he and Powell will be perceived as opposing busing, but he begins 
to have second thoughts about Baker in light of Moore’s advocacy of Rehnquist.  A 
few minutes later, Nixon talks to Mitchell, who reports that Baker is on an airplane 
coming back to the capital from Knoxville but hasn’t left word about why he left 
Washington or what his response will be.  “Maybe we leave him off the list,” says 
Nixon.  “I still think the Rehnquist thing is a damn good possibility, if he doesn’t 
go.”11  Then Nixon’s doubts overtake him.  “God damn it, Baker shouldn’t diddle us 
along like this,” he says.12
 By 7:40 that evening, Mitchell reports to the President that Howard Baker is 
coming to see him in a few minutes.  Nixon makes clear that he can still have the 
job if he wants it but that Mitchell shouldn’t push Baker.  Nixon also instructs him 
to find out whether Baker has any troubles that could explain his procrastinating. 
Just after 10 p.m., Mitchell calls Nixon again and reports that Baker has asked for 
more time to consult his family before making a final decision.
 That final delay proved to be fatal to his candidacy.  The following morning, at 
9:30 a.m., Mitchell reports to the President that “Baker wants to go.”  Nixon isn’t 
pleased.  “Well God damn it, sure you couldn’t talk him out of it, huh?”  Mitchell 
says Nixon can change his mind if he wants to go the other way.  After a long pause, 
seventeen seconds of silence, Nixon decides he wants to let Baker off the hook. 
7 Id. at 206.
8 Id. at 207-8.
9 Id. at 222.
10 Id. at 225.
11 Id. at 235.
12 Id. at 237.
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“Now do you think we are in a position of telling him no?  We just feel that under 
the political considerations that you’ve raised [about who his Senate replacement 
would be], Howard, are such that you shouldn’t go.”13  Mitchell agrees that this 
would allow Baker to maintain his dignity, and Nixon says, “I have a feeling I’m 
going to go the other way.”  Mitchell agrees to “turn Baker off ” and calls back a 
few minutes later to say that Baker has accepted the decision with good grace.  “I 
think it was with some relief, actually, on his part, but very warm and very gracious.” 
“Good,” replies Nixon.  Rehnquist is the nominee.14
 So that’s the story.  Let’s now think through the historical counterfactual:  How 
would the Court and the country have been different if Senator Baker had said yes 
one day earlier?  What would his judicial philosophy have been?  I gather that Senator 
Baker has not been interviewed on this subject—it would be a great contribution to 
history if he were—he might have served for forty years and might still be serving 
there today.  My hypothesis is that he would have been more in the mode of Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor than Rehnquist, more of a pragmatic conservative dedicated 
to states’ rights but also deferential to the political prerogatives of Congress and the 
president, showing a willingness to find middle ground and to compromise, rather 
than displaying the doctrinaire strict constructionism that Rehnquist was known 
for, especially in his earlier years on the Court.
 Think of the many cases over the past forty years that might have come out 
differently.  I’ve been told how committed Senator Baker was to enforcing Baker 
v. Carr,15 the Supreme Court’s great voting rights case.  I wonder if he would have 
voted on the other side of the Court’s 5-4 cases challenging congressional power, 
from the Lopez case,16 involving the gun free schools act, to the Morrison case,17 
striking down parts of the Violence Against Women Act, and how he might vote 
in the cases on the horizon involving health care reform and financial regulation. 
Would Baker have been on the other side of the Citizens United campaign finance 
case?18  The Senator knows how hard it is to achieve landmark bipartisan legislation, 
and, like O’Connor, he might have voted to uphold the McCain Feingold law.
 What about Bush v. Gore?19  There, Justice O’Connor was not inclined to 
compromises, although initially there was some wavering on the part of Justice 
Kennedy.  Senator Baker, perhaps, might have understood that this was arguably a 
political question.  His respect for congressional prerogatives might have led him to 
resist the Court’s taking the case at all.
 There are a series of cases raising issues that divide the Court today—racial 
preferences, for example.  It is not implausible to think that, given the Senator’s 
understanding of the challenges of civil rights enforcement and his deep 
13 Id. at 245.
14 Id. at 246.
15 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
16  U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
17  U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
18 Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. — (2010).
19 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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understanding of Southern politics, he might have been more sympathetic to local 
experimentation.
 On Roe v. Wade,20 I gather that Senator Baker has a deep respect for precedent, 
and I wouldn’t be surprised if he were with the plurality in Casey v. Planned 
Parenthood21 that upheld Roe v. Wade.  When it comes to partial-birth abortions, 
by contrast, he might have been sympathetic to Congress’s prerogatives to restrict 
late-term choice and protect early-term choice.
 In the simplest case, in all the cases that have switched from the liberal to the 
conservative direction with the replacement of Justice O’Connor by Justice Samuel 
A. Alito, Jr., they might have come out the other way if Senator Baker had been on 
the Court.  More broadly, though, how would conservative legal philosophy have 
been different if Baker had been on the Court?  There are several cross-cutting 
strains among conservative legal activists over the past thirty years—libertarian 
conservatives like Justice Kennedy, Tea Party conservatives like Justice Clarence 
Thomas, and pro-executive power conservatives like Justices Antonin Scalia and 
Alito and Chief Justice John Roberts, who favor national uniformity over states’ 
rights and tend to follow business interests.
 Where would Senator Baker fit in?  I imagine that although he might have 
shown some interest in federalism, like the pragmatic states’ rights advocates, 
Rehnquist and O’Connor, he would have been closer to the pro-executive power 
conservatives, more concerned about uniform national rules than about dismantling 
the New Deal.  With his concern for bipartisanship and precedent, he would have 
been suspicious of efforts to strike down the regulatory state at its core.  With his 
passionate defense of the Martin Luther King holiday, I cannot imagine that he 
would have joined 5-4 decisions striking down affirmative action and voting districts 
for minorities, let alone questioning the constitutionality of the amendments to the 
Voting Rights Act, as Justice Clarence Thomas has done.
 One thing, however, is clear.  William Rehnquist’s influence on the Court was 
large.  As Chief Justice, he moderated his youthful reputation as the lone dissenter 
and was willing to provide the sixth vote to uphold decisions he had once criticized, 
such as the one requiring cops to read suspects their Miranda rights.  But Rehnquist 
combined that pragmatism with a crusading strict constructionism.  Senator Baker’s 
influence, I imagine, would have been similarly great.  And both the Court and the 
country might have been a less polarized place if he had accepted Nixon’s offer of a 
Supreme Court seat only twenty-four hours earlier.
20 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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The Senate Watergate Committee:
Its Place in History and the Discovery
of the White House Tapes
James Hamilton1
Introduction
 I am pleased to be here to honor Senator Howard Baker, with whom I worked 
closely during the Watergate Committee’s investigation and whom I have long 
admired.
 My topic is the Senate Watergate Committee and its place in history, a place 
secured in part because of its discovery of the White House tapes.  I want to tell you 
about how those tapes were discovered, because it is a good tale and because it also 
illustrates some of the broader points that I want to make this morning.
 Watergate is a topic that I know first-hand for it consumed a year-and-a-half 
of my life. It was a time of little sleep and greatly reduced social life.  It was a time 
when my tennis game went to hell.
 It was also a unique experience.  My main assignment, being responsible for 
the investigation of the Watergate break-in and cover-up, was at the time about the 
best job for a young lawyer in America.  I very much appreciate being given that 
opportunity by Senators Sam Ervin and Howard Baker, and Chief Counsel Sam 
Dash.
I. The Watergate Hearings in Historical Context
 Congressional investigations, of course, have played a significant role in 
American life for most of the nation’s history.2  That point can be made just by 
mentioning a few of the major investigations of the last century.  Indeed, to recall 
their names is to remind that congressional investigations are very much the stuff 
of our history.
 In the years 1912-1913, there were the “Money Trust” investigations by a 
House Banking and Currency Subcommittee. These investigations focused on 
concentrations of economic power in the hands of men such as J.P. Morgan and 
John D. Rockefeller and led to the passage of major antitrust laws—the Clayton 
Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. 3
 In the early 1920’s, the Senate investigated the Teapot Dome bribery and graft 
scandals in the Harding Administration, which involved both the Attorney General 
1 James Hamilton is a partner in the Washington office of Bingham McCutchen LLP and was Assistant Chief 
Counsel of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities—the Senate Watergate Committee.
2 On congressional investigations generally, see James Hamilton, The Power to Probe: A Study of 
Congressional Investigations (1976); James Hamilton, Robert F. Muse, & Kevin R. Amer, Congressional 
Investigations:  Politics and Process, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1115-76 (2007).
3 For the Money Trust investigation, see Hamilton, supra note 2, at 6-7; Joel Seligman, The 
Transformation of Wall Street:  A History of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and Modern Corporate Finance 51 (1982); Telford Taylor, Grand Inquest:  The Story of 
Congressional Investigations 63-65 (1955).
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and the Secretary of the Interior.4  Will Rogers branded the scene the “great morality 
panic of 1924.”5
 In the 1930’s, in a precursor of the investigations of recent times, the Senate 
Banking and Currency Committee, led by  the committee’s chief counsel, Ferdinand 
Pecora, examined manipulations of the stock market during the Great Depression. 
The result was the passage by Congress of the major securities legislation that 
governs the markets today.6
 Starting in 1938 and running past mid-century were the so-called “loyalty 
investigations,” which sought to discover the extent of Communist activity and 
influence in American life.  These investigations often used methods now held 
in disrepute.  The investigative abuses of Senator Joseph McCarthy, who chaired 
the Senate Committee on Government Operations, were revealed in the explosive 
Army-McCarthy hearings.  Eventually McCarthy was condemned by the Senate 
for his conduct.  Richard Nixon first came to prominence during the House Un-
American Activities Committee’s investigation of accused Soviet spy Alger Hiss.7
 More useful were the 1950-51 hearings of the Senate Special Committee to 
Investigate Organized Crime headed by Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, 
which examined the illicit activities of many gangland figures, such as crime boss 
Frank Costello.  These were among the first, and most significant and widely viewed, 
of the early televised congressional hearings.8
 During 1987, there was the Iran-Contra investigation conducted jointly by 
select committees  of both houses of Congress.  This investigation concerned the 
sale of arms to Iran and the distribution of the proceeds to rebels in Nicaragua.9 
They made the scheme’s mastermind, Marine Colonel Oliver North, a national 
figure.
 In the 1990’s, there was a spate of investigations:
•	 The 1990-91 Keating Five hearings by the Senate Ethics Committee, 
which examined whether five prominent senators had improperly 
4 For the Teapot Dome investigation, see Hamilton, supra note 2, at 7.
5 Id. at 7; Burl Noggle, Teapot Dome:  Oil and Politics in the 1920s at vii (1962), quoted in Gary 
A. Fine, Reputational Entrepreneurs and the Memory of Incompetence:  Melting Supporters, Partisan Warriors, and 
Images of President Harding, 101 Am. J. Sociology 1159, 1174 n.17 (1996).
6 For the Pecora investigation, see Hamilton, supra note 2, at 7-8; Taylor, supra note 3, at 65-67.
7 For the McCarthy investigations and the House Un-American Activities Committee’s hearings, see 
Hamilton, supra note 2, at 8-9; see also Ted Morgan, Reds:  McCarthyism  in Twentieth-Century 
America 187-222,  428-504 passim (2003); Thomas C. Reeves, The Life and Times of Joe McCarthy 
207-15, 459-637 passim (1982).
8 For the Kefauver Committee’s investigation of organized crime, see Hamilton, supra note 2, at 9-10; 
Charles L. Fontenay, Estes Kefauver:  A Biography 164-186 (1980); Taylor, supra note 3, at 240.  For a 
generally negative  view of the Kefauver Crime Committee, see William H. Moore, The Kefauver Committee 
and the Politics of Crime, 1950-1952 (1974).
9 For the Iran-Contra investigation, see Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra 
Affair:  Hearings before the H. Select Comm. To Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran and the S. Select 
Comm. On Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., H.R.Rep. No. 
100-433, S. Rep. No. 100-216 (1987).
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done favors for savings-and-loan mogul, Charles H. Keating, Jr., who 
had contributed heavily to all of them.10
•	 The 1991 confirmation hearing of Supreme Court Justice Clarence 
Thomas, which heard allegations of sexual harassment by his former 
aide, Anita Hill.11
•	 The  campaign finance hearings held in 1997 by the Senate Committee 
on Governmental Affairs, chaired by Senator Fred Thompson (R. 
Tenn.), which involved, e.g., the extent of foreign money that made its 
way to the Clinton reelection campaign and business-as-usual events 
such as a fundraiser at a Buddhist temple.12
•	 And finally, the impeachment proceedings against President 
Clinton.13
 Congressional investigations continue unabated in this century.  Just in the last 
several years there have been major investigations into our latest financial crisis and 
the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.14  And now that the Republicans have 
taken control of the House, many investigations into the conduct of the Obama 
Administration may follow.
II. The Watergate Committee Investigation
A. The Significance of the Watergate Investigation
 But none of these other investigations, as momentous and important as they 
may have been, concerned more significant issues or commanded the attention of 
the nation more than the Senate Watergate Committee investigation.  None dealt 
more with the fabric of what we are as a nation, and none were conducted with 
more success.  Let me spend a little time considering why all of this was so.
10 For the Keating Five hearings, see http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/ subjects/k/
keating_five/index.html.
11 For the Thomas confirmation hearings, see Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice:  A Commentary on the 
Nomination and Confirmation of Justice Thomas, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 969 (1992); Donald P. Judges, Confirmation 
as Conscientiousness-Raising:  Lessons for the Supreme Court from the Clarence Thomas Confirmation Hearings, 7 St. 
John’s J. Legal Comment. 147 (1991).
12 For the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee’s campaign finance investigation, see Final Report of the 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs:  Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 
Federal Election Campaigns, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., S. Rep. No. 105-167 (1998).
13 For the Clinton impeachment proceedings, see The Impeachment and Trial of President Clinton: 
The Official Transcripts, from the House Judiciary Committee to the Senate Trial (1999).
14 For the congressional investigations into the financial crisis and the Gulf oil spill, see, e.g., U.S. Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 111th Cong., Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: 
Anatomy of a Financial Collapse (2010); Jim Snyder, Congress Opens Probe into Gulf Coast Oil Spill, The 
Hill, May 10, 2010, available at http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/677-e2-wire/96865-congress-opens-oil-spill-
probe.
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 Part of the reason, of course, was the magnitude of the wrongdoing being 
investigated. Watergate, it must be remembered, involved not just the break-in at 
the Democratic National Committee’s headquarters in the Watergate office building 
and the subsequent cover-up, but also massive illegal corporate contributions to the 
Nixon reelection campaign; a wide-ranging series of dirty tricks, some quite puerile, 
designed to sway the presidential election of 1972; and an unlawful scheme to use 
the resources of the executive branch to reelect President Nixon.
 Watergate also involved a cast of characters worthy of fiction.  There was 
President Nixon, as enigmatic as the best-known person in America perhaps could 
be.  Nixon was a man of considerable ability, but as every new release of tapes of 
his conversations reveals, he was beset by dark demons that overwhelmed both his 
judgment and moral principles.
 Watergate had the snarling duo of presidential aides, John Reichmann and 
Charles Colson, who were public relations nightmares for the Administration. 
Reichmann could not speak to the Committee without curling his upper lip in 
a sneer.  Colson was notoriously reported as saying he would walk over his 
grandmother to reelect Nixon.
 Some would add President Nixon’s Chief of Staff, Bob Haldeman, to this 
twosome.  But in my dealings with Haldeman, I found that I rather liked him, 
which made me question both my own judgment and character.
 And then we had the Watergate burglars, which included four tough Cuban-
Americans, with Bay of Pigs and CIA backgrounds.  Also involved in the burglary 
was the maniacal Gordon Liddy and the shadowy Howard Hunt.  Hunt was a 
former CIA agent.  Liddy was an operative of the Committee to Reelect the 
President, affectionately referred to, at least by the Watergate Committee majority 
staff, as CREEP.  Neither Liddy or Hunt seemingly had ever seen a clandestine, 
nefarious scheme they could not fondly embrace, no matter how bizarre and bound 
for failure it might be.
 And finally, on the other side, was a genuine folk hero, Sam Ervin, who, with his 
pungent humor, his rectitude, his Southern drawl, and his iconic, dancing eyebrows 
was the right man for this troubled, historical time.
 The Senate Watergate investigation was also successful because of good staff 
work. Chief Counsel Sam Dash insisted on a rigorous, fearless investigation, and 
he received that from his staff.  But Sam also knew how to tell a story to draw the 
public into the investigation and to convey its import.  That is what the hearings of 
the Spring and Summer of 1973 did.  Those hearings were the best soap opera on 
television, and the nation was glued to the tube.  One day around 60 million people 
heard White House Counsel John Dean testify about Nixon’s role in the cover-up 
and about how he told Nixon that there was a cancer growing on the presidency.
 The Senate Watergate investigation also was successful because of the 
partnership between Senator Ervin and Senator Baker, which I observed closely 
during my stint on the Committee staff.  There obviously was a strong friendship 
and tremendous mutual respect between these two extraordinary men.  And each 
seemed committed to making the investigation as non-partisan as possible.
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 They succeeded in this goal in a remarkable way regarding an investigation as 
controversial as any in American history.  Consider, for example:
•	 that the massive Watergate Final Report that condemned a 
Republican administration was unanimous,
•	 that the decision to subpoena the President for the White House 
tapes was unanimous, and
•	 that the decision to sue the President when he didn’t comply was 
by unanimous vote on a motion made by Senator Baker.
Can one even imagine such unanimity on such a highly charged issue in today’s 
highly partisan climate?
 Senator Ervin paid tribute to Senator Baker in his book on Watergate.  Ervin 
noted that Senator Baker was a “stalwart East Tennessee Republican” with a “strong 
sense of loyalty to the Republican Party.”  “I suspect,” Ervin wrote, “that the White 
House undertook to bring much pressure on him to influence his conduct as a 
member of the committee.”  “If it did,” Ervin said, “it failed in its purpose.”  He added: 
“As vice chairman, Senator Baker rendered faithful service to the committee in its 
quest for the truth … and earned my enduring gratitude.”15
 This is not to say that there were not some tensions within the Committee. 
It would have been miraculous if there had not been.  But as a Democratic staff 
member, I felt that the investigation essentially was a non-partisan effort and that I 
was working for Senator Baker as well as Senator Ervin.
 Permit me a personal reflection about Senator Baker that showed he also 
considered that I was on his team.
 In 1974, when we were wrapping up the investigation, in court against the 
President about the tapes, and beginning work on the Final Report, I came down 
with a bout of kidney stones that sent me to the hospital—an experience I would 
not recommend.  One Committee member took the time to visit me there—Senator 
Baker.  I am sure he has long forgotten that act of kindness.  But I have not.
B. The Discovery of the White House Tapes:  Part I
 There is a final reason the Senate Watergate investigation was successful, 
and that is because we discovered the White House tapes that brought down a 
President.  In the few minutes remaining, I want to tell you how that came about. 
It was no accident.
 There were clues that something like the taping system existed.  For instance, 
John Dean testified that, in an April 5, 1973, conversation with the President, 
Nixon went behind his chair to a corner of an office in the Executive Office Building 
and, in a nearly inaudible tone, said that he was probably foolish to have discussed 
Hunt’s clemency with Colson.  This gave Dean an inkling that the conversation was 
15 Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The Whole Truth:  The Watergate Conspiracy 25 (1980) (emphasis added).
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taped.  Ironically, it was later revealed that the recording device in that office had 
run out of tape before that conversation occurred, and it was not recorded.
 Moreover, as Fred Thompson recounts in his book on Watergate, before Dean 
testified, then-White House counsel Fred Buzhardt called him and gave him in great 
detail the White House version of Nixon’s conversations with Dean and others. 
Thompson prepared and distributed a memo of his conversation with Buzhardt, 
which at least suggested that there was some kind of record of the conversations.16
 In any event, on Friday, July 13, 1973, the Committee’s staff interviewed 
Alexander Butterfield.  I gave the order to interview Butterfield because he had 
been an assistant to the President and in Haldeman’s ambit.  But demonstrating my 
usual perspicacity, I decided not to go to the interview, because I thought that he 
had nothing important to say.
 At the end of the over three-hour interview, Deputy Minority Counsel Don 
Sanders, who had Fred’s memo, asked Butterfield if there was any basis for the 
implication in Dean’s testimony that White House conversations were recorded. 
Butterfield, an honest man, said yes and revealed the existence of the White House 
taping system.  Actually, he was surprised that we hadn’t known already, because we 
had interviewed others who also knew—Haldeman and Larry Higby.
 I learned of this testimony early the next morning, Saturday, July 14, when Sam 
Dash called to tell me about it.
C. The Watergate Committee Leaks:  A Brief Digression
 Now I must digress to discuss a galling incident.
 As is well known, the Watergate Committee was plagued by leaks. 
Senator Baker once remarked that, although the Senate Watergate 
Committee did not invent the leak, we had elevated it to its highest art form. 
The running joke was that the Capitol Hill press corps would go out of 
business if a certain senator’s Xerox machine were to  break down.
 So maybe it was not surprising that, as they recount in their book, All 
the President’s Men, Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein also learned of the 
tapes on Saturday, July 14, even before many Committee members and 
senior staff knew about it.  Amazingly, however, Washington Post executive 
editor Ben Bradlee initially thought this was only a “B plus” story, not worthy 
of immediate attention, so nothing about the tapes was published by the Post 
until after Butterfield’s testimony.17
 Who leaked this information, I don’t know for sure.  But the senior 
majority staffer in the session with Butterfield was later best man in Bob 
Woodward’s wedding.18
16 Fred D. Thompson, At That Point In Time:  The Inside Story of the Senate Watergate 
Committee 83 (1975).
17 Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, All The President’s Men 330-31 (1974).
18 Thompson, supra note 16 at 82.
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D. The Discovery of the White House Tapes:  Part II
 When Sam Dash called me early on Saturday, July 14, he said, let’s go tell John 
Dean what we’ve just learned.  A little later, Sam picked me up, and we drove to 
Dean’s townhouse in Alexandria, Virginia.
 John and his glamorous wife, the always well put-together Mo, met us at the 
front door. John had a quizzical look on his face, for he did not yet know the purpose 
of  our visit.
 We went upstairs to their living room.  John and Mo sat on a couch.  After 
some preliminary conversation, Sam sat down to their left.  I stood before John 
and Mo by the mantelpiece where I could look directly at John.  I wanted to see his 
reaction when Sam told him what we now knew.
 When Sam finally did, John broke into a wide smile, for he knew the tapes 
essentially would confirm his damning testimony about Nixon.  As John recounts it 
in his book, Blind Ambition, he then said to Sam:
Sam, do you know what this means, if you get those conversations?  
It would mean my ass is not hanging out there all alone.  It means 
that you can verify my testimony.  And I’ll tell you this, you’ll find 
out that I’ve undertestified, rather than overtestified, just to be 
careful.19
 On Monday morning, July 16, Ervin, Baker, Dash, and Thompson met and 
decided to put Butterfield on the stand that afternoon.  I was dispatched to summon 
him.  When I told Butterfield that his presence was required that day, he was 
distinctly displeased.  Indeed, he refused to appear.  He said that he was preparing 
for a trip to Russia on Federal Aviation Administration business, of which he was 
then the chairman, and that he was too busy to attend.
 I relayed Butterfield’s response to Senator Ervin.  Ervin grew agitated.  His 
eyebrows cavorted; his jaw churned.  Finally he said to me:  “Tell Mr. Butterfield 
that, if he is not here this afternoon, I will send the Senate sergeant at arms to fetch 
him.”
 Now, I have carefully refrained from discussing the law of congressional 
investigations so far in these remarks.  It is too early in the morning for a discourse 
on law.  But I must do so briefly now.
 The Senate has the constitutional power, if a lawful order or subpoena is 
ignored, to send its sergeant at arms to arrest the miscreant and to imprison him in 
the Capitol.  This power has not been used since World War II, having essentially 
been replaced by use of the contempt of Congress statute that allows criminal 
prosecution for disobedience.  Nonetheless, the power still exists.20
 But this power only can be exercised by a vote of the full Senate.  Sam Ervin did 
not have the right, on his own, to dispatch the sergeant at arms to arrest Butterfield. 
Ervin, a great constitutional scholar, undoubtedly knew that, but he nonetheless 
19 John Dean, Blind Ambition 332 (1976).
20 See generally, Hamilton, supra note 2, at 85-91; Hamilton, Muse & Amer, supra note 2, at 1132-33.
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instructed me to deliver his message to Butterfield, which, having located him in a 
barber chair, I did faithfully.
 That message changed his mind, and later that afternoon Butterfield, now 
contrite and neatly coifed, arrived at the Committee to give his electrifying testimony. 
The subpoena I served on him for that testimony still hangs in my office.
 Before Butterfield’s testimony, Senator Baker approached Sam Dash and 
asked Sam to let Fred open the questioning, because minority aide Don Sanders 
had asked the fateful question to Butterfield.  Sam thought about this request for 
a while and then, as he describes in his book, Chief Counsel, reluctantly agreed, 
because he thought it was only “fair.”21
 I have heard Fred say that asking that question was a big boost to his political 
career.  I wonder if Sam, an ardent, unabashed liberal Democrat until the day 
he died, would have so graciously agreed to Senator Baker’s request had he been 
prescient enough to realize the later political advantage it afforded.  I’m certain 
Sam would have been pleased to assist Fred in becoming a prominent actor.  But a 
Republican Senator, probably not.
 It was, however, a good thing for the Committee that Fred took the lead in 
questioning Butterfield.  It demonstrated, as Senator Baker knew it would, that 
the investigation was non-partisan, and that Republicans and Democrats alike 
wanted all the facts to come out, no matter how dire the results were for the Nixon 
Administration.  Perhaps it also helped achieve unanimity in the votes to subpoena 
and sue the President.
 It is another irony of Watergate that the Senate Committee, although it 
discovered the tapes, never actually obtained them but had to settle for transcripts. 
The D.C. Circuit found that the case involved not just a political question but 
was justiciable—that is, it could be decided by a court—and that the President’s 
executive privilege was not absolute, but was subject to a balancing test.  But 
the Court ultimately held that the President’s interests in protecting the tapes 
outweighed the Committee’s need for them.22
 The ruling was frustrating and odd, because the transcripts were public and 
the House Judiciary Committee, which was conducting impeachment proceedings 
concerning the President, had the actual tapes.  Nonetheless, precedent was 
established that was recently applied in the House Judiciary Committee’s suit 
against Bush White House officials, Harriet Miers and Joshua Bolten.  The U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia, relying on the Select Committee’s 
case, held that the suit against Miers and Bolten could proceed, that the President 
did not have an absolute executive privilege, and that the House had a right to the 
testimony and materials it sought.23  In 2008, I wrote an amicus brief in the Miers 
case supporting the House on behalf of, among others, Senator Dan Inouye, who 
had been a member of the Watergate Committee.  Nearly forty years earlier, I had 
21 Samuel Dash, Chief Counsel:  Inside the Ervin Committee —The Untold Story of Watergate 
184 (1976).
22 Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
23 Comm. on Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008).
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written the briefs in the Senate Watergate Committee case, proving, I guess, that in 
Washington we are all recycled.
 But this recent opinion is only a very small part of the legacy of the Senate 
Watergate Committee.  It also spawned significant legislation, for example, the 
central elements of the Nation’s campaign finance laws and the Ethics in Government 
Act of 1978, including the misused, now discarded, but not lamented Independent 
Counsel statute.24
 But beyond that, the Senate Watergate Committee is an enduring model of 
how to do things the right way, how to investigate thoroughly and fairly, and how to 
seek the truth in a non-partisan manner.  Much of that legacy is due to the beneficial 
partnership that Senator Ervin and Senator Baker forged.  That is one reason why 
it is most appropriate to honor Senator Baker by this symposium, and to hope 
that maybe, just maybe, his example of civility and cooperation may influence some 
of the more reckless, short-sighted partisans on both sides of the aisle who today 
inhabit Capitol Hill.
24 Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 601(a), 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-73 (1978).
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Howard Baker and the Meaning 
and Legacy of Watergate:
An Overview
Rick Perlstein1
 Early in 1973, the editor of the magazine Intellectual Digest was asked what 
might be the biggest surprise to the prisoners of war just then returning from North 
Vietnam.  He answered, “that for the first time Americans have had at least a partial 
loss in the fundamental belief in ourselves.  We’ve always believed we were the new 
men, the new people, the new society.  The last best hope of earth, in Lincoln’s 
terms.  For the first time, we’ve really begun to doubt  it.”2
 The televised hearings of the United States Senate’s Select Committee to 
Investigate Campaign Practices that spring and summer—also known as the 
“Watergate Committee” or the “Ervin Committee,” after its chairman, Senator Sam 
J. Ervin, Jr. (D. N.C.), are justly considered one of the most important events in 
recent American history—Constitutional history, legal history, presidential history, 
senatorial history, and political history.  For me, however, they are most fascinating 
as a document in America’s moral history.  The hearings in which Senator Howard 
H. Baker, Jr., played so important a part inaugurated a national symposium on the 
question, Was America still the last best hope on earth?
 Start on January 20, 1969.  A new President, in his inaugural address, 
announced that the keynote of his new administration would be morality:  After 
the chaos and confusion of the 1960s, he promised to “bring us together”—to 
“build a great cathedral of the spirit—each of us raising it one stone at a time, as he 
reaches out to his neighbor, helping, caring, doing.”3  To the millions of Americans 
who loved Richard Nixon, in fact, he embodied morality; morality in the sense of 
rectitude, of right living, of law and order.  Immorality—the coddling of miscreants, 
the countenancing of chaos, the dissolution of moral codes—they associated with 
the other party, the Democrats; the party whose Democratic National Committee 
(DNC) had just moved its headquarters, in 1969, into the swankiest address in 
Washington, the mixed-use office, residential, and retail complex on the Potomac 
River known simply as the Watergate.
 When seven burglars and accomplices, including James W. McCord, a retired 
CIA employee and  the chief of security operations for Nixon’s reelection campaign, 
were caught on June 17, 1972, breaking into those headquarters, many Americans 
were prepared to believe exactly what the President’s campaign manager, John 
Mitchell, formerly the Attorney General of the United States, said about them: 
McCord and the other people involved “were not operating either in our behalf 
1 Rick Perlstein is the author of Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus 
(2001) and Nixonland:  The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (2008).  He also is a a contributor to 
Newsweek, The American Prospect, and The Nation and a former writer for The Village Voice and The New Republic.
2 Today Show, Feb. 22, 1973, viewed by the author at the Vanderbilt University News Archive, Nashville, 
Tennessee.
3 Richard M. Nixon, Speeches, Writings, Documents 158 (Rick Perlstein ed. 2008).
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or with our consent.”4  The cover story the White House began circulating was 
that these were ideologically unhinged anti-Castro Cubans who were irrationally 
terrified of the prospect of the same sort of Communist takeover in America.  It 
worked.  DNC chairman Larry O’Brien, wrote one syndicated columnist, was 
“‘grab[bing] onto this astonishing episode for political gain, and mak[ing] all sorts 
of outlandish charges such as the one that there is ‘a developing clear line to the 
White House in the case.  Humor is blessed relief in a messy episode like this 
one.’”5  The Chicago Tribune didn’t run an article about the DNC break-in on the 
front page until the end of August of 1972.6  In October, White House allies in 
Congress easily shut down a proposed House inquiry into Watergate.  Right up to 
election day, Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward of the Washington Post produced a 
line of scoops indicating staff and financial ties between the Watergate defendants 
and the top levels of the White House and Nixon campaigns.  But they ran next 
to falsely equivalent stories about irregularities in the presidential campaign of the 
Democratic nominee, Senator George McGovern.  The Gallup public-opinion 
polling organization published the results of an election-eve poll asking, “Which 
candidate—Nixon or McGovern—do you think is more sincere, believable?” Nixon 
won, 59 percent to 20 percent.7
 The White House got away with it.  Nixon’s second term got off to a propitious 
start.  Near the end of January 1973, after he had announced the Paris Peace 
accords ending the Vietnam War, his approval rating was 67 percent8—not exactly 
the mark of an incipient national villain.
 The trial of the Watergate burglars and accomplices began scarcely more than 
ten days before Nixon’s second inaugural with a strikingly narrow indictment and 
a weak government prosecution.  Presiding at the trial was an obscure federal judge 
named John J. Sirica, who kept on badgering defendants and witnesses about matters 
beyond his brief:  “Who paid them? . . . What was the purpose[?]”9  He wondered 
why, every time cross-examination led to Nixon’s reelection headquarters, or to 
questions regarding the hundreds of thousands of dollars other investigations had 
already established had been laundered through Mexico, memories grew vague.10 
Be that as it may, most of official Washington was ready to end their concern with 
the Watergate affair with the seven men’s convictions.  Judge Sirica was cornered 
at a cocktail party and asked whether he was being paid off to discredit Nixon’s 
4 Bob Woodward & Carl Bernstein, GOP Security Aide Among 5 Arrested In Bugging Affair, Wash. Post, June 
19, 1972, at A1.
5 Rick Perlstein, Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America 684 
(2008).
6 Tian-jia Dong, Understanding Power through Watergate: The Washington Collective 
Power Dynamics 28 (2005).
7 Gallup Opinion Index, Rep. No. 88 at 7 (Oct. 1972).
8 Gallup Opinion Index, Rep. No. 92 at 3 (Feb. 1973).
9 U.S. v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (quoting excerpts from opening statements by defendants’ 
counsel and from questions by Judge Sirica).
10 John J. Sirica, To Set the Record Straight: The Break-in, the Tapes, the Conspirators, the 
Pardon 73 (1979).
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reelection by the McGovern campaign.11
 The Senate had voted 77-0 to establish the Ervin Committee12—but the very 
fact that the decision was unanimous was an indication that the proceedings were 
not expected to be particularly controversial.  Pundit Stewart Alsop called Ervin 
“far and away the best of the Senate’s . . . character actors.”13  Ervin himself thought 
it “simply inconceivable” that President Nixon would be found to be involved in 
Watergate.14
 Then, however, a twist:  before his sentencing, Watergate conspirator McCord 
revealed in a letter to Judge Sirica that “[t]here was political pressure applied to 
the defendants to plead guilty and remain silent. . . . [p]erjury occurred during the 
trial of matters highly material to the very structure, orientation, and impact of the 
government’s case . . .,” and that “[o]thers involved in the Watergate operation were 
not identified during the trial.”15  The case was blown wide open, just before the 
Ervin hearings were set to begin.
 That made the May 17 opening session, carried live on all three networks and 
PBS, the hottest ticket on television.  The Committee’s proceedings on that day, 
however, and for the first few weeks, for that matter, turned out to be mostly a 
rather boring show.  Mousy young bureaucrats were grilled about the allocation of 
office space.  “Wouldn’t you really rather watch Jeopardy! than watch Senator Ervin 
chew on pencils,” one angry housewife wrote to her local newspaper.16
 From the beginning, however, other housewives argued differently.  “Never 
have I enjoyed watching television more than in the last few weeks….I’ve served 
notice to my family.  I do not intend to sauté an onion, dust a table top, nor darn 
a sock while those hearings are on.  I wouldn’t miss a word for the world.”17  And 
when the hearings began calling the most critical witnesses toward the end of June, 
the melodrama really began.  When presidential assistant John Dean testified on 
June 26—calmly, studiously, and in great detail, holding up with great forbearance 
against difficult cross-examination from the senators and their staffs—about 
his first-hand knowledge of President Nixon’s intimate involvement, despite his 
denials, of the criminal cover-up to keep the Watergate conspirators quiet—the 
hearings became a national obsession.  Time magazine named the stakes:  “If Dean’s 
claims are true—and his supporting details as well as some of his circumstantial 
documents were impressive—that would make Nixon’s . . . denials outright lies.”18 
11 Joseph C. Goulden, The Benchwarmers: The Private World of the Powerful Federal Judge 
188 (1974).
12 Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon 256 (1992).
13 Robert W. Merry, Taking on the World: Joseph and Stewart Alsop, Guardians of the 
American Century 515 (1997).
14 Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The Whole Truth: The Watergate Conspiracy 19 (1980).
15 Fred Emery, Watergate: The Corruption of American Politics and the Fall of Richard 
Nixon 270 (1995).
16 “Today’s Living,” Louisville Courier-Journal, June 2, 1973.
17 Letter to the editor, Wash. Post, June 1, 1973.
18 The Hearings: Dean’s Case Against the President, Time, July 9, 1973, available at http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/ article/0,9171,907488-3,00.html.
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The question of whether those claims were true—whether the public should 
believe the President’s word, or the word of this mousy and obscure man testifying 
in exchange for partial criminal immunity—became even more melodramatic, even 
more the national obsession, when it was revealed in open hearings on July 16 that 
President Nixon had taped every word uttered in the Oval Office.19
 This all is by now very familiar.  Less well-remembered, but even more crucial 
for the sort of broad-gaged cultural history of America in the 1970s that I am 
endeavoring to write, were those almost random moments in which the deepest 
questions about America’s moral self-image suddenly came to the fore.  These, I 
hypothesize, even as much as the forensic questions of what the President knew 
and when he knew it, were what kept Americans glued to their televisions during 
the “Watergate Summer” of 1973.
 For instance, when Senator Baker grilled Herb Porter, the young treasurer of 
the Committee to Re-Elect the President, bearing down not on what he had done 
to further the dirty tricks operation against the Democratic candidates during the 
1972 presidential election, but why he had done it.  “Did you ever have any doubt in 
your mind about the propriety of this? . . . Not the illegality, but the propriety of it.”
 The young man hedged and dodged.  Senator Baker sharpened the question:
 “Did you ever have any qualms about what you were doing . . . ?”
 Porter’s answer—”I kind of drifted along”—was the sort of thing that became 
a touchstone for American water-cooler conversations that summer.  Why did he 
“drift along?”  “In all honesty, probably because of the fear of group pressure that 
would ensue, of not being a team player.”
 “What caused you to abdicate your own conscience and disapproval, if you did 
disapprove, of the practices of [the] dirty tricks operation?”
 “Well, Senator Baker, my loyalty to this man, Richard Nixon . . . .”20
 Americans had seen Senate witnesses sounding like mafioso in televised hearings 
before—but these had been hearings on the mafia, held by Senator Estes Kefauver 
(D. Tenn.) more than two decades earlier.  These witnesses, though, were “all the 
President’s men” who were hemming and hawing about crimes they had committed, 
perjury they had suborned, bribes they had made with money they had laundered, 
and all the rest.  What is more, many were willfully refusing to acknowledge they 
had done anything wrong.  When Jeb Stuart Magruder was pressed—once more by 
Senator Baker—why he persisted in planning the Watergate break-in even though 
he had acknowledged that “it was illegal and that it was inappropriate and that it 
may not work,”21 he brought up a minister he knew in college:  William Sloane 
Coffin, the anti-war chaplain of Yale.  Coffin, rationalized Magruder, “tells me my 
ethics are bad.  Yet he was indicted for criminal charges.  He recommended on the 
Washington Monument grounds that students burn their draft cards. . . . Now 
19 Michael A. Genovese, The Watergate Crisis 41-42 (1999).
20 Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972, Watergate and Related Activities, Phase I: Watergate Investigation, Bk. 
2: Hearings Before the S. Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 93rd Cong. 648-49 (1973) (testimony of 
Herbert Lloyd Porter).
21 Id. at 813.
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here are ethical, legitimate people whom I respected. . . . breaking the law without 
any regard for any other person’s pattern of behavior or belief. . . . So, consequently 
. . . when these subjects came up and although I was aware they were illegal, . . . 
we had become somewhat inured to using some activities that would help us in 
accomplishing what we thought was a cause, a legitimate cause.”22
 Well, what of it?
 The Watergate Committee hearings provided a stage for the debate about these 
most basic questions:  Who was right?  Who was wrong?  Was Jeb Stuart Magruder 
just talking like a weasel?  Or was he making a legitimate point about how the 
insurgencies of the 1960s had loosened the bonds of law and order and paved the 
way for Watergate?
 It was, in any event, a mess.  On July 23, Senator Joseph Montoya (D. N.M.) 
asked another young witness, White House assistant Gordon Strachan, what 
advice he had for young people thinking of going to Washington and entering 
government service.  Strachan’s response got the biggest laughter of all the 
hearings—embarrassed, embarrassing laughter:  “[S]tay away.”23
 Was America still the last, best hope of earth?  Or was it something else?  If 
so, what? The questions were suddenly proliferating everywhere in 1973.  In that 
summer’s annual Soap Box Derby race in Akron, Ohio, the winning entrant was 
discovered to have outfitted his car with a battery-enhanced magnet.  An op-ed 
writer in the Los Angeles Times responded with anger—that the boy had been 
disqualified.  “Cheating Always Part of Soap Box Fun,” he argued, calling 
what the boy did “enterprise.”24
 A new phrase was creeping into the national conversation:  energy crisis. 
Suddenly, there were rumors that the summer might bring gas rationing:  in some 
places, like Southern California and New Jersey, because of dangerous levels of air 
pollution; in others, like the Midwest, because supplies of gasoline were said to be 
running low.  The rumors were widespread that this was the result of a conspiracy 
on the part of oil companies—the same sort of companies being revealed every 
day in the Watergate hearings to have funneled hundreds of thousands of dollars 
in illicit cash to the Nixon reelection campaign.  In September, at the close of 
Watergate Summer, the Republican governor of Oregon issued an edict banning 
commercial and decorative electric signs at night.  In October came the OPEC oil 
embargo, tripling the price of fuel.  It happened the same week President Nixon 
fired special prosecutor Archibald Cox, and the scary White House Chief of Staff, 
Alexander Haig, who came to work every day in a general’s uniform, ordered the 
FBI to seal the office of the Attorney General.  “There was a real sense,” said one of 
Cox’s aides, that “a fascist takeover could be imminent.”  There were even rumors 
that the Pentagon planned to turn off the eternal flame at the gravesite of President 
22 Id. at 814.
23 Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972, Watergate and Related Activities, Phase I: Watergate Investigation, Bk. 
6: Hearings Before the S. Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 93rd Cong. 2478 (1973) (testimony of 
Gordon Strachan).
24 Rick Perlstein, That Seventies Show, The Nation, Nov. 8, 2010, at 25, available at http://www.thenation.
com/article/155492/ seventies-show.
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Kennedy to save energy.  A letter-writer to the Times thought that an excellent idea: 
“Wouldn’t it seem logical to use that gas for a better use such as heating homes or 
office buildings rather than just burning it to no real purpose whatever?”25
 Now everything was up for grabs.  Such moments inaugurated one of the 
keynote discussions of American in the 1970s:  was the American Century over? 
Should it have ever begun?
 It was the kind of discussion, inaugurated in Watergate Summer, that very 
much paved the way for the candidacy and victory of Ronald Reagan in 1980.
25 Id.
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Cincinnatus of Tennessee:
Howard Baker as White House 
Chief of Staff
David B. Cohen and Charles E. Walcott1
I am . . . pleased to announce that Howard H. Baker, Jr., has agreed to serve 
as Chief of Staff to the President of the United States.  Howard Baker is a 
distinguished American who has served as majority and minority leader of 
the United States Senate, a leader of the Republican Party, and a man of 
unquestioned integrity and ability.  I am enormously pleased that he is willing 
to take on this responsibility and to help me organize the White House staff for 
an aggressive two years of work. Howard and I have been friends for a number 
of years.  I have the utmost respect and admiration for him . . . . I look forward 
to having him work with me in the months ahead.2
—President Ronald Reagan, February 27, 1987
Cincinnatus of Tennessee
 Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus was a hero of the early Roman republic.  In the 
year 458 B.C., the city of Rome was attacked by its neighbors, the Aequi and the 
Volscians.  The city’s independence was at stake.  Cincinnatus, who previously had 
been Rome’s leader, had retired to his farm, but in its hour of need, Rome called 
on him to resume that leadership role.  Cincinnatus agreed, left the farm, came 
to Rome, led its armies to a stunning victory, and retired back to his farm, all in 
sixteen days.  To the Romans, the enduring legacy of Cincinnatus was not only his 
patriotic willingness to serve in desperate times, but his modesty in relinquishing 
power when he was finished.3
 There are many parallels between Cincinnatus and Howard Baker.  Baker was 
not on a farm when the call came asking him to join the Reagan White House in 
its hour of need, but he was with his family at a zoo, which is pretty close.  He 
was not a former president but had been a U.S. Senator, Senate majority leader, 
and a presidential aspirant.  The country was not being invaded in 1987, but the 
Administration of President Ronald Reagan was in deep trouble; indeed, the word 
“impeachment” had been whispered in the media and in the halls of Congress, while 
advisers to Baker himself were consulting the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution because the President seemed out of touch.  The President knew he 
1 David B. Cohen is Professor of Political Science and Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics Fellow at 
the University of Akron in Akron, Ohio.  Charles E. Walcott is Professor of Political Science at the Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University in Blacksburg, Virginia.
2 Ronald Reagan, Statement on the Resignation of Donald T. Regan and the Appointment of Howard H. 
Baker, Jr., as Chief of Staff, Feb. 27, 1987, The American Presidency Project ( John T. Woolley & Gerhard 
Peters eds.),  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33911.
3 For Cincinnatus and his legacy, see Michael J. Hillyard, Cincinnatus and the Citizen-Servant 
Ideal:  The Roman Legend’s Life, Times, and Legacy (2001).
69
had problems.  When he called Baker and was informed by his wife Joy that he was 
at the zoo with the grandchildren, Reagan joked, “Well, tell him I need him because 
we’ve got a zoo up here.”4  Finally, Howard Baker was not an interim dictator, as 
Cincinnatus was, but, as the contrast between Baker and his predecessor reveals, as 
White House chief of staff, he was assuredly one of the most important officials in 
the United States government.
The Reagan White House and the Iran-Contra Mess
 In order to appreciate the task that Baker was asked to take on, we need to 
review just how dire the situation that confronted him really had become and how 
Reagan had become ensnared by the Iran-Contra scandal.  In transitioning between 
his first and second terms, Reagan had made significant changes in personnel in his 
Administration and in his White House.  Gone now were the “troika” of advisers 
who had ably, if at times contentiously, served him in the White House for four 
years.5  Edwin Meese, the President’s policy overseer, had become Attorney General. 
Michael Deaver, the mastermind behind the President’s “Teflon” image, had left to 
go into the lobbying business.  James Baker, Reagan’s first chief of staff and, arguably, 
first among White House equals, had become Secretary of the Treasury.  In moving 
to Treasury, James Baker had swapped jobs with the incumbent Treasury Secretary, 
Donald Regan, and Regan had become White House chief of staff.  Then the 
troubles began.
 Don Regan’s tenure as chief of staff was problematic in several ways.  From 
the beginning, it was intended to be different from his predecessor’s.  Touted in the 
business press as a “streamlined, corporate-style White House,” Regan’s staff was a 
clear hierarchy, with none of the perceived messiness of the “troika” arrangement.6 
Nor did Regan share any of James Baker’s fondness for delegating responsibility. 
While the lines of accountability were simplified, the staff in the chief ’s office grew, 
and any staffers who might challenge him were eventually removed.  Regan’s staff, 
loyal and dependent upon their boss but basically implementers and not thinkers, 
came to be known widely in the White House as the “mice.”  According to journalist 
Hedrick Smith:
Regan operated more like a corporate CEO or a Marine officer (he had 
been both) than a politician accustomed to the ways of sharing power.  He 
personally held all the key levers in the White House power structure.  His 
hand-picked aides controlled the president’s paper flow and schedule but 
were so meek and dutiful that they were quickly nicknamed the “mice.”
4 Lou Cannon, President Reagan:  The Role of a Lifetime 730 (1991).
5 For excellent descriptions of “the Troika,” see id.; Lou Cannon & Lee Lescaze, ‘The Trio’ Still Rules But With 
Less Clout, Wash. Post, Mar. 21, 1982, at A1; Lou Cannon & Lee Lescaze, Reagan’s Decision-Making Process Still 
a Mystery, Wash. Post, Mar. 22, 1982, at A1.
6 E.g., see Jane Mayer & Doyle McManus, Landslide:  The Unmaking of the President, 1984-1988, 
at 40-41  (1989); Ann Reilly, Don Regan Recruits His White House Staff, Fortune, Mar. 4, 1985, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1985/03/04/65651/index.htm.
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 Given a free rein in the president’s political household, Regan 
tolerated no competing power centers inside the White House. . . . 
Gradually, the White House apparatus came to reflect more loyalty to 
Regan than to the president.7
 Regan was indeed the boss, and he deemed no one, save the President, to 
be his equal.  Regan was gruff and assertive—traits that many concluded were 
inappropriate in a sensitive White House position in which he was not a Number 
1, but rather a Number 2.  As chief of staff, his job was not to preempt decisions 
but rather to ensure that all relevant interests and points of view became involved in 
the decision-making process.  Instead, he tended to try to protect Reagan from the 
clash of ideas, which he felt made the President uncomfortable.  To some, Regan 
seemed to be acting more like a prime minister than a mere chief of staff, and he 
actually boasted about his decision-making power.8  As Ed Rollins, Assistant to 
the President for Political Affairs under both James Baker and Regan put it, “He 
figured, if Ronald Reagan didn’t want to be president all the time, he would be.”9 
Regan’s assertiveness and propensity to claim credit placed him on the bad side of 
the President’s wife, and Nancy Reagan would ultimately be influential in forcing 
him out of the White House.  Ironically, however, in the crisis that came to consume 
the Reagan White House, what was known as the Iran-Contra affair, Don Regan’s 
contribution to the problem lay less in what he did than in what he failed do.
 In fact, Iran-Contra lay at the root of the problems that Howard Baker 
encountered as Regan’s successor.  Though they involved extreme secrecy, complex 
deal-making, shady characters, and a certain disregard for the niceties of the law, 
the Iran-Contra dealings were fairly simple in outline.10  The first part involved 
Iran.  In 1985, the Iranian-sponsored group Hezbollah was holding six captured 
U.S. citizens hostage.  President Reagan wanted to free them.  The chance seemed 
to come in the person of Manucher Ghorbanifar, a self-described representative 
of “moderates” in the Iranian government (and a known liar who was listed on an 
official CIA “fabricator notice.”).  The moderate Iranians, Ghorbanifar suggested, 
could use their influence in the Iranian government to persuade Hezbollah to 
release the hostages.  In exchange for this, the so-called moderates wanted only 
7 Hedrick Smith, The Power Game:  How Washington Works 325-26 (1988).
8 See Adriana Bosch & David McCullough, Reagan:  An American Story 302 (2000)  (quoting 
recollection of Ed Rollins, who had served as Reagan’s 1984 campaign manager, that “Don Regan was a tyrant. 
And he was miscast as a chief of staff and never thought of himself as staff.  He thought of himself as Deputy 
President. Said to me one day, ‘I can make 85 percent of the decisions the President makes.’  And I said to him, I 
said, ‘Don, I just ran a campaign in 50 states.  I didn’t see your name on the ballot anywhere.’”); Cannon, supra 
note 4, at 721 (quoting longtime Reagan political adviser Stuart Spencer as having said of Regan, “[H]e became a 
prime minister, he became a guy that was in every photo op, he wasn’t watching the shop.”); Mayer & McManus, 
supra note 6, at 42; Richard Reeves, President Reagan:  The Triumph of Imagination (2005) (caption 
to photograph 10 of illustrations following p. 270, containing unattributed statement that “the arrogant former 
Treasury Secretary . . . boasted that he made 85 percent of the President’s decisions.”).
9 Mayer & McManus, supra note 6, at 42.
10 For useful overviews of the scandal, see Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line:  The Iran-Contra 
Affairs (1991) and Mayer & McManus, supra note 6.
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the chance to buy U.S. anti-tank weapons.  Reagan Administration officials, led 
by National Security Advisor Robert (“Bud”) McFarlane and his aide, Lieutenant 
Colonel Oliver North, agreed to the deal.  Israel would directly provide the arms, 
while the United States would resupply them and keep the proceeds from the sales. 
All this was arguably illegal, given an existing arms embargo on Iran.  Nonetheless, 
the National Security Council (NSC) officials went ahead.  Whether, and to what 
extent, Ronald Reagan knew of all this or understood its import, remains debatable, 
though the President and Regan were present at crucial meetings at which the 
operation was discussed.  The President, to the consternation of most, admitted 
that the transactions—eventually a complex series of them involving eight separate 
arms shipments—did take place, but he denied the seemingly obvious conclusion 
that the United States had attempted to trade arms for hostages.  In any event, 
the effort was largely a failure.  Only three hostages were ever released, and in the 
meantime three more were captured.  Worse for the Reagan Administration, the 
plot was exposed by a Lebanese magazine in November, 1986.11
 The second part of the “affair,” the Contra part, arose as the White House 
conspirators found a creative way to use the profits from the arms sales.  Probably no 
cause was dearer to Ronald Reagan’s heart than that of the “Contras” of Nicaragua, 
a rebel band seeking to overthrow the leftist Sandinista government of that country. 
To their opponents, including many in the United States, the Contras were guerillas 
who were guilty of drug trafficking and persistent human rights abuses.  To the 
Reagan Administration, they were “freedom fighters,” engaged in the overthrow of a 
Communist-backed government.  Legislative majorities being largely of the former 
opinion, Congress had passed the Boland Amendment, barring U.S. government 
support for the Contras.  In the Reagan White House, the reaction to that was to 
sponsor a “stand alone” operation, dubbed “the Enterprise,” whereby the Contras 
could continue to be armed and trained.  Funding for this came from various private 
sources, but also came to include the proceeds from the arms sales to Iran.  Hence, 
the “Iran-Contra” affair.
 Central to the Iran-Contra operation were the efforts of certain top officials in 
the Reagan White House.  McFarlane and North were clearly instigators, and when 
McFarlane left, his replacement, his former deputy Vice Admiral John Poindexter, 
continued the program.  But, a great deal of the responsibility also fell on the 
shoulders of Regan.  One consequence of a hierarchical staff organization is that, 
since little is fully delegated, the hierarchical leader can be credited or blamed for 
just about everything.  The Iran-Contra initiative was not Regan’s idea, but he did 
nothing to stop it.  One of the key elements of a chief of staff ’s job—perhaps the 
key responsibility—is to be a guardian, which means to protect the interests of the 
President.  In this, Donald Regan failed, not because he took control, but because 
he did not.
 Failure to protect the President was the ultimate crime in the eyes of one other 
major White House personage:  First Lady Nancy Reagan.  Nancy Reagan had 
11 Mayer & McManus, supra note 6, at 293.
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developed a long-standing distrust of Donald Regan.  Essentially, she was not 
convinced that he put her husband’s political requirements ahead of his own.  As 
the disclosures and turmoil surrounding the Iran-Contra initiative worsened, she 
resented what seemed to be Regan’s efforts to deflect the blame onto others and 
became firmly convinced that he had to leave the Administration.12  To that end, 
she not only lobbied the President, but also brought in close friends and allies to 
help.  Regan’s opponents even began to lobby the press with damaging leaks.  Don 
Regan resisted, and the other old Irishman, Ronald Reagan, was not convinced.
 Finally, though, the President in November 1986, at the suggestion of Donald 
Regan’s aides, appointed a commission comprised of former U.S. Senator John 
Tower (R. Tex.), former Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie, and former 
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft—the so-called Tower Commission—
to investigate the leaks.  When the Tower Commission issued its report in February 
1987, it found that Regan bore central responsibility for the crisis that had gripped 
the White House.  It concluded, “More than almost any chief of staff in recent 
memory, he [Regan] asserted personal control over the White House staff and 
sought to extend his control to the National Security Advisor.  He was personally 
active in national security affairs and attended almost all of the relevant meetings 
regarding the Iran initiative.  He, as much as anyone, should have insisted that an 
orderly process be observed. . . . He must bear primary responsibility for the chaos 
that descended upon the White House when such disclosure did occur.”13
 “Chaos” was not too strong a word.  The White House had become an 
“every man for himself ” operation and clearly needed to be totally reconstructed, 
beginning with replacement of the chief of staff and his retainers.  This did not 
happen smoothly.  Don Regan felt wronged and said so.  But hanging up on the 
First Lady and the release of the Tower Commission Report made the outcome 
inevitable.14  Regan was persuaded to resign in a meeting with Vice President Bush. 
Angry that the President didn’t fire him himself and that news had leaked that 
Howard Baker would be replacing him, Regan refused to remain at his post even 
for a few days to allow for an orderly transition and, instead, penned a one-sentence 
letter that read simply and curtly:  “I hereby resign as Chief of Staff to the President 
of the United States.”15  Regan departed the White House the same day, Friday, 
February 27, 1987.
12 See, e.g., Richard Reeves, President Reagan: the Triumph of Imagination 366-67 (2005).
13 John Tower, Edmund Muskie, & Brent Scowcroft, The Tower Commission Report  81 (1987).
14 See Cannon, supra note 4, at 725, 729; Reeves, supra note 12, at 366-67, 384.
15 Donald T. Regan, For the Record:  From Wall Street to Washington 371-72 (1988); Ronald 
Reagan, An American Life 538-39 (1990).
SPECIAL ISSUE COHEN-WALCOTT 73
Cincinnatus to the Rescue:
Howard Baker as Chief of Staff
A White House in Disarray
 Upon Regan’s abrupt departure, Attorney General Ed Meese telephoned 
Howard Baker at his Washington law office and urged him to come to the White 
House immediately.  Baker demurred, saying that Reagan wanted him to wait 
until Monday.  Meese insisted:  “Howard, I think you better get over to the White 
House.  There’s no one in charge.”16  Howard Baker hadn’t wanted to be chief of staff. 
When he got to the White House and appraised the situation, his apprehension 
was justified—the former regime was in tatters, and there were doubts about the 
President’s competence.  Baker’s mandate was first to assess the President’s mental 
state and then to reconstruct the top echelons of the White House staff and try to 
save Reagan’s presidency.
 The White House staff was dysfunctional and in disarray.  Regan had been 
feared by his staff, who were viewed by many colleagues as minions of a chief of 
staff who had attempted to be a prime minister.  Baker had to shake up the staff and 
reorganize the White House.  He brought with him two close associates who had 
worked with him over the years:  James Cannon and Tom Griscom.  Cannon and 
Griscom were immediately given the assignment of interviewing as many White 
House staff as they could and of making a general assessment of the situation. 
Their findings were not encouraging—the staff system had broken down, and the 
place was in utter disarray.  Cannon, a veteran of the Ford White House, observed 
that it was “Chaos.  There was no order in the place.  The staff system had just 
broken down.  It had just evaporated.  There was no pattern of analysis, no coming 
together . . . .  I took a look at some of the staff ’s paperwork and was stunned at their 
incompetence.  They were rank amateurs.”17
 Baker understood that the process and personnel in the White House had to 
change, and fast.  In order to alleviate the paralysis that had set in, Baker had to 
clean house and repair the White House culture.  He had to put people in place that 
were loyal to Baker and Reagan, not Regan.  “When I first got Don Regan’s staff 
together,” Baker recalled,
they were obviously apprehensive and even some were hostile.  I began 
by saying, “Look, you’re not all fired immediately, but some of you will be 
fired.  Some of you will be changed . . . .  In order to serve the President 
well, I’ve got to have my own people, people I already know and trust.18
16 Mayer & McManus, supra note 6, at 385.
17 Id. at viii-ix.
18 Howard H. Baker, Jr., Interview,  Aug. 24, 2004, Transcript at 9, Ronald Reagan Oral History Project, 
Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, available at http://web1.millercenter.org/poh/transcripts/
ohp_2004_ 0824_baker.pdf .
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 One of the keys to Baker’s new system was bringing in Kenneth Duberstein 
as deputy chief of staff.  Duberstein was an experienced Reagan hand who had 
previously headed the legislative affairs shop in the first term.  Baker also brought in 
Tom Griscom as communications director and A. B. Culvahouse as White House 
counsel and point person on Iran-Contra.  Baker had initially wanted Griscom 
to serve as the President’s press secretary, but Reagan, having just hired Marlin 
Fitzwater for that position, kept Fitzwater in place.19
Reengaging Reagan
 Baker’s immediate task was to assess Reagan’s mental and physical health.  The 
reports that Baker and his people received about the President’s condition were 
alarming—alarming enough that, at a meeting at Baker’s home on Sunday, March 1, 
Cannon, Griscom, and others broached the possibility of invoking the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment.20  Two of Regan’s aides told Cannon and Griscom that the President 
was “inattentive . . . , inept . . . , [and] lazy” and that staff regularly forged Reagan’s 
initials on important documents.21  Cannon informed Baker that aides had told 
him that Reagan “wasn’t interested in the job.  They said he wouldn’t read the papers 
they gave him—even short position papers and documents.  They said he wouldn’t 
come over to work—all he wanted to do was to watch movies and television at the 
residence.”22
 Baker’s reaction was to instruct his inner circle to observe the President closely 
and see if there was any evidence supporting the claim of Reagan’s impairment.23 
Much of Baker’s first day on the job was spent observing Reagan, and he later told 
reporters that “I didn’t see an AWOL President.”24  Years later, Baker observed that 
reports of Reagan’s impaired mental state had been “really inaccurate . . . . I never 
thought Reagan was impaired . . . . I think he was fully functional, and after the first 
staff meeting I gathered up the senior staff and said, ‘Boys, this is a fully functioning 
and capable President and I don’t want to hear anymore talk about that.’”25
 Baker did, however, observe a President he characterized as “down . . . [and] 
despondent but not depressed.”26  The cure for Reagan’s malady, in Baker’s opinion: 
get Reagan reengaged.  So Baker laid out what he termed a “significant speaking 
program and public events” for the President.27  He increased the number of 
19 See generally Marlin Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!  Reagan and Bush, Sam and Helen:  A 
Decade with Presidents and the Press (1995).
20 The Twenty-fifth Amendment establishes procedures by which the Vice President becomes “Acting 
President” when the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.  See U.S. Const. amend. 
XXV, § 4.
21 J. Lee Annis, Jr., Howard Baker:  Conciliator in an Age of Crisis, 2d ed., at 213-14  (2007). 
22 Mayer & McManus,  supra note 6, at ix.
23 Bob Woodward, Shadow:  Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate 126 (1999).
24 Annis, supra note 21, at 214.
25 Baker Interview, supra note 18.
26 Id.
27 Id.
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appearances by the President outside the Beltway—both to get Reagan involved 
and to escape the gaze of a White House press corps that was obsessed with Iran-
Contra.28  Washington Post reporters Lou Cannon and David Hoffman observed at 
the time that:
President Reagan has embarked on an intensive campaign, publicly and 
privately, to demonstrate that he has changed his management approach as 
a result of the Tower commission’s critical report on the Iran-contra affair, 
White House officials say.
In the six weeks since Howard H. Baker Jr. became his chief of staff, 
Reagan has been more visibly involved in the activities of his administration 
than at any other time during his second term.
“It’s been good for him,” Baker said in an interview.  “. . . He appears 
to me to be happy, and he seems to be enthusiastic, and I think that is 
accounted for in part by the fact that he is more active now and more 
directly in contact.”
The visible signs of Reagan’s new approach are that he attends more 
meetings, hears divergent views and more freely answers policy questions.29
 Baker told Culvahouse that he had three goals in mind for the waning days 
of the Reagan presidency:  (1) survive Iran-Contra if possible and if it’s deserved, 
(2) obtain an arms agreement with the Soviet Union, and (3) elect a Republican 
president in 1988.30  In order to help achieve these goals, Baker refocused the 
strategy and tactics of the Administration by assuming a more conciliatory approach 
to the Democratic-controlled Congress in domestic affairs and focusing on deficit-
reduction.31
Baker as Chief
 Modern presidential chiefs of staff assume four major roles as chief: 
administrator of the White House process, adviser to the President, guardian of the 
President’s interests, and proxy for the President on Capitol Hill and in the media. 
Baker’s two predecessors, James Baker and Donald Regan, had widely varying styles 
and levels of success in the job.32  Howard Baker’s personality, style, and methods 
of operation were a stark contrast from those of the man he replaced.  Regan, a 
former Marine and Wall Street CEO, viewed himself, or at least operated as, a 
prime minister.  Regan also delegated little and ruled through fear.  He and his staff 
were a bottleneck for information and people—everything went through Regan, 
28 Annis, supra note 21, at 217.
29 Lou Cannon & David Hoffman, Reagan Seeks to Show Take-Charge Approach, Wash. Post, Apr. 12, 1987, 
at A1.
30 Woodward, supra note 23, at 127.
31 Lou Cannon & David Hoffman, Baker Defines Reagan Agenda, Wash. Post, Mar. 15, 1987, at A9.
32 E.g., see David B. Cohen, From the Fabulous Baker Boys to the Master of Disaster: The White House Chief of 
Staff in the Reagan and G.H.W. Bush Administrations, 32 Pres. Stud. Q. 463-83 (2002).
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and the President was cut off from many within the Administration.
 Baker’s style and view of Reagan were very different from Regan’s.  Baker did 
not rule through fear but through respect and collegiality.  He gave subordinates 
great leeway and expected accountability in return.  He opened up the process—
though all paper and people flowed through Baker and his deputy; he was not a 
bottleneck but a facilitator.  The staff felt comfortable with him and felt as if they 
had access to both the Chief of Staff and President when needed.
 Unlike Regan, Baker was comfortable delegating authority.33  He trusted Ken 
Duberstein to manage the day-to-day affairs of the White House while Baker 
focused on the big picture and grand questions.34  Tom Griscom described Baker’s 
style as “responsibility and accountability. He’d give you a lot of responsibility as 
long as you were accountable and kept him informed. . . . Senator Baker’s style, 
interestingly, was very much like President Reagan’s, which was also one of 
delegation.”35  The National Journal’s Dirk Kirschten described the process:
After five weeks on the job as chief of staff, Howard H. Baker Jr. is emerging 
as a genial ringmaster who has generously delegated managerial chores 
among a handful of key aides.  Baker, as an established political figure in 
his own right, stands out from the crowd as the most senior presidential 
confidant and counselor.  But his prime mission is to assure that a range 
of advisory voices is heard in the Oval Office.  Unlike his predecessor, 
Donald T. Regan, who sought to formalize the West Wing chain of 
reporting relationships, Baker is using a staffing strategy that counts upon 
cooperation among team players of supposedly coequal standing.  As befits 
a creature of the legislative branch, his style of operation tends toward the 
collegial rather than the hierarchical.36
 Baker embraced the role of adviser or counselor to the president.  With his 
decades in the Senate and highly accurate political antennae, he provided much 
needed political and policy advice on both domestic and foreign policy issues and 
was involved in all the major policy decisions of 1987-1988.  Baker’s political 
experience and wisdom were another stark contrast to those of his immediate 
predecessor, who was a creature of Wall Street, not the Beltway.  From Reagan’s 
Bitburg Cemetery speech to the arms-for-hostages deal, Don Regan was often 
politically tone-deaf.
 That is not to say that Howard Baker always had perfect instincts.  From the 
fiascos surrounding the failed Supreme Court nominations of Robert Bork and 
Douglas Ginsberg to telling Tom Griscom to remove the “tear down this wall” line 
33 Thomas Griscom Interview, White House Transition Project, July 19, 1999, available at http://www.
archives.gov/presidential-libraries/research/transition-interviews/pdf/griscom.pdf. 
34 See Martha Joynt Kumar, Managing the President’s Message:  The White House 
Communications Operation 145 (2007).
35 Griscom Interview, supra note 33.
36 Dick Kirschten, Aides Need Not Scale a Pyramid Now They’re Running in Circles, Nat’l J., Apr, 4, 1987, at 
824.
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from Reagan’s Brandenburg Gate speech (a suggestion which was not heeded), 
Baker himself admits that not all his advice was sage.37
 All chiefs of staff are expected to be guardians of the president’s political 
interests. Regan failed miserably and publicly in this role by not doing what he 
could to kill Iran-Contra in its infancy.  Baker’s political antennae guarded against a 
repeat of Regan’s performance.  Moreover, Baker also ensured that he was constantly 
scanning the horizon for potential problems, and one way that he accomplished 
this objective was to require that all papers addressed to or sent by the President, 
including presidential speeches, went through Baker.38
 One of the most unpleasant responsibilities of the chief of staff in his capacity 
as guardian of the President’s political interests is to perform tasks for the President 
such as firing Administration personnel, disciplining subordinates, or saying no to 
people.  Though some chiefs, such as President George H.W. Bush’s first chief of 
staff, John Sununu, relished this role, Baker did not.39  But he had to do this at 
times. Baker recounted this aspect of the job:
One of the unhappy responsibilities as chief of staff was that Ronald 
Reagan was emotionally incapable of firing anybody.  More than once 
he’d come to me and say, “Now Howard, tell me, how long has that fellow 
worked for us?”  I’d say, “Mr. President, let me make sure I understand 
what you’re asking.  Are you suggesting that perhaps he’s worked here long 
enough?”  Sometimes he’d say, “Yes, I think so.”  Then it would be my duty 
and responsibility to summon that person and tell them that the President 
did not require their services any longer, and can we be helpful in your 
future endeavor?40
 A final major role that chiefs of staff take on in the modern White House 
is that of presidential proxy.  The chief often has to be the legislative or political 
point person for the White House in its relations with Capitol Hill and the media. 
Chiefs are often called upon to oversee or directly negotiate items such as the federal 
budget with Congress, and Baker did this.  He personally negotiated budgetary and 
other important legislative items with Congress.  Baker’s years of Senate service 
served him well in this role—he already had credibility and respect on the Hill. 
For example, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D. N.Y.) commented that Baker’s 
appointment “changed the equation” with regard to Democrats not cutting off the 
final installment of aid to the Contras for the year.41  Representative Leon Panetta 
(D. Cal.), who would go on to serve as chief of staff in the Clinton Administration, 
37 Baker Interview, supra note 18.
38 Id.
39 David B. Cohen, George Bush’s Vicar of the West Wing: John Sununu as White House Chief of Staff, 24 
Congress & The Presidency 37-59 (1997).
40 Baker Interview, supra note 18.
41 Helen Dewar, Democrats Altering Strategy for Cutoff to Contra Funding:  ‘Howard Baker Changed the Equation,’ 
Wash. Post, Mar. 4, 1987, at A8.
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commented at the time that “Baker understands Congress; he knows the importance 
of negotiations.”42
Accomplishments During Baker’s Tenure
 Though relatively brief, Baker’s tenure as chief of staff in the Reagan White 
House was one of accomplishment.  Perhaps most importantly (but often 
overlooked), Ronald Reagan survived the Iran-Contra scandal.  At the time, it was 
not clear that he would, and in fact many in the media used the “I” word when 
the scandal first broke.  Baker’s proactive approach—essentially assigning White 
House counsel A. B. Culvahouse to act as the chief ’s own special prosecutor within 
the White House to poke, prod, and investigate—was a masterstroke that helped 
restore credibility both within and outside the Administration.  He also urged the 
President to go public, to talk about what went wrong, and to take responsibility for 
the ill-fated initiative, and in Baker’s first week of duty, Reagan addressed the topic 
of Iran-Contra in a prime-time, nationally televised address in which he took full 
responsibility for the scandal:
. . . I take full responsibility for my own actions and for those of my 
administration.  As angry as I may be about activities undertaken without 
my knowledge, I am still accountable for those activities.  As disappointed 
as I may be in some who served me, I’m still the one who must answer to 
the American people for this behavior. . . .
. . . . A few months ago I told the American people I did not trade arms for 
hostages.  My heart and my best intentions still tell me that’s true, but the 
facts and the evidence tell me it is not.  As the Tower board reported, what 
began as a strategic opening to Iran deteriorated, in its implementation, 
into trading arms for hostages.  This runs counter to my own beliefs, to 
administration policy, and to the original strategy we had in mind.  There 
are reasons why it happened, but no excuses.  It was a mistake.43
 Reaction on the Hill to the speech was positive:
House Minority Leader Bob Michel (R-Ill.), who watched Reagan’s 
speech with Baker at the White House, found himself humming and 
singing as he walked the congressional corridors.  Even Democrats had to 
admit something smelled different.  “Howard Baker will get votes for the 
President,” says Senator James Sasser, a Tennessee Democrat.  “He is more 
popular in Congress than either the President or his policies.”44
42 Peter Osterlund, Congress and Reagan:  Speech Didn’t Remove Key, Divisive Issues, Christian Sci. 
Monitor, Mar. 6, 1987, at 3.
43 Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy, Mar. 4, 1987, The 
American Presidency Project ( John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, eds.), available at http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33938.
44 Gloria Borger, The Hard Road Ahead on the Comeback Trail, U.S. News & World Rep., Mar. 16, 1987, at 16.
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The speech, combined with release of the Tower Commission Report and White 
House staff changes, was crucial to the nation’s moving forward from Iran-Contra 
and to the quashing of any further impeachment speculation.
 Also key to moving past Iran-Contra was the improvement in relations between 
the Reagan White House and Congress.  Baker’s years of service in the Senate and 
the respect that he had earned during his tenure on the Hill were crucial in thawing 
relations between the White House and the Democratic-controlled Congress.  Just 
a week after Baker’s appointment, members of Congress from both sides of the aisle 
were growing positive:
Republicans and Democrats alike were delighted with the appointment.  
Relief was acute among members of the president’s own party, who saw 
the Baker appointment as the first indication in weeks that Reagan had 
the instincts and capacity to revive his presidency.  Members of Congress 
were especially happy.  “It’s as though the president reached out and picked 
one of our own,” said Rep. Dick Cheney, ranking Republican on the House 
Select Committee on Iran and White House chief of staff under President 
Ford.  From the Democratic camp, power broker Robert Strauss observed, 
“This makes the White House a player again.”45
 Baker’s relations with Congress also allowed the Administration to move 
quickly and confidently on groundbreaking foreign policy issues with the Soviet 
Union.  Over a period of several months after Baker’s arrival at the White House, 
the Reagan Administration negotiated and completed a historic agreement with 
the Soviet Union in the area of arms control.  The Intermediate Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty was signed by President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary 
Mikhail Gorbachev at the White House on December 8, 1987.  By providing for 
the elimination of all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 
between 500 and 5500 kilometers, the INF Treaty represented the first time that 
the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to eliminate an entire class of 
nuclear weapons.  On May 27, 1988, the INF Treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate 
by a vote of 93 to 5.  President Reagan brought the ratification documents with him 
to Moscow in May of 1988 as the leaders of the two superpowers engaged in their 
fourth arms-control summit.  Though no other major breakthroughs between the 
United States and the USSR were accomplished there, as a public relations event, 
the summit was an enormous success.
 Perhaps a more tangible measurement of the success of the new chief of staff 
was Reagan’s rising popularity during Baker’s tenure.  Reagan’s approval ratings 
surged during the last two years of his presidency, and much of this was due to 
Baker’s quick action upon his arrival at the White House.  On the day of Donald 
Regan’s resignation, Reagan’s popularity (as measured by Gallup) hovered at around 
40%.  During Baker’s tenure, Reagan’s approval ratings were regularly more than 
50% and reached 61% at one point.  At the end of Baker’s sixteen-month service 
45 Bill Barol, One for the Gipper: Baker Signs On, Newsweek, Mar. 9, 1987, at 22.
80 BAKER CENTER JOURNAL OF APPLIED PUBLIC POLICY
as chief of staff, Reagan’s approval rating was 50%, and a few weeks before Reagan 
himself left office, the President’s approval rating was 63% (see Figure 1 below).46
Failures During Baker’s Tenure
 Baker’s tenure as chief of staff, however, was not without challenges and 
mistakes.  Perhaps the most visible misstep was that of President Reagan’s failed 
nominations of Robert Bork and Douglas Ginsburg to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Having had discussions with his old colleagues in the Senate, Baker knew that 
Bork, a brilliant jurist and a champion to conservatives but a pariah to liberals, 
would be a tough sell in the Democratic-controlled Senate.  But Reagan wanted 
46 Figure created by the authors from Gallup data compiled by John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, 
The American Presidency Project, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ data/popularity.
php?pres=40&sort =time&direct=ASC&Submit=DISPLAY.
Figure 1
Reagan Approval Rating, Feb. 27, 1987-Dec. 27, 1988
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Bork.  This was one instance in which Reagan did not listen to his chief ’s counsel. 
Howard Baker explained that:
We had made an evaluation of the prospects for the nomination in the 
Senate.  That was part of the briefing of the President.  But the President 
had high confidence that he could move anything. . . . He took account of 
the fact that there were big storm warnings about Bork ahead of time but 
it was very Reagan-like to say, “I want to do it anyway,” and he did.47
On October 23, 1987,48 the U.S. Senate rejected Bork’s appointment by a vote of 
58-42.
 Bork’s replacement was Douglas Ginsburg, a federal appeals court judge, former 
deputy assistant attorney general, and law professor.  Attorney General Ed Meese 
wanted Ginsburg; Baker pressed for Anthony Kennedy, another federal appeals 
court judge who would eventually take a seat on the high court.49  Reagan agreed 
with Meese.  Journalist Steven Roberts observed:
 President Reagan’s nomination of Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg for 
the Supreme Court has renewed tensions between White House factions 
and has frustrated Howard H. Baker Jr., the White House chief of staff, 
Administration officials said today
 One Republican politician with close ties to the White House said 
Mr. Baker and his staff were “really upset” by the choice of Judge Ginsburg, 
which Mr. Baker thought would run into considerable opposition, but that 
the chief of staff had accepted the President’s decision and would work for 
the judge’s confirmation.50
 Among other problems, Ginsburg’s habit of smoking marijuana with his law 
students forced him to withdraw his nomination after only a week and caused 
considerable embarrassment for Reagan.51  Clearly, in the rush to replace Bork, 
Ginsburg had not been vetted well enough.
 Baker was also a punching bag for the hard Right of the GOP.  Many conservatives 
distrusted the conciliatory senator from Tennessee and felt he was much too 
accommodating to Democrats and the Soviets.52  Conservatives also accused Baker 
47 Baker Interview, supra, note 18.
48 133 Cong. Rec. 29121-29122 (Oct. 23, 1987); Edward Walsh & Ruth Marcus, Bork Rejected for High 
Court:  Senate’s 58-42 Vote Sets Record for Margin of Defeat, Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 1987, at  A1.
49 Lou Cannon, Ginsburg Nomination May Trigger New Fight, Wash. Post, Oct. 30, 1987, at A1.
50 Steven V. Roberts, Ginsburg Choice Renews Tension Between Factions in White House, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 
1987, at 1.
51 See Lou Cannon & Helen Dewar, Judge Kennedy to be High-Court Nominee, Wash. Post, Nov. 11, 1987, at 
A1, A19.
52 See Bob Schieffer & Gary Paul Gates, The Acting President 85, 332-33 (1989). 
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of the ultimate heresy:  of not letting Reagan be Reagan.  Pat Buchanan, the political 
commentator who had served as White House Communications Director under 
Regan, captured the sentiment of conservatives when he wrote:
. . . The president is paying a heavy price for having deeded over so 
generous a slice of his political inheritance to a party establishment whose 
disenfranchisement, after all, was supposed to be first order of business of 
the Reagan Revolution.
. . .  The central failing of the moderate Republicans—the Baker Boys 
and the White House staff—is that they do not understand the Reagan 
coalition; they do not understand  “cause” politics; they do not understand 
the philosophical struggle on-going in America.  They are living in a 
simpler past.
. . . A decent, honorable man of the middle, Howard Baker does not 
understand the us-versus-them politics of the flank that today dominates 
both parties.53
 Reagan had the foresight to figure out that he would take heat from conservatives 
for picking Baker as chief but chose him anyway.  The day he telephoned Baker to 
ask him to be chief of staff, Reagan wrote in his diary:  “I’d probably take some 
bumps from our right wingers but I can handle that.”54
Cincinnatus Returns to Private Life
 Howard Baker survived the wrath of the Right and exited the White House on 
his own terms.  Having felt that his work in restoring the Reagan legacy had largely 
been accomplished, Baker left his post on June 30, 1988.55  Both his wife Joy and 
his stepmother were ill—during his time as chief of staff, Baker often returned to 
Tennessee to help care for Joy.56  It was time to go home and stay home.  For the final 
half-year of the Reagan presidency, Baker handed the reigns off to Ken Duberstein, 
his deputy chief of staff, who had served a sixteen-month apprenticeship.  Ronald 
Reagan summed up Baker’s service to his Administration and to the country in his 
weekly radio address two days after Baker went back home:
One man who has contributed more than his share to our country left 
government service this week.  For a year and a half, Howard Baker has 
been my Chief of Staff here at the White House.  He’s served with great 
53 Patrick J. Buchanan, How the Baker Boys Toppled Reagan: The GOP Needs Attack Dogs, Not These 
Compromising Cocker Spaniels, Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 1987, at C1-C2.
54 Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries 478 (Douglas Brinkley, ed., 2007).
55 Steven V. Roberts, Aides Say Baker Felt Task Finished, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1988, at A20.
56 See Annis, supra note 21, at 228.
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distinction, helping me guide important legislation through Congress, as 
well as helping me at the summits with Mr. Gorbachev in Washington and 
Moscow.  Serving with distinction is nothing new for Howard Baker.  He 
did it for almost two decades in the United States Senate, the last 4 years 
as majority leader.  I know I’ll miss him around the White House.57
 
 Like Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, when duty called, Howard Baker served 
his country.  When his job was finished, he voluntarily surrendered the reigns of 
power and returned to private life in Huntsville, Tennessee.  Though he had once 
been Reagan’s competitor for the 1980 GOP presidential nomination and though 
it had cost him any chance to run for the White House in 1988, Baker agreed 
to serve as chief of staff because the President asked him and needed him.  In so 
doing, Howard Baker helped rescue not only Ronald Reagan’s presidency but the 
President’s legacy as well.
57 Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on the Resignation of Howard Baker as Chief of Staff to 
the President and the Administration’s Agenda, July 2, 1988,  The American Presidency Project ( John T. 
Woolley & Gerhard Peters, eds.), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/?pid=36078.
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The President’s Nominee:
Robert Bork and the Modern Judicial Confirmation Process
Keith E. Whittington1
 The 1987 battle over the nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the U.S. Supreme 
Court continues to affect American politics.  Bork’s failed nomination was the 
first in over fifteen years, and on its face Bork’s troubles did not seem comparable 
to those Richard Nixon’s doomed nominations of Clement Haynsworth and G. 
Harrold Carswell.  The explicitly ideological and partisan struggle over the Bork 
nomination seemed distinctive.  The fight was embittering and seemed to set the 
tone for, or perhaps simply symbolize, a new era of contested judicial nominations. 
Rightly or wrongly, it remains a touchstone for modern difficulties and challenges 
in the confirmation process.
 President Reagan’s inability to place Bork on the Court still has consequences 
for the judiciary itself.  Lewis Powell’s seat that Bork was nominated to fill eventually 
went to Anthony Kennedy.  Of course, Justice Kennedy has long been a pivotal vote 
on a closely divided Supreme Court, and he continues to serve on the Court over 
two decades after Bork’s defeat.  Had Bork filled that seat instead, the current Court 
would look quite different.  Justice Samuel Alito or Chief Justice John Roberts 
might now be the median justice on the Court instead of Justice Kennedy.
 In considering the Bork nomination and what it tells us about modern Supreme 
Court appointment politics, this article is divided into three parts.  The first part 
begins by considering the opportunities that the president has to place justices on 
the Court and by doing so to influence the direction of the Court and constitutional 
law.  The second part examines some factors that made the early Senate a much 
riskier environment than the modern Senate is, while also revealing the extent to 
which divided government is now the critical variable in the confirmation calculus. 
The third part focuses on the Bork nomination itself and the division between 
conservatives and moderates within Republican ranks as the Reagan administration 
tried to make the most of its opportunity to fill a seat on the Court.
I.
 In his classic article on the Supreme Court’s relationship to the rest of the 
political system, the political scientist Robert Dahl echoed the sentiment of the 
turn-of-the-century fictional bartender Mr. Dooley:  The Supreme Court follows 
the election returns.  Mr. Dooley was not very specific about why the Court would 
do that, but writing in the middle of the twentieth century, Dahl pointed to the 
mechanism that he thought tied the Court to the electorate.  The Court is staffed 
through a political appointments process.  As Dahl pointed out, over the Court’s 
history a new justice is appointed on average every twenty-two months.  With 
those odds in mind, a president might expect to appoint two justices during a single 
term of office and four justices if reelected.  Most presidents might reasonably start 
1 Keith E. Whittington is William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics at Princeton University.
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their administration optimistic about their ability to “tip the balance on a normally 
divided Court” (Dahl 1957, 284).
 Things have changed a bit since Dahl wrote at the dawn of the Warren Court. 
Recently, there has been some fretting over how long justices serve and conversely 
how often new vacancies appear on the high bench (Cramton and Carrington 2006; 
Crowe and Karpowitz 2007).  With a half-century distance on Dahl, the numbers 
have changed a bit.  Across American history as a whole, we would now say that 
on average a vacancy has opened up on the Court every twenty-five months.  The 
historical average is obviously being driven up somewhat by the modern experience, 
where vacancies have become somewhat more precious.  Even thinking in these 
simple terms, a president could not readily expect to appoint two justices during a 
single term of office or four during two terms.
 One way that Dahl highlighted the frequency of vacancies on the Court was 
by looking at the interval between appointments to the Court.  Table 1 replicates 
and updates his own findings on this.  Taking into account all the successful 
Supreme Court nominations in American history, the table shows the distribution 
of appointments by how much time passed between appointments.  As Table 1 
highlights, the majority of appointments to the Court have come in close succession 
to one another.  In most cases, relatively little time passes before the president is able 
to place a justice on the Supreme Court.  Nearly half of the appointments have come 
within a year of the preceding one.  There have been occasions when the country has 
gone for relatively long periods without an appointment to the Court—as long as 
decade—but such occasions are exceedingly rare in American history.  It is perhaps 
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Table 1:
The Interval Between Appointments to the Supreme Court
 Intervals in Years Percent of Total Cumulative
  Appointments Percentage
 Less than 1 43% 43%
 1 23% 66%
 2 10% 76%
 3 10% 86%
 4 7% 93%
 5 5% 98%
 . . . . . . . . .
 11 2% 100%
NOTE:  The table excludes the six appointments made in 1789.  It measures by day of nomination to 
the Senate.  The results differ somewhat from Dahl’s calculation, presumably due to how appointments 
were measured.  The extreme outliers are between the appointments of Duvall and Thompson in the 
Jeffersonian era and of Breyer and Roberts in the modern era.
SOURCE:  “Supreme Court Nominations, 1789-present,” http://www.senate.gov/ pagelayout/
reference/nominations/ reverseNominations.htm
not surprising that recent discussions of judicial terms limits emerged during one 
of these historical outliers.  Even with another half century of experience, Table 1 
still reinforces Dahl’s point that Supreme Court appointments happen frequently, 
and most presidents might reasonably expect to have a significant influence on the 
shape of the Court by adding new justices to the bench.
 But from the perspective of an individual president, averages may matter 
less than the variation.  As Dahl (1957, 285) wryly noted, Franklin Roosevelt 
had “unusually bad luck” in not being able to make an appointment to the Court 
during his entire first term of office.  The consequences of Roosevelt’s unusually 
bad luck for both the country and the political institutions involved were rather 
severe.  Other presidents have had unusually good luck.  Eisenhower made five 
appointments to the Court in two terms; Richard Nixon made four in less than 
two terms; Taft made six in his two terms as president.  History also shows that 
the timing of vacancies matters.  Vacancies near the end of a presidential term have 
often proven difficult to fill (Whittington 2007).  It matters when vacancies occur.
 Another way of looking at this is to consider the distribution of Supreme 
Court appointments across four-year presidential terms of office.  Table 2 provides 
that distribution.  The table highlights four-year terms rather than individual 
presidencies or presidential administrations since the concern is with how 
appointments are distributed across electoral cycles.  Dahl emphasized the average 
length of time between appointments, but from the perspective of a newly elected 
president with an uncertain prospect of reelection, what have been the prospects 
of filling seats on the high bench?  The story in Table 2 looks a little different. 
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Table 2:
Number of Supreme Court Appointments Per Presidential 
Term
 Number of
 Appointments Percent of Total Cumulative
 per Term Appointments Percentage
 0 18% 18%
 1 20% 38%
 2 32% 70%
 3 14% 84%
 4 9% 93%
 5 5% 98%
 6 2% 100%
NOTE:  The table excludes the six appointments made in 1789 and includes only nominees who took a 
seat on the Supreme Court.
SOURCE:  “Supreme Court Nominations, 1789-present,” http://www.senate.gov/ pagelayout/
reference/nominations/ reverseNominations.htm
Nearly a fifth of presidential terms have passed without a single Supreme Court 
appointment being made.  Nearly forty percent of presidential terms have seen one 
or fewer new Supreme Court justices assume their robes.
 Once we take into account the variance in the frequency of Supreme Court 
appointments, Franklin Roosevelt’s first term begins to look a little less like 
“unusually bad luck.”  His poor luck was shared by many presidents, including 
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Andrew Johnson, Woodrow Wilson, Calvin 
Coolidge, and Jimmy Carter.  The relatively small interval between appointments 
that appears in Table 1 in part reflects a clustering that can occur with appointments. 
The opportunities that Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, U.S. Grant, Benjamin 
Harrison, William Howard Taft, and Franklin Roosevelt had to make large number 
of appointments to the Court in rapid succession drove up the percentage of 
appointments in the categories at the top of Table 1.  But those are not the normal 
presidential administrations.  Those presidents were able to have an outsized 
influence on the Court.  Opportunities that fell to them might well have been denied 
to others.  In some cases, of course, presidents were specifically blocked from being 
able to make judicial appointments, as was the case with Andrew Johnson who was 
filling out Abraham Lincoln’s second term and had Supreme Court vacancies taken 
away from him by a hostile Congress.  But consider that in a single term of office 
William Howard Taft was able to make six appointments to the Court, while in the 
three previous terms William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt were only able to 
make a total of four appointments.  The distribution of appointments across time 
is lumpy, and presidents cannot necessarily expect many opportunities to influence 
the composition of the Court.
 Every Supreme Court appointment is precious.  Over the long-term, Dahl’s 
point remains true that the elected branches will put their mark on the judiciary 
through the appointments process.  For any individual president, the prospect of 
a vacancy, or two, in any given term of office remains highly uncertain.  Vacancies 
cannot be taken for granted, and the possibility of influencing the Court through 
a carefully chosen appointment cannot be taken lightly by an administration that 
cares about the future of constitutional doctrine.
II.
 Dahl also simplified things by largely ignoring the details of the appointment 
process.  His focus was on a “national lawmaking majority” or “political coalition.” 
With Progressive and New Deal battles in mind, his basic point was both important 
and salient—that conservative political parties appointed more conservative 
justices, and liberal political parties appointed more liberal justices, and when a 
political party controlled the lawmaking institutions of the national government, 
it had fairly quickly been able to turn the Court in its favor by appointing its 
own party faithful to the bench.  Dahl could afford to ignore the details of the 
appointment process—that is, the division between the president and the Senate—
but we cannot.  Those divisions have consequences now that they did not have at 
earlier points in American history.
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 Over the course of American history, twenty-seven presidential nominees to 
the U.S. Supreme Court have been rejected by the Senate.2  That is just under 
a fifth of the total number of names that presidents have put before the Senate. 
Dahl happened to be writing during a period of historic success in presidential 
nominations to the Supreme Court, however.  With the notable exception of the 
dramatic failure of Herbert Hoover’s nomination of Judge John Parker to the Court 
in 1930, the first half of the twentieth century was a period of relatively smooth 
sailing for Supreme Court appointments.  The American experience more generally 
suggests that presidents often have difficulty getting their choices for the Court 
through the Senate.
 The details of the appointment process might not matter to Dahl’s central 
concern if failures are idiosyncratic.  That is ultimately our quarry as well.  In what 
ways might presidents need to worry about the Senate when they do have the 
opportunity to try to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court?
 Divided government has been an uncommon but difficult environment for 
Supreme Court nominations.  Relatively few nominations have been made during 
periods of explicitly divided government, but these situations account for a high 
percentage of the failures in presidential nominations to the Supreme Court.  A 
third of all failed Supreme Court nominations have occurred when the president 
and the Senate are in the hands of different political parties.  The failure rate for 
Supreme Court nominations is twice as high during periods of divided government 
as it is during periods of unified government.  Moreover, the relative success of 
2 The focus here is on official nominations to the U.S. Senate that are clearly rejected by direct action or 
deliberate inaction.  For details, see Whittington 2006, 410.
Table 3:
Supreme Court Nominations by Party Control,
1789-2010
  Divided Government Unified Government
 Number confirmed 18 105
 Number not
 confirmed 8 19
 Failure rate (%) 31% 15%
NOTE:  Number confirmed includes individuals who declined to serve.  President and Senate 
majority party identity is nominal.  For details, see Whittington 2006.
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unified government has not historically required large, filibuster-proof majorities 
but has been emerged even with fairly slim partisan majorities.
 Looking at the raw numbers, divided government would appear to be bad news 
for Supreme Court nominees.  Unified government would appear to be a much safer 
environment, though not completely secure.  As with the frequency of Supreme 
Court nominations, however, the historical averages regarding divided and unified 
government are misleading.  There are some important differences over time that 
have shaped the strategic environment within which presidents make Supreme 
Court nominations.
 Some have argued that the nineteenth-century Senate was a more aggressive 
gatekeeper than the more modern Senate (Tulis 1997).  Certainly it is true that 
a quarter of the nominees to the Supreme Court prior to 1900 were rejected.  By 
contrast, just under ten percent of the nominees since 1900 have been rejected. 
Something is different about the early Senate compared to the more modern Senate.
 Two differences can be briefly noted here, one relating to the electoral calendar 
and the other relating to party behavior.  The fixed American electoral calendar 
means that some vacancies may arise near a presidential election, or even during the 
lame-duck period after a new president as been selected.  This window for late-term 
and lame-duck vacancies and appointments was much larger prior to the adoption 
of the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution in 1933, which shortened 
congressional terms and set the inauguration day at January 20th rather than the 
traditional date of March 4th.  We might expect that Supreme Court nominations 
made near or after presidential elections would have a more difficult time making 
it through the Senate confirmation process than nominations made in the middle 
of the legislative session.  As the session nears its end, obstruction becomes a more 
attractive strategy.  The time to move a nominee through the process is limited, and 
there is a possibility that the opposition can simply wait out the president and hold 
the vacancy over to the next presidential administration.  In the middle of a term, 
there is no prospect that a vacancy will eventually be filled by a different president. 
The Senate must ultimately come to terms with the sitting president and the type 
of nominees that he favors, giving the president a much greater advantage in his 
dealings with the Senate.
 In practice, late-term appointments were much more common early in American 
history than they have been more recently.  The last lame-duck nomination, for 
example, occurred in 1892, when Republican President Benjamin Harrison tried 
to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court after he had been defeated by Democrat 
Grover Cleveland.  Harrison was eventually successful, but only after negotiating 
with the Democratic minority to nominate one of their own to fill the seat, former 
Democratic Senator Howell Jackson, who had been appointed to the federal circuit 
court during Cleveland’s first term as president (Friedman 1983, 40).  In total, 
presidents have made nineteen Supreme Court nominations within six months of 
an upcoming presidential election or after an election.  All but two of those came 
before 1900.  On the whole, they have distinctly higher failure rates than other 
nominations.  Upwards of half of those nominations have failed to be confirmed, 
compared to just over ten percent of nominations made at other points during 
90 BAKER CENTER JOURNAL OF APPLIED PUBLIC POLICY
the presidential term (Whittington 2006, 417).  These few nominations have an 
outsized effect on our image of the nineteenth-century Senate as a bulwark against 
presidential choices to fill judicial vacancies.  The nineteenth-century Senate’s 
track record for rejecting presidential nominees for the Court is inflated by these 
historically unusual late-term appointments.
 Party behavior as it relates to Supreme Court nominations has not been entirely 
uniform across American history either.  Table 3 calls our attention to the relatively 
large failure rate of Supreme Court nominees during periods of divided government. 
But it is also notable how many failures, in absolute terms, have occurred during 
unified government.  In the nineteenth century, presidents quite often had difficulty 
getting Supreme Court nominees past their own co-partisans in the Senate. 
That experience is (mostly) reflective of features of politics that are unlikely to be 
prominent today.  During periods of party instability and fragmentation, some 
presidents were only nominally members of the same political party as the Senate 
majority, and the government was unified in name only.  President John Tyler may 
have been a kind of Whig, but the Whig leadership in Congress regarded him as 
an apostate and a pretender to the office of chief executive (Morgan 1954).  Tyler 
was also persistent.  He had six nominations rejected by the Whig Senate in 
rapid succession, before finally winning confirmation for a respected Whig jurist 
after a Democrat won the presidential election of 1844.  In other cases, senators 
of the same party were willing to send the president back to the well in making 
a Supreme Court nomination if the original nominee offended party interests or 
factional cohesion.  Republican senators used the nomination of Ebenezer Hoar 
to the Supreme Court by President Grant as an opportunity to extract payback for 
Hoar’s civil service crusade while attorney general (Warren 1922, 3:223-229).
 These additional factors in the historic experience with Supreme Court 
confirmations are summarized in Table 4.  The table highlights that the 
appointments process was much riskier prior to 1900 than it has been since 1900. 
Nonetheless, there have been some notable shifts over time in the appointments 
process.  Late-term nominations have always been exceedingly risky, and they were 
once quite common.  They have virtually disappeared from modern politics.  The 
resignation of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes to accept the 1916 Republican 
nomination for the presidency and the resignation of Chief Justice Earl Warren 
on the eve of the 1968 election in an ill-fated attempt to prevent Richard Nixon 
from choosing his successor are the only modern exceptions and emphasize their 
exceptional nature.  Nominations now come in the middle of presidential terms. 
As Table 4 highlights, it was once the case that during the middle of their terms, 
presidents had to fear the Senate when it was controlled by their own party but not 
when it was controlled by the opposite party.  The sole exception during divided 
government was when the lame duck Whig Senate rejected the nomination of the 
hated Roger Taney to be associate justice out of spite.  Andrew Jackson only needed 
to wait a few months to try again.  (As it happened, the position of chief justice 
opened up during the interval.)  By contrast, a quarter of the nominees made during 
divided government in the middle of a presidential term have gone down in defeat 
since the turn of the twentieth century.  No matter what else could be said about 
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those failed nominees, they certainly were not as politically polarizing as Roger 
Taney in 1835.  Even as modern nominations have become riskier during divided 
government, they have become easier during periods of united government.  Since 
1900, only John Parker and Harriet Miers have failed to win confirmation when 
sent to a same-party Senate in the middle of a presidential term.
 Divided government has become a crucial factor affecting judicial nominations. 
This was not always the case.  Presidents had difficulty from the opposition party 
when they tried to make nominations near the end of their terms, but traditionally 
the opposition did not resist the president’s choice for the Supreme Court when 
the president was staying in place.  Modern appointment politics is distinctly 
different.  The focus is more ideological and, as a consequence, more partisan.  The 
opposition party is now concerned with playing the spoiler on ideological grounds 
and negotiating with a sitting president for a better nominee, just as the allied party 
once did on factional and patronage grounds.
Table 4:
Supreme Court Nominations by Timing and Party Control, 
1789-2010
  Divided Government Unified Government
 
  Late- Not Late- Late- Not Late-
  Term Term Term Term
 Pre-1900
 Number
 Confirmed 0 6 8 50
 Number Not
 Confirmed 4 1 5 11
 Post-1900    
 Number
 Confirmed 0 12 1 46
 Number Not
 Confirmed 0 3 1 2
NOTE:  “Late-Term” nominations include all nominations made within six months of a presi-
dential election or after the election.  For details, see Whittington 2006.
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III.
 The Reagan administration came into office in 1981 anticipating the 
possibility of vacancies on the Supreme Court and hoping to make the most of 
them.  Planning started early and was unusual in the extent to which judicial 
philosophy was prioritized over other political and personal goals.  Unlike many 
other presidents, Reagan did not look to personal acquaintances and friends as 
his primary pool for potential nominees, nor did he identify strong preferences for 
particular demographic characteristics in his nominees.  He opened the door for his 
subordinates to canvass the options to identify the best candidates who would carry 
the administration’s constitutional views into the Supreme Court.
 President Jimmy Carter had been shut out from making an appointment 
to the Supreme Court.  The Reagan administration was given an immediate 
opportunity to influence the Court when Justice Potter Stewart sent word soon 
after the inauguration that he planned to retire.  The job of identifying a nominee 
was divided between the White House and the Justice Department.  The Justice 
Department took the lead in conducting the research on the nominees, meaning 
that Attorney General William French Smith’s ultimate choice of Judge Sandra Day 
O’Connor would likely dominate the deliberations of the White House Counsel’s 
office.  Chief Justice Warren Burger had called O’Connor to the attention of both 
the Justice Department and the White House, catapulting her to the top of the list 
of female candidates (Yalof 1999, 135-36).
 Robert Bork was on the White House short-list in 1981.  When Edwin 
Meese became attorney general, the process for considering judicial nominees 
was revamped, and Bork was placed on the Justice Department’s short-list for any 
Supreme Court vacancy.  The Justice Department gave little attention to issues of 
confirmability when assessing candidates and regarded Bork and Antonin Scalia 
as equally attractive.  In 1986, the White House pushed Scalia over Bork in part 
to avoid adding to a confirmation fight that was already expected for William 
Rehnquist (Yalof 1999, 150-54).
 Bork had missed his chance at being nominated in 1986 in part because of 
concerns that the combination of him and Rehnquist would be hard to push 
through the Senate.  In 1986, the Republicans controlled the Senate.  The 
Democrats managed to hold up Rehnquist’s appointment to be Chief Justice, and 
they cast a historically large number of votes against his appointment, but in the 
end they had little chance of derailing his confirmation.  History suggested that the 
biggest risk the White House faced in 1986 was division within its own party.  If 
the administration could avoid a revolt from its own ranks, then it should expect 
to win confirmation for its nominees during periods of unified government.  In a 
narrowly divided Senate, the Republicans lost only two senators on the Rehnquist 
vote (Charles Mathias and Lowell Weicker), while picking up sixteen Democratic 
votes.
 The situation was quite different when Justice Powell retired in 1987.  Bork was 
still on the short-list and favored by both Justice Department and White House 
officials as a strong advocate for the administration’s conservative constitutional 
philosophy.  The president personally indicated that he wanted Bork to be in the 
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mix for the Powell vacancy (Wermiel, Seib, and Birnbaum 1987, 24).  But the 
Republicans had lost control of the Senate in the 1986 midterm elections, and 
Reagan’s personal clout had been damaged by the Iran-Contra scandal that emerged 
in the fall of 1986.  If there was reason to be concerned about his confirmability in 
1986, it should have been significantly heightened in 1987.  The administration no 
longer had to hold its own party.  Administration officials now had to win over the 
other party, or at least a significant component of it.
 The White House had the advantage of being able to nominate other individuals 
who shared its philosophy to the vacancy, minimizing the value to the Senate of 
obstructing any single nominee.  But if the Democrats doubted the resolve of the 
White House to keep up the fight, or if they regarded a given nominee as uniquely 
unsuitable, then obstruction could still work to their advantage.  Just as Robert Bork 
was almost uniquely attractive to members of the conservative legal movement, he 
was a particular lightening rod to interest groups of the legal left.  Keeping him 
off the Court might well have been valuable to activists on the left even if the 
president were ultimately successful in appointing a similarly conservative justice 
to fill the vacancy.  If there was no “similar justice,” then fighting the nomination 
becomes all the more worthwhile.  If the bullpen of plausible conservative nominees 
was sufficiently thin, then Reagan might be forced to move to a more moderate 
nominee simply because he had exhausted his list, even laying aside any desire on 
the administration’s part to compromise and seek out a more confirmable nominee. 
In fact, the internal candidate lists do not suggest that the administration had 
many potential nominees in mind who would have been the functional equivalent 
to Scalia or Bork.  Once those names were exhausted, compromises had to be 
made.  Any other selection was unlikely to be fully satisfying to conservative goals 
(Yalof 1999, 156-57).  Just as Richard Nixon found few attractive candidates who 
could meet his optimal political criteria for Supreme Court nominations (e.g., 
sitting Republican Southern judges) in the late 1960s, so Reagan found few well-
credentialed conservatives suitable for promotion to the Supreme Court in the 
1980s. For Democrats in the Senate, defeating Bork would almost necessarily mean 
moving down the list to someone like Anthony Kennedy.
 White House personnel had also undergone significant changes since Bork 
was passed over in favor of Scalia in 1986.  By the time of the Powell vacancy in 
1987, the White House had a new counsel, Arthur Culvahouse, and chief of staff, 
former Senate majority leader Howard Baker, both of whom would be closely 
involved in any Supreme Court appointment.  The White House now put more 
consideration into problems of confirmability, including the possibility that a long 
confirmation fight would distract political resources that might have been needed 
elsewhere late in the president’s second term and after the Iran-Contra scandal. 
The administration committed to nominating Bork, but the decision was not as 
straightforward as it would have seemed in 1986.
 For conservatives inside and outside the administration, Baker’s hesitation 
and tentativeness about the Bork nomination indicated a lack of commitment 
(Evans and Novak 1987).  Baker certainly did not hide his view that Bork was a 
“controversial” nominee who would have a hard time being confirmed (Anonymous 
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3 July 1987; Anonymous 6 July 1987).  Conservatives accused Baker of preferring 
more moderate goals for the Court.  They thought he should challenge the Senate and 
rally conservatives behind the appointment.  As conservatives quickly recognized, 
the Bork confirmation was going to be a political battle, and they preferred to put 
pressure on senators to support their nominee just as liberal groups were putting 
pressure on senators to oppose the nominee.  Free Congress Foundation president 
Paul Weyrich complained that Baker just did not “understand the national coalition 
that put Reagan in office. The price is a presidency without punch” (Gerstenzang 
and Fritz 1987).
 The White House recognized that they needed to sell the nominee to the 
Democratic majority if they were going to be successful.  Not unreasonably, they 
assumed conservatives and Republicans would eventually support the nominee. 
But Republicans no longer controlled the Senate.  Mobilizing conservatives would 
be unlikely to secure a majority vote either in the Judiciary Committee or on the 
chamber floor.  The pivotal votes were held by more moderate Democrats.
 Baker thought the administration needed to vet the names of some potential 
nominees with the Senate, and Baker and Meese visited several senators with a list 
in hand.  Baker portrayed these visits as a process of genuine consultation and an 
effort to get feedback.  Some Democratic senators viewed these visits as pro forma 
announcements that Bork would be the nominee.  In either case, the administration 
quickly decided to move forward with Bork, and nothing that the senators had said 
was regarded as decisive in indicating that he could not be confirmed (Yalof 1999, 
159-60; Vieira and Gross 1998, 11).
 With a coalition of liberal interest groups and prominent liberal senators like 
Ted Kennedy coming out in strong opposition to the Bork nomination, Baker and the 
White House chose a more low-key approach to winning over enough Democratic 
votes to secure confirmation.  White House officials remained convinced that most 
Democratic senators would not let ideological disagreements prevent them from 
voting in favor of a qualified judicial nominee.  Senators had once indicated as much 
about Bork himself, but were quickly backing off such statements now that the 
nomination was becoming a reality (Yalof 1999, 158).  The White House brought in 
lobbyist Tom Korologos to help sell the nomination.  As he emphasized, “the votes 
they needed were from the moderates” (Vieira and Gross 1998, 36).  In order to win 
those votes, the White House thought, Bork needed to be packaged as a mature, 
mainstream jurist, not as a conservative intellectual.  Baker, for example, went to the 
NAACP convention to urge the organization not to commit itself to defeating the 
nomination (Cottman 1987).  The goal was to defuse the opposition and convince 
moderates that they had no reasonable basis for opposing the nomination.  Rather 
than contributing to making the Bork confirmation debate an ideological battle 
with Bork positioned with as a conservative firebrand poised to overthrow swaths 
of established precedents—as many conservative activists wanted—Baker hoped 
to reframe the discussion in more traditional terms as about legal qualifications 
(Annis 2007, 221).  If moderates could be dissuaded from joining in an ideological 
vote, then the White House could afford to lose more the more liberal senators and 
still win a majority in a Democratic Senate.
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 The effort was unsuccessful.  The public campaign against Bork had framed 
him as an extremist.  Liberal interest groups had put substantial pressure on 
wavering senators to vote against the nominee.  The president had just lost support 
in the 1986 elections and had little leverage with which to persuade the newly 
elected Democrats or moderate Republicans (Annis 2007, 222-25).  In particular, 
the president had just lost ground in the South, where he had actively campaigned 
against the southern Democratic senators whose votes were now pivotal to the 
Bork confirmation (Annis 2007, 223).  Those senators owed a greater debt to their 
African-American constituents who were now being mobilized by the NAACP 
and others against Bork than to conservative groups who had favored Republican 
candidates in the 1986 elections (Wermiel, Seib, and Birnbaum 1987, 24).  Going 
into the nomination, the administration worried most that Bork would primarily 
suffer from old scandals, such as his involvement in the firing of the Watergate 
special prosecutor.  In the end, the opposition was content to focus on ideological 
disagreements.  They built the case that that was enough to oppose a Supreme 
Court nominee.  They had already developed that argument when blocking some 
of the Reagan administration’s nominations to the lower courts.  Some individuals, 
they contended, were simply too far out of the mainstream to be confirmable.  That 
argument was now applied to Robert Bork, despite his earlier success in being 
appointed to the federal circuit court.  In the end, the White House had to fall back 
to the confirmable Anthony Kennedy, the candidate favored by Howard Baker all 
along (Ostrow and Gerstenzang 1987).
 The idea that some individuals are too far out of the mainstream to be 
confirmable and that senators should take into account ideology when casting their 
votes on judicial nominees is now commonplace.  It was not readily predictable 
that so many senators would act on that view when Bork was nominated.  Such 
developments were underway, but the Bork confirmation battle solidified them 
and made them much more visible.  It is now routine for nominees like Alito 
and Roberts to lose a large number of votes from the other party.  If those same 
nominations were made during a period of divided government, it seems likely that 
they would be defeated.
IV.
 Presidents cannot take their opportunities to make appointments to the 
Supreme Court for granted.  Although some presidents have been able to 
significantly reshape the Court through the appointments process, many others 
have had relatively little influence on the Court.  Vacancies do not appear regularly, 
and when they do appear, presidents are not always able to use them to shift the 
direction of the Court.
 One constraint on the ability of presidents to influence the Court is the 
participation of the Senate in the confirmation process.  Across its history, the 
Senate has often rejected presidential nominees to the Supreme Court, but many 
of those rejections now appear idiosyncratic or driven by political considerations 
of little long-term interest.  The emergence of the close ideological examination of 
judicial nominees by the modern Senate is a noteworthy and historically distinctive 
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phenomenon.  It is only in the modern era that successful Supreme Court nominees 
routinely receive large numbers of negative votes from their ideological opponents. 
It is only in the modern era that divided government poses serious threats to 
Supreme Court nominees in the middle of the presidential administration.  The 
ideological polarization of the parties and the surrounding interest groups focused 
on the judiciary has increased the odds of Bork-like fights.  As White House Chief 
of Staff, Howard Baker tried to dampen the political fires so that the debate over 
the Bork nomination could take place on the neutral ground of legal credentials 
and intellectual qualifications.  Neither side of the political divide was interested in 
limiting the terms of the debate.
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IMAGES FROM A 
LIFE IN PUBLIC SERVICE 
  HOWARD H. BAKER JR. PAPERS 
Howard H. Baker, Jr. and Joy Dirksen Baker (standing) with 
Congressman Howard H. Baker Sr. and Darek Dirksen Baker (seated), ca. 1956 
 
U.S. SENATE PHOTOGRAPH 
Howard H. Baker, Jr. is sworn in as Tennessee’s newest U.S. Senator, January 1967 
(left to right) Sen. Mike Mansfield, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, Baker, 
Sen. Everett M. Dirksen 
 
HOWARD H. BAKER JR. PAPERS 
Sen. Baker with father-in-law Sen. Dirksen 
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. PAPERS 
Sen. Baker and daughter Cissy (lower left) attend President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
State of the Union Message, 1967 or 1968 
Sen. Robert Byrd stands to Cissy’s right, and  Sen. Everett M. Dirksen is at Baker’s left.  Below 
President Johnson are Sen. Clinton Anderson (D. N.M.), Sen. James B. Allen (D. Ala.), 
Sen. J. William Fulbright (D. Ark.), and Sen. Jennings Randolph (D. W. Va.), 
Congressman John J. Duncan (R. Tenn.) stands at right near upper corner. 
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. PAPERS 
Sen. Baker with former President Dwight D. Eisenhower and 
former Vice President Richard M. Nixon 
 Freshman Sen. Baker with 
a copy of H.R. 2508, 
1967.  Baker joined Sen. 
Edward M. Kennedy (D. 
Mass.) in successfully 
opposing the measure, 
which would have under-
mined the Supreme 
Court’s one-man, one vote 
rulings and which was 
supported by his father-in
-law, Senate Minority 
Leader Everett M. Dirk-
sen (R. Ill.).  Dirksen told 
Baker, “Howard, if you’re 
going to fight, try to win.”  
He did. 
 U.S. SENATE PHOTOGRAPH COURTESY OF  U.S. SENATE HISTORICAL OFFICE  
Sen. Baker meeting with a group of Tennessee farmers from Crockett County 
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. PAPERS 
 Sen. Baker with Congressman Richard Fulton (D. Tenn.) (left) and WSM’s 
Jud Collins (center), anchoring Tennessee’s election-night coverage, 1970. 
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. PAPERS 
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. PAPERS 
Sen. Baker campaigning for re-election from the Baker Special, 1972 
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WHITE HOUSE PHOTOGRAPH 
Sen. Baker with President Richard M. Nixon and an unidentified military aide 
 
U.S. SENATE PHOTOGRAPH 
 Former U.S. Attorney General John Mitchell and Sen. Baker 
WHITE HOUSE PHOTOGRAPH 
Sen. Baker with President Richard M. Nixon and an unidentified military aide 
 
U.S. SENATE PHOTOGRAPH 
 Former U.S. Attorney General John Mitchell and Sen. Baker 
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. PAPERS 
The Senate Watergate Committee in Session 
(left to right) Sen. Edward Gurney, Minority Counsel Fred Thompson, Sen. Baker, 
Sen. Ervin, Majority Counsel Sam Dash, Assistant Majority Counsel James Hamilton 
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. PAPERS 
The Senate Watergate Committee Leadership: 
Sen. Baker and Sen. Sam Ervin (D. N.C.) 
(Left) 
Editorial cartoonist 
Charlie Daniel’s take on 
the relationship between 
Sen. Baker and Sen. 
Ervin. 
 
COURTESY OF CHARLIE DANIEL 
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. PAPERS 
(Right)  
Sen. Lowell Weicker, 
Sen. Baker, Assistant 
Chief Counsel James 
Hamilton (back to cam-
era), Sen. Ervin, Chief 
Counsel Sam Dash 
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. PAPERS 
Sen. Baker:  “What did the President know, and when did he know it?” 
COURTESY OF THE  JIMMY CARTER LIBRARY 
Senate leaders in the battle over ratification of the Panama Canal treaties, 1978 
(left to right) Sen. Baker, Sen. Paul Laxalt (R. Nev.), Sen. Byrd, and Sen. Frank Church (D. Idaho) 
As indicated in this 
editorial cartoon by 
The Knoxville Jour-
nal’s Charlie Daniel, 
Sen. Baker’s support 
for ratification  of the 
Panama Canal trea-
ties, even with reser-
vations, was not politi-
cally popular back 
home in Tennessee, 
where he was running 
for re-election to the 
Senate.  He won none-
theless. 
 COURTESY OF CHARLIE DANIEL 
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. PAPERS 
Newly elected Senate Majority Leader Baker meets the press, December 5, 1980 
Senate Leaders Baker and Robert Byrd 
U. S. SENATE PHOTOGRAPH 
U.S. SENATE PHOTOGRAPH 
Sen. Baker with Senate Republican Colleagues 
(left to right) Sen. Wallace Bennett (R. Utah), Sen. Baker, Sen. Norris Cotton (R. N.H.)  
U.S. SENATE PHOTOGRAPH 
COURTESY OF U.S. HISTORICAL OFFICE 
Sen. Baker speaks to a 
group of civil rights 
leaders and representa-
tives of the NAACP on 
the twenty-fifth anniver-
sary of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in 
Brown v. Bd. of Educa-
tion (1954). Actor Ossie 
Davis is at Baker’s 
right. Sen. Claiborne 
Pell (D.R.I.) stands at 
far right. 
COURTESY OF U.S. SENATE HISTORICAL OFFICE 
  
WHITE HOUSE PHOTOGRAPH  
COURTESY OF THE RONALD W. REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY & MUSEUM 
In the Rose Garden of the White House on November 2, 1983, President Reagan signs legislation into law 
designating a national holiday honoring the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., as 
the Rev. King’s widow, Coretta Scott King (left); Rep. Katie Beatrice Hall (D. Ind.); 
U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Samuel R. Pierce, Jr.; an unidentified guest; 
and Sen. Baker (right) look on 
U.S. SENATE PHOTOGRAPH 
Sen. Baker with Presidents Ford and Carter, 1983 
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. PAPERS 
Sen. Baker the Photographer 
WHITE HOUSE PHOTOGRAPH 
White House Chief of Staff Baker (right) and 
Deputy White House Chief of Staff Kenneth M. Duberstein (left) with President Reagan 
WHITE HOUSE PHOTOGRAPH 
White House Chief of Staff Baker (right) with President Reagan, Secretary of State George P. 
Schultz, and National Security Adviser Colin L. Powell 
WHITE HOUSE PHOTOGRAPH 
President Reagan selects Judge Robert Bork as his nominee to the U.S. Supreme Court, 1987. 
(left to right) Chief of Staff Baker, Judge Bork, Deputy Chief of Staff Kenneth M. Duberstein, 
White House Director of Communications Tom C. Griscom, White House Press Secretary Marlin 
Fitzwater, President Reagan, and White House Assistant Jim Kuhn 
WHITE HOUSE PHOTOGRAPH 
COPURTESY OF THE RONALD W. REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY & MUSEUM 
President Reagan, Chief of Staff Baker, and National Security Adviser Colin L. Powell 
WHITE HOUSE PHOTOGRAPH 
White House Chief of Staff Baker with President Ronald Reagan 
WHITE HOUSE PHOTOGRAPH 
COURTESY OF THE RONALD W. REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBARARY & MUSEUM 
The President and his Chief of Staff share a moment of levity with a familiar-looking, 
hand-picked guest 
WHITE HOUSE PHOTOGRAPH 
President Reagan selects Judge Robert Bork as his nominee to the U.S. Supreme Court, 1987. 
(left to right) Chief of Staff Baker, Judge Bork, Deputy Chief of Staff Kenneth M. Duberstein, 
White House Director of Communications Tom C. Griscom, White House Press Secretary Marlin 
Fitzwater, President Reagan, and White House Assistant Jim Kuhn 
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COPURTESY OF THE RONALD W. REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY & MUSEUM 
President Reagan, Chief of Staff Baker, and National Security Adviser Colin L. Powell 
 WHITE HOUSE PHOTOGRAPH 
White House ceremony for the wearing in of former Sen. Baker as 
U. S. Ambassador to Japan, June 25, 2001 
(left to right) Former Ambassador Armin H. Meyer, former Sen. Nancy Kassebaum Baker, 
Ambassador Mike Mansfield, Sen. Baker, Former Ambassador Michael H. Armacost, 
President George W. Bush 
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. PAPERS 
Former Senators Nancy Kassebaum and Howard H. Baker, Jr., ca. 1996 
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Remarks on the Apportionment of 
Congressional Districts (1967)1
Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.
U. S. Senate, May 25, 1967
 Mr. Baker.  Mr. President, legislation which attempts to modify the 
constitutional standards governing congressional districting is rushing toward the 
Senate floor and will probably arrive, I am told, the week after next.
 The legislation, which passed the House on April 27 by a vote of 289 to 63, 
will be among the most important and far reaching that Congress considers in this 
session, because it involves the composition of the House of Representatives and 
the jurisdiction of the Federal judiciary.
 The House-approved version of the bill, H.R. 2508, would, first, establish 
temporary and permanent guidelines defining what variation is permissible from 
the one-man, one-vote constitutional principle of equal apportionment; and second, 
attempt to discourage gerrymandering by requiring that districts be composed of 
contiguous territory in as reasonably a compact form as the State finds practicable.
 Far and away the most important part of the bill as passed by the House is 
section (2) which would make permissible until 1972 a deviation of 30 percent 
between the most-populated and least-populated districts in a State.  After 1972—
the beginning of the 93d Congress—the permissible deviation would drop to 10 
percent.
 On Tuesday of this week, the Senate Judiciary Committee, by a reported vote 
of 11 to 4, approved the House bill with amendments which would, among other 
things, raise the temporary deviation standard to 35 percent.
 Only four States—California, Ohio, West Virginia, and Georgia—have 
congressional districts so badly malapportioned that they would be exempted from 
constitutional redistricting requirements under the generous 35-percent standard.
 Seventeen other States—which are clearly malapportioned according to the 
1 113 Cong. Rec. 14,016-18 (May 25, 1967),  31,700-02 (Nov. 8, 1967) (remarks of Sen. Baker).  During the 
summer and fall of 1967, the Congress considered a bill, H.R. 2508, that attempted to dilute the one-man, one-
vote principle enunciated by the U. S. Supreme Court in Westberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), by, among other 
things, raising the level of permissible deviation between the most-populated and least-populated congressional 
districts in a state to 30 percent until 1972, after which the permissible deviation would drop to 10 percent.  The 
House of Representatives approved the measure by a vote of 289 to 63.  The House-approved version of H.R. 
2508 thereafter was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, which approved the bill with amendments that 
would have, among other things, raised the temporary deviation standard to 35 percent.  When the version that 
was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee reached the floor of the Senate, Senator Baker joined with 
Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D. Mass.) to oppose the bill.  The version of H.R. 2508 that the Senate eventually 
passed included an amendment, introduced by Senator Kennedy and strongly supported by Senator Baker, that 
would have permitted only a 10 percent deviation that would have gone into effect in 1968.  The House disagreed 
with the Senate version of H.R. 2508.  A subsequent conference committee bill, which would have, among other 
things, postponed the application of the 10-percent deviation standard until 1972, was rejected by the Senate on 
Nov. 8, 1967.  113 Cong. Rec. 31,712.  The collaboration between Baker and Kennedy to defeat H.R. 2508 put 
the freshman Senator from Tennessee at odds with several elders of the Senate, including his own father-in-law, 
Senate Minority Leader Everett M. Dirksen (R. Ill.).
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stricter constitutional standards established by the Supreme Court—would not be 
required to redistrict until 1972 under the standards set by the legislation.
 The legislation, therefore, presents a question of the greatest magnitude: 
whether the Congress may validly, or should desirably, modify the constitutional 
one-man, one-vote principle in a way that would postpone for 5 years fair 
congressional districting in 17 States which have 214, or about one-half the total, 
seats in the House of Representatives.
 While a serious constitutional question exists, as I shall discuss later, the 
question that most concerns me is:  Is it desirable, simply as a matter of policy, 
for Congress to interject itself at this time and in this way into the process of 
reapportioning congressional districts?  I strongly believe that the answer is “No.”
 This belief proceeds from the proposition that the House of Representatives is 
the keystone of our Nation’s representative form of self-government.  The process 
of electing Congressmen is the most effective means the majority of the people 
have of regularly imposing their will upon the central government, the dominating 
government in our federal system.
 The primary means of determining what set of beliefs will be imposed upon 
the central government is, of course, our traditional system of partisan political 
competition in which two national parties contend for the right to express the 
ambitions, desires, aspirations, and dissent of all Americans.
 Our Nation comes closest to true representative government expressed through 
political party competition when each man’s vote counts as much as the next man’s.
 If a man has only part of a vote, the candidate of his political party has only a 
part of a fair opportunity to compete for the right to speak for him in the House of 
Representatives, and his Nation has a Government which represents only a part of 
the people.
 These abstract principles can be expressed most eloquently in practice, and can 
be expressed most competently by me by reference to the situation with which I 
have the most familiarity, my home State of Tennessee.
 Tennessee has been the pioneer State in reapportionment because of the 
landmark decision by the Supreme Court in Baker against Carr.  Members of 
the Tennessee Republican Party were the instigators of that successful litigation 
because the party had been locked into a minority position in our State because 
of unfair reapportionment.  A quick glance at the congressional districting 
developments during the last 15 years explains that situation graphically.  The 1951 
Tennessee Apportionment Act had two major inequities.  Shelby County, with a 
population of 627,019, and which includes the city of Memphis, comprised the 
Ninth Congressional District.  The Seventh and Eighth Districts had populations, 
respectively, of 232,652 and 223,387, or a combined population which was less 
than that of the Ninth District alone.
 The second major inequity was that the three easternmost districts in the 
State, where the voters are predominantly Republican, had an average population 
of 456,789, while the three districts in middle Tennessee, where the voters are 
predominantly Democrat, had an average population of 371,221.
 A court-ordered reapportionment in 1965 corrected most of the population 
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disparities between the ninth district and the seventh and eighth districts. This 
realignment in district lines unquestionably helped make it possible for the 
Republican Party to elect a Representative  from the ninth district and to run 
its strongest race in history in the seventh district.  Further reapportionment, 
which would necessarily shift Republican strength from the three east Tennessee 
districts into the middle three districts, would bring our party to a position of fair 
competition and, for the first time, allow Tennessee to have vigorous competition 
between two strong parties.
 I offer no apologies for saying that reapportionment of congressional districts 
in my State has been desirable because it has promoted the development of the 
Republican Party in Tennessee.  In other States, fair apportionment of districts will 
benefit the Democratic Party. Two, or 5, or 10 years from now, fair apportionment 
may benefit the Democratic Party in Tennessee.  And, although I intend to do all I 
legitimately can through the partisan political process to see that my party continues 
to grow strong, I will not object if fair districting helps my opposition.  For I do not 
ask for my party, and I do not intend to permit another party, a handicap conferred 
by malapportioned districts.  The handicap falls squarely upon the people.
 One might expect that a matter of such far-reaching importance to our system 
of government would have had careful, public scrutiny before being presented to the 
House and Senate.  The fact is, that there have never been hearings in the Senate 
on the legislation, with the exception of a 1-day hearing in 1965 at which two 
Congressmen testified and which has gone unreported.  The most recent hearings in 
the House were in 1964, which was the year in which the Supreme Court signaled 
the beginning of fair congressional districting by its landmark decision in Wesberry 
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
 Between now and the week beginning June 5, when I understand the legislation 
is scheduled to come to the floor of this Chamber, I hope that Members of the 
Senate will carefully consider these consequences and will initiate independent 
study of the bill which has received too little attention.
 The best course for the Senate, in my opinion, would be to defeat the bill 
outright; this would avoid confusing and impeding the swift movement in the 
Nation toward assuring each person that his vote for a Congressman counts 
the same as his neighbor’s vote.  The next best course would be to recommit the 
legislation for extended public hearings.  At least the bill should be amended to 
eliminate completely temporary standards of permissible deviation that in any way 
conflict with what the Supreme Court has said the constitutional standards are.
 Because the report of the Judiciary Committee is not yet available, I do not 
propose at this point to make an extended analysis of the bill.  However, I do 
think it might be helpful to outline briefly why, in my judgment, the legislation is 
unconstitutional.
 The constitutional argument begins with the Supreme Court’s 1964 decision 
in Wesberry against Sanders, which established that the Constitution’s plain 
objective is that of making “equal representation for equal numbers of people the 
fundamental goal of the House of Representatives.”  376 U.S. 1, 18.
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 The Court held that:
 The command of Art. I, sec. 2, that Representatives be chosen “by the 
People of the several states” means that as nearly as is practicable one man’s 
vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.
Id. at 8.
 Language in the Court’s later holding in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 
(1964), made clear the suggestion in Wesberry that there is a more exacting standard 
of equality required in congressional districting than in State legislative election 
districts:
 Some distinctions may well be made between congressional and state 
legislative representation.  Since, almost invariably, there is a significantly 
larger number of seats in state legislature bodies to be distributed within a 
state than congressional seats, it may be feasible to use political subdivision 
lines to a greater extent in establishing state legislative districts than in 
congressional districting while still affording adequate representation to all 
parts of the state.
 Perhaps because population is so clearly the central, and probably exclusive, 
factor of importance in congressional redistricting, the Supreme Court has moved 
more swiftly than in State legislative redistricting toward requiring near exactness 
of population equality among the districts.  Thus, on January 9 of this year, the 
Supreme Court indicated that a 10-percent variation from the State average district 
population is too large to meet the Court’s one-man, one-vote rule.  In an Indiana 
case, Duddleston v. Grills, 385 U.S. 455 (1967), Court ordered a lower court to 
reconsider its approval of a congressional redistricting plan which permitted 
deviations up to only 12.8 percent of the State average district population.  The 
Court cited a Florida decision involving legislative reapportionment to the effect 
that no good reasons were presented why the State could not have come much 
closer to providing districts of equal population than it did.  The other January 9 
order of the Court affirmed a lower court ruling that Missouri’s 1965 congressional 
redistricting plan was unconstitutional, although it kept deviations from the 
average district population to within 10.4 percent, Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 385 U.S. 
450 (1967).
 In 21 States, congressional districts vary from the average district population by 
10 percent or more.  In eight of these States—New York, Tennessee, Massachusetts, 
Indiana, Texas, Missouri, North Carolina, and New Jersey—courts already 
have ordered redistricting before the 1968 elections.  In two others—Ohio and 
Florida—court challenges are underway or pending.  Certainly in these 10 States, 
and probably in most of the others, there is time to achieve a fair apportionment of 
districts before the 1968 elections.  But all 21 of these States—except California, 
Ohio, West Virginia, and Georgia—are to be protected from redistricting until 
1972 by enactment of H.R. 2508.
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 In 1951, during the 82d Congress, when the distinguished chairman of the 
House Judiciary Committee, Mr. Celler, began his efforts to enact legislation 
that would have required fair apportionment, Congress may have had the power to 
establish permissible deviation standards other than those now proclaimed by the 
Judiciary.
 But since the Supreme Court’s decision in Wesberry in 1964, it seems clear that 
Congress’ power in this area is limited only to establishing standards which are not 
at variance with constitutional standards.
 There was some lively debate in the House on April 27 when this constitutional 
question was discussed.  Mr. Celler suggested that the legislative standards would 
not be mandatory on the Court:
 We could not issue a mandate to the court, as the gentleman from 
New Jersey said.  This language is permissive.  When the court would 
interpret the nature of the lines, it would undoubtedly take the guidelines 
into most serious consideration, but that would not be absolute.  That 
would be persuasive, and I am inclined to agree that the courts would not 
likely disregard the admonition laid down by the Congress when it devised 
the guidelines, but one cannot say that the court of necessity must follow 
the guidelines.
 But others disagreed, such as Mr. Mathias who said:
 We are not here, let me say, to lay down guidelines for the courts in 
future cases, we are here, as I conceive of the bill, to eliminate the necessity 
of the future cases.  We are not laying down guidelines, we are laying down 
the law.  And we have the constitutional authority and the constitutional 
responsibility to do that.  We have not discharged that constitutionality 
responsibility for far too long.
 I hope and I trust, before the Senate acts on this proposal and the proposed 
legislation, that there will be extensive debate on the merits and the underlying 
philosophy of the proposal.
 I respectfully suggest that whether the 35-percent deviation standard is 
permissive or mandatory is of no consequence.  If Congress is setting a permissive 
35- percent guideline, then the Supreme Court will ignore it.  If Congress is laying 
down the law, then the Supreme Court will rule the law unconstitutional.
 As a lawyer, I am quite aware of the vagaries and uncertainties that accompany 
the process of predicting the development of constitutional law.  Nevertheless, 
I think in this case it is crystal clear that the Supreme Court, which has been 
moving swiftly toward requiring nearly absolute equality between populations in 
congressional districts, will not tolerate an attempt to force a retreat in this process.
 The respected Committee on Federal Legislation of the Association of the Bar 
of the City of New York observed in 1964 that—
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 In view of the pronouncements in Wesberry, it would seem highly 
doubtful that a variation of as much as 15 percent from the average—which 
could mean a 30-percent variation between districts from the average—is 
permissible.
 Dean Robert B. McKay, of New York University School of Law, probably the 
leading authority on reapportionment, wrote in 1965:
 It must be taken as a starting point that Congress cannot now 
redefine the concept of election of Representatives “by the People” to mean 
something other than the Court when it called for equality “as nearly as is 
practicable.”
U. S. Senate, November 8, 1967
 Mr. Baker.  . . . .
 Mr. President, with all due deference to the conference committee, I am opposed 
to the report of the Senate-House conference on congressional redistricting.  I will 
vote against acceptance of it, and I earnestly hope that a majority of the Senate also 
will vote to reject it.
 The issue which the report presents is essentially the same issue with which 
this body dealt definitively and, in my judgment, properly, during the debate 
on congressional redistricting in May and June of this year; that is, whether the 
Congress may validly, or should desirably, enact a law which would in 18 States, 
which include 259 Congressmen, delay for 5 years the enforcement of the clear 
constitutional mandate that each man’s vote for his Congressman counts as much 
as the next man’s vote.
 The American people are familiar with the nature of this mandate and with the 
brief history of its swift implementation by the courts and the State legislatures.  The 
constitutional basis for fair districting begins with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1964 
decision in Wesberry against Sanders, which established that the Constitution’s 
plain objective is that of making “equal representation for equal numbers of people 
the fundamental goal of the House of Representatives”—376 U.S. 1. 18.  The 
Court held that:
 The command of Art. I, sec. 2, that Representatives be chosen “by the 
People of the several states” means that as nearly as is practicable one man’s 
vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.
Id. at 8.
 Language in the Court’s later holding in Reynolds v. Sims (377 U.S. 533, 
578 (1964)) made clear the suggestion in Wesberry that there is a more exacting 
standard of equality required in congressional districting than in State legislative 
election districts.
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 Perhaps because population is so clearly the central, and probably exclusive, 
factor of importance in congressional redistricting, the Supreme Court has moved 
more swiftly than in State legislative redistricting toward requiring near exactness 
of population equality among the districts within a State.  The Court’s latest 
decisions indicate that a State’s district lines do not conform to the requirements of 
the Constitution if any district’s population deviates more than 10 percent above or 
below the State’s average district population.  See Duddleston v. Grills (385 U.S. 455 
(1967)); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler (385 U.S. 450 (1967)).
 These landmark decisions have worked extraordinary changes in the quality 
of the Nation’s representative Government.  Since the Wesberry decision, district 
lines have been reshaped in 33 States.  Many States redistricted voluntarily; some 
only with the encouragement of a court’s order; and, in a few States where the 
legislatures could not agree, the courts themselves redrew the lines.
 The magnitude of the importance of the decision is dramatically demonstrated 
by the fact that between 1964 and 1966 lines in 158 congressional districts were 
redrawn, in response to the requirements set down in the Wesberry decision 
and others, and in response to the requirement of the Constitution for equal 
representation in the House of Representatives.
 The conclusion one draws from these events in inescapable: the determined 
implementation of the principle of the Wesberry decision during the past 2½ years 
has been the backbone of the movement toward fair districting in the Nation; any 
weakening or avoidance of that principle or delaying of its implementation would 
seriously undermine pending and future efforts at fulfillment of these important 
constitutional rights.
 And let there be no doubt that much remains to be done.  There are today 18 
States with congressional districts which have been declared unconstitutional by 
the courts—California, Indiana, and New Jersey—or in which court challenges are 
pending—Texas, Missouri, Ohio, New York, and Florida—or in which district lines 
are vulnerable to attack under constitutional standards—Colorado, Connecticut, 
Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Washington, and 
West Virginia.
 There is also the question of gerrymandering—which will not be dealt with 
today—but with which the Senate did deal firmly in June.  The outlawing of this 
shoddy practice—which has been employed to discriminate against minority 
parties, interests, groups, and races—is essential to a completion of the task of 
assuring fair representation for all Americans in the U.S. Congress.
 I should like to emphasize at this point that my motives in my actions today do 
not spring from any narrow, local interest.  The State of Tennessee has no districting 
problem of which I am aware; its lines were redrawn only this summer by court 
order, after extensive consideration of the views of all parties affected, and to the 
seeming satisfaction of all parties.
 Neither am I motivated by partisan political interests.  While it is true that in 
some States the Republican Party has been disadvantaged by unfair districting, it is 
equally true that in other States unfair drawing of district lines has worked against 
the Democrats.
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 And I have not succumbed, I hope—despite my lawyer-like inclination in that 
direction—to a detached entrancement with the manipulation of barren legalisms 
in an attempt to justify my position or prove my point.
 Instead I am concerned about each individual’s right in this democracy to 
the most perfect form of representative government possible under the Federal 
Constitution.  This concern is based upon the proposition that the House of 
Representatives is the keystone of our Nation’s representative form of self-
government.  The process of electing Congressmen is the most effective means 
the majority of the people have of regularly imposing their will upon the Central 
Government, which in our federal system is the dominant Government.
 The primary means of determining what set of beliefs will be imposed upon 
the Central Government is, of course, our traditional system of partisan political 
competition in which two national parties contend for the right to express the 
ambitions, desires, aspirations, and dissent of all Americans.
 Our Nation comes closest to true representative government expressed through 
political party competition when each man’s vote counts as much as the next man’s.
 If a man has only a part of a vote, the candidate of his political party has only a 
part of a fair opportunity to compete for the right to speak for him in the House of 
Representatives, and his Nation has a Government which represents a part of the 
people more adequately than it does the rest.
 Acting upon these principles and this belief, the Senate, on June 8, passed by 
a convincing margin, 55 to 28, legislation which would have set definite legislative 
standards implementing and fully consistent with the Federal Constitution’s strict 
one-man, one-vote requirement.  That legislation would have prohibited the 
gerrymandering of congressional districts and would have permitted a population 
variance of only 10 percent between the smallest and largest districts in a State 
beginning with the 1968 elections.
 The Senate action came in the form of an amendment to a House-passed 
bill, and the debate focused upon the same issue upon which we focus today.  The 
House version, H.R. 2508, would have permitted a population variance of 30 
percent between the largest and the smallest districts in the States—a variance that 
clearly exceeded the limits permitted by the Constitution.  The House also would 
have left the question of gerrymandering to the States—or, in other words, would 
have left the question of gerrymandering where it is today.  Finally, the House 
bill prohibited at-large elections for House members, except in Hawaii and New 
Mexico, beginning with the 1968 elections.
 Although the distinguished chairman of the House Judiciary Committee [Mr. 
Celler] began as early as 1951 to gain enactment of sound legislative standards 
for redistricting, the measure that came to the Senate this year from the House had 
not felt the scrutiny of careful public hearings.  Indeed, the first real public attention 
to the bill was drawn briefly during the limited House debate—largely through the 
efforts of the Congressman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers]—and during a more 
extended discussion in this body.
 Following the debate, the Senate rejected the attempt by the House to fashion 
legislation that would avoid the one-man, one-vote decision, amended the bill to 
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establish sound constitutional legislative standards for redistricting, and there was 
a conference.
 The conference, despite diligent efforts, could not agree on the gerrymandering 
question and on the question of temporary and permanent standards governing 
population variance between districts.
 Finally, on October 19, the conference filed its report with the House of 
Representatives.  There was nothing in the report that was included in the Senate’s 
amendment.  Instead, the House reported one provision which was in the House 
bill as it originally came to the Senate, and one new provision which had been in 
neither the House nor the Senate version.
 The part of the report extracted from the House version, and later agreed to 
by the Senate, made illegal at-large elections for House Members, except in Hawaii 
and New Mexico, for the 1968 and 1970 elections.  This provision reflected a 
widespread, and justifiable, I think, concern among House Members that a Federal 
court faced with a recalcitrant State legislature might simply order all members of 
that State’s delegation to run at large in the 1968 or 1970 elections.
 Such a result would be an unwelcome distortion of the political process.  A 
strength of the House is that its Members represent narrowly defined groups of 
people.  In all but the smallest States, a Member elected from a district can pay 
closer attention to the needs and problems of individual constituents than can a 
Senator or a Representative at large who must represent many more individuals.
 The desirability of Congress acting promptly and definitively to remove the 
possibility of at-large elections in all States with more than one district is clear. 
And no one doubts that Congress may properly enact such a provision pursuant to 
its constitutional power under article I, section 4, to alter regulations governing the 
times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives.
 The problem with the at-large prohibition contained in the conference report 
is that the prohibition is inseparably connected to another provision regarding 
special Federal censuses which, I am convinced, and as I will explain in a moment, 
is unconstitutional.
 If the courts declare the one part unconstitutional, the at-large prohibition will 
also fall, for there is no severability clause contained in the report.
 The result will be, if this report is enacted and then found unconstitutional, 
to heighten the possibility of at-large elections in 1968 for the 259 Members of 
Congress in those 18 States which are now under court order to redistrict, or in 
which court challenges are pending, or in which district lines are vulnerable under 
constitutional standards.
 This is so because, given the usual delays in the legislative and judicial process, 
it may be next spring before the Supreme Court provides a definitive answer on 
the constitutionality of this proposed legislation.  Until that time, the judicial 
and legislative endeavors in many of these 18 States probably will grind to a halt 
awaiting the Court’s decision.  After that decision, there may not be time to convene 
the legislature in order to redistrict.  The courts could then either draw the lines 
themselves—which has only happened in Arizona, Illinois, Maryland, Montana, 
and Tennessee—or order at-large elections.
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 Therefore, I think it fair to say that a vote to accept this conference report is a 
vote for increasing the possibility of at-large elections for House Members in 1968. 
From the point of view of those concerned about at-large elections, no bill is better 
than this bill.
 The most effective way to prohibit at-large elections will be to pass separate 
legislation, unclouded by doubts of constitutionality, that immediately and finally 
bans at-large elections in all States.  I have indicated my firm intention to attach 
to some pending business in the Senate an amendment that will do exactly this.  I 
reiterate my intention to do so.  I feel confident that both the Senate and the House 
will accept such an amendment.
 Therefore, for those Senators concerned about at-large elections, I submit that 
the most effective method of prohibiting such elections is to vote against acceptance 
of this conference report—which heightens the possibility of at-large elections—
and to vote for my amendment to ban such elections.
 I am hopeful that this suggested treatment of the at-large elections issue should 
satisfy those with qualms about voting against a report containing an at-large 
election prohibition, and that the remainder of the debate might focus upon the 
question whether the special census provision is unconstitutional and bad policy 
and whether therefore the report should be rejected by the Senate.
 The second sentence of the conference report provides that no State shall be 
required to redistrict prior to the Nineteenth Federal Decennial Census unless the 
results of a special Federal census conducted pursuant to the act of August 26, 
1954, as amended, are available for use.
 The justification for this provision, according to the House managers of the 
bill, is that:
 Changes that have occurred in the structure of the U.S. population 
since 1960 are too vast in many instances to permit any reasonable degree 
of accuracy in establishing district lines on the basis of the 1960 census 
data.
 The expense and effort involved in congressional redistricting should 
not be devoted to an enterprise that necessarily in many states must be 
so inaccurate as to be unreasonable when based on 1960 census data.  It 
is preferable to wait until the 19th decennial data is available if updated 
special census data is not available.
 I should like to respond in the following way to the arguments in favor of this 
new provision which was in neither the original House bill nor the original Senate 
amendment to the House bill, but was developed in the conference.
 First, if this provision is saying to the courts, “You cannot order a State 
to redistrict unless that State voluntarily agrees to pay for and provide a special 
Federal census,” then the legislation is unconstitutional because it permits a State 
the option of declining to redistrict by refusing to authorize and pay for a special 
Federal census.  There is no question that Congress can act, as the Senate did in 
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June, to establish more defined standards within the limits set by the Constitution.
 There is equally no doubt in my mind that congressional action which attempts, 
as this special census provision does, to limit the Supreme Court’s definition of 
the Constitution will be ruled repugnant to the Constitution.  This provision is 
repugnant to the Constitution because it permits the State the option to withdraw 
from the court’s jurisdiction over implementation of the one-man, one-vote 
principle.
 But it has been suggested by proponents of the report that because the 
legislation has a presumption of constitutionality, we should interpret the special 
census provision in a way that might be constitutional.
 It has been pointed out that nothing in the bill prohibits a State from voluntarily 
redistricting on the basis of 1960 census figures.  It has also been suggested that a 
Federal court could itself re-draw the State’s lines on the basis of the 1960 census 
figures.
 Finally, it is suggested that even if there is some unconstitutional aspect to the 
legislation, that this legislation serves only as an admonition to the courts.  Such 
arguments certainly create confusion about the justification for the special census 
provision.  If the purpose of the provision is to establish a congressional policy 
against the use of 1960 census figures, then why should the 1960 figures be bad 
only when Federal courts order a State legislature to draw new district lines?  Why 
are 1960 figures also not outdated when Federal courts themselves redraw district 
lines, or when a State decides to redistrict, or even when a State court—as in the 
California situation—has ordered a legislature to redistrict?  One must conclude 
that there must be some reason other than the inaccuracy of 1960 census figures to 
justify our acceptance of this special census provision.
 The only other interpretation is that the Congress is either admonishing or 
ordering the courts not to require any State to redistrict until the 1972 elections 
unless it voluntarily agrees to do so.
 This interpretation is suggested in the remarks of the distinguished Senator 
from Nebraska [Mr. Hruska], made on the Senate floor on October 31, Record, 
page 30635, where he says:
 The language of the conference report is simple and direct.  It 
accomplished its objective very well.  In short, no state shall be forced 
to redistrict prior to the 1970 census; however, a state can voluntarily 
redistrict at any time.  It also prohibits at-large elections except for the 
states of Hawaii and New Mexico.  This and nothing more is the intent of 
the bill.
 In short, the Senator seems to be saying that this bill is designed to delay 
redistricting in all States which do not voluntarily decide to redistrict until after the 
1970 census is completed.
 Mr. President, after the congressional redistricting bill was sent to conference 
and returned, first to the House of Representatives and then to the Senate, I find, 
upon close examination, that not one provision of the amended Senate version 
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of this bill was retained in conference.  The House provision against running at-
large was eliminated in the Senate form, but restored in conference.  The provision 
against gerrymandering in the Senate form was eliminated in conference.  The 
provision dealing with the permanent limitation of not more than 10 percent 
variation between districts was eliminated in conference; and we are presented, Mr. 
President, with a conference report which is, in fact and deed, a complete innovation 
of that committee, and which has the practical effect of doing two things, in my 
judgment:  First, depriving the Federal judiciary of any effective right to review the 
inadequacies of redistricting prior to 1972; and second, heightening the possibility 
and advancing the probability that this Nation may be faced with at-large elections 
in many of our States in 1968.
 The reason for that, Mr. President, in my judgment, is that a close reading of 
the conference version of the bill will disclose that there is no severability clause to 
establish the independence of the provision which defers redistricting until 1972 
from the provision which prohibits at-large elections.
 If the courts find, and I feel they will find, that this conference report is 
unconstitutional, if any part of the bill fails, the entire bill will fail, and we will have 
no prohibition against at-large elections.
 In conclusion, it therefore seems to me that there is no way to interpret the 
bill in a way that is both reasonable and consistent with the Constitution.  It must 
be read either to be unconstitutional or to mean nothing.  It does not establish 
a congressional policy against the use of the 1960 census figures:  First, because 
it unreasonably permits the figures to be used in all types of situations but one; 
and second, because it could not establish such a policy since the courts have 
repeatedly ruled that, whatever the inaccuracies of those figures, there will continue 
to be court-ordered redistricting and it will be done on the basis of 1960 figures. 
If the justification for the special census provision is to delay redistricting until 
1972 unless a State voluntarily elects to do so, it is clearly unconstitutional.  If 
the justification for it is to “admonish” the courts to delay redistricting until 1972, 
the legislation is either suggesting that the courts overrule themselves, which is not 
likely, or it means nothing.
 So, Mr. President, as I stated earlier, I shall vote against this conference report, 
for I feel that in this instance, no bill is better than this bill.
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Remarks on the Assassinations of
the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. and
Senator Robert F. Kennedy (1968)1
Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.
U. S. Senate, April 5, 1968
 Mr. Baker.  Mr. President, I join Senators today in an expression of compassion 
for the widow and children of Martin Luther King.  While nothing can relieve the 
grief that they will bear, we all hope that somehow their grief will be lessened by the 
resolve of our Nation to persevere in the ways of peace.
 There is a grim irony and poignance in the fact that he died by the very violence 
that he saw threatening his country.  We know from his last words and actions that 
he saw even his own crusade for equality among Americans menaced by the violence 
he deplored.  For he deplored violence of every kind—violence abroad, violence at 
home, violence by whites, violence by blacks.  At the moment of his death he was 
deeply troubled that his own long and arduous work might be subverted by persons 
and purposes and methods entirely foreign to what he sought to accomplish:  the 
peaceful, lawful, orderly absorption of every American into the fullness of our 
national life.
 As men and women, our reaction to the isolated deed of perverted violence 
must be one of sorrow for his family.  As Americans, it must be one of renewed 
resolve that our vigorous national efforts toward full equality of opportunity and 
citizenship will be carried on within the flexible but peaceful framework of justice 
and legal order.
U. S. Senate, July 30, 1968
 Mr. Baker.  Mr. President, I join in these tributes to our late colleague from 
New York, Senator Robert Francis Kennedy, who, during the relatively short 
time he spent in this body, made his presence felt to an extent that will not be fully 
known for many years to come.
 While I often found myself in opposition to Senator Kennedy in the Senate, 
I was and am convinced that he was a man of unquestionable integrity and deep 
conviction who, throughout his life, waged a vigorous battle against indifference 
and mediocrity in our society.
 It has been said that life, though tragic, is still worthwhile.  Certainly this is true 
of the life of Bob Kennedy, a life so often touched by tragedy and yet rich, full, and 
productive until its untimely end.
 It is hoped that history will remember him, not so much for the utter tragedy 
of his death, but for what he was in life—a genuine human being of high ideals and 
infinite compassion who did what he could for his fellowman.
1 114 Cong. Rec. 9,137 (Apr. 5, 1968), 24,127 ( July 30, 1968) (remarks of Sen. Baker).
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Remarks in Support of a Constitutional 
Amendment Lowering the Voting Age to 
Eighteen (1968)1
Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.
 Mr. Baker.  Mr. President, I desire to voice my support of the President’s 
proposal to amend the Constitution to extend the right to vote to citizens 18 years 
of age or older in both Federal and State elections.
 This proposed constitutional amendment reflects the view not only of the 
President, but of many Members of Congress, as well, that extending the suffrage to 
citizens who have reached the age of 18 would broaden the base of democracy.  The 
18-year-old of today is more than adequately prepared to accept the responsibility 
of suffrage and undertake full participation in the American political process.
 At the present time, four States permit persons under the age of 21 to vote: 
Georgia, Kentucky, Alaska, and Hawaii.  Recent nationwide public opinion polls 
show that public support for lowering the voting age requirement to 18 has reached 
an all-time high.
 I urge Senators on both sides of the aisle to join with me in supporting this 
proposal.
1 114 Cong. Rec. 19,293 ( June 28, 1968) (remarks of Sen. Baker).  On June 27, 1968, President Lyndon B. 
Johnson sent a message to the Congress, proposing an amendment to the United States Constitution that would 
have lowered the voting age to eighteen in both federal and state elections.  Lyndon B. Johnson, Message from 
the President of the United States Transmitting a Proposal to Amend the U.S. Constitution 
to Lower the Voting Age to 18, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., H.R. Doc No. 334.  A proposal similar to President 
Johnson’s ultimately became the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which had received the votes of the requisite number 
of states for ratification by July 1, 1971.
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U.S. Senate Watergate Committee
Opening Statement (1973)1
Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.
 Senator Baker.  Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I believe there is no 
need for me to further emphasize the gravity of the matters that we begin to explore 
publicly here this morning.  Suffice it to say there are most serious charges and 
allegations made against individuals, and against institutions.  The very integrity of 
our political process itself has been called into question.
 Commensurate with the gravity of the subject matter under review and the 
responsibilities of this committee and the witnesses who come before it, we have a 
great burden to discharge and carry.  This committee is not a court, nor is it a jury. 
We do not sit to pass judgment on the guilt or innocence of anyone.  The greatest 
service that this committee can perform for the Senate, the Congress, and for the 
people of this Nation is to achieve a full discovery of all of the facts that bear on 
the subject of this inquiry.  This committee was created by the Senate to do exactly 
that.  To find as many of the facts, the circumstances, and the relationships as we 
could, to assemble those facts into a coherent and intelligible presentation and to 
make recommendations to the Congress for any changes in statute law or the basic 
charter document of the United States that may seem indicated.
 But this committee can serve another quite important function that neither a 
grand jury investigation nor a jury proceeding is equipped to serve, and that is to 
develop the facts in full view of all of the people of America.  Although juries will 
eventually determine the guilt or the innocence of persons who have been and may 
be indicted for specific violations of the law, it is the American people who must be 
the final judge of Watergate.  It is the American people who must decide, based on 
the evidence spread before them, what Watergate means, [and] about how we all 
should conduct our public business in the future.
 When the resolution which created this committee was being debated on 
the floor of the Senate in February of this year, I and other Republican Senators 
expressed concern that the inquiry might become a partisan effort by one party 
to exploit the temporary vulnerability of another.  Other congressional inquiries 
in the past had been conducted by committees made up of equal numbers of 
members from each party.  I offered an amendment to the resolution which would 
have given the Republican members equal representation on this committee.  That 
amendment did not pass.  But any doubts that I might have had about the fairness 
and impartiality of this investigation have been swept away during the last few weeks. 
Virtually every action taken by this committee since its inception has been taken 
with complete unanimity of purpose and procedure.  The integrity and fairness of 
each member of this committee and of its fine professional staff have been made 
1 Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972, Watergate and Related Activities, Phase I: 
Watergate Investigation, Bk. 1: Hearings Before the S. Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign 
Activities, 93rd Cong. 4-6 (1973) (opening statement of Sen. Baker, May 17, 1973).
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manifest to me, and I know they will be made manifest to the American people 
during the course of this proceeding.  This is not in any way a partisan undertaking, 
but, rather it is a bipartisan search for the unvarnished truth.
 I would like to close, Mr. Chairman, with a few thoughts on the political 
process in this country.  There has been a great deal of discussion across the country 
in recent weeks about the impact that Watergate might have on the President, the 
office of the Presidency, the Congress, or our ability to carry on relations with other 
countries, and so on.  The constitutional institutions of this Republic are so strong 
and so resilient that I have never doubted for a moment their ability to function 
without interruption.  On the contrary, it seems clear to me the very fact that we are 
now involved in the public process of cleaning our own house, before the eyes of the 
world, is a mark of the greatest strength.  I do not believe that any other political 
system could endure the thoroughness and the ferocity of the various inquiries now 
underway within the branches of Government and in our courageous, tenacious 
free press.
 No mention is made in our Constitution of political parties.  But the two-party 
system, in my judgment, is as integral and as important to our form of government 
as the three formal branches of the central Government themselves.  Millions of 
Americans participated actively, on one level or another, and with great enthusiasm, 
in the Presidential election of 1972.  This involvement in the political process by 
citizens across the land is essential to participatory democracy.  If one of the effects 
of Watergate is public disillusionment with partisan politics, if people are turned 
off and drop out of the political system, this will be the greatest Watergate casualty 
of all.  If, on the other hand, this national catharsis in which we are now engaged 
should result in a new and better way of doing political business, if Watergate 
produces changes in laws and campaign procedures, then Watergate may prove to 
be a great national opportunity to revitalize the political process and to involve 
even more Americans in the day-to-day work of our two great political parties. 
I am deeply encouraged by the fact that I find no evidence at this point in time 
to indicate that either the Democratic National Committee or the Republican 
National Committee played any role in whatever may have gone wrong in 1972. 
The hundreds of seasoned political professionals across this country, and the 
millions of people who devoted their time and energies to the campaigns, should 
not feel implicated or let down by what has taken place.
 With these thoughts in mind, I intend to pursue, as I know each member 
of this committee intends to pursue, an objective and evenhanded but thorough, 
complete, and energetic inquiry into the facts.  We will inquire into every fact and 
follow every lead, unrestrained by any fear of where that lead might ultimately take 
us.
 Mr. Chairman, my thanks to you for the great leadership you have brought 
to this committee in its preparatory phases, and my thanks to Mr. Dash, who has 
served with distinction as chief counsel to the committee and Mr. Thompson, who 
serves as minority counsel to the committee.  I believe we are fully prepared to 
proceed with the business of discovering the facts.
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Excerpts from the Senate Watergate 
Hearings (1973)
Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.
U. S. Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
Testimony of Herbert Lloyd Porter
June 7, 19731
 Senator Baker.  As I understand the essence of your testimony to this point, 
then, 75 percent of the money is unaccountable, or you cannot account for; 25 
percent of the money you can; that you hired two men to do, as you put it, a Dick 
Tuck operation, so-called “prank” operation.
 Mr. Porter.2  Yes, sir.
 Senator Baker.  Is this synonymous with the “dirty tricks” operation that you 
referred to earlier in your testimony?
 Mr. Porter.  No, sir.  Mr. Magruder3 indicated to me that money had been, 
in fact, authorized to Mr. Liddy4 for dirty tricks and other special projects.  Now, 
what he said was that they were not illegal and that what Mr. Liddy had done, 
apparently—what he had apparently done at that time was illegal and was not a 
part of that authorization.
 Senator Baker.  Did you ever have any doubt in your mind about the propriety 
of this?
 Mr. Porter.  About the what, sir?
 Senator Baker.  About the propriety?  Not the illegality, but the propriety of 
it.
1 Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972, Watergate and Related Activities, Phase I: 
Watergate Investigation, Bk. 2: Hearings Before the S. Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign 
Activities, 93rd Cong. 648-49 (1973) (testimony of Herbert Lloyd Porter).
2 Herbert L. Porter, the scheduling director of the Committee for the Re-election of the President, was 
subsequently convicted of lying to the Federal Bureau of Investigation about his knowledge of Donald H. Segretti, 
the former Treasury Department lawyer who had directed a campaign of political espionage and sabotage against 
the Democratic Party during the presidential campaign of 1972.  Watergate:  the Fall of Richard M. Nixon 
xx (Stanley I. Kutler, ed., 1996).
3 Jeb Stuart Magruder, deputy director of the Committee for the Re-election of the President.  Id. at xix.
4 G. Gordon Liddy, former counsel to the Committee for the Re-election of the President, was convicted on 
counts of conspiracy, burglary, and illegal wiretapping in the Watergate case.  Id.
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 Mr. Porter.  I did not know what he was referring to, and he did not tell me 
what he was referring to.  He never explained any of the dirty tricks operation that 
Mr. Liddy was involved in.
 Senator Baker.  I do not think that answers my question.
 Mr. Porter.  I am sorry, sir.
 Senator Baker.  I will put it [to you] again.  Did you ever have any qualms 
about what you were doing, about the propriety of hiring these people for the dirty 
tricks or whatever it was?  I am probing into your state of mind, Mr. Porter.
 Mr. Porter.  I understand.  I think the thought crossed my mind, Senator, in 
all honesty, that I really could not see what effect it had on reelecting a President of 
the United States.  On the other hand, in all fairness, I was not the one to stand up 
in a meeting and say that this should be stopped, either.  So I do not—I mean, there 
is space in between.  I kind of drifted along.
 Senator Baker.  Now, you have reached now precisely that point that I would 
like to examine and I intend to examine it with other witnesses as this hearing 
proceeds.
 Mr. Porter.  OK.
 Senator Baker.  Where does the system break down when concern for what 
is right as distinguished from what is legal is never asserted or never thought about 
and you do not stand up and say so?  At any time, did you ever think of saying:  I do 
that think this is quite right, this is not quite the way it ought to be.  Did you ever 
think of that?
 Mr. Porter.  I think most people would probably stop and think about that.
 Senator Baker.  Did you?
 Mr. Porter.  Yes, I did.
 Senator Baker.  What did you do about it?
 Mr. Porter.  I did not do anything.
 Senator Baker.  Why didn’t you?
 Mr. Porter.  In all honesty, probably because of the fear of group pressure that 
would ensue, of not being a team player.
 Senator Baker.  And the fear of not being a team player was strong enough to 
suppress your judgment on what action you should take if you considered an action 
improper, if not illegal?
 Mr. Porter.  Well, I never considered any action up to that point illegal, No. 
1.  However, I was——
 Senator Baker.  Do you think an organization, a political organization, 
should be so anonymous, so military and obedient, so careful for the concerns 
of peer approval that it, each and every member of that organization, at least up 
until a certain point and level in the organizational chart, completely abdicates his 
conscience and judgment?
 Mr. Porter.  No, sir; I certainly do not.
 Senator Baker.  What caused you to abdicate your own conscience and 
disapproval, if you did disapprove, of the practices or dirty tricks operation?
 Mr. Porter.  Well, Senator Baker, my loyalty to this man, Richard Nixon, goes 
back longer than any person that you will see sitting at this table throughout any of 
these hearings.  I first met the President——
 Senator Baker.  I really very much doubt that, Mr. Porter.  I have known 
Richard Nixon probably longer than you have been alive, and I really expect that the 
greatest disservice that a man could do to a President of the United States would be 
to abdicate his conscience.
U. S. Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
Testimony of John W. Dean III5
June 27, 19736
 Senator Baker.  Mr. Chairman,7 thank you very much.
 Senator Ervin.  First, I want to thank you for swapping places with me so I can 
fulfill an engagement later.  Thank you very much.
 Senator Baker.  Mr. Chairman, there is no way on earth I can swap places with 
you.  But I thank you for that and I am happy to relinquish my place in the sequence 
5 John W. Dean III, counsel to President Nixon.  Id. at xviii.
6 Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972, Watergate and Related Activities, Phase I: Watergate Investigation, 
Bk. 4: Hearings Before the S. Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 93rd Cong. 1,465-82 (1973) 
(testimony of John W. Dean III).
7 Senator Sam J. Ervin (D. N. Car.) represented North Carolina in the United States Senate, 1954-1974, 
and served as chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities.  Biographical 
Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-Present, available at http://bioguide.congress.gov/
biosearch/biosearch.asp.
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of questioning so that you could complete your very, very thorough and very, very 
important line of questioning this morning.
 I was about to say, Mr. Dean, that you have been a very patient witness, and very 
thorough.  You presented us with a great mass of information, almost 250 pages in 
your written statement of voluminous testimony in response to the interrogation of 
members of this committee, and we are very grateful.
 Some of the specific allegations that you make in your testimony are at least 
prima facie extraordinarily important.  The net sum of your testimony is fairly 
mind-boggling.  It is not my purpose in these questions that are about to follow 
to do what would ordinarily be the expected function of a committee member, to 
try to test your testimony.  I think that you have been subjected to a rather rigid 
examination by my colleagues on the committee thus far and, of course, your 
testimony and its credibility, its importance and relevance, will fall into place not 
only in terms of its own significance but in terms of its relationship to the testimony 
of other witnesses. . . .
 It occurs to me that at this point, the central question, and in no way in 
derogation of the importance of the great volume of material and the implications 
that flow from it, but the central question at this point is simply put.  What did the 
President know and when did he know it?
 In trying to structure your testimony I would ask that you give attention to 
three categories of information:  That information that you can impart to the 
committee that you know of your own personal knowledge; that type of information 
that we lawyers refer to as circumstantial evidence, which would include evidence 
given based on your opinion or on inferences you draw from circumstances in the 
situation; and, third, that type of evidence that ordinarily would not be admitted in 
a court of law but is admitted here for whatever purpose it may serve, that is hearsay 
evidence or evidence about which you have only secondhand information. . . .
 I am in no way criticizing your testimony, I think you really have been a very 
remarkable witness.
 Mr. Dean.  Mr. Vice Chairman, I might say this, in preparing my testimony I 
made a very conscious effort to not write a brief against any man but merely to state 
facts sequentially as close as I could.  By sequentially some things it was necessary to 
follow forward to explain a given sequence of events to bring the matter into a time 
sequence but I did not by design try to write a brief or a document that focused in 
on any individual or any set of circumstances surrounding any individual.  Rather, 
laid them out in the totality of their context.
 Senator Baker.  I understand that, Mr. Dean, and I really do hope you 
understand that what I am saying to you is not a criticism of you nor any implication 
of criticism.  Rather instead you have presented us with a sequential presentation, 
and I am trying to convert it into an organized presentation, according to categories 
and to the quality and scope of the information that you possess. So please believe 
me, I am not trying to attack your testimony but rather to organize it for our own 
committee purpose.
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 Now, there is one other thing I would like to say and it may or may not be 
possible to do this, and again I am not being critical of you as a witness.  As I said 
just a moment ago I think you have been a very remarkable witness.  When I used 
to practice law, I used to call on the trial judge from time to time to instruct the 
witness to first answer the question and then to explain it. So I hope I can keep my 
questions brief and I hope you might preface your answers with a yes or no, if that 
is possible, and then whatever explanation you wish.
 Mr. Dean.  Certainly.
 Senator Baker.  It is not meant to be an entrapment, nor a “do you still beat 
your wife” question, answer yes or no.  But it is meant to try to advance the cause of 
factfinding.
 Under the heading of what did the President know and when did he know 
it falls into several subdivisions.  The first one is the break-in at the Democratic 
National Committee headquarters of the Watergate complex on the morning of 
June 17, 1972.
 Do you know what the President knew of that in advance?
 Mr. Dean.  I do not.
 Senator Baker.  Do you have any information that he did know of it?
 Mr. Dean.  I only know that I learned upon my return to the office that events 
had occurred that indicated that calls had come from Key Biscayne to Washington 
to Mr. Strachan8 to destroy incriminating documents in the possession of Mr. 
Haldeman.9
 Senator Baker.  The question is, I hope, not impossibly narrow but your 
testimony touches many people.  It touches Mr. Ehrlichman,10 Mr. Haldeman, Mr. 
Colson,11 Mr. Mitchell,12 Mr. Dean, and many others.  But I am trying to focus on 
the President.
 Mr. Dean.  I understand.
 Senator Baker.  What did the President know and when did he know it?
8 Gordon C. Strachan, assistant to White House chief of staff H. R. Haldeman.  Watergate, supra note 2, 
at xxi.
9 H. R. Haldeman, White House chief of staff.  Id. at xviii.
10 John D. Erlichman, chief domestic affairs adviser to President Nixon.  Id.
11 Charles W. Colson, special counsel to President Nixon.  Id. at xvii.
12 John N. Mitchell, former U. S. Attorney General and director of the Committee for the Re-election of the 
President.  Id. at xix.
122 BAKER CENTER JOURNAL OF APPLIED PUBLIC POLICY
 Is it possible for you, based on direct knowledge or circumstantial information, 
and you have given us an indication of circumstances, or even hearsay, to tell us 
whether or not you can shed any further light on whether the President knew or, 
in the parlance of tort law, should have known of the break-in at the Watergate 
complex on June 17?
 Mr. Dean.  You mean, could he have prior knowledge of it?
 Senator Baker.  Yes.
 Mr. Dean.  I cannot testify of any firsthand knowledge of that.  I can only 
testify as to the fact that anything that came to Mr. Haldeman’s attention of any 
importance was generally passed to the President by Mr. Haldeman, and if Mr. 
Haldeman had advance knowledge or had received advance indications it would be 
my assumption that that had been passed along but I do not know that for a fact.
 Senator Baker.  So that would fall into category 2 of my organization.
 Mr. Dean.  Yes, sir.
 Senator Baker.  That is an inference that you do draw from the arrangements 
of the organization of the White House and your knowledge of the relationships, 
the relationship of Mr. Haldeman and the President.
 Mr. Dean.  That is correct.
 Senator Baker.  But it does not fall in category 1 or 3 which is to say direct 
knowledge or hearsay information from other parties.
 Mr. Dean.  That is correct.
 Senator Baker.  The coverup is the second heading and, of course, the coverup 
embraces and involves so many things and so many people over such a span of time 
that it is difficult really to place it in a single category but I would like to try.
 What did the President know and when did he know it about the coverup. 
You have already testified about this, Mr. Dean, and I understand, I believe, the 
burden of your testimony, the thrust of your testimony, but for the sake of clarity, 
and understanding and organization of this record, tell me briefly:  based on your 
personal knowledge, based on circumstantial evidence or based even on hearsay, 
what the President knew and when he first knew it.
 Mr. Dean.  I would have to start back from personal knowledge and that would 
be when I had a meeting on September 15 when we discussed what was very clear 
to me in terms of coverup.  We discussed in terms of delaying lawsuits, compliments 
to me on my efforts to that point.  Discussed timing and trials, because we didn’t 
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want them to occur before the election.  That was direct conversation that I testified 
to.
 Now, going back from September 15, back to the June 17 time, I believe that 
I have testified to countless occasions in which I have—I reported information to 
Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, made recommendations to them regarding 
Mr. Magruder, I was aware of the fact that often Mr. Haldeman took notes, I know 
that Mr. Haldeman met daily with the President, I was quite aware of the fact 
that this was one of the most important and virtually the only issue that was really 
developing at all, and given the normal reporting channels I worked through it was 
my assumption, without questioning, that this was going in to the President.
 Now, at what point in time this was that Mr. Haldeman discussed this with the 
President, I have no idea.
 . . . .
 Senator Baker.  I am going to try now to focus entirely on the meeting of 
September 15.
 Mr. Dean.  Right.
 Senator Baker.  And I have an ambition to focus sharply on it in order to 
disclose as much information as possible about the September 15 meeting.  What 
I want to do is to test, once again, not the credibility of your testimony, but the 
quality of the evidence, that is, is it direct evidence?
 Mr. Dean.  I understand.
 Senator Baker.  Hearsay evidence or any circumstantial evidence related to 
the September 15 meeting, so take a little time with it, if you will.
 Mr. Dean.  All right.  During the morning of the 15th the indictments had 
been handed down.  I think there was a general sigh of relief at the White House. 
I had no idea that I was going to be called to the President’s office.  Mr. Haldeman 
was quite aware of the fact that I had spent a great deal of time; he had spent a great 
deal of time, that Mr. Ehrlichman had spent a great deal of time, on this matter.  In 
the late afternoon I received a call requesting I come to the President’s office. . . . 
When I entered the office I can recall that—you have been in the office, you know 
the way there are two chairs at the side of the President’s desk.
 Senator Baker.  You are speaking of the oval office?
 Mr. Dean.  Of the oval office.  As you face the President on the left-hand chair 
Mr. Haldeman was sitting and they had obviously been immersed in a conversation 
and the President asked me to come in and I stood there for a moment.
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 He said, “Sit down” and I sat on a chair on the other side.
 Senator Baker.  You sat in the right-hand chair?
 Mr. Dean.  I sat on the right-hand chair.
 Senator Baker.  That is the one he usually says no to, but go ahead.
 Mr. Dean.  I was unaware of that.  [Laughter.]
 Senator Baker.  Go ahead, Mr. Dean.
 Mr. Dean.  As I tried to describe in my statement, the reception was very 
warm and very cordial.  There was some preliminary pleasantries, and then the next 
thing that I recall the President very clearly saying to me is that he had been told 
by Mr. Haldeman that he had been kept posted or made aware of my handling of 
the various aspects of the Watergate case and the fact that the case, you know, the 
indictments had now been handed down, no one in the White House had been 
indicted, they had stopped at Liddy.
 Senator Baker.  Stop, stop, stop just for one second.  Let’s examine those 
particular words just for a second.
 That no one in the White House had been indicted.  Is that as near to the exact 
language—I don’t know so I am not laying a trap for you, I just want to know.
 Mr. Dean.  Yes, there was a reference to the fact the indictments had been 
handed down and it was quite obvious that no one in the White House had been 
indicted on the indictments that had been handed down.
 Senator Baker.  Did he say that, though?
 Mr. Dean.  Did he say that no one in the White House had been handed 
down?  I can’t recall it.  I can recall a reference to the fact that the indictments were 
now handed down and he was aware of that and the status of the indictments and 
expressed what to me was a pleasure to the fact that it had stopped at Mr. Liddy.
 Senator Baker.  Tell me what he said.
 Mr. Dean.  Well, as I say, he told me I had done a good job——
 . . . .
 Senator Baker.  Can you give us any information, can you give us any further 
insight into what the President said?
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 Mr. Dean.  Yes, I can recall he told me that he appreciated how difficult a job it 
had been for me.
 Senator Baker.  Is that close to the exact language?
 Mr. Dean.  Yes, that is close to the exact language.  That stuck very clearly in 
my mind because I recall my response to that was that I didn’t feel that I could take 
credit.  I thought that others had done much more difficult things and by that I was 
referring to the fact that Mr. Magruder had perjured himself.  [Laughter.]  There 
was not an extended discussion from there as to any more of my involvement.  I had 
been complimented.  I told him I couldn’t take the credit, and then we moved into 
a discussion of the status of the case.
 Senator Baker.  Stop, before you get to the status, and let’s lay that aside just 
for a second because I do want to hear about that, too, but this really, and I don’t 
mean to be melodramatic, but this is really a terribly important moment in history. 
As you know, this meeting was in the afternoon in the oval office in Washington 
on September 15, 1972, and you were there, the President was there, and Mr. 
Haldeman.
 Mr. Dean.  Mr. Haldeman was there.
 Senator Baker.  What was the President’s demeanor, what was his attitude, 
what was the expression on his face, the quality of his voice?
 Mr. Dean.  Well, as I said, when I walked in it was very warm, very cordial. 
They were smiling, they were happy, they were relaxed.  The President, I think 
I said earlier this morning, was about to go somewhere and I think that actually 
was delaying his departure to have this conversation with me.  The fact that I had 
not been in to see the President other than on a rather mechanical activity before 
that dealing with his testamentary papers, indicated so clearly that Haldeman had 
thought that the President should compliment me for my handling of this matter, 
and that that was one of the reasons I probably had been called over, and the 
President had done it at Mr. Haldeman’s request.
 Senator Baker.  All right.  Now, tell us about, as you started to say before I 
interrupted you, the status of the case.
 Mr. Dean.  All right.  He was interested in knowing if it was likely—well, let 
me before I go on to that, let me say something else that I recall.  When we talked 
about the fact that the indictments had been handed down, at some point, and after 
the compliment I told him at that point that we had managed, you know, that the 
matter had been contained, it had not come into the White House, I didn’t say that, 
I said it had been contained.
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 Senator Baker.  Did you say anything beyond that it had been contained?
 Mr. Dean.  No, I did not.  I used that, I recall very clearly using that expression 
that it had been contained.
 Senator Baker.  That is an important word, it has been contained.
 Mr. Dean.  That is right.
 Senator Baker.  What was the President’s or Mr. Haldeman’s reaction to that 
word because that is a rather significant word, I think.
 Mr. Dean.  Well, I have got to say this, I wasn’t studying the President’s face 
or Mr. Haldeman’s face at this time.  I had not ever had a one on one with the 
President before and must confess I was a little nervous in there.  They were trying 
to make me as relaxed as possible, and make it as cordial as possible, but I was quite 
naturally nervous.  There was a man who is the most important man in the Western 
World, and here I am having a conversation with him for the first time one on one, 
so I was not studying his reactions and it wasn’t until I started meeting with him 
more frequently later that the tenor of our conversations changed and——
 Senator Baker.  You see what I am driving at I am sure, Mr. Dean.  If someone 
had said that the investigation has been contained it might evoke a question, that 
might create a startled look on one’s face, it might be taken for granted, and that 
might be important to shed light.
 Mr. Dean.  That is right.
 Senator Baker.  On the state of the knowledge with the person with whom 
you were having the conversation.
 Mr. Dean.  Everyone seemed to understand what I was talking about.  It 
didn’t evoke any questions and I was going on to say that I didn’t think it could be 
contained indefinitely.  I said that this is, you know, there are a lot of hurdles that 
have to be leaped down the road before it will definitely remain contained and I was 
trying to tell the President at that time that I was not sure the coverup even then 
would last indefinitely.
 Senator Baker.  This, once again, is a terribly important area of inquiry, so let 
me interrupt you again and take you over it one more time.  You told the President, 
I don’t think it can continue to be contained?
 Mr. Dean.  That is correct.
 Senator Baker.  Are those close to your exact words?
SPECIAL ISSUE APPENDIX 127
 Mr. Dean.  That is very close to my words, because I told him it had been 
contained to that point and I was not sure that it would be contained indefinitely.
 Senator Baker.  What was his reaction to this?
 Mr. Dean.  As I say, I don’t recall any particular reaction.
 Senator Baker.  Was there any statement by him or by Mr. Haldeman at that 
point on this statement?
 Mr. Dean.  No, not to my recollection.
 . . . .
 Senator Baker.  All right.  It seems to me then that the extent to which the 
September 15 meeting would give us some guidance in our inquiry as to what 
the President knew and when he knew it, that you depend on a combination of 
things.  You depend on your experience at the White House as a staffer, with the 
interrelationships of staff and the Presidential staff; the remarks which did not 
relate directly to Watergate, that is the break-in at Watergate or to the concealment 
of the involvements and responsibilities for it.  But based on the general tenor of 
the conversation, you gained the impression, I believe you said, to paraphrase your 
testimony, that the President knew that there was an on-going counter-effort, at 
least, and when you couple that with your knowledge of the relationships and 
circumstances, that you concluded then in your own mind that he knew something 
. . . . I am not trying to distort the meaning of your testimony by summary, but, 
in effect, you drew inferences from the totality of this conversation and the 
circumstances and relationships as you knew it, you drew inferences from that that 
led you to believe that on September 15 the President knew something about at 
least the efforts to counter the Watergate and possibly, in fact, about Watergate 
itself.
 Mr. Dean.  That is correct.
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Watergate’s Lancelot (1973)1
Jack Waugh2
 Mr. Baker.  Mr. Speaker, because of the televised hearings on the Watergate 
incident, the whole country is learning what we in Tennessee have known for a long 
time about the ability and character of our senior Senator, Howard Baker.
 The response to his incisive questioning and his fairness in handling witnesses 
has been nothing but favorable.  One of the best stories I have seen was written by 
Jack Waugh in the Christian Science Monitor.  He sees Senator Baker emerging as 
the “Lancelot” of the Watergate hearings.
 I am not sure that Senator Baker seeks such a designation, but his impact 
upon this aspect of the political scene can not be ignored.
 Under leave to extend my remarks, I direct the attention of my colleagues to 
this article on “Watergate’s Lancelot”:
Watergate’s Lancelot
by Jack Waugh
 Washington.—When Howard Baker was a lawyer back in the Cumberland 
Mountains, he used to try a case and the whole town of Huntsville (pop. 300) 
would turn out to hear him argue it.
 Things haven’t changed much.  Howard Baker is now a Republican senator 
from Tennessee.  And he’s involved in another case and a lot of the country is 
turning out every day to hear it.
 Senator Baker is the vice-chairman and the ranking Republican on the Senate 
select committee investigating the Watergate [matter].  And with his deep-throated 
Tennessee accent and his probing questions and photogenic face, he is emerging as 
a star of the televised hearings.  And he also may be rising as the newest political 
comet in the Republican firmament.
What He Does Best
 “That’s just Howard,” says one of his best friends, Lamar Alexander, a Nashville 
lawyer, “doing the two things he does best—engaging in a heads-on exchange and 
being on television.”
 One of Senator Baker’s aides once said that if the Senator had a fault it was 
that “he doesn’t do a good job of letting his light shine before men.”
 The aide is now eating his words, and 300 letters are piling into the Senator’s 
office every day.
 Some of them are accusing him of picking on the President, but most of them 
1 119 Cong. Rec. 19,297-98 ( June 12, 1973) (remarks of Rep. Lamar Baker).
2 Staff correspondent and Washington Bureau Chief for The Christian Science Monitor, 1956-1973.
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are admiring him personally.  A young lady from Ohio expressed regret he is not 
single.
 For Senator Baker, going to the Senate, which he first did six years ago, was like 
coming home to the family reunion.
 His father once was a congressman.  His mother was a congresswoman.  His 
father-in-law was Everett McKinley Dirksen, the late Republican Senator from 
Illinois.  His brother-in-law, William Wampler, is a congressman from Virginia. 
And then there is cousin John Sherman Cooper (Senator from  Kentucky).
 When Mr. Baker first ran for the Senate in Tennessee—in 1964—the state 
had so infrequently seen a Republican doing that with any conviction, that it almost 
elected him just because it was so novel.
 Next time around, in 1966, Mr. Baker, a moderate Republican, was elected 
by sheer dint of his appeal and talent.  He had to beat a well-known incumbent 
Governor, Frank Clement, to do it.
Tennessee First
 He was the first Republican ever popularly elected to the Senate from 
Tennessee.  The only other Tennessee Republicans before him had been appointed 
in reconstruction times and there hadn’t been any since.
 The Senator turned out to be, then only 41, the father of the two-party system 
in Tennessee.  After him since has come William Brock, another photogenic 
Republican, who is now the junior Senator from Tennessee.  Together they sport 
the two most boyish faces in the cloakroom.
 Mr. Baker early established himself as a master of the committee hearing. 
And it is in the give-and-take of the committee room that he has earned nearly 
everybody’s respect.  As it was hard to find anybody in Hollywood who didn’t like 
Gary Cooper, it is hard to find anybody in Washington who doesn’t respect Senator 
Baker.  Or if they don’t, they aren’t saying so.
Instant Grasp
 One of his aides says, “He can go into a hearing cold, with maybe 10 or 15 
minutes briefing, listen for half an hour, finally speak up, and show a devastating 
command of the situation.  It is humbling, because it makes me think he doesn’t 
really need me.”
 The Senator is the ranking Republican on the Public Works Committee and 
sits on both the Commerce Committee and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. 
He is a recognized expert on environmental legislation.
 Even those who often find themselves on the other side of the issue from the 
Senator circle him warily.
 A Democratic staffer on one of his committees, who often finds himself across 
the issue from the Senator, says, “He is the kind of man, if he takes a position 
opposite of yours he is so persuasive you find yourself reconsidering your own.  If 
you are still convinced then that you are right, then you can’t believe he is against 
you and that if he just thinks it through long enough he soon won’t be because 
anybody that intelligent can’t be.”
Looking For Trouble
 Besides being the Lancelot of the committee room, Senator Baker, as one of his 
aides has it, “likes to be on the Senate floor seeing what trouble he can get into.”
 He got into plenty of it the day the Senate decided to establish the select 
committee to inspect the about-to-burst Watergate situation.  No sooner had the 
deed been done than the Republican leadership pointed to him and said, “You.”
 Senator Baker at first figuratively said, “Who, me?”  And they said, “Yes, you.” 
And he said, “No, not me.”  But the leadership, principally minority leader Hugh 
Scott, put it in terms of duty to the party.  Senator Baker, full of misgivings, finally 
agreed.  The day he did there was no bigger albatross to be found in Washington.
A Star Is Born
 But now the Watergate affair has exploded with such force on the American 
ken that it is capable of blowing old faces completely out of the political spotlight 
and new ones in.  And one of the new ones may well be Senator Baker’s.
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Return to the Citizen-Legislator (1977)1
Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.
 I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak to you about the situation in 
Washington and the governmental affairs of our nation as I perceive and hope 
to understand them.  I do understand that politics in general and Congress in 
particular have a bad name these days.  Politics is considered to be something less 
than desirable by many Americans while some consider it to be something less than 
entirely honorable.  But that is not so.  Politics is an important occupation.
 I can’t tell you how convinced I am that the essence of the future of our nation 
and the assurance that we will make the right decisions on the major and grave 
issues depend upon our ability to tap the collective judgment and genius of the 
American people.  We must address America’s problems and decide the future 
course of our nation.  That is what politics is really all about.  It is the business of 
translating popular sentiment into useful federal, state, and local policies.
 But now we have transcended many of the events that have caused a troublesome 
reaction and perception of politics in the public mind.  The acute political distress 
of the recent past seems to have subsided.  We have passed into a new era of politics 
with the advent of the Carter Administration.
 Many changes have occurred in Washington other than the orderly transition 
of the Administration from a Republican to a Democratic one.  That is certainly a 
celebration in which America takes great pride—the ability to hand over the reins 
of power in the executive department and to transfer our allegiance to a new Chief 
of State, not just a new head of government.  And we celebrate that transition not 
only with freedom, dispatch, and ease but with a festive air and a renewal of our 
dedication to a single commonality of purpose.
Opinion Withheld
 Some journalists find it hard to accept the idea that I do not yet know what I 
think of the Carter Administration.  I have read all of the stories about the first 100 
days of the new Administration and I honestly believe that there are not enough 
points on the chart yet to start drawing curves.  It is not yet time to decide how the 
Administration has performed or may perform in the future.
 We have seen a developing foreign policy that has caused consternation in 
some quarters and uncertainty in others.  We have also observed an economic 
program that sounds strangely Republican to some ears as the President speaks of 
the need for a balanced budget, fiscal restraint, an overhaul of the welfare system, 
and a simplification of government in general.
 How does the Republican leadership respond to that?  Does that frighten me? 
1 This condensed version of a speech delivered on May 31, 1977, by Senator Baker, entitled “The Republican 
Leadership Looks at a New Administration,” before the Town Hall General Luncheon, Los Angeles Forum, was 
originally published in 39 Town Hall Journal 234-36 ( July 5, 1977).  © Town Hall Los Angeles.  Reprinted by 
permission of Town Hall Los Angeles.
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Of course it doesn’t frighten me but I must confess that I have to reexamine some 
of my prejudices.  It does not concern me that the President appears to be singing 
our song.  We have another tradition in America that the great decisions are made 
on the basis of a man’s stand on the issues.  If President Carter wants to stand 
with us, we will welcome him.  We will support him when his views and attitudes 
coincide with the Republican perspective, just as he will have broad-based and 
unified Republican opposition on those occasions when our perspectives differ.
 It is a truly remarkable thing that I do not yet know how the Carter 
Administration is going to perform.  I simply cannot tell you if the President will 
continue to move toward fiscal conservatism.  I do not yet know if he will negotiate 
a renewal or an extension of the SALT Agreement with the Soviet Union that will 
adequately provide for our defense and for the de-escalation of the nuclear threat. 
Furthermore, I do not know what his proposals will be in such supersensitive areas 
as welfare reform, tax reform, and health care.
 It is truly difficult for people in public life to say “I don’t know” but I rather 
suspect that we are all better served in some instances by that approach.  For that 
reason, I choose to reserve my judgment until we have a clearer picture of where the 
President’s future proposals will take us.
Republican Alternatives
 I have been criticized by some of my colleagues on the Republican side of the 
aisle for not attempting to create a clear set of alternatives to the Administration’s 
position on the major issues.  I am aware of our responsibility but we cannot form an 
alternative platform until we have the full-form program of the Administration.  So 
my advice and counsel is simply to wait and see what President Carter’s proposals 
look like when they occur and then we shall respond accordingly.
 Incidentally, Republicans haven’t done too badly in Congress of late.  We have 
38 soldiers in our troops and so far they have performed quite well.  We have 
won most of the big battles that we have chosen to join issue on.  And we have 
accomplished those feats because there is unity in the Republican Party.  Whether 
you are a Republican or a Democrat, I think that you should take some interest in 
that fact.
An Endangered Institution
 I should also like to discuss with you a problem that has not yet fully emerged 
in the public consciousness.  The problem has to do with the structural arrangement 
of the Congress itself—the nature of the institution.  At this time, I believe that we 
are headed in the wrong direction.  We have many serious problems and unless 
something is done about them Congress is going to be in serious trouble.
 As recently as 1950, when my father was elected, Congress met for a total of 
103 days and accumulated a grand total of 85 votes.  As we do now, my father came 
to Washington in January for the convening of Congress but there the similarity 
ends.  In the spring, he returned to Tennessee to practice law and to participate 
fully in the mainstream of the economic, social, and political life of his community, 
his District, and his State.  He knew firsthand what policies of government would 
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benefit the people of Tennessee because he lived there.  He was in every sense of the 
word a citizen of Tennessee, and I believe he was also a better legislator because of 
it.
 By comparison, Congress today remains in session virtually the entire year. 
Last year alone we had 700 roll call votes.  We pass bills of incredible length and 
detail that specify the functions of government and, in turn, impose ever-increasing 
guidance and regulation on the lives and livelihoods of an unwelcoming public. 
And we do this in self-imposed isolation without any true exposure to the needs of 
the public we serve and by whom we are elected.
 I should like to see us return to a situation where legislators come to Washington 
as “visitors” for 6 or 7 months a year.  The rest of the time they should be at home 
practicing law, running their businesses and farms, and staying close to the people 
who send them to the Capitol.  Congress ought to be involved in setting policy 
instead of grinding out voluminous reports and complex legislation.  We should 
help to set the nation’s direction, not run its traffic lights.
 There is no reason why Congressional committees with oversight responsibilities 
cannot have their meetings around the country instead of in Washington, D.C.  That 
is what grass roots democracy is all about.  Citizens should have the opportunity to 
interview with the staff of those committees or even to testify.  I have no notion that 
fundamental changes of this kind will likely occur overnight.  However, I do suggest 
that it will not occur at all unless we examine the differences between the Congress 
or now and then and attempt to apply some legislative brakes.
 We may have a serious shortage of energy in this country but there is certainly 
no shortage of laws.  I don’t believe that anyone would suffer a great loss if we 
reduced the tempo of producing new laws and left the Administration to its job of 
executing the policies set by Congress with appropriate safeguards and legislative 
oversight.
Pay Increase Controversy
 To take up another aspect of the structural arrangement of Congress itself, 
there is much resentment among the American people over the recent pay increase 
for Members of Congress.  I supported that legislation because I have to live in 
Washington and I know what it costs.  The increase in salary to $57,500 a year was 
essential to the performance of our Congressional duties.  Part of the reason that 
the American people cannot understand the need for that pay increase is that 99% 
of the American people do not earn $57,500!  And we are constantly reminded that 
the American people do not send us to Washington to grow fat and happy on their 
tax dollars.
 The whole question of the pay scale for Congressmen would be radically 
different if we did have citizen-legislators.  It never occurred to my father that being 
a Member of Congress would ever be his primary source of livelihood.  Of course, 
the possibilities for conflict of interest are manifold and manifest but I think it will 
be far more attractive to the American people if we began paying Congressmen on 
a per diem basis.  Pay them for the time they are actually on the job in Washington 
but don’t let them become professionals who are dependent upon the Treasury of 
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the United States to supply their livelihood, the education of their children, the 
mortgage on their house, and, ultimately, the campaign funds for their reelection.
 If we returned to citizen-legislators, policy-setters instead of elected bureaucrats, 
I believe that the whole idea of conflict, distrust, and mistrust and the quarrel over 
Congressional pay scales would disappear.
Among the People
 One of the Federalist Papers described the Congress as being of the people and 
being drawn from the people with Congressmen living among the people—but we 
don’t!  I think it would be a great idea if we returned to the original concept of 
people being drawn as citizens to serve their country in the policy-setting functions 
of the Congress.  Representatives would visit Washington once or twice each year 
to ensure that the policies of the government were adequately debated, codified, 
and transmitted to the government for their faithful execution.  Representatives 
would then return to the mainstream of American life and continue their primary 
pursuits.
 The whole idea of 1,000-page statutes, of bloated bureaucracy, of distant 
government, of insensitive government, and of unseemly government would be less 
likely to occur if Members of Congress lived among the people.  This may seem 
like an esoteric concern of mine to be troubled by the structural arrangements of 
government at a time when far more urgent issues require our full attention.  But 
this country has been right on the great issues of the past 200 years simply because 
those structural arrangements of the government guarantee that it resonates to the 
collective judgment of the citizens.
 The political system functions and we are what we are today because of those 
structural arrangements.  Congress has translated your judgments, desires, and 
demands into useful federal policies.  That is why we are a great nation and that is 
why we must ensure that the structural arrangements maintain their integrity, their 
responsiveness, and their sensitivity to your genius.
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Remarks on Senate Ratification of the 
Panama Canal Treaties (1978)1
Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Senator Robert C. Byrd2
Senator Paul Sarbanes3
Senator Paul Laxalt4
Senator Frank Church5
U. S. Senate, February 9, 1978
 Mr. Baker. . . . .
 Mr. President, I thank all those who have participated thus far in this debate. In 
these 2 days, the Senate already has demonstrated that it retains its prime purpose 
and principal importance to the scheme of legislative and democratic government 
in the United States—that is, the opportunity for the Senate to provide a useful 
forum for the exchange of ideas; to provide for the country a stage on which the 
adversary positions of men and women of good will can be tested and compared; 
and to illustrate to the rest of the country that out of this adversary relationship 
comes neither anger nor disunity, but rather, a better legislative product.
 In that view, I urge my colleagues, and indeed the entire country, to understand 
that in this debate, over such a divisive and emotional issue, the Senate is doing 
precisely what the Founding Fathers intended and what it does best in terms of the 
relevant needs of the country.  The Senate is providing an opportunity to synthesize 
the best ideas, to test the best judgments, and to formulate the best policy for the 
future national security interests of the United States.
 I would be the last to claim—indeed, I never have claimed—that all the 
wisdom on this issue is on one side or the other.  Not only is the question of advice 
and consent to the ratification of the Panama Canal treaties a divisive issue; it is a 
close issue.  Men and women of good will are still on both sides of this question 
1 124 Cong. Rec. 3,022-25 (Feb. 9, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Baker), 10,951 (Apr. 20, 1978) (statement by 
Sens. Frank Church and Paul Sarbanes).
2 Senator Robert C. Byrd (D. W. Va.) represented West Virginia in the United States Senate, 1959-2010, 
and served as Senate Majority Leader, 1977-1980 and 1987-1988, and as Senate Minority Leader, 1981-1986. 
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-Present, available at http://bioguide.
congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch1.asp.
3 Senator Paul Sarbanes (D. Md.) represented Maryland in the United States Senate, 1977-2007.  Id.  Senator 
Sarbanes served with Senator Frank Church (D. Ida.) as Senate floor managers in connection with the ratification 
of the Panama Canal treaties.
4 Senator Paul Laxalt (R. Nev.) represented Nevada in the United States Senate, 1974-1987.  Id.
5 Senator Frank Church (D. Ida.) represented Idaho in the United States Senate, 1957-1981.  Id.  Senator 
Church served with Senator Paul Sarbanes (D. Md.) as Senate floor managers in connection with the ratification 
of the Panama Canal treaties.
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and no doubt will be on both sides of it after we conclude our determination, make 
our judgment as a Senate, and certify our decision to the President in terms of our 
consent or the withholding of that consent to the ratification of these treaties.
 However, I think the country will be best served by understanding that it is the 
function and the responsibility of the Senate to hear, to understand, to test, and to 
judge the differing points of view, not only in the country but more particularly in 
this Chamber.
 I say at the very outset that I have nothing but the most profound respect for 
every Member of this body and for their points of view and that I will consider each 
of them separately.
 In my own case, I already have announced to the people of Tennessee, on Tuesday 
night, that it is my judgment that the new treaties, with certain amendments that 
have now been offered by the distinguished majority leader and me, are in the best 
national security interests of the United States.  I will explain why I think so and 
even a little of how I arrived at that decision.  But before I do, I should like to say 
a little about the remarks made by the distinguished Senator from Virginia (Mr. 
Scott)6 at the very beginning of the debate today.
 I asked the majority leader to yield to me only long enough to say that the 
sensitivity of one who is a candidate for reelection is probably greater than that 
of anybody else who was involved in that colloquy, and I was the only candidate 
involved.  I know firsthand the difficulty of making a decision on this issue under 
those circumstances.
 Mr. President, without trying to assume or play the role of a moral giant, which 
I am not, or to lay claim to intellectual superiority and insight, which I do not, 
it may serve some purpose to give some insight into how one who is under the 
gun—that is, up for reelection in 1978—in fact judged this issue, before I turn to 
an analysis of the question itself.
 To begin with, this is not a new issue.  Other speakers, yesterday and today, 
have remarked on the fact that the matter of revisions of our treaty arrangement 
with the Republic of Panama have been the subject of conversations at various levels 
since the administration of President Eisenhower and, actually, before that. This 
matter was actively pursued in the administrations of President Johnson and each 
succeeding President, Republican and Democrat.  It is not like the cartoon I saw 
in a magazine the other day that showed two men standing at a bar, and one said, 
“You know, I have not thought about the Panama Canal in 30 years, and suddenly I 
find I cannot live without it.”  This is not a new issue.  It has been around for a long 
time.  It simply had not been the high-pitched, emotional issue that it has become 
in recent years.
 I think that the intensity of the emotion and the extent of the public campaign 
in support of or in opposition to the treaties, does not relate to their importance 
in terms of our perception of national issues but rather to another factor—and 
that is that in this age of instantaneous communications and almost instantaneous 
6 Senator William L. Scott (R. Va.) represented Virginia in the United States Senate, 1973-1979.  
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-Present, available at http://bioguide.
congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000189.
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transportation and at a time when the population is better educated and more aware 
than at any other time in the history of the country, there is a more active concern 
for the major issues that confront the country.  Therefore, I judge the importance of 
this event in terms of the public’s participation in it.
 I do not resent that there have been extraordinary letter-writing campaigns, 
newspaper advertisements, and, in fact, the utilization of all the modern media to 
try to bring to bear the point of view of one party or the other.  I am speaking now 
of people, not political parties.  I think it is a good thing, because it verifies the 
fact that America, even now, is still maturing into its full role as a self-governing 
republic.  It is uncomfortable for those of us who are running for reelection to have 
40,000 letters pour into the mail room, with less than 30 staff members trying to 
handle them.  I say again, to anyone who has not received an answer, just bear with 
me.  It takes a while.
 . . . .
 It always causes a concern to pick up a paper in Nashville, Tenn., and see a full 
page ad in a Sunday edition that says “Only Howard Baker can save the Panama 
Canal.”  It never dawned on me that only Howard Baker could save the Panama 
Canal.  Moreover, the ad said, “Write, call, or visit.”  My wife asked: “Which one do 
you think they will do?”  I said: “Probably all three.”  And they have.
 But I welcome that as well because it is an extension of the public participation 
in a great national debate.  It, likewise, caused a bit of consternation to go to a 
University of Tennessee football game in that magnificent stadium in my hometown 
of Knoxville that seats 102,000 people, which is almost as big as the city, and to see 
an airplane fly over at halftime saying: “Contact Senator Baker.  Save the Panama 
Canal.”
 So when my friend from Virginia (Mr. Scott) suggested that this was a matter 
of particular interest to the people who might stand for reelection in 1978, all I can 
tell him is that he “ain’t seen nothing yet.”  I have been there and I know what it is 
about.  I have visited with the American Legionnaires who talk in earnest about 
this matter and who listen patiently to my attempt to analyze the issue carefully and 
dispassionately for them.
 Mr. President, even with that experience and with the sensitivity that I have to 
my own political fortunes, I would not presume to tell you or any of my colleagues 
what the country thinks about this issue.  I rather suspect that the country wants us 
to help them decide what to think about this issue.  I suspect that the polls recently 
taken indicate that most people instinctively oppose new treaties with the Republic 
of Panama, but with certain amendments and additional guarantees a majority 
probably support new treaties with the Republic of Panama.  I would not presume 
to stand here on this floor and tell you that the American people think so and so.  I 
can tell you what my judgment is, and I have done so.
 I believe that the judgment of the sovereign, the people of this country, is still to 
be made and that this debate may have a significant part to play in that judgment.
 Parenthetically, Mr. President, I commend the majority leader for agreeing to 
broadcasts from the floor of the Senate.  I had rather hoped that this debate might 
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be televised as well, because I think electronic access to the Senate itself is a logical 
next extension of the public galleries.  If the people of this country are to participate 
fully and meaningfully in the deliberations of their Government and if we are, in 
fact, to march together with the collective judgment of the sovereign, electronic 
communications from this Chamber will be very helpful and a good first step.
 Mr. President, I have spoken of the sensitivity I feel for this issue.  It is sort 
of like being, if my friend from Nevada will pardon the expression, a Las Vegas 
gambler.  I feel sometimes you are betting every chip you have on this because this 
issue is a killer issue politically.  It may devour you, or you may survive it, but you 
cannot profit from it politically.  No way.
 Mr. President, all that does is make the issue more difficult.  It does not shed any 
light on our determination.  It makes it more uncomfortable.  It does not facilitate 
the decision.  It makes it more unpleasant, but it does not alter the facts.
 Against that background of acute political distress, let me tell you how one 
Senator arrived at his decision.  First, I know the majority leader will forgive me if 
I say that while we arrived at the same judgment on the desirability of amending 
these treaties by Senate action, and ratifying them as amended, I believe we arrived 
at that judgment, in part at least, by different routes.  For instance, I do not think 
the 1903 treaty was a bad treaty.  I think it was good for Panama and good for the 
United States, and I am  proud of the canal that came as a result of it.  I believe the 
pride that it has brought to the United States is well justified.
 But that is not the point.
 The point is—I did not negotiate that treaty, and I refuse to accept a burden 
of guilt for someone else who did.  I must take the facts as I find them.  And I 
judge them on the basis of what will best serve the national security interests of this 
country in the future, not by what happened in the past.  Some may say, “Oh, the 
insensitivity of that.”
 I am not insensitive, and I have a compassionate concern for the plight of the 
Panamanian people, then and now.  But my official sworn responsibility as a U.S. 
Senator is to look to the future of the United States.  My judgment must be made 
not on whether it was a good treaty then, but whether it is a good treaty now; and, 
whether that treaty agreement should be changed.
 Mr. President, as far as I am concerned, this political odyssey began in August 
1977, when I was in Tennessee during the period that the Senate was not in 
legislative session.  I was enjoying an opportunity to travel about my State, even to 
visit with my family a little, and as I recall it was early one afternoon when I picked 
up the telephone and the operator said, “Senator Baker, the President wants to 
speak to you.”
 The President came on the line to tell me that negotiations with Panama were 
about complete and that he wanted me to know of this in advance.  The President 
also said that he hoped that the treaty could be submitted to the Senate immediately 
and that we could have early action on that treaty in 1977.
 I am sure the President will not be offended if I repeat now my reply in substance. 
I try to make it a policy not to repeat conversations in which only Presidents and 
I are present, but I think this is important and I believe the President would not 
judge it a mistake to deviate from that personal policy.
 I thought for a minute and replied:
  Mr. President, I am sure you know as certainly I know that this is 
an issue that will generate strong emotions, that will divide my State, the 
country, and indeed divide my party and your party, too.  One only has to 
recall that extraordinary contest in the Republican Presidential primary in 
1976 when this was certainly one of the principal issues in the campaign 
between President Ford and Governor Reagan, to know that it is going to 
be divisive.  It is going to be difficult.  And I must say, Mr. President, that I 
want you to know that I will consciously make the decision not to decide 
how I will vote during this year, and that I will wait until after the first of 
January to make that determination because I want to make certain that I 
fulfill my responsibilities as a Senator to my State and as minority leader 
to my party in the Senate.
 I believe the President understood my point of view.  When I returned to 
Washington, I discussed the matter with the distinguished majority leader, and as 
a result he and I cosigned a letter to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
chaired by Senator Sparkman, of Alabama, and on which the senior Republican, 
the ranking minority member, is Senator Case of New Jersey.  The essence of the 
letter was:  We want the Foreign Relations Committee to hold the most extensive 
hearings.  We want you to take your time.  We want you to provide a forum for 
everyone on every side of the issue to be heard.  We will cooperate with you as 
majority leader and minority leader in seeing that you have all the time you need to 
meet, and would encourage you to meet even after the Congress adjourns sine die 
so that the Senate will be in a position after the Congress reconvenes in January to 
proceed to consideration of these treaties.
 The Foreign Relations Committee did hold extensive hearings, and did hear a 
wide variety of testimony on every conceivable side of the issue.  The report of the 
Foreign Relations Committee is voluminous and extensive indeed.
 Following the hearings, Mr. President, if I may take just a little more of the 
time of my colleagues to describe how I arrived at my decision, the Congress 
adjourned sine die in December.  There was an opportunity to return to Tennessee 
once more, to spend Christmas there, and to ponder on what had gone before, to 
try to understand this avalanche of information and contradictory testimony, to 
consider the views represented in the briefs and position papers submitted by two 
expert consultants that I had employed in my office as minority leader—one for 
the treaties and one opposed—and decide whether I had done all I needed to do 
to make a wise and reasoned judgment that would fully respond to my duties as a 
Senator and to my party in the Senate.
 In December, I decided that the treaties did not meet the requirement that the 
future interests of the United States be fully protected, and that there was ambiguity 
in the neutrality treaty that I felt had to be dealt with.  I had previously the privilege 
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of visiting at the White House with President Carter.  President Carter indicated 
then that he hoped to have a memorandum of understanding with General Torrijos 
to clarify articles IV and VI of the neutrality treaty.
 I told the President that I would encourage him to do that—at that time the 
proposed memorandum of understanding was in the form of a letter—and I urged 
him to try to get General Torrijos to sign the letter.  However, I also told him then 
that I did not think that a memorandum of understanding between President Carter 
and General Torrijos would suffice, that I thought that the matter had now moved 
to the Senate, that the Senate had an obligation under article II of the Constitution, 
and that, while a memorandum of understanding was desirable, I thought it did not 
meet the need for mandatory action by the Senate.
 That was my final judgment.  I decided there needed to be further amendments 
to the neutrality treaty before we turned to the consideration of the canal treaty 
itself, keeping in mind, of course, that unlike the 1903 arrangement, where there 
was one treaty—there are two in this case—the canal treaty and the neutrality 
treaty.
 The question arose, what would the President of the United States say about the 
submission of such amendments?  What would the Republic of Panama say?  Would 
they reject the amendments?  This was important because amendments require the 
formal concurrence of the other government.  Was it or was it not worthwhile to 
try?  What would the other countries of Latin America think?  Mexico, for instance, 
or Colombia, or Venezuela?  In two or three of those countries, there is at least the 
possibility that a sea-level canal might be built.  There is a provision in these treaties 
that the United States will not build a future canal anywhere except in Panama. 
What would these other Latin American countries think about amendments with 
respect to the sea-level canal?
 Shortly after the first week of the new year, it was my privilege to travel, in 
the company of two other Senators, pursuant to an authorizing resolution of this 
Senate, to Panama and to other countries, to ascertain their views.  The distinguished 
Senator from Utah (Mr. Garn) and the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island 
(Mr. Chafee) accompanied me on that trip.
 Mr. President, to abbreviate this chronology, I would like to say that on meeting 
with General Torrijos in Panama, I told him that I felt that our best interests, his 
and mine, would be served by absolute candor and frankness, and that I wanted 
him to know that the treaties in their present form, unamended, in my judgment 
had absolutely no chance of passing the United States Senate.  If he was amenable 
to amending the treaties, I would like to know that before I decided whether it was 
worthwhile to ask the Senate to work its will, in the amendatory process, to change 
them.
 Our delegation, Mr. President, met twice with General Torrijos and a number 
of other government officials, both military and civilian, and the net result was that 
in my judgment General Torrijos indicated that the Government of Panama was 
ready to consider certain amendments, that they would not object to them, and 
that a satisfactory package of amendments on additional guarantees might be put 
together that would have some chance of passing the Senate, as contrasted to the 
treaties unadorned, which, in my view, had no chance of prevailing.
 Having reached that decision, I made an announcement in Panama that I would 
return to Washington and try to put together such a package of amendments; and, 
I did.  The result of that, Mr. President, was the joint initiative of the distinguished 
majority leader and 77 other Senators, including me:  a joint leadership effort and 
a bipartisan effort to put these treaties in shape so that they were consistent with 
the requirement that they serve the undoubted national security interests of this 
country, and so that they would have some reasonable chance of passing this Senate.
 It is still uncertain whether the treaties, as amended, can pass this Senate.  That 
is what this debate is all about.  This is one of the few cases where the Senate will 
decide the issue on the basis of the debate.  It is not a charade.  What is going on 
here will probably determine the outcome.
 But I was pleased that we were able to get that number of cosponsors.  I think 
it augurs well, not only for the future of the treaties but also the spirit of this body, 
because it showed that although Members disagreed on the final outcome, many of 
them wanted to work together to try to improve the submission before the Senate.
 I look around the Chamber and see the distinguished Senator from Utah, the 
distinguished Senator from Nevada, the distinguished Senator from Indiana—and 
there are others here—who cosponsored that amendment.  I am certain that some 
of those I have named may not be entirely convinced that they should vote for 
the treaties, but I think the fact that they cosponsored the amendment signifies a 
healthy and wholesome attitude in the Senate, that is, that the Senate will work its 
will to improve the documents, and then make final judgment on what the outcome 
should be.
 Mr. Robert C. Byrd.  Will the distinguished minority leader yield for one 
observation at that point?
 Mr. Baker.  Yes, I will.
 Mr. Robert C. Byrd.  I had the experience, and I am sure the distinguished 
minority leader had the same experience, in talking with some Senators about those 
amendments, that some Senators told me they would support the amendments, but 
for various reasons they did not want to cosponsor them.  So actually the support of 
the amendments will be greater than is reflected by the 78 sponsors and cosponsors 
thereon.
 Mr. Baker.  I thank the majority leader. I had, indeed, the same experience, 
and I was doubly grateful for the cooperation and indeed the assistance of Senators 
who do not favor the treaties at this point, in trying to improve them according to 
the suggestions contained in those amendments.
 Mr. President, I do not want to state this next set of facts without great care. 
I want my colleagues to fully understand that while the Panamanian Government 
indicated to my satisfaction that they would support such amendments and would 
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not object to them, it is still, as far as I know, the position of the U.S. administration 
that they do not favor amendments.  I cannot say that the administration will favor 
them.  I can only say that it is my best judgment that if the Senate works its will and 
does, in fact, amend the treaties, they will not be objected to by the administration. 
I want that carefully understood.  I do not have that representation at present, but 
I have a strong view that the administration will not object if the Senate decides to 
work its will and, in fact, to amend these treaties.
 Following that point, Mr. President, the distinguished majority leader (Mr. 
Robert C. Byrd) appeared before the Committee on Foreign Relations to express 
his point of view as that committee began proceedings which would lead to the 
reporting of the treaties to this body for its consideration.  At his request, and at 
mine, the Foreign Relations Committee did not amend the treaties, but rather, 
made only recommendations for amendments.  That was not to short circuit the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, but because we believed that every Member of 
the Senate should have an opportunity equal to that of members of the Foreign 
Relations Committee to participate in deliberations.  After all, the Senate now 
in a special procedure, sitting as the Committee of the Whole, is the functional 
equivalent of the Foreign Relations Committee and has general jurisdiction of 
the subject matter as a committee.  Therefore, I was particularly pleased that the 
committee accepted the judgment of the majority leader, in which I concurred, 
that the maximum opportunity for those for and against the treaties would be 
afforded by reporting the treaties to the floor without amendments, but, rather, 
with suggestions.
 I think that was borne out by the fact that 76 people did participate in co-
sponsoring the amendments Senator Byrd and I suggested, whereas in the Foreign 
Relations Committee no one but the members could have participated.  The 
amendments would have appeared here as committee amendments rather than 
Senate amendments.  I pay special tribute to the Foreign Relations Committee for 
doing that because, while it did not diminish their stature, it did accommodate the 
greater need of a greater number of Senators in this Chamber.
 Mr. Sarbanes.  Will the Senator yield?
 Mr. Baker.  I yield.
 Mr. Sarbanes.  As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I want to 
say that I believe the procedure suggested by the majority leader and supported 
by the minority leader was an extremely constructive procedure to follow in this 
instance.  The minority leader is correct that the committee did not actually amend 
the treaties, but it did adopt positive recommendation with respect to amendments 
which should be offered and which the majority and minority leaders had presented.
 It was my view, shared obviously by the committee, that this was a constructive 
way in which to proceed, and that it would give maximum opportunity to the 
Members of the Senate to work their will in respect to this very important matter.
 Mr. Baker.  Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Maryland 
for his comments, and for his help in the committee in dealing with the issue there, 
and in supporting this method of bringing it to the floor for the consideration of 
this body as a Committee of the Whole.  I appreciate his remarks.
 Mr. President, I would like now to turn to the reasons why I believe the 
amended treaties best serve the national security interests of the United States.
 I followed with great interest the colloquy just held between the distinguished 
majority leader, Senator Byrd, and the equally distinguished Senator from Nevada 
(Mr. Laxalt), about whether we were bending our knee as a nation to the threat of 
terrorists.  I would like to state my views without any association with either point 
of view.  I simply want to state my views on this subject.
 I believe the United States of America can operate that canal come what may.
 I think every Member of this body, and the President of the United States, 
would do whatever was necessary to see that that canal stayed open and available 
for shipping and military purposes, whether these treaties are amended or not.  I 
just happen to think it is going to be a lot easier to try to keep the Panamanians as 
our friends and allies than it is to convoy ships through the canal.
 I just happen to think it is going to be better to try to accommodate the 
purposes of 1978 instead of clinging to the status quo.
 I believe, Mr. President, that the 1903 treaty was a good treaty then but I do 
not think it is a good treaty now.
 I do not think the United States should approve these treaties out of fear of 
another Vietnam, because I do not believe there will be another Vietnam in Panama.
 In traveling to Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, and Colombia, I asked in each case 
what would happen if these treaties were rejected.  Would there be assistance and 
aid from adjoining countries?  Would there be a supply line to Panama as there was 
into Vietnam?  The answer was, “Of course not.”
 I do not believe for one instant that terrorist activities or student activities in 
Panama could keep the United States from using and enjoying that great waterway. 
It might be necessary to reinforce our garrisons there, but if it is we will just do it.
 However, I think there is a better way, Mr. President.  The better way is 
with revised treaties, extending in perpetuity our right to defend that canal in its 
utilization and neutrality, and our right to use it in time of war against anyone else, 
even including Panamanians, forever.
 Some say, Mr. President, that by doing this we are giving away the canal.  On 
the contrary, Mr. President, if these treaties are ratified, as amended, we will have 
more rights to defend the Panama Canal after the year 2000 than we have at any 
other defense establishment anywhere else in the world—more than in Spain, in 
Greece, in Turkey, in England, or anywhere.  We will have more permanent rights, 
more extensively held, in relation to the defense of the canal than anyplace else in 
the world.
 Mr. Laxalt.  Will the Senator yield for a question?
 Mr. Baker.  Yes.
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 Mr. Laxalt.  While it may be admitted that that may be the case in relation to 
our bases elsewhere, the Senator is not contending for a moment that we will have 
more rights after we give up this canal in its protection and operation.
 Mr. Baker.  The Senator from Nevada is entirely right.  That is one of the 
factors we have to take account of in making the balancing judgment.  Certainly, we 
will have less rights after the year 2000 than we have now, but we will have more 
rights after the year 2000 than at any other military establishment anywhere else in 
the world, except those in the United States.
 This points up, Mr. President, this very pertinent inquiry by the Senator from 
Nevada, the nature of the difficulty in arriving at these decisions.  There is no clear-
cut answer to this.  Do we need greater rights than I have described?  Do we need 
the rights we have now or even more rights than we have now in case of a world 
challenge in the future?  I do not know.
 All I can do is bring forth my very best judgment and decide, on balance, what 
is best for the country.  Men can honestly differ on that point.  It is a good point.  Mr. 
President, that brings me to the last point I would like to make.  There is a section 
of the report on my trip to Latin American entitled “What Will the Neighbors 
Think?”
 To summarize briefly, Mexicans think if a sea-level canal is built they may want 
to build it.  In fact, I suspect that they are more interested in natural gas problems 
right now than they are in the Panama Canal.
 The Colombians, on the other hand, have every right to be a little resentful. 
We may have, indeed, facilitated the loss of the Panama province.  But I found no 
recrimination or bitterness in their attitude. I found instead that they are greatly 
concerned about the perpetuation of their rights to free passage of Colombian ships 
through the canal.
 I found in Venezuela that there was a great concern for the unrest, the distress, 
and the political difficulty that might occur if the treaties were not ratified, 
particularly in terms of future encroachments by unfriendly powers such as Castro’s 
Cuba.
 I heard in Brazil a statement that America is a great power but it will not solve 
all of its problems in Latin America with the Panama Canal treaties.  I would urge 
my colleagues to understand that.  We are not going to solve every problem in Latin 
America with these treaties whether we approve them or do not approve them.
 We have big problems with Brazil and I urge the administration to face them 
because they are problems of major consequence.  Brazil has an economy that is 
growing so fast that in a few years its GNP, its population, and certainly its national 
pride may rival that of the United States.  We have to put our house in order with 
Brazil.
 Their general view is, “You ought to have the treaties but that does not solve all 
your problems.  That is just an installment along the way.”
 I suspect this is probably right.
 Mr. President, the President of Venezuela, who is an articulate, ebullient, 
capable politician, a great administrator, and magnificent host—we stopped at 
Caracas for 6 hours on the way back and spent a productive 4 hours with him in 
nonstop conversation—is most persuasive.
 I asked this question, and I think it has a telling impact:  What would happen 
if some years in the future another head of government in Panama decided that 
Torrijos had done such a good job and made so much political hay out of new 
treaties with the United States [that he asked], “Why don’t I do it one better and 
negotiate that treaty again?  Why don’t I try to accelerate the day of the Panamanian 
take-over from 2000 to the year 1990, for instance?”  It is a pretty good political 
issue in Panama.
 The President of Venezuela said, and I am grateful to him for saying it, that if 
the United States does, in fact, negotiate satisfactory new treaties with the Republic 
of Panama, he will insist, as will, in his view, all Latin American countries, and 
even support the United States in the insistence that the treaties be fully performed 
according to their terms.
 Mr. President, I close by saying, once again, that this is a close issue and a close 
call.  I have indicated to my friends on this side of the aisle, on both sides of the 
question, that I wish to be of service to them in seeing that we have a meaningful 
and thorough debate.  And I will do that.
 Not only will future unity in this country be served by that, but significant 
debate on a close and important issue in the Senate go a long way toward the growth 
of our ability to govern ourselves intelligently at a time when we are better suited to 
it than ever before; at a time when the American Congress is more relevant to this 
era than ever before; at a time when our population is better educated and more 
aware than ever before; and at a time when our greatness has just begun.7
U. S. Senate, April 20, 1978
 Mr. Church.  Mr. President, now that the Panama Canal treaties have been 
approved by the Senate, for both Senator Sarbanes and myself, I wish to say a few 
words about the work of the majority and minority leaders on the Panama Canal 
treaties.
 Both played an essential role in shaping the final form of the treaties, in creating 
the political consensus necessary to obtain the approval of two-thirds of the Senate, 
and in providing masterful leadership during floor debate.  These treaties would not 
have received the Senate’s advice and consent without the active and courageous 
support of Senator Robert C. Byrd and Senator Baker.
 There is a long history behind what came to be called the leadership amendments 
that dealt with problems that, from the beginning of the hearings, concerned so 
many members of the Foreign Relations Committee.  Their sponsorship of these 
two amendments was the crucial factor in reassuring many Senators with similar 
concerns.  Later, when questions of interpretation about Senator DeConcini’s 
provision threatened the fragile consensus behind the treaties, both in the Senate 
7 By a margin of one vote, 68 to 32, the constitutional requisite of two-thirds of the Senate ratified the 
Panama Canal treaties, as amended, on April 18, 1978.  124 Cong. Rec. 10,540-41.
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and in Panama, the leadership worked with all parties to find the key to the problem.
 As floor managers of the treaties, Senator Sarbanes and I had the fullest co-
operation from the majority and the minority leader throughout the 38 days the 
Senate debated the treaties.  It has been a pleasure and an honor to work with them 
so closely.
 Both have demonstrated the highest qualities of true political leadership.  They 
deserve the thanks of all Members of this body.  Their role in this controversial issue 
was crucial.  It will not go unnoticed in history.
Proud of Being a Politician (1979)1
Hugh Sidey2
 The de Havilland Sky Hawker is all fueled up.  The Hasselblad camera is packed 
away in its tan case with the Senator’s favorite 120-mm lens nestled in leather.  He 
has a clutch of Arthur Adler’s summer suits ready for rumpling.  Tab, Fresca and 
coffee by the gallon are in the hold.  The ghost of Everett McKinley Dirksen has 
been signed on.  About this time Howard Henry Baker Jr. (5 ft. 7’2 in.; 160 lbs.) is 
ready to roll through 26 states, thumping and sweating and striving to be President 
of the U.S.
 There is something bright and burning about this Republican camera nut and 
son-in-law of the late Dirksen.  It is Baker’s season.  In six months he has come up 
ten to twelve points in the opinion polls.  In the Kentucky hills and along the clear 
streams of Utah, when they take time to think about politics, there are unusual 
numbers of queries now about Howard Baker.
 Teddy Kennedy this week will be camping in the cool Berkshires, Ronald 
Reagan is taking off the entire month of August.  Jimmy Carter hopes for an 
interlude soon on an ocean island, savoring a fisherman’s solitude.  Not Baker.
 He will inspect beef cattle and beauty queens and shout to everyone that “I am 
proud of being a politician!”  He will tell his audiences that he is sick and tired of 
hearing that professional politicians are not worthy of trust, that he is fed up with 
amateurism.
 The Senate minority leader has a remarkable record on the issues.  He 
is responsible, often original and almost always ahead.  He dived in to help the 
President win the Panama Canal Treaty and the arms package for Israel, Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia.  Down at the G.O.P.’s Tidewater Conference he seized the moment 
and focused on SALT as an occasion for a broad re-examination of the “total 
military and foreign policy relationship between the Soviet Union and the U.S.”  It 
was, in Baker’s eyes, time to dispel the tattered remnants of Arthur Vandenberg’s 
bipartisan tradition, something that was right a generation ago, just after World 
War II, but is not fully applicable in today’s psychological struggles.
 Baker articulated the dark thoughts that crossed the mind of many a citizen 
stuck in a gas line.  If the big oil companies were gouging the American people, 
Baker declared, they risked nationalization.  Baker was wildly against even the 
thought of such a measure, but as a professional pol he sensed an ugly mood.  His 
warning nearly cracked the picture windows in Houston’s Petroleum Club.  Baker’s 
mail showed it.
 He went to Moscow and warned Leonid Brezhnev about the doubts the Senate 
had over SALT.  He raised his questions back home, and his state of mind is crucial 
as the debate rumbles along.  When Jimmy Carter came down from the mountaintop 
in his new leadership robes, Baker, who was not invited to the seminars, swallowed 
1 125 Cong. Rec. 22,979 (remarks of Sen. Lugar) (Sept. 5, 1979); originally appeared in Time, Aug. 13, 1979.
2 Hugh Sidey (1927-2005) was a journalist for Life, 1955-1957, and Time, 1957-1966.
148 BAKER CENTER JOURNAL OF APPLIED PUBLIC POLICY
hard, but once again supported his political rival.
 “Deep down I’d like to tell him to go to hell,” Baker muttered to friends.  But he 
did not.  Instead, he said he was “willing to lay aside animosities . . . He is President, 
we are in a tough time, he’s got a big problem, the country has a big problem.  And 
I’m going to give him his day.”
 Therein is the legacy of Dirksen, who used to reside in Baker’s Capitol office, 
doing Baker’s leadership job.  “I saw it close up,” says Baker.  “Right here Dirksen 
and Lyndon Johnson worked out their differences for the good of the country.  They 
were adversaries but not enemies.”
 So Howard Baker insists that judgment should be first but politics a close 
second.  That means some solid whacks, as well as support in critical times.  Baker 
was the one who labeled Carter “a yellow-pad President” and suggested that while 
the President “was saying the right things, I’m not sure he can make them happen.” 
Politics, Baker believes, is results, though even he sometimes pauses to make a few 
notes.  They are always brief enough to go on the backs of envelopes.
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The Founding Fathers, 
the Federal Register, and
“Staying Home from Politics” (1980)1
Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.
 In 1970 there were 203 million people living in the United States.  If the experts 
are right, there will be 20 million more when the results of the 1980 census are in. 
That’s almost a quarter of a billion people living in a prosperous and self-governing 
republic.  It’s a staggering conception when you think that there were only 4 million 
Americans when George Washington took the oath of office as the country’s first 
President.  After 150 years of European settlement and struggle, the United States 
was still a strip of sparsely settled farms and cities along the eastern seaboard of a 
largely unexplored and threatening continent.  But a political miracle of sorts had 
already occurred (and we’ve had plenty since).
 Four million people, still fairly clinging to the edges of the new world, created 
a climate in which its citizenry weighed, accepted, and gave life to the Constitution 
of the United States.
 The few hundred political leaders of the thirteen colonies who actually 
determined the direction of the new republic, and the few dozen who wrote the 
declaration of its independence and its governing document, were almost unique 
in human history.  Scholars tell us that the richness of their intellects, the quality 
of their vision, and the restraints they placed on their individual self-interest hadn’t 
been equaled since democracy took its first steps in ancient Athens.  But their most 
remarkable accomplishment was not the nobility of their expression or even the 
quality of the government they instituted among themselves.  The most important 
political act of that or any generation before or since was their creation of a nuts-
and-bolts blueprint for government that has survived as a working document for 
191 years.
 The Constitution is so often invoked as a kind of semi-religious object that we 
forget the miracle of what it really is.  The men who wrote that Constitution for a 
small and homogeneous population (all rooted in Western Europe, and most from 
the British Isles), on a continent comfortably distant from much of the turmoil of 
their ancestral homes, made a document that still serves as an umbrella of governing 
principles for the world’s most rapidly changing and growing civilization.
 These were men who couldn’t know about the internal combustion machine, 
or the power of the atom, or the civil and global wars to come, or the flooding of a 
thriving empire with immigrants from eastern and southern Europe and Africa and 
Asia and Central and South America.  They had no knowledge of the automobiles 
and the airplanes and the great railroads that were to forge a continental republic 
from the thirteen colonies in which they lived.
 Somehow, without that knowledge, with no record that implies anything 
1 © Howard H. Baker, Jr.  Reprinted from Howard H. Baker, Jr., No Margin for Error:  America in 
the Eighties 13-33 (1980).
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but the vaguest prescience of what was to come, they made a set of governing 
principles that are central to the life of twentieth-century Americans.  If anything, 
the Constitution has a significance to citizens living today that goes far beyond the 
impact any political covenant could have had on the rural people who first lived 
under its rubric.
 From the beginning, the Constitution has been read by different eyes in many 
different ways.  Its most enduring quality is the opportunity it has given succeeding 
generations to interpret it in accord with the needs of their own times.  Perhaps the 
secret is that the Constitution is a short document.  There are only 7,500 words, and 
that includes all twenty-six amendments that have been adopted since 1789.  Any 
young lawyer worth his or her degree can write a brief on one constitutional clause 
that’s longer than the entire text.  A number of policy-makers have come to feel 
that a document subject to such detailed exegesis and differences of interpretation 
needs a stringent overhauling.  But I believe that we have a more than serviceable 
document for our own time; and we certainly have had enough practice in amending 
it when that has been necessary to accommodate to new attitudes and the changing 
will of the people.
 That is the central strength in the Constitution.  It has, historically, been adapted 
to the will of the people; not the whim, but the overwhelming will, as articulated in 
the detailed and frequently emotional dialogue that always precedes the passage of 
a constitutional amendment.  We may not all agree as to whether one or the other 
of the amendments that is now part of the Constitution should have been adopted. 
But only the willfully blind would contend that those amendments have failed to 
reflect the strong beliefs of the majority of the political constituency.
 The Constitution has thus provided a frame for democratic government in 
keeping with an egalitarianism that grew with American expansion in territory, 
power, and a surging and heterogeneous population.  In 1980 it is hard to remember 
that a distinguished American historian, Charles Beard, once wrote a major work 
that analyzed the Constitution as a document produced by a small oligarchy of 
landowners determined to protect their own economic interests against the mob!
 But if the Constitution is a document to satisfy all of the social orders that have 
been implanted in America, it offers no easy answers to the problems that inevitably 
arise in the day-to-day business of government.
 It would have been beyond the most nightmarish visions of any of the founding 
fathers that in 1980 there would be any such thing as the Federal Register.
 You should know about the Federal Register because it influences almost every 
aspect of your life.  Each and every year the Federal Register publishes 60,000 legally 
binding regulations.  It might just as well be called “your guide to everyday living” 
because it publishes rules that have to do with the coffee you drink, the toothpaste 
you choose, how much interest your bank can pay you, as well as where and how 
your children go to school.
 The rules promulgated in the Federal Register are not laws passed by Congress. 
But they have every bit of the force of law and too frequently they use the law as a 
pretext to impose the beliefs of civil servants who may sometimes disagree with the 
intent of the law as written.
 The Federal Register has become a kind of daily addition to the Constitution 
of the United States.  It is the surface expression of much of the work done by the 
executive branch of the government and the regulatory agencies (most of them are 
ostensibly independent) that grind out millions of pages of paper work for ordinary 
citizens to do.  As a matter of fact, the President of the United States recently 
thought it necessary to appoint still another commission.  This one is supposed to 
study whether or not there’s a way to reduce the federal paper logjam.  So far the 
commission has succeeded only in adding more pulp to the already choking stream. 
No wonder the shortage of newsprint threatens to drive a good many smaller 
newspapers out of business.
 But the important question is whether or not the staggering range of subject 
and content in the Register is an incursion of bureaucratic power that is at odds 
with the spirit of the Constitution and with the fundamental principles of self-
government.
 In 1936, the first year of the Federal Register’s regular publication, some 2,619 
pages of bureaucratic rulemaking were printed.  Let’s not forget that in 1936 the 
United States was in the trough of the Great Depression.  For the first time in 
American history the federal government was involved in massive across-the-board 
intervention in American life.  Once that kind of intervention begins, the law of 
inertia takes over.  By 1970 the Federal Register was publishing over 20,000 pages 
annually.  In 1976, 57,000 pages of federal regulation were bound in the Federal 
Register.  And in 1980—only four years later—it is estimated that 100,000 pages 
of Federal Register material will have been published since the year began.  The level 
of the paper machine’s output is hardly the most significant measure of government 
interference in the minutiae of our everyday lives.  But it is certainly a symbolic 
expression of the aggravation to which we have become accustomed.  Brood with 
me on this IRS regulation as embodied in one of those 100,000 pages put out in 
1980:
Bread crumbs treated so as to simulate salmon eggs and pork rind, cut 
and dyed to resemble frogs, eels, or tad poles are considered to be “artificial 
fishing lures.”
That means, under IRS rules, that these particular bread crumbs are subject to an 
excise tax.  But, ever alert, the IRS took great care to evaluate a fishing bait made of 
chicken blood that’s processed into patties.  It is, according to the Federal Register, 
“still identifiable as chicken blood.”  Inasmuch as it hasn’t been made to “resemble 
another article more attractive to fish,” the bait is exempt from the tax.
 Thus the Federal Register!  Who’s baiting whom?
 According to the text of a workbook issued by the people who give you the 
Federal Register, “Congress delegates the authority to agencies to implement the 
law of Congress.  In this respect regulations can be considered delegated legislation.” 
Inasmuch as Congress cannot constitutionally delegate its legislative authority, such 
an observation is peculiarly revealing of a bureaucratic mind set at odds with the 
principles of self-government.  But it would be most unfair to lay the blame for 
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that mind set on the men and women who operate the bureaucracy.  The sad fact is 
that Congress has, to all intents and purposes, abdicated a substantial portion of its 
obligation to make the substantive law of the United States.  Vacuums in authority 
are apparently subject to the laws of physics.  No matter how, they will be filled. 
But it does raise a serious question as to what has happened to our representative 
democracy.
 The growth of regulation has had another, wholly unexpected effect.  The 
federal court system has intruded itself into the day-to-day business of government.
 In this generation we have seen a change in the way the courts view their roles 
and a reluctance on the part of Congress to draw the line.  It is no great feat of the 
imagination to see a constitutional crisis down the road.
 I remember a story about the Supreme Court that made the rounds when I 
was in law school.  It seems a young lawyer who was arguing his first case was 
going on about some proposition when the Chief Justice interrupted him and said, 
“Young man, that’s not the law.”  The young fellow said, “Well, it was the law until 
Your Honor spoke.”  That tale illustrates the absolute power of the Supreme Court 
in judicial matters.  Whatever they interpret the law to be, it is the law.  That lends 
itself, then, to the law being different things at different times.
 Baker v. Carr is a good example of the process.  The Supreme Court had 
consistently held that reapportionment and redistricting were political matters and 
could not be intruded on by the federal government.  Then the Warren Court, in 
Baker v. Carr, held that it was an infringement of equal protection of the laws to 
hold elections that give more electoral weight to a vote in one part of a state than 
another.  From that day on the law meant something totally new.  That may or may 
not have been implicit in the first decisions that created the authority of the Court 
to review legislative and executive action.  But it has become a part of constitutional 
tradition and it means in effect that the Court can act in a quasi-legislative manner.
 The Warren Court was the most activist in recent years, certainly in civil rights 
and social policy.  I knew Earl Warren2 over a period of time.  He seemed to be a 
very unlikely personality to lead such an activist Court.  He was jovial and almost 
jolly.  He gave the impression of avoiding controversy rather than mediating it.  On 
the bench he was courtly.  I remember when Estes Kefauver3 and my father stood 
by me as I was introduced to the Supreme Court that Warren made almost a social 
occasion out of it.
 If you read his decisions you’ll find that they were complex, sometimes 
wandered, almost never were they scholarly, but they were extraordinary.  They 
plowed new ground.
 I had the same impression of Earl Warren as I have of almost every other 
Supreme Court member.  They’re hungry for companionship.  They feel removed, 
2 Earl Warren served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1953-1969.  
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, available at http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid= 
2506&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na.
3 Senator Estes Kefauver (D. Tenn.) represented Tennessee in the United States Senate, 1949-1963, and 
Tennessee’s Third Congressional District in the House of Representatives, 1939-1949.  Biographical 
Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-Present, available at http://bioguide.congress.gov/
biosearch/biosearch.asp.
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or at least insulated, from the political process.  Every time I see one of them I get 
the impression that they long for social chatter.  They like to hear the little stories 
and I’m always tempted to ask them over for lunch.  They should show themselves 
and get out into the world.  I think it was a mistake that we let them move out of 
the Capitol, where they held court for many, many years.  It would be good for them 
if they did come up and have lunch.  It would have a great humanizing effect.
 I know Potter Stewart4 as well as any of the justices.  We got acquainted when 
he was on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  I argued a few cases before him and 
won some, lost some.  He’s what I call a Cincinnati lawyer.
 Cincinnati lawyers are a special breed.  They’re gentlemanly, midwestern, 
nonpontifical, and very, very skillful.  Potter is in that mold, although I disagree 
with some of his judicial views as expressed in court decisions.
 The abortion issue was, I believe, the least appropriate of subjects for the 
Supreme Court’s consideration.  It is so sensitive an issue, and so peculiar to the 
social mores of particular areas and beliefs, that, at the very most, the states should 
establish the guidelines for abortion.  Since the Court opened the question to federal 
guidance that view is no longer viable because Congress is continually involved with 
that thorny problem of federal funds for abortion.
 The most obvious and widely noted intrusion of the courts into government 
administration is closely linked to school busing.  When school districts have not 
conformed to court-dictated administrative remedies with sufficient alacrity, courts 
have simply taken over the schools.  That means the judges run them without 
reference to the wishes of the people and their elected representatives.  It is a 
practice that has produced the symptoms of increased racial tension at a time when 
there is every reason for it to disappear.
 But the school-busing situation is only the tip of the iceberg of the increasing 
practice of government by judge.
 The courts have also taken it on themselves to assume jurisdiction over prisons, 
hospitals, and other institutions whenever the practices or the standards of the 
authorities in charge have failed to meet some arbitrarily and subjectively determined 
constitutional precept.  There has been much anger but little legislative response to 
this new judicial activism.  But, in my view, government by judiciary is diametrically 
opposed to the principles of the separation of powers.  It is only a matter of time 
before justified limits are placed on the practice of judicial interference.  When 
and if the battle comes it will be a contest of enormous significance because we, 
as a people, have historically deferred to the judicial power as an instrument of 
arbitration.  It is for the future to decide whether we can continue to do so if it 
breaks the spirit of the Constitution it must uphold.  I’m convinced of one thing. 
Judges, as a rule, are too far removed from the give-and-take of everyday life to make 
good executives and legislators, even if they had the right to do those jobs.
 I’ve given considerable thought to the Court and its role.  I had to because I 
4 Potter Stewart served as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1958-1985, and as 
Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 1954-1958.  Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, 
supra, note 2.
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almost became a Supreme Court justice myself.  Bill Rehnquist5 has the seat that 
I might have had.  When John Mitchell was attorney general he called me one day 
and I went down to see him at the Justice Department.  I’d known John as a lawyer 
for some time, long before he got into government.  He asked what I would do if 
President Nixon offered me a seat on the Supreme Court, and I said, “I think I wish 
he wouldn’t do that.”  He asked why.  I told him that it would pose a real dilemma 
for me because I enjoyed what I was doing.  Mitchell asked me to think about it. 
After that, I went over to see Potter Stewart.  That was the first and only time I’ve 
ever been in the Court’s private chambers.  I talked to Potter about what their life 
was like, what they did when the Court wasn’t in session, and how many clerks they 
had.  I looked around, and talked with him about the Court’s life.  It reminded me 
so much of law school, and I never was really fond of law school, that I had to say my 
appetite was not whetted.  Finally, I told Mitchell that if the President insisted that 
I do it I would feel I must, but I really would prefer to stay where I was.  He said, 
“Since you feel that way, I think we’d all be better off if we went with Rehnquist.”
 I never for a moment regretted that decision not to accept a seat on the Court, 
because for me the heart of representative government is elective politics.
 Yet, we have to ask whether free elections alone provide adequate assurance 
that the American people are running their own country.  I think a pretty good case 
can be made that free election is only a step toward self-government and that many 
Americans feel excluded from the decisions that affect the quality of their lives.
 Only 36 percent of eligible voters went to the polls on election day in 1978. 
Compare that with the figures in other places where people are allowed to make up 
their own minds as to whether or not they vote.  In England, 70 percent recently 
chose the people who are going to lead them.  In France it’s 80 percent; in Austria it’s 
90 percent.  Even in Italy, where government is generally thought to be at a standstill 
most of the time, 85 percent of the voters go to the polls at every election.  In Japan, 
a country which has had a democratic government only since 1945, the number is 
68 percent, and in West Germany it’s 85 percent.
 That suggests a profound alienation or indifference on the part of a majority of 
Americans to the processes of the very government that affects their lives more and 
more as each day passes.
 The numbers send us an even more distressing signal.  The younger the 
prospective voter, the less likely he or she is to show up at the polls on election day; 
this in a country that passed a constitutional amendment to permit eighteen-year 
olds to vote.
 The theme of the campaign for the eighteen-year-old vote, for those readers too 
young to remember, was “If you’re old enough to fight for your country, you’re old 
enough to vote for its leaders.”  Fair enough.  But where are the beneficiaries of the 
amendment?  Why don’t they come out?
 I think I understand in my bones the reason the indifferents stay at home. 
They don’t think they count.  They don’t believe that who they vote for, what party 
they vote for, will mean a solitary thing to them in their individual lives.
5 William H. Rehnquist served as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1971-1986, 
and as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1986-2005.  Id.
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 There’s a real paradox at work in party politics right now.  The old city machines 
are well on the way out; and good riddance.  I remember the way old Ed Crump6 
had a lock on Shelby County and the city of Memphis for almost too many years 
to count.
 He ran a good city, he ran a clean city, he ran an efficient organization.  As far as 
I could tell in the daily affairs of the city, its fiscal affairs, it was an honest city.  But 
it was corrupt politics.  It was just the kind of politics that turns people off.
 I recall when my father ran for governor in 1938.  He was a young man, thirty-
seven years old.  He got 1,179 votes in Shelby County at the same time as his 
running mate for the U.S. Senate received only 100 votes fewer in that same county. 
That was clearly impossible.  There’d be more mistakes than that in a total vote of 
200,000 or whatever Shelby County had at the time.
 They tell a great story about the bivalence of Mr. Crump’s honesty in 
administration and his shady political operations.  Mr. Crump and his close 
associate Will Gerber walked into the graveyard one night taking names to vote the 
dead people on the tombstones the next day.  And they were writing them down 
and writing them down, and it was sort of dark and dim, and they came to one 
tombstone and Will held up the flashlight and rubbed against the name and the 
date and couldn’t quite make it out, and Gerber said, “Mr. Ed, I can’t quite make this 
one out.  Shall we just put down another name?”  Crump said, “No, Will, you got 
remember we run a clean election.”
 Most of the Crump people weren’t venal.  But it was such an authoritarian 
politics that I simply cannot believe that it had any redeeming grace whatever.  Even 
though the machine was too high a price to pay for orderliness, we have to recognize 
that a different and legitimate party structure has to replace it if voters are going to 
feel that they have a stake in the system, that the parties are genuinely responsive to 
people.
 What we need at this point in history are strong, highly effective, well-
organized state political organizations and the changing presidential nominating 
system is beginning to accomplish just that.  The only purpose and justification 
that a political party has in the American scheme is to compete for the opportunity 
to represent the multiple interests and views of a majority of the people.  The 
party’s philosophy will evolve based on its membership and its points of view at a 
particular time and place.  This kind of political apparatus must be strengthened 
by much closer contact with the grassroots.  It should be armed with the full array 
of patron age opportunities, of the power of appointment, of protection of citizens 
from a predatory government.  And it should encourage a political President who 
understands that politics is a legitimate and sustaining enterprise.
 Something dangerous has happened when mainstream Americans have 
6 Edward H. Crump (1874-1954), the legendary political boss of Memphis, Shelby County, and Tennessee, 
served as mayor of Memphis, 1910-1915, 1916, 1940, and represented Tennessee’s Tenth Congressional District 
in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1931-1933.  The nomination and election of Estes Kefauver to the United 
States Senate in 1948 effectively ended Crump’s plenary control of Tennessee politics.  Biographical Directory 
of the United States Congress, 1774-Present, supra, note 3; David Tucker, Edward Hull “Boss” Crump, 
Tennessee Encyclopedia of History and Culture, available at http://tennesseeencyclopedia.net/entry.
php?rec=334; http://www. memphis history.org/Politics/TheMayorsofMemphis/MemphisMayors/tabid/209/
Default.aspx; http://www.enotes. com/topic/Tennessee %27s_10th_congressional_district.
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decided to stay home from politics.  A kind of disease has spread through the 
system and it’s time that we cure it.  It’s a disease that first manifested itself among 
the American blacks and Hispanics who were forced by circumstance to live on 
the economic and social margins of society.  As these groups move into the social 
and economic action they increasingly need to participate in the political process. 
But even as late as 1978 too many blacks and Puerto Ricans and Chicanos missed 
the opportunity to make themselves felt at the polls.  Only 37 percent of the black 
voters participated in the congressional elections of 1978, and 23.5 percent of the 
Hispanic population voted.  That’s an improvement over past performance, but it 
tells us that, like increasing numbers of younger people and older Americans who 
have broken the voting habit, there is a tendency to regard politics as a futile game 
for someone else to play.
 Let’s do something about it.  Let’s register voters automatically so that every 
American can vote in federal elections at age eighteen.  The history of the United 
States has been a history of the extension of the voting franchise.  Yet, even today, 
a significant number of our people are effectively prevented from participating in 
elections by complex, and often archaic, registration and residency requirements.
 Several Western nations have already successfully implemented a form of 
automatic voter registration.  In the Scandinavian countries and in Switzerland 
every eligible citizen is registered ex officio in a voting register.  A list of voters is 
published by the elections authorities in advance of the election date.  Any citizen 
whose name has not been included in the list then has until approximately a 
week before the election to correct the situation.  In the United States, however, 
citizens still must contend with what amounts to a perpetual registration process. 
Serious difficulties would doubtless crop up in translating automatic registration 
to the realities of the American experience and attempting to reconcile it with state 
registration procedures.  Social Security numbers might be utilized to standardize 
the procedure.  More than 95 percent of eligible voters are already registered with 
Social Security.  We ought to consider any device that will encourage an end to stay-
at-home politicking.
 We must also add still more genuine significance to the presidential primaries. 
One possibility would require all the primary states to hold them on four or five 
specific dates at two- or three-week intervals.  Other alternatives might be a single 
national primary for each party with a subsequent runoff unless one candidate 
polls more than 40 percent, or a system of regional primaries also held at specific 
intervals, but encompassing all of the country.
 I’m inclined to support a system of regional primaries in which every eligible 
voter who desires to participate in the selection of a party nominee can do so by 
voting in the regional primary that includes his state.  This would permit the millions 
of Americans who support candidates who will not receive the party nomination to 
express that support in a meaningful way.  It would also give them a personal stake 
in the election and increase the likelihood of their participation in the subsequent 
general election campaign.
 Specifically, I would propose dividing the country into four geographic regions, 
largely along the lines of time zones so as to avoid holding a “southern” or a “New 
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England” primary with a distinct ideological slant.  I would make those regions of 
roughly equal population and would hold the four primaries at three-week intervals 
beginning in early June and ending in early August.  Each would compete for state 
delegates who would be won according to the proportion of vote received in each 
state rather than on a winner-take-all basis.  Although I am aware of the high cost 
involved in running in regional primaries, the basic idea is to vastly expand the 
public participation in the nominating process and to significantly reduce the official 
length of presidential campaigns.
 As it is now, the first presidential primary or caucus takes place in late January, 
with the general election ten months later in November.  But, as I see it, there is 
absolutely no reason why that process must take that long.  It costs exorbitant sums 
of money, and bores a great many people.  I think that eventually all primaries for 
federal office should be held no earlier than the first of June and no later than the 
fifteenth of August. This would significantly shorten the official length of campaigns 
for federal office and permit the Congress to work at relatively full strength for four 
months before most members are forced to return to their states or districts to 
campaign full time for the nomination.
 We should also open and close polls all across the country at a uniform time 
and keep them open a full twenty-four hours.  That’s the best way I know of to 
prevent the harmful effects of broadcast networks projecting the outcome of 
elections, based on very early returns, when polls in the western states are still open. 
Moreover, twenty-four hours would maximize the individual’s opportunity to vote 
before, after, or during work.
 The presidential electoral system should also be made more responsive and 
representative by the abolition of the electoral college, an eighteenth-century 
vestigial remnant of constitutional compromise.  I favor and have always supported 
the direct election of the President by popular vote, but having unsuccessfully 
urged that move, I am willing to settle for an improvement if not a cure for this 
situation.  Congress and the states should fully debate the merits of popular vote, 
congressional district vote, proportional allocation of electoral votes by states 
according to the popular vote, or any other electoral process calculated to eliminate 
what I view as the two undemocratic elements of the present system.  The first is 
the winner-take-all process, which created and perpetuated the one-party South 
for a century after the Civil War; and the second is the possibility of the selection 
of the President by the House of Representatives.  That is simply no way to elect a 
President in a democracy.  The sensitivity of the electoral system, the coherence of 
the selection process, and the vitality of the two-party system are essential to the 
political prosperity of the country and are paramount in their importance to every 
other consideration.
 But no mechanism we can devise will combat that part of what the pollsters call 
“voter apathy” that is an outgrowth of about thirty years of increasingly arbitrary 
and unresponsive government action.
 Anonymous government officials issue confusing and frequently conflicting 
instructions on a daily and sometimes hourly basis.  They can range in importance 
from the likely direction of radioactive fallout in a nuclear accident to the mandatory 
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size and shape of a safety helmet that must be worn by California motorcyclists 
under the threat of a federal cutoff of that state’s highway safety funds.
 Potomac Survey and Lou Harris and Dan Yankelovich and George Gallup and 
dozens of others who specialize in one aspect or another of public opinion and 
behavior have all come to the conclusion that there is significantly less confidence 
in the President and in Congress than ever before.  If an individual member of 
Congress thought that his constituents felt he was as ineffectual as they feel about 
Congress as a whole, he would be tempted to throw up the job and go home.  But 
the fact is that people don’t blame individual members of Congress; they blame 
the institution itself for being inadequate to the job it is elected to do.  President 
Carter, who has taken the most dramatic roller-coaster ride in the history of public-
opinion polling, is also increasingly regarded as a good man in the wrong job.  Some 
of the polls that probe more deeply into why people think and feel the way they do 
indicate that there is a more than casual belief that the fulfillment of the presidency 
is now beyond the capacity of anyone in a way that will give positive direction to 
the country’s economic and social life.  I disagree.  Our institutions are viable in 
themselves, as they have been for two hundred years.  The trouble is that they have 
been misused and abused.
 Political scientists and specialists in government don’t take into sufficient 
account the play of human passion that infuses the process with life.  When I hear 
discussions about the significance of what happened at a particular hearing or the 
“meaning” of the way a debate was handled on the Senate floor I sometimes shake 
my head in wonderment.  It’s like reading about a game between the Washington 
Redskins and the Dallas Cowboys as though it were played by those little X’s and O’s 
that coaches like to put on their blackboards.  Who would want to watch anything 
like that on a Sunday afternoon?  Big men are hitting each other hard and that’s 
what the yelling is all about. In those pile-ups on the field some pretty violent things 
happen and that, unfortunately, is a piece of what life is all about. Constitutions and 
statutes provide a framework for human action. But the emphasis is on the word 
“human.”
 Bob Byrd7 is the most skillful Senate parliamentarian I have seen, by far.  He 
has made a study of the rules and precedents of the Senate that I hope someday he 
will record for the legislators of the future.  He is as close to being a true creature of 
the procedural Senate as any man could be.  He has a second skill that is less often 
observed, and that is to weld together that disparate group on the Democratic side 
of the Senate.  In a lot of ways he has a tougher job than I do in trying to keep the 
Republicans together simply because there are more of them, and they probably 
do have a broader spectrum of differences of view on their side.  He does it very 
well.  It takes a lot of bending and twisting sometimes, and I frequently suspect 
that Bob Byrd has to abdicate some points of view that he holds himself in order to 
accomplish his leadership goals.  That’s sometimes a necessary part of the process. 
Byrd incurs a lot of enmity, on both sides of the aisle, as a hard driver; that is, he has 
7 Senator Robert C. Byrd (D. W. Va.) represented West Virginia in the United States Senate, 1959-2010, 
and served as Senate Majority Leader, 1977-1980 and 1987-1988, as Senate Minority Leader, 1981-1986, and 
as President pro tempore of the United States Senate, 1989-1995.  Biographical Directory of the United 
States Congress, supra, note 3.
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no compunction about running the Senate late and bringing it in early.  He’s fiercely 
partisan, a quality I am certainly not one to criticize.  Each of us was elected to lead 
our parties in the Senate, and though we frequently differ on issues, we cooperate 
to keep the Senate moving.
 I meet with ranking Republican members of all Senate committees at least 
once a week to try to get a fix on what’s coming up for decision.  Byrd and I trade 
visits several times every day to deal with the legislative calendar.  An interesting 
aspect of Senate life is the custom that requires the majority and minority leaders to 
work out mutually satisfactory arrangements as to what, how, and when the Senate 
will consider a bill or a presidential appointment.  If comity breaks down the Senate 
will grind to a halt.  That’s how Black Monday came about in October of 1978.
 It all started when the Senate found itself tied up in a wrangle over whether or 
not to deregulate natural gas prices.  The votes were there to do it, but a minority of 
senators, led by Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio and Jim Abourezk of South Dakota, 
refused to let it come to a vote.  They led a filibuster by amendment.  Abourezk, a 
Senate maverick who had a reputation for going his own way, offered hundreds of 
amendments to the bipartisan Pearson-Bentsen bill designed to phase out regulation 
that inhibited additional fuel production.  The Senate stayed in session eighteen to 
twenty hours a day in an attempt to break the filibuster.  Cots were brought into my 
office, to the caucus room, and to the cloakrooms.  The lights burned all night long. 
But the two senators were in great physical condition and stood their ground on the 
right, hallowed by long custom, to offer and debate amendment after amendment.
 Finally, on Sunday afternoon, Bob Byrd and I met in the majority leader’s office, 
just a few feet off the Senate chamber, to see if we could settle this thing.  Bill 
Hildenbrand, the Senate minority secretary, is in many ways my strong right arm. 
He was with me.  Scoop Jackson,8 Russell Long,9 and Murray Zweben, the Senate 
parliamentarian, also participated.
 The difficulty was that people always find different ways to get around the anti-
filibuster rule.  Jim Allen, the late senator from Alabama, was a past master at using 
the intricacies of the Senate rules to delay debate.  Metzenbaum and Abourezk 
used a variation on the Jim Allen theorem, and that is filibuster by amendment. 
They put in four or five hundred amendments, and even if there were no time for 
debate, the rules permitted them to have the amendments voted on.  So they’d call 
up an amendment; somebody would suggest the absence of a quorum, which is a 
constitutional right and can’t be abrogated; the chair would read the amendment, 
which might be hundreds of pages long; then there was a quorum call. It would take 
thirty minutes or an hour to assemble a quorum.  You could go on for months like 
that.  They had perfected a new filibuster art form and Byrd became more and more 
incensed.  It was clear that we weren’t going to be able to break this thing unless we 
plowed some new ground at our meeting.
 Byrd wanted to propose some rules changes.  But I wouldn’t do that because 
the minority party can be seriously damaged once we begin changing the rules to 
8 Senator Henry M. (“Scoop”) Jackson (D. Wash.) represented the state of Washington in the United States 
Senate, 1953-1983.  Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, supra, note 3.
9 Senator Russell B. Long (D. La.) represented Louisiana in the United States Senate, 1948-1987.  Id.
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accommodate to a particular circumstance.  Byrd knew that he couldn’t steamroll 
us, that we could hold all the Republicans together on something like changes in the 
rules.  So we began exploring other possibilities.  We agreed on the objective: that we 
had to get this thing shut down and pass that bill.  In the course of the conversation 
Byrd or the parliamentarian pointed out that Rule 2210 prohibits dilatory motions. 
Why not establish a precedent that if you had already had a quorum call since the 
last vote, then another such call was dilatory?  The premise was that if you’ve got 
five hundred amendments, you know full well they’re dilatory.  The sticky question 
was what to do about the right of any senator to appeal the ruling of the chair.  That 
was the toughest decision for me to make because it was an exercise in raw power.
 One of the few real powers that a majority or a minority leader has is for 
preferential recognition.  If there are twenty people standing up or eighty people 
standing up seeking recognition, the chair by precedent must recognize the majority 
leader first and then the minority leader.  That’s a powerful legislative weapon. 
We decided that Byrd and I would use the power of prior recognition to prevent 
further filibustering.  He’d call up one amendment after the other and get it ruled 
out of order.  We went through hundreds of amendments that way, with everybody 
screaming, beating on the desks, and carrying on.  That’s the only time in my career 
I’ve ever used pure raw power.
 But I first said, “Look, if we’re going to do this deed, if we’re going to do these 
things, boys, you have that Vice-President in the chair.  The White House is going 
to share the responsibility for this.”
 On Monday at noon Fritz Mondale11 took the chair.  The majority leader and 
I stood at our aisle desks.  The Vice President recognized me so that I could make 
a point of order that would set the stage for what followed.  I said that it was my 
view that an amendment that had been offered, and ruled out of order, was no 
longer pending business before the Senate.  That meant that a quorum call was not 
in order either.  The filibustering Senators were thus deprived of their principal 
delaying tactic.  Mondale accepted the point and Byrd addressed him in one of the 
Senate’s most dramatic moments.
 “Mr. President, I call up unprinted Metzenbaum Amendment Number Forty-
two to Calendar Item Number Sixty-seven.”  Mondale replied, “The amendment is 
dilatory and out of order.”  “Mr. President, I call up unprinted Abourezk Amendment 
Number Forty-three . . . ”  Again Mondale repeated, “The amendment is dilatory and 
out of order.”  Byrd and I looked straight ahead, ignoring the murmur of disapproval 
that began to swell around us.  We called up amendment after amendment.  There 
were shouts for recognition from around the chamber, but the Vice-President kept 
his eyes riveted on Byrd and Baker.  He wasn’t about to recognize anyone on a 
point of order or for anything else until he had ruled almost all of the filibuster 
amendments out of order.  I have never heard the chamber in such disorder as on 
10 Senate Rule 22 provides, in pertinent part, “No dilatory motion, or dilatory amendment, or amendment 
not germane shall be in order.”  U.S. Senate Rule 22, available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.
cfm?p=RuleXXII.
11 Walter F. (“Fritz”) Mondale served as Vice President of the United States, 1977-1981, and represented 
Minnesota in the United States Senate, 1964-1976.  He was the Democratic Party’s presidential nominee in 1984. 
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, supra, note 3.
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that Black Monday.
 When the last amendment had been ruled out of order, the Vice-President 
recognized an angered and shaken Javits of New York.  Javits spoke for the majority 
of the senators when he told the chair that the Senate rules had been bent if not 
broken, and that it was a classic case of using the ends to justify the means.
 Senators call that day Black Monday because we can never be sure of what it 
bodes for the future.  The rules are designed to keep things moving.  But both the 
rules and custom provide a strong bulwark against tyranny of the majority.  Every 
time we bend those rules out of shape, every time we break custom rooted in time, 
we walk along a dangerous precipice.
 What we did was perfectly legal.  We didn’t change any rules and we didn’t 
prejudice any Republican rights; but we really did treat the filibuster senators 
shabbily because we flat cut them out with the power of the leadership.  I 
sympathized with the Javits position, but it had to be done.
 Too many people in positions of influence and power have passed a kind of 
Parkinson’s law that more red tape is better red tape.  They insist that excessive 
legislation, over regulation, and constant executive tampering with the minutiae of 
everyday life is the kind of government that we must have to satisfy our economic and 
social needs.  That kind of government failed us in the 1970’s.  We will insist in the 
1980’s on a government that sees to it that the United States maintains the military 
and the economic strength necessary to survive as a democracy (a government that 
sharply revises federal statutes that interfere with individual liberties at the expense 
of economic stability, growth, and productivity) and a government that hacks away 
at the accretion of tens of thousands of regulations that choke our enterprise.
 We have the materials at hand to build the kind of country most Americans 
want to live in at the end of the 1980’s.  What kind of country can it be?
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Musings of the Majority Leader on a 
Beautiful Day in Washington (1983)1
Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.
 Mr. Baker.  Mr. President, I am presently the only occupant of this Chamber 
except for the distinguished Presiding Officer, and under those circumstances, I feel 
compelled to take certain liberties.  There is a long list of bills here that I am now 
willing to pass by unanimous consent, and we will see how fast that brings Senators 
to the floor.
 Seriously, Mr. President, I do not plan to ask the Senate to turn to the 
bankruptcy bills until those who are principal to the debate and the management of 
those measures and the minority leader have an opportunity to come to the floor.
 While I am doing that, Mr. President, I cannot help but share my musings with 
the Senate.  I just walked from the Dirksen Office Building across the east ellipse 
of the Capitol grounds to the Senate steps.  I would estimate the temperature is 
about 85 degrees, the grass is freshly mowed, the air is soft and sweet, the sunshine 
is penetrating, and it confirms what I have always believed and that is winter should 
be a place that you visit and not a season of the year.  I have waited months for this 
day when we could shed the last remnants of winter and engage once more in the 
natural festivities that mankind enjoys so much in the spring and summer.
 I am tempted, Mr. President, to ask that the Senate adjourn itself to the front 
lawn of the Capitol and conduct our business there.  But on further thought it 
struck me that if I get 100 Senators out there under those salubrious circumstances, 
it would be impossible to keep a quorum.
 I even had the opportunity to do a little historical research to see when, if at 
all, the Senate last met out of doors, and I can find no such record.  The closest I 
found was when the Capitol was burned in August 1814 by errant British troops. 
Incidentally, that fire began in my office, and I have been tempted ever since to start 
another one.  [Laughter.]
 Mr. President, after that, surely the Senate did not meet in its accustomed 
Chambers because they had been incinerated, but there is no clear historic record 
that the Senate met on the lawn or anyplace else outside.  The closest we can come 
is to an undocumented report that the Congress, both the House and the Senate, 
met in a tavern across the street from the Capitol in the space now occupied by the 
Supreme Court Building.  Perhaps there is significance to be attached to the fact 
that the House of Representatives met on the ground floor and the Senate met on 
the second floor thereby giving rise no doubt to the term of the Senate as the upper 
Chamber.
 Mr. President, I have said all I know how to say and still there are no Senators 
here, and therefore I suggest the absence of a quorum.
1 129 Cong. Rec. S5,292 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1983) (remarks of Sen. Baker).
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The Women’s Hour (1983)1
Howard H. Baker, Jr.
 Mr. Baker.  Mr. President, for those narrow-minded and misguided 
individuals who continue to think of the U.S. Senate as an all-male, vested-suited, 
Gucci-loafered, silver-haired private club—submitted for your consideration, the 
scene which took place at approximately 10:50 a.m. this morning on the Senate 
floor:
 The distinguished Senator from Florida (Mrs. Hawkins) was delivering a 
persuasive speech on our Nation’s drug problems; the distinguished Senator from 
Kansas (Mrs. Kassebaum) was presiding over the Senate; Mrs. Marilyn Courtot, 
the Assistant Secretary of the Senate was at the desk and subsequently called the 
roll during a quorum; Mrs. E. Frances Garro, the Official Reporter of Debates, 
reported verbatim the remarks of Senator Hawkins; Miss Jennifer Smith, the 
second assistant bill clerk, was on duty in the well of the Senate acting as the staff 
assistant for the official reporters; Miss Elizabeth Baldwin, floor assistant for the 
secretary for the majority, was on duty in the Chamber; and, the operations on the 
floor were being serviced by half a dozen female pages.
 Frankly, Mr. President, I do not know if I am more proud or more frightened 
by a total takeover by the female population here in the Capitol.  It is obvious that 
we mere mortal men are not required anymore, and I just want to plead with my 
biological counterparts not to forget about us guys out here.  I also hope that the 
press will not dwell on the reports that the Senate was a fixture of decisiveness and 
harmony, in an unprecedented fashion, during this time, which will no doubt come 
to be known as “The Women’s Hour.”
1 129 Cong. Rec. S11,147 (daily ed. July 29, 1983) (remarks of Sen. Baker).
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Remarks on the Designation of a 
National Holiday Honoring 
the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. (1983)1
Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.
U. S. Senate, October 19, 1983
 The Vice President.  The majority leader.
 Mr. Baker.  Will the manager yield to me?
 Mr. Dole.  I am happy to yield.
 Mr. Kennedy.  Whatever time the leader desires.
 Mr. Baker.  I am most grateful to both Senators.  Mr. President, we are 
approaching a momentous time as only the Senate can approach such important 
events.  I have witnessed a few.  I participated in many great debates that have 
surged through this Chamber, and divided our membership.  I have seen, Mr. 
President, issues debated here, determined, and resolved here which have far-
reaching implications on the foreign and domestic policies of this Nation.
 But I have seldom approached a moment in this Chamber when I thought 
that the action we are about to take has greater potential for good and a greater 
symbolism for unity than the vote that is about to occur in 8 minutes.
 That event, Mr. President, which is about to happen, makes my mind go back 
fully 20 years to a time when I was in this city, not as a Senator but as a young 
Tennessee lawyer traveling from a place where I had transacted my client’s business 
in the direction of National Airport.
 But, Mr. President, it was not an easy journey because as I made my way, I was 
impeded by a sea of humanity and by what seemed like a million Greyhound buses. 
For this was the day of the great civil rights march on Washington and there was no 
escaping it.
 Mr. President, the taxi driver had his radio on and it was tuned to those 
proceedings that were going on on the Mall and at the Lincoln Memorial.  It seemed 
as I listened and waited and sat in that crowded traffic jam that an endless procession 
of speakers took their turn at the microphone and all of them presenting with great 
emotion and great energy their appreciation for justice, all of them demanding 
equality before the law and each of them proclaiming the same insistent message 
1 129 Cong. Rec. 28,379-80 (Oct. 19, 1983) (remarks of Sen. Baker).  Shortly after the conclusion of Senator 
Baker’s remarks, the Senate voted, 78 to 22, in favor of legislation designating a national holiday in honor of Dr. 
King.  Id. at 28,380.  President Reagan signed the legislation into law at a ceremony in the Rose Garden of the 
White House on Nov. 2, 1983, attended by, among others, Dr. King’s widow, Coretta Scott King, and Senator 
Baker (see insert of photographs in this issue).
that their emancipation was incomplete.
 But, Mr. President, as I sat there listening I also heard a 34-year-old minister 
who was the head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, a dynamic 
young man who had spent part of that year in a Birmingham jail, and I left that taxi 
to try to work my way toward the focus of that dynamism and to hear this man first 
hand and unfiltered.
 As he spoke through the murmuring noise of that crowd I could sense the 
special impact that he was having on that group and I was sure on the Nation and 
the world.
 As he reached the climax of his speech no one in this country could doubt that 
that special attention was well-deserved.  The speaker, Mr. President, was Martin 
Luther King, Jr. and the speech was “I Have a Dream.”
 More than 20 years separate that day from this and in those 20 years we 
have seen changes in this country and in this society which are nothing short of 
revolutionary, and we have the opportunity to memorialize the extraordinary 
progress we have made in race and social relations in America and to renew our 
commitment to improving those relations and now to expanding the horizon of 
human freedom still more.
 Black Americans have suffered too much for too long in this country.  They have 
been bound in the chains of slavery and barred from the free exercise of political 
expression and, as Martin Luther King once wrote, “Smothered in the airtight cage 
of poverty.”
 But, Mr. President, for all of this, black Americans have made extraordinary 
contributions to this country and in every aspect of our national and personal 
lives.  They have fought and died for this Nation; they have defended, they have 
expanded, and extended, the blessings of freedom and opportunity in this country. 
Mr. President, they have served this country much better than this country has 
always served them.
 So it is only right that we set aside a day of national commemoration of that 
role black Americans have played in American’s life, its work and social progress, 
and only fitting and proper that that day should be designated in memory of and 
in celebration of the accomplishments of Dr. Martin Luther King who in so many 
ways is the embodiment and the ennoblement of the aspirations and ambitions of 
so many millions from every walk of life.
 So, Mr. President, the vote we are about to cast will perhaps not settle great 
issues between nations or change the statute law and the institutional arrangements 
of Government.  The vote we are about to cast may not balance the budget but it is 
proof positive, Mr. President, that the country and the Senate have a soul and that 
we intend to acknowledge and to celebrate the nobility of all of our citizens in the 
opportunity which they must have to participate in the fullness of America’s future.
 We can do that, Mr. President, by the establishment of this national holiday for 
this purpose at this time.2
2 Shortly after the conclusion of Senator Baker’s remarks, the Senate passed legislation designating a 
national holiday in honor of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., by a vote of  78 to 22.  Id.
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Comments on President Ronald Reagan’s 
Award of the Medal of Freedom to 
Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (1984)1
Senator Theodore (Ted) F. Stevens2
Senator Robert C Byrd3
Senator J. Strom Thurmond4
 Mr. Stevens.  Mr. President, the majority leader is not present this morning. 
He is at the White House with the President where he is being presented the U.S. 
Medal of Freedom for his distinguished service and contributions in the field of 
Government.
 This award is the highest civilian medal and is presented in the most unique 
and special of circumstances.
 Mr. President, it is my opinion that the Senate, Republicans and Democrats 
alike, is proud of the Senate majority leader, Howard Baker.  Time and time again 
he has found the legislative common denominator where none seemed possible. 
Patience, courtesy, and accommodation have been the foundation of his approach 
as the majority leader.  Preparedness and foresight that he has exhibited as majority 
leader have provided a model for all Senators to emulate.
 Having had the privilege of serving in the leadership with the Senator from 
Tennessee since 1977, I have become aware of his real leadership capability.  At the 
time that he and I became the leader and  assistant leader, we were in the minority. 
Senator Baker was the minority leader.  In 1981 he began his service as majority 
leader, and the experience he had as minority leader has served him well.
 Senator Baker has been the vocal conscience of the Senate Republican 
majority, yet never has Senator Baker forgotten what it means to serve in the 
minority and the importance of the minority views here U.S.in the U. S. Senate.
 I applaud President Reagan for having selected our majority leader, Howard 
Baker, for this Medal of Freedom, and I hope that I speak for the Senate as a 
whole in extending our congratulations to the majority leader for his historical 
contribution to the Senate and to the U.S. Government as a whole.
 Mr. Byrd.  Mr. President, will the acting majority leader yield?
1 130 Cong. Rec. S,3,131 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1984) (remarks of Sens. Stevens, Byrd, and Thurmond).
2 Senator Theodore F. Stevens (R. Alas.) represented Alaska in the United States Senate, 1968-2009, and 
served as Senate Republican Whip, 1977-1985.  Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 
1774-Present, available at http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/ biosearch.asp.
3 Senator Robert C. Byrd (D. W. Va.) represented West Virginia in the United States Senate, 1959-2010, and 
served as Senate Majority Leader, 1977-1980 and 1987-1988, and as Senate Minority Leader, 1981-1986.  Id.
4 Senator J. Strom Thurmond (D., R. S. Car.) represented South Carolina in the United States Senate, 1954-
2003, served as President pro tempore of the Senate, 1981-1987 and 1995-2001, and served as President pro 
tempore emeritus of the Senate, 2001-2003.  Id.
 Mr. Stevens.  Yes, I yield.
 . . . .
 Mr. Byrd.  Mr. President, I want to add my support for what my friend the 
able majority whip, Senator Stevens has already said.  Our mutual friend, the 
distinguished majority leader, Senator Howard Baker, is receiving the U.S. 
Medal of Freedom this morning in a ceremony at the White House.  I want to 
commend the President for choosing to award this highest recognition of civilian 
achievement to Senator Baker.
 The Medal of Freedom was established by President Truman in 1945 to salute 
meritorious service in the military or in advancing our national security.  President 
Kennedy expanded the criteria in 1963 to recognize those who have made a 
meritorious contribution to world peace or cultural or other significant public or 
private endeavors.  Senator Baker is just such a man.
 As majority leader for the past 3½ years and leader of the Republican Senators 
for the past 7½ years, Senator Baker has proved himself to be fair, cognizant of 
the needs and important role of the minority party in this great institution, and 
a congenial colleague to us all.  He has been remarkably capable in synthesizing 
vastly differing viewpoints on a variety of difficult issues facing our Nation and in 
facilitating the Senate’s working its will.
 I know I speak for all my colleagues on this side of the aisle in repeating what I 
have said so many times before—Howard Baker is my close friend and I applaud 
him for this recognition of his distinguished service.
 Mr. Thurmond.  Mr. President, will the distinguished acting majority leader 
yield?
 Mr. Stevens.  Yes.
 Mr. Thurmond.  Mr. President, I wish to associate myself with the remarks of 
the acting majority leader concerning Mr. Baker receiving the Medal of Freedom. 
I do not know of any man who has served in the Senate who deserves this medal 
more.  He is a man of integrity, a man of ability, a man of dedication.
 Those are his hallmarks.
 Senator Baker works long hours, and he works strenuously.  He has been very 
patient in dealing with Senators.  He has performed his task in a very skillful and 
wonderful manner.
 I am very pleased to speak these few words in his behalf, as I feel that he is one 
of the most worthy Senators with whom I have served in my 30 years in the Senate.
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Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for 
the Presidential Medal of Freedom: 
the Baker Citation (1984)1
President Ronald Reagan
 Thank you very much.  We’re delighted to welcome you to the White House. 
Over its history this room has been the site of many occasions honoring America’s 
heroes, and today we carry on in that tradition.
 During my inaugural address, I noted that those who say that we’re in a time 
when there are no heroes, they just don’t know where to look. . . .
 The Medal of Freedom is designed not to honor individuals for single acts of 
bravery, but instead, to acknowledge lifetime accomplishments that have changed 
the face and the soul of our country.  The people we honor today are people who 
refused to take the easy way out, and the rest of us are better off for it.  They’re 
people who knew the risks and the overwhelming effort that could be required, but 
were undeterred from their goals.  They are people who set standards for themselves 
and refused to compromise.  And they’re people who were not afraid to travel in 
unexplored territory.
 By honoring them today, we, as a free people, are thanking them.  Choices they 
made have enriched the lives of free men and women everywhere, and we’re grateful.
 Now, let me read the citations and present the medals to each recipient.  And 
the first is Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. 
 The citation:
As a Member of the United States Senate, one of the country’s most 
powerful and influential citizens, and an individual whose character 
shines brightly as an example to others, Howard Baker has been a force 
for responsibility and civility on a generation of Americans.  In his almost 
20 years of service, he has earned the respect and admiration of his fellow 
citizens regardless of their political persuasion.  As Majority Leader of 
the Senate, his quiet, cooperative style and keen legislative skills have 
honored America’s finest traditions of enlightened political leadership and 
statesmanship.
 . . . .
1 Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Presidential Medal of Freedom, Mar. 
26, 1984, the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/ archives/
speeches/1984/32684a.htm.
Farewell Address to the Senate (1984)1
Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.
A Tribute to Senator Robert C. Byrd
 Mr. Baker.  Mr. President, this may be the last time I ever get the last word. 
But before I move the Senate adjourn, I would like to take this opportunity to tell 
the Senate how extraordinarily fortunate they are to have Robert C. Byrd as an 
officer of this body, as a colleague, as minority leader and, in the past, the majority 
leader.
 I have said to Bob Byrd on previous occasions, and I will repeat now, there are 
not many people in life who work so closely together, so intimately over a period of 
time, that they know each other as well as the minority and majority leaders of the 
Senate.  There are not many situations in life where it is so necessary to understand 
the needs and requirements each of the other, and the responsibilities that each 
have to our fellow Members on our sides of the aisle.
 The leadership of the Senate is little understood as an institution.  The joint 
leadership of the Senate is almost never understood.  But the joint leadership of 
the Senate, the Republican and Democratic leaders of the Senate, who have an 
understanding of their responsibility to the entire Senate, is the glue that holds 
this place together.  And Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, both as minority and 
majority leader, has provided the perfect example of how that should be conducted 
in both roles.
 On occasion after occasion, when we have confronted each other on issues, 
in controversy after controversy, where it has been necessary for us to compete for 
victory or suffer defeat, there has been an unspoken but a clear understanding of 
our responsibilities, not only to the Senate but to each other, to make sure that this 
place functions.
 Someone in the press asked me the other day, “What do you think your greatest 
achievement has been in your leadership?”  And my answer came quickly, and I will 
repeat it now.  It is that this place works—and it has worked.
 But it would not have worked without Robert C. Byrd.  I wish to express to 
him my gratitude, my admiration, and my appreciation.
 Mr. Byrd.  Mr. President, I do not seek the last word.  I want Howard Baker 
to have the last word, and he should have.
 I just want to do something that I do not say often on this floor, and that is, to 
address another Senator in the second person—thank you, Howard.
The 98th Congress
 Mr. Baker.  Mr. President, impossible as it may seem, we have come to the end 
of the 98th Congress.
 The experience of recent days reminds me, as it may remind my  learned and 
literate colleagues, of the  words of William Faulkner on accepting the Nobel Prize 
1 130 Cong. Rec. 32,509-11 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Baker).
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for Literature more than 30 years ago.
It is easy enough to say that man is immortal, simply because he will 
endure, that when the last dingdong of doom has clanged and faded in the 
red and dying evening, even then there will be one more sound:  that of his 
inexhaustible voice still talking.
 But, like Faulkner, I refuse to accept this.  I believe man is immortal not because 
he has an inexhaustible voice but because he has “a soul, a spirit capable of passion 
and sacrifice and endurance.”
 In the waning days of this Congress, we have endured quite a lot.  But we have 
not only survived; we have prevailed.
 We have shown once again that in the clamorous, cumbersome, chaotic way we 
do business here, we do it in the people’s name and with the people’s consent and 
in a manner that reflects with astonishing clarity the passion and conviction and 
ultimate commonsense of the American people themselves.
 It’s not always a glamorous job, but somebody’s got to do it, and I believe we 
have an extraordinary assembly of talented and conscientious men and women who 
do this job very well.
 In this session of Congress alone, the Senate has made some enormously useful 
contributions to the law and  life of the American people.
 We have reformed the Federal Criminal Code.  We have made a $140 billion 
down payment on the Federal deficit.  We have reformed our farm programs and 
our banking, insurance, and bankruptcy laws.  We’ve stepped up the fight against 
organized crime with the Labor Management Racketeering Act.  And we’ve added 
more than 7.5 million acres of national lands and forests to the wilderness system.
 These achievements and others, together with those of the first session of 
the 98th Congress—the extension of the Voting Rights Act, the preservation of 
the Social Security System, the passage of the Caribbean Basin initiative, and the 
creation of a national holiday honoring the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., among 
many other important legislative measures—constitute a record of performance 
that speaks well of us even if we may speak ill of the tortuous process which leads 
us to these legislative goals.
 Clearly there is room for improvement.  Clearly there is no need—and no real 
excuse—for us to routinely run the risk of shutting down the Government of the 
United States for lack of appropriated funds.
 Surely there may be better ways to organize ourselves and our legislative 
responsibilities so that the months we pass at leisure in the beginning of a 
congressional session need not be redeemed in long hours of agony and turmoil at 
the end.
 We say these things near the adjournment of every Congress now.  The words 
are almost as familiar and frequently intoned as the farewells we bid each other.  But 
we never act to remedy these conditions by reforming our procedures, and I fear 
we are becoming accustomed to this accursed system when that is the last thing we 
should do.
 The subjects of congressional reform and congressional responsibility have 
weighed heavily on my mind for some time now.  I have spoken often and written 
much on these subjects in the past, and I daresay I will speak and write still more in 
the future, because I love this Senate and I want to see its special role in the Nation’s 
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leadership preserved and enhanced with time.
 Perhaps the greatest reform involves not a change of rules but a change of heart 
in this Chamber.  We are in danger of losing the spirit of civility that can sustain us 
in times of political stress and legislative logjams.
 The vigorous competition of ideas is essential to the Senate’s success, and 
we have some of the ablest and keenest competitors today that we’ve had in my 
experience.
 But the time must ultimately come when we say of an issue, “This matter is 
decided.”
 The Senate cannot fight a guerrilla war over every issue all the time.  We cannot 
be sniping at one another and talking issues to death while the essential work of 
Government goes undone.
 That is not what the American people expect of us, and it is not what they will 
accept from us.  If we cannot resurrect the spirit of chivalry that once reigned here, 
at least we must restore some semblance of civility and commonality of purpose in 
this time of challenge at home and danger abroad.
 My time in the Senate has come now to an end.  This has been my home and 
harbor for 18 years, and this year’s farewell will be my last.
 It is impossible, at times like these, not to look back on the road one has traveled, 
to survey the familiar landmarks with an appreciation that is both old and new, to 
summon up memories of friends and colleagues and experiences and achievements 
that have made these 18 years the best of my life.
 I feel a little as General MacArthur must have felt when, near the end of his life, 
he told the corps of cadets at West Point, “Today marks my final roll call with you.”
 MacArthur spoke of lengthening shadows and vanished days, of faint bugles 
and far drums and the strange mournful mutter of the battlefield.
 These were the images and senses of an old soldier at the twilight, and I can 
appreciate and share both the pride and the pain of such reflections.
 I think of my first days in the Senate when the doorkeepers would not let me 
in the Chamber, certain I was too young to be a Senator.  The doorkeepers now are 
not so kind.
 I think of the great issues in which I’ve been engaged—fair housing, clean air, 
clean water, revenue sharing, Watergate, the Panama Canal, budget cuts and tax 
cuts, and dozens of other battles.
 I think of the friends I’ve made here: the 99 friends who are my fellow Senators 
today; the absent friends who were my colleagues in days gone by; the remarkable 
staff, known but to God and us, who serve this institution and this country so well.
 But grateful as I am for all these treasures, I have resolved not to dwell on them 
to the exclusion of all else.
 I believe, with Jesse Jackson, that “God is not finished with me yet.”
 I believe there is life after the Senate, and I intend to live that life to the full.
 As my colleagues know, I will be resuming the practice of law next January.  I 
will be engaged in a number of private enterprises and public enterprises, as well.
 As I have said on occasions beyond counting, I believe it is possible, and 
preferable, to be a public servant and a private citizen simultaneously, and I intend 
to show my abidingly skeptical colleagues by my own example how to be a useful 
“public citizen.”
 But however the fates may play in the future, I have already had an opportunity 
for service which has been entirely satisfying.
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 I shall forever be in the debt of the good people of Tennessee for giving me that 
opportunity.  They are the best people on Earth, and it has been the highest honor 
of my life to represent them here.
 I am indebted to my Republican colleagues for choosing me as their floor leader 
these past 8 years, and for their constant healthy and humbling reminders of the 
Biblical teaching that “the first shall be last.”
 I am especially grateful to my colleagues in the Republican leadership:  Ted 
Stevens, the assistant leader; Jim McClure, the conference chairman; Jake Garn, 
secretary of the conference; John Tower, the policy chairman; Dick Lugar, 
the senatorial committee chairman; and Strom Thurmond, the distinguished 
president pro tem of the Senate.
 These gentlemen perform their important roles with great talent, dedication 
and skill, and whatever success I have had in this position is due in large measure to 
the work they have done in theirs.
 I am particularly grateful, also, to the chairmen of the standing committees of 
the Senate, who have proven beyond doubt these last 4 years that a quarter-century 
in the minority did not diminish the Republican capacity to govern the legislative 
as well as the executive branch.
 These chairmen have done more, both individually and collectively, for this 
institution and this country than they will ever be properly credited for, and I wish 
to pay them special tribute today.
 I am grateful to my worthy adversary and good friend, Bob Byrd, with whom I 
have waged near-constant battle these past 8 years and for whom I have the highest 
professional respect and personal admiration.
 I am grateful to each of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle for making my 
experience in the Senate so rich and rewarding.
 I believe the quality of the membership of this body has grown steadily over the 
last 18 years, and I am confident I leave the Senate in eminently good hands.
 I wish to salute the Presidents with whom I’ve been privileged to serve—
Presidents Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan—for the many contributions 
that each of them has made to the Nation we serve together.
 Since my service as majority leader has been coterminous with President 
Reagan’s service in the White House, I feel a special bond with him, and I should 
like to state for the record my belief that Ronald Reagan will go down in history as 
one of the very best Presidents who ever served in that office.
 In this moment of magnanimity, I shall even toss a small bouquet in the 
direction of the press gallery, though I am certain they will bat it down one way 
or another.  I cherish my friends in the fourth estate as I once cherished a dog that 
nobody liked but me, a dog that had the single bad habit of biting people in the 
nose.
 Finally, I would thank my wife Joy and our family for their long-suffering 
patience with the rigors of public life.
 Our children, who were small when we came here, are grown now with careers 
and children of their own.  I’m very proud of them, and I’m especially proud of my 
wife, who has been a quiet profile in courage and a source of inspiration and insight 
for me beyond value.
 Senator Norris Cotton of New Hampshire told me early in my service here 
that once I smelled the marble in these halls I would be hooked for life.  As usual, 
he was right, and the intoxicating scent of history in the making will remain with 
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me to my last days.
 Today marks my final roll call with you.  As I take my leave, I pray for the 
blessing of Him who, as Lincoln said, can go with me and abide with you and be 
everywhere for good.
 In His care, I am confident the Senate and the Nation it serves will not only 
endure but prevail in the great challenges that define our modern world.
 In the spirit of friendship and respect and love, I bid you farewell.
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Address to the 78th Annual Convention of 
the NAACP (1987)1
White House Chief of Staff 
Howard H. Baker, Jr.
 My good friend, Ben Hooks, Chairman of the Board, Dr. William F. Gibson, 
President McMillan, Chairman of the Special Contribution Fund Board, Mr. 
Colley, my fellow Tennesseans, Sarah Greene, Jesse Turner, and Maxine Smith, 
members and friends of the Nation’s oldest civil rights organization:
 I am honored to join you today as you conclude your 78th annual convention.
 Let me pay my respects, first of all, to the distinguished executive director of 
this organization, Ben Hooks, whom I’ve been proud to call my friend for more 
than 20 years.
 Ben Hooks has probably done more good for more people—individually 
and collectively—than anyone else that I know, and I believe his union with this 
venerable and vital organization is a marriage made in heaven.
 Let me hasten to add I feel the same way about his marriage to the remarkable 
Frances Hooks, in whose debt I shall always be for her leadership in advancing my 
political career in our home State of Tennessee.
 And let me pay special tribute, as well, to the First Lady of the civil rights 
movement, Coretta Scott King.
 Mrs. King and I have known each other a long time, and I recall with special 
fondness her frequent visits to my office in the United States Senate a few years ago 
when we were engaged in a joint venture of some consequence to this gathering.
 I count it as one of the highlights of my legislative career to have worked 
with this gracious and tenacious lady to establish a national holiday honoring the 
Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King.
 Over the past 78 years, the NAACP has  been in the vanguard of the changes 
in civil rights that have occurred in this Nation.
 Through your persistence in the courts, you have brilliantly made the point that 
a society cannot exist with dual citizenships:  one privileged and one second-class. 
Through your Washington Bureau, headed by the legendary Clarence Mitchell, 
(now headed by the indefatigable Althea Simmons), this organization led the way 
in securing bi-partisan support for the civil rights actions of 1957, 1964, and 1965. 
Because of your tenacity and persistence, segregation is outlawed in this Nation.
 We are all the beneficiaries, black and white, Republicans and Democrats, of 
a legacy of a society that has in large measure opened its doors to those who have 
been systematically excluded.
 It goes without saying that much still remains to be done, that the civil rights 
agenda is incomplete.  I hasten to add that the problems that we face are not 
Republican or Democrat problems.  Not black or white problems, but American 
problems.  No political party can have hung around its neck the albatross of 
responsibility for that which is still not right in this great land today.
 By the same token, no party should be expected to accept the blame for 
1 133 Cong. Rec. 19,296-97 ( July 10, 1987).
conditions that have grown out of years of denial, abuse, and systematic exclusion. 
I am proud of the role that my party has played in bringing about change in this 
Nation.  We need to analyze the current situation we face and, together, with mutual 
respect, go about the business of opening up doors to all Americans.
 I came to Washington 20 years ago last January, and, to the extent that I was 
known at all then, I was known either as my father’s son (my father having served 
seven terms in the House of Representatives) or as the son-in-law of the Senate 
Republican Leader, Everett McKinley Dirksen.
 I was and I am a politician, and proud to be one, because I think politics is a 
noble profession.  Indeed, it is the mechanism by which citizens of this country 
express the full range of their desire[s], demands, and dissent to the structures of 
government.  And I am proud to be a politician who believes that this country’s time 
of greatness is still before it—a country whose passion for fairness and enthusiasm 
for progress is unrivaled in this troubled world. I am proud to have served in a 
government whose social conscience and whose concern for equal justice are so 
apparent.  The machinery of government of this Nation was a marvelously inspired 
product of young founding fathers who could not have possibly understood all the 
challenges of the 20th and 21st centuries, but whose fundamental understanding of 
liberty, equality, and the blessings of freedom dedicated a republic that resonates to 
the will of the people.  And it is in this context that we are all privileged to address 
our agreements and disagreements on great public issues.
 Let me tell you something about my beliefs.  Since I first came to public life, I 
have believed, and I still believe, that to be compassionate and caring and concerned 
the government need not be large, anonymous, and unresponsive.  Indeed, a little 
government goes a long way, and we ought not to have any more government 
involvement in our national life than we absolutely need.
 I believed, and I still believe, that a fundamental obligation of this government 
and any government is to provide ultimately for the protection of our citizens 
against the elements of discrimination, injustice, and threats from abroad.  But I 
also believe that the government is the keeper of the public purse; that government 
sought not to spend more money than it receives in taxes; and taxes ought to be 
as low as possible. I believed when I came to Washington, and I still believe, that 
the best insurance of peace in this dangerous world is the strongest defense for 
our country. I believed, and I still believe, that the United States should not be a 
diplomatic doormat for the rest of the world and that it should stand firmly for its 
rights and interests.
 I believe that these obligations and opportunities to the citizens of this great 
land are best served by an understanding of the adversarial nature of politics and 
its essential contribution to the formulation of public policy.  And yet to be a public 
servant in this system means being a part of a system of ideas and beliefs that swirl 
and rush and sometimes threaten to overwhelm—about the most one can hope for 
is the approval of the majority of the people in the resolution of these conflicting 
ideas.  So in my public career I have tried to understand the point of view of those 
who disagree with me, to assist those things that I believe are best for the Nation, 
and to face difficult and unpopular issues with the courage to believe that the 
country will understand.
 And it is in this belief that one of the most important votes I gave in the 
United States Senate was a vote in favor of the Fair Housing Act that granted 
the government extraordinary powers to impose national standards of fairness 
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throughout the land.  I did it because I thought it was the right thing to do, and I 
did it proudly.  As I began my second term in the Senate in 1973, I was called upon 
to investigate the scandal we know today as Watergate, to follow the facts of that 
tragic case wherever they led, to ask the central troubling question that ultimately 
removed a man I respected from an office I revered.
 And then as I was campaigning for a third time in the Senate, the issue arose 
as to whether or not the United States should re-negotiate the treaty governing its 
rights and responsibilities with respect to the Panama Canal.
 I weighed both sides of this contentious issue for a very long time, and finally 
decided that the right thing to do was to re-negotiate those treaties and ensure 
that our rights were protected by something more substantial than a 75-year-old 
document signed under duress.
 All of these were the right thing to do.
 Such was the act of a great Senate leader, Everett Dirksen, when he helped 
Lyndon Johnson secure passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
 Such was the act of Strom Thurmond, who in 1984 led the fight to extend the 
Voting Rights Act.
 And such were the acts of Justice Hugo Black, whose forceful championship of 
civil rights and civil liberties were scarcely foretold by his youthful membership in 
the Ku Klux Klan.
 Comes now the case of Robert Bork, whom the President has nominated to 
serve as a Justice of the Supreme Court.
 I have come today because I believe that the NAACP, with its long commitment 
to fairness and the give-and-take of honest, conscientious differences of opinion, is 
willing to hear arguments on the other side.
 I am well aware of the fact that most members of this organization are opposed 
to the confirmation of Judge Robert Bork to the U. S. Supreme Court.  Your 
opposition is based upon information that has been presented by the media and by 
speakers at this Convention.
 One of the strengths of a democratic society is the right of the people to hold 
different views and to have them expressed.  I understand that as an advocacy 
organization with a deep concern for the Supreme Court (an institution which has 
been of tantamount importance to you over the years), you are troubled by changes 
in the institution.
 I ask you today not to judge Robert Bork upon a fragmented record, reflected 
in news clippings.
 I ask you to consider the full record and Judge Bork’s views as they emerge 
during the confirmation process.
 As an organization that prides itself on fairness, as individuals who have 
been the victims of prejudice based upon race, I am sure that you understand 
the importance of allowing all the facts to be put forward and in a non-heated 
or emotional fashion, particularly as the Senate, the body of deliberation, affords 
Justice Bork an opportunity to be heard, examined, and confirmed.
 So I ask you today not to precipitously oppose this man but rather to wait and 
let the confirmation hearings paint a portrait worthy of the man and worthy of your 
serious consideration.
 I ask you not to commit the power and prestige of this organization to defeating 
the nomination of an honorable man who has demonstrated so clearly in his own 
life the power of redemption.
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 Now, beyond the Court we must together find ways to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination against persons regardless of race, creed, color, or gender.
 Let me pay special tribute to the NAACP that, since 1909 when you were 
founded here in New York, has kept watch on the ramparts of freedom for all 
Americans.
 We must together find ways to end the vicious cycle of poverty that plagues too 
many of our citizens.  We must together work to build a society where our senior 
citizens are secure in retirement and where our young people’s mental skies are not 
clouded by stunted growth and the denial of hope.
 My friends, the agenda before us is one that  requires every able-bodied man, 
woman, and child to labor assiduously for a new day and “the bright sunlit uplands” 
of an America without racism or discrimination.  I am optimistic that both 
conservatives and liberals will benefit by the creation of a society where opportunity 
is our creed and justice is an obtainable goal.
 I want you to know—as Ben and Frances Hooks have known for a long time—
that I am a soldier with you in the struggle that gives this convention its theme and 
this movement its life.
 I hope the time will come when this power is manifest more fully in our Nation.
 I hope the time will come when the divisiveness and discord and discrimination 
of our time will yield to greater understanding in a more perfect union.
 That is easier than it sounds in a country like ours, for by our very nature we 
can never expect—and should never even hope—to be all one thing or all another.
 People of every color, every religion, every nationality, every point of view have 
found a home and a haven here, and it is the glory of our Nation that this is so.
 But for all our differences, there are strong ties that bind us together as 
Americans, and none is stronger than our fundamental national belief in liberty 
and justice for all.
 That is a promise we have not yet fully kept, but it is a struggle worthy of a great 
people.
 I am proud to be a soldier with you in this struggle.
 And I share with you the confidence and the commitment that we shall 
someday overcome.
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Remarks on the Departure of 
Howard H. Baker, Jr.
as Chief of Staff to the 
President of the United States (1988)1
Senator Robert J. Dole2
Senator Robert C. Byrd3
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan4
 Mr. Dole.  Mr. President, it has just been called to my attention—in fact it was 
on the wire when I came back from the White House—that the good friend of all 
of us, Howard Baker, will be leaving the White House as chief of staff on July 1.
 I called Senator Baker and indicated had I known that while I was at the White 
House I would have certainly thanked him publicly in every way, and I am doing so 
now, for his efforts not just on behalf of the President but for all of us in the Senate, 
for all those in Government and those outside Government.  He certainly has done 
a superb job as chief of staff for the President of the United States.
 As a former colleague and a colleague that we all loved and respected, Howard 
Baker leaves with our best wishes.
 I understand that he is going to rejoin his law firm.
 I do know that his wife, Joy, has not been well.  I think that is another reason.
 But he indicated before his leaving, and he had indicated to the President some 
months ago, that following the summit he thought most things were in pretty good 
order and he would be going back to the private sector.
 So I would just say to my good friend, Howard Baker, Godspeed, best wishes, 
and good luck.
 Mr. Byrd.  Mr. President, will the distinguished Republican leader yield?
 Mr. Dole. I am happy to yield.
 Mr. Byrd.  Mr. President, I wish to associate myself with the remarks that have 
just been made by the distinguished Republican leader.
 We all have not only a very fine relationship with Howard Baker and have had 
for many years when he was a Member of the Senate—our relationships during 
those years when we shared the leadership of the Senate were very warm—but 
1 134 Cong. Rec. 14,408-09 ( June 14, 1988) (remarks of Sens. Dole, Byrd, and Moynihan).
2 Senator Robert J. Dole (R. Kan.) represented Kansas in the United States Senate, 1969-1996, and served as 
Senate Majority Leader, 1985-1987 and 1995-1996, and as Senate Minority Leader, 1987-1995.  Biographical 
Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-Present, available at http://bioguide.congress.gov/
biosearch/biosearch.asp.
3 Senator Robert C. Byrd (D. W. Va.) represented West Virginia in the United States Senate, 1959-2010, 
and served as Senate Majority Leader, 1977-1980 and 1987-1988, as Senate Minority Leader, 1981-1986, and as 
President pro tempore of the United States Senate, 1989-1995.  Id.
4 Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D. N.Y.) represented New York in the United States Senate, 1977-2001. 
Id.
we also have a deep understanding and appreciation for the good work that he 
has done for the President during Mr. Baker’s somewhat brief tenure at the White 
House.
 He came to the White House when things were stormy and there were rough 
seas.  I think he did much to help to calm, quiet, and make things more serene there. 
He has performed a great service not only for the President but also for his country.
 I join with the distinguished Republican leader in wishing Howard well as he 
returns to his former work.  I also want to share my concerns and, I am sure, my 
wife Erma’s with respect to Joy, the wife of Senator Baker.  We wish her well.  We 
will remember her in our meditations, thoughts, and prayers.
 Mr. Dole.  I thank the distinguished majority leader.
 I know that when Howard leaves he will be replaced by Ken Duberstein 
who had a lot of experience not as a Member of Congress but working with the 
House and Senate and I have just conveyed my congratulations to Mr. Duberstein 
whom we look forward to working with, not for him, with him, and I express the 
sentiments of everyone, and he will do a good job.
 Mr. Moynihan.  Mr. President, I associate myself with the remarks and I 
think it would not be inappropriate to say the sentiments of the Republican leader 
and our distinguished majority leader.
 I learned just a moment ago on this floor that Howard Baker will be leaving his 
position as Chief of Staff, a newly created position only in this administration, and 
he surely has filled it to the extraordinary debt owed him now.
 What he has done is he took a shattered institution and he restored stability 
to that most precious of democratic institutions.  Only perhaps a man as sensitive 
to the prospects of instability could be as effective in restoring it in a moment of 
genuine crisis.  The Presidency was tottering when he took hold, and it is sufficiently 
restored that he feels able to leave.  If he is prepared to leave, it is in that sense, in my 
view, to be taken as a good sign.  His sense of duty and his realistic understanding 
of what is involved is such that he would never leave were it not possible to continue 
without him and that, in a sense, is a measure of his success.
 We wish Howard Baker and his wife Joy, who is our friend, enormous good 
fortune.
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Letter from President Ronald Reagan 
Accepting the Resignation of 
White House Chief of Staff
Howard H. Baker, Jr. (1988)1
President Ronald Reagan
the White House
Washington
June 28, 1988
Dear Howard:
It is with especially deep regret that I accept your resignation as Chief of Staff, 
effective June 30.
You and I have known each other for many years as public servants, partisan allies, 
and good friends.  You came to the United States Senate the same year I went to the 
Statehouse in California; and, as I’m sure you would agree, things haven’t been the 
same for either of us since.  Our paths brought us together in those early years and 
helped determine the future direction of our Party and our country.  And let me 
add:  Our Nation has rarely seen a more dedicated and capable leader in its capital 
than Howard Baker.
Your dedication to public service was renowned during your 18 years in the Senate, 
but it became even more so when you set aside your personal and political interests 
to answer my call to service in the Executive branch.  For that, I am particularly 
appreciative.  You accepted the position of Chief of Staff and quickly assembled a 
top-flight team of senior aides to move my agenda forward.  A tone of cooperation 
and conciliation in those difficult early months of 1987 was communicated to the 
public and to those in the Congress.  At the same time, the White House functioned 
efficiently and effectively in setting out and pursuing my policy goals.
I clearly appreciate the challenges you faced.  Your tireless efforts on my behalf 
with your former colleagues to forge a sense of cooperation last October to reach a 
budget agreement; your counsel on many issues that enabled me to make the best 
decisions on behalf of all the people; your significant contributions to bring about 
the first reduction in United States and Soviet nuclear arms; and also your gentle 
Tennessee wit that can relax a tense moment—these are attributes that come from 
1 Ronald Reagan to Howard H. Baker, Jr., June 28, 1988, Howard H. Baker, Jr. Papers (unprocessed), Modern 
Political Archives, Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy.
the heart and that have made our relationship not a job but a friendship that will 
last forever.
No one understands better than Nancy and I the personal reasons that lead you to 
relinquish your responsibilities at this time.  That, too, is a tribute to your character 
and your integrity.  With all the years you and I have been associated, this truly is 
no farewell, but rather a note of enduring and heartfelt thanks for a job well done.
Our best wishes for happiness and good health to you, Joy, and your entire family 
now and for the future.  God bless you.
Sincerely,
Ron
The Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
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The Role of the Senate (1989)
Howard H. Baker, Jr.1
 Mr. Baker.  Mr. President, my former colleagues and friends, it is a delight to 
be here, to be chosen, along with Senator Eagleton, to make these remarks on this 
momentous occasion.
 I also knew if I lived long enough, sooner or later I would be on television in the 
Senate.
 Mr. President, I spent 18 years in the Senate and I loved every day of it, though 
I will confess, as I have to many of you, I loved some days more than others.  I am 
reminded today that when I first came to the Senate in 1967, I went for a walk 
down one of these majestic Capitol corridors with our late colleague, Senator Norris 
Cotton, of New Hampshire.  And after we had walked a ways Norris Cotton said 
to me, “Howard, do you smell the white marble?” I said, “No, Norris, I don’t believe 
you can smell marble.”  And he said, “One day you’ll smell the marble, and you’ll 
never get over it.”
 Unless you have been a Senator for a while, that counsel may mystify you as 
much as it did me on that day so long ago.  But after serving in this body for a 
few years, I really discovered that you can smell white marble, you can sense and 
understand and appreciate the surroundings that make this place so great and 
house so many great men and women as the nesting place for the future hopes and 
aspirations of this Nation in so many ways.
 I discovered at roughly the same time that once one is so thoroughly acclimatized 
to the special atmosphere of the Senate, the air in any other place is pretty thin.
 This is a special place, my friends.  It is not, as Mark Russell of an earlier day 
said, “a body of elderly gentlemen charged with high duties and misdemeanors.”
 It is, instead, the institution which has nurtured the Websters, the Clays, and 
Calhouns of America, the Lodges, the Lafollettes, the Russells, the Longs, the 
Johnsons, the Mansfields, the Tafts, the Dirksens, three Kennedys, three Byrds, a 
Thurmond, an Eagleton, a Stennis, a Javits, a Dole, occasionally a Margaret Chase 
Smith, and all too infrequently an Ed Brooke.
 These men and women of distinction—and others like them—have been 
drawn to the Senate by the special role which this institution and its Members play 
and have played in the mainstream of the life of this Nation.
 Mr. President, that role has been steadily evolving since the earliest days of 
the Republic, and indeed since the Constitution first spoke with such exquisite 
imprecision about the role of the Senate.  Those of us who have occupied this and 
the other Chamber have attempted to define it.
 The charter document says, for example, that anyone who is 30 years old, a 
9-year resident in the United States, residing in the State that he or she will 
represent, is qualified to be a Senator, and it sets the term of a Senator at 6 years, 
which, as you know, is the longest elective term in our national political system.
1 35 Cong. Rec. S3,402-03 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1989) (remarks by former Sen. Baker).
 For the institution itself, the Constitution requires that the Senate give equal 
representation to the several States, that it try impeachments, and that it give advice 
and consent to the President on treaties and nominations, and beyond that the 
Constitution requires very little.
 But 200 years of experience and precedents have given the Senate much richer 
definition.  Powers implicitly granted by the Constitution have been more explicitly 
acknowledged and more aggressively exercised with every new Congress.
 I believe, Mr. President, that the danger we face in modern times, that we faced 
in my time in this Chamber, in this Senate, and that these men and women face 
today, is not that the Senate will do too much but that the Senate will do too little.
 Ever since 1913, when the Constitution was amended to provide for the direct 
popular election of Senators—rather than election by the several State legislatures—
it seems to me that some unfortunate law of political physics has tended to merge 
the missions of the Senate with that of the House of Representatives.  While I have 
unlimited respect for the other body, as we say—and, indeed, both my father and 
my mother served in the House of Representatives—I believe that conceiving of 
and exercising the powers of the Senate as the mirror image of the powers of the 
House of Representatives is a temptation and a tendency which must be resisted 
because if we do not, we will lose the specialty of the Senate itself as a particular 
constitutional body.
 These remarks and this comparison are not meant to diminish the House 
of Representatives in any way.  Indeed, the House in so many ways is the front 
line of American democracy.  Its 2-year terms are intentionally short, its local 
constituencies relatively small, so as to keep its Members close to the people and 
highly responsible to the public will.
 But the Senate is different, and we all know that.  We feel that without being 
told, certainly by me.  Thomas Jefferson spoke it well when he said that the Senate 
is the saucer in which the passions of the Nation should be poured to cool.
 We might speak of it today as a kind of national board of directors to set broad 
general policy, for I believe that the Senate was never intended to manage the day-
to-day affairs of our Government, but, rather, to work in its special constitutional 
way, its unique and special way with the Chief Executive of our Republic in the 
formulation of public policy and its execution.
 A Senator has more insulation from his electors than any other officer in the 
Government, including the President and Vice President of the United States.
 The constituency a Senator serves is not only the people of his State but the 
State itself, the embodiment of the theoretical sovereignty of our Union, and in the 
Senate alone does the term “United States” have a literal, political, and parliamentary 
meaning. 
 Similarly, the 6-year term, the longest in elective politics, encourages the 
historic view, and I may say the heroic judgment, by the Members of this body, and 
while “government by public opinion” is sacred to the Members of the House of 
Representatives, it is subject to proof in the Senate of the United States.
 As we all know with varying degrees of approval or disapproval, the rules and 
the precedent of the Senate encourage extended debate among men and women 
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who need no such encouragement.  In the Senate a determined minority, sometimes 
even a minority of one, may make the Senate stop and consider carefully the 
consequences of its action.  I look about this room and I can see individual Members 
with whom I have served, who aroused the index and quotient of frustration in my 
leadership role to the point where I could hardly stand it and on both sides of 
the aisle.  But in retrospect, my friends, I wish to pay them a compliment because 
you who stood on principle, you who slowed the forward progress of the Senate’s 
deliberations, far more often than not represented the very essence of the greatness 
of this body and required us to be that institution in which the passions of the 
Nation were allowed to cool.
 My friends, I have had the privilege not only of serving in this body but also, 
and unexpectedly, to serve at the right hand of the President of the United States, 
and perhaps that gives me uniqueness of view and perspective that I might share 
with you in the concluding part of these remarks.
 As you know, the President of the United States has many powers, inherent 
and explicit.  He is the embodiment of our nationhood in so many ways; he is one 
of two officials that are elected by the entire Nation, but he has specified powers as 
well.  And those specified powers in relation to the responsibility of the U.S. Senate 
are the matters on which I would like to speak.
 The President of the United States may negotiate treaties with foreign powers, 
but he may ratify them only by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.  The 
President may nominate whom he or she chooses for the principal officers of the 
executive branch, but the Senate must agree.  Whatever partisan differences may 
separate the President of the United States and the Senate of the United States, 
the Constitution requires that a partnership be formed between the President and 
the Senate in these specified matters, and whether we like it or not that partnership 
begins on Inauguration Day and moves forward with varying degrees of tranquility 
throughout the Presidential and senatorial terms and sessions.  The quality of that 
partnership, in my view, is for each President and each Senate to determine, but in 
those unhappy times when the partnership has suffered, the Nation has inevitably 
suffered, and when that partnership has prospered, I believe so have we all.
 For 8 years before I came to Washington and for almost 3 years thereafter, my 
father-in-law, Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, of Illinois, was the Republican 
leader of the U.S. Senate and for the first 2 years of his tenure in that office his 
counterpart on the Democratic side was Senator Lyndon Baines Johnson, of Texas. 
I believe I am betraying no great confidence when I say that from time to time at 
the end of a legislative day, Senator Dirksen and Senator Johnson would repair to 
a private quarter to discuss the issues and personalities of the day as only a couple 
of unrepentant politicians can do.  There was magic in those moments, and they 
continued long after Senator Johnson became President Johnson.  Those meetings 
did not save the country the sorrow of Vietnam, but they did help win the battle 
for civil rights.  They did not solve every problem in Lyndon Johnson’s or Everett 
Dirksen’s “in” box, but, my friends, they solved their share.  There was a bond of 
fundamental trust and personal goodwill about those meetings and those men, and 
it is well understood that if a national crisis should suddenly arise, the President of 
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the United States and the Republican leader of the Senate could counsel frankly 
and deal effectively with one another.
 That is the nature of the partnership implied by the constitutional 
responsibilities.  I think we need those relationships throughout our history; we 
have always needed them.  We need them today maybe more than ever.  It is my 
hope that the Senate looks to its past today and will rediscover the real meaning, 
the essence of this institutional greatness, but among the elements that I hope it 
ascertains and redefines is the nature of friendship and civility and understanding 
and partnership between this body and the executive authority of the Government 
of the United States.
 My friends, these remarks were too long perhaps, but I could not avoid the 
temptation to share these thoughts with you that have occurred to me over that day 
in January of 1985 when, as I recall, only the Presiding Officer, the distinguished 
occupant of this chair and I were on the floor at the moment of adjournment, that 
moment of my term ending, and I said something which now must join that long 
and growing list of issues on which I was wrong when I said these are the last words 
I will speak on the floor of the Senate of the United States.
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The View from Both Ends of the Avenue 
(1990)1
Howard H. Baker, Jr.
 As one who has served on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue—as Majority 
Leader of the Senate and as White House chief of staff—I’d like to talk with you 
this evening about making that famous stretch of road more of a two-way street 
politically as well as physically, and why the need to do that is so great.
 When I first came to the Senate in 1967, my father-in-law Everett Dirksen was 
Republican Leader of the Senate and Lyndon Johnson was President of the United 
States.  Johnson and Dirksen had served in the Senate leadership together, and 
they had developed a personal bond that held them together through all manner of 
political strains.
 I believe I am betraying no great confidence when I say that from time to time at 
the end of a legislative day Senator Dirksen and Senator Johnson—later President 
Johnson—would join each other in some kind of liquid refreshment and discuss 
the issues and personalities of the day as only a couple of unrepentant politicians 
can do.
 There was magic in those meetings, and in that special relationship between two 
highly partisan men.  Those meetings didn’t save America the sorrow of Vietnam, 
but they did help win the battle for civil rights.  They didn’t solve every problem in 
the government’s “in box,” but they solved their share.
 There was a bond of fundamental trust and personal good will about those 
meetings and those men, and it was well understood that if a national crisis should 
suddenly arise, the President of the United States and the Republican Leader of the 
Senate could counsel frankly and deal effectively with one another.
 That kind of relationship simply doesn’t exist much in Washington anymore. 
One need only look at the level of discourse between the Majority Leader of the 
House of Representatives and the Assistant Majority Leader of the United States 
Senate in recent days to understand how far we have come from those earlier, more 
congenial days of intimate friendship and professional respect.
 In place of all that have come statutory barricades and elaborate staff structures 
which make candid and confidential conversations between the White House and 
Congress all but impossible.
 We have found, among other things, that it’s pretty hard to keep a secret under 
these circumstances, and what is worse, we have put a serious strain on the ability 
of the executive and legislative branches to do anything important together.
 This is habitually true of efforts to reduce the federal budget deficit, and it is 
maddeningly true of efforts to exercise military or diplomatic power in the world.
1 © 1990 Center for the Study of the Presidency.  Originally published in 20 Presidential Stud. Q. 489-92 
(1990), based upon Senator Baker’s keynote address on Mar. 16, 1990, in Washington, D. C., at the 21st Annual 
Student Symposium of the Center for the Study of the Presidency.  Reproduced with the express permission of 
the Center for the Study of the Presidency.
 A chorus of congressional second-guessing seems to attend every presidential 
initiative in foreign affairs, and Presidents never seem to learn that if they want 
these initiatives to succeed, Congress has to be in on the take-off as well as the 
landing.
 I believe it is possible to work out better practical arrangements, more realistic 
institutional roles, and better personal relationships between the President and the 
Congress.
 I believe, for example, it’s only common sense that before a President undertakes 
any kind of military campaign, he should take the leadership of the Congress into 
his confidence and solicit their views on the matter.
 In cases of a surgical strike, as in Libya four years ago or Panama more recently, 
the element of surprise must be protected, and so the number of people who know 
the secret must be limited.  I believe most people in Congress understand that.
 In cases where sustained engagement is likely to be necessary, as in our 
convoy operations in the Persian Gulf or certainly as in the case of Vietnam, the 
mission simply cannot succeed unless it has broad political and public support, 
which consultation and communication alone can win.  I believe most Presidents 
understand that.
 The question in each case is, who exactly should be consulted?  It is the tendency 
of congressmen in such situations to prefer lots of company.  It is the tendency of 
Presidents to prefer as few political “generals” as possible.
 I believe a reasonable compromise would involve automatic, timely presidential 
consultation with the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House, and the Majority 
and Minority Leaders of the Senate, at the absolute minimum.
 Depending on the nature of the engagement of forces, other members of 
Congress should be involved by the mutual agreement of the President and the 
congressional leadership.
 Ultimately, of course, even though the Constitution vests the powers of 
commander-in-chief with the President, it is the power of the purse—vested in the 
Congress—that decides what any President can do and not do.
 If the Congress wants to end an American military engagement abroad, it 
needs only cut funds for that engagement.  Congress cut off funds for our forces 
in Vietnam in April of 1975, and the last helicopter left the roof of the Saigon 
embassy in April of 1975.
 Precisely because the Congress has this ultimate power—in matters of war 
and peace, taxing and spending, soup to nuts—I believe the Congress seriously 
misunderstands, indeed underestimates, its role in modern government.
 I believe the modern Congress spends far too much time engaged in bureaucratic 
warfare with the executive branch and far too little time functioning as the national 
board of directors the Constitution intended it to be.
 It hasn’t been so long ago that members of Congress were real people with real 
jobs in real communities throughout the country.  They were truly representative 
of the people who elected them—and had the moral and political authority of 
true representatives—because they played an active, integral part in the civil and 
economic and social affairs of their constituencies.  They went to Washington 
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temporarily, and they came home.
 For all practical purposes, today’s members of Congress consider Washington 
home, and they’re tourists in their own constituencies.
 They’re committed full-time to the legislative undertaking, and they’re expected 
to be free of any conflict of interest by abdicating any interest except political power.
 In this self-imposed isolation, they grow more and more susceptible to the 
loudest voice or the largest mailing—or the biggest check—and they surrender the 
power of independent, practical judgment.
 And because they are virtual captives of the capital city, they think up more and 
more government programs, hold more and more hearings, propose more and more 
legislation, because that’s what they think they’re paid for.
 They pass thousand-page legislative bills that read more like bureaucratic 
jargon than public law.  They stopped seeing the forest for the trees a long time ago, 
and now they label the leaves.
 Yet for all this endless activity, there is precious little action of a constructive 
nature.  Twice in recent years, the federal government has literally run out of money, 
because the Congress of the United States—with nothing to do but govern—has 
failed to approve funds in a timely way to meet the payrolls of executive departments 
and agencies.
 Little wonder, then, that people—and Presidents—tend to hold Congress as 
an institution in what former Speaker of the House John McCormack used to call 
“minimum high regard.”
 I think Congress can do better than that, not by doing more but by doing less. 
I believe the Congress could do everything it really needs to do in about six months: 
a few months early in the year to decide what to spend money on, and a few months 
near the end of the year to decide how much to spend.
 I would propose that the rest of the year be spent not in Washington but in 
America, seeing first-hand the practical effects of federal laws on private lives and 
enterprise, staying in personal touch with the people they’re elected to represent, 
experiencing life as the rest of us know it—and drawing the authority from such 
close encounters with real people to tell a President he’s full of beans when he 
proposes something out of kilter with the real world.
 I will stipulate here that many of my former colleagues in the Congress consider 
my perennial call for a “citizen legislature” quaint at best, and dangerous at worst.
 They maintain that a part-time Congress would cede too much power to a 
full-time President, or be insufficiently versed in the complex issues of our time to 
render sound policy judgments, or both.
 But I would remind my friends on Capitol Hill that the Supreme Court sits 
in formal session only six months a year, deals with devilishly complicated and 
controversial issues (with a much smaller staff than Congress has), and has wielded 
co-equal power with every President and every Congress since the earliest days of 
the Republic.
 The truth is that as long as the Congress keeps the power of the purse, it will be 
first among equals in the federal government whether it meets three days a year or 
365.
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 A member of Congress doesn’t have to be in Washington every day to be a 
conscientious and skillful legislator, and he or she can’t be in Washington every day 
and remain truly representative of the people back home.
 The President, for his part, could do with a little less remoteness from the 
Congress itself.  Presidents used to have a working office in the Capitol building, 
and I think we should open that office again.  The symbolism of a President and 
a Congress physically working together is as obvious as it is important.  But the 
practical implications are a great deal more important.
 As things stand now, the President comes to Capitol Hill only a few times a year. 
And even these rare appearances have been reduced to formalities, with Presidents 
using the Congress as so much scenery for a speech, and Congress responding with 
a cacophony of criticism for nearly everything the President has to say.
 I think a little greater proximity between the President and the Congress, as 
between the Congress and its constituents, would do wonders for our politics.  I 
think, among other things, it’s harder to say nasty things about somebody you’re apt 
to see in the hallway every day.
 We live in a political atmosphere now in which common civility seems about 
to join chivalry in extinction, an atmosphere in which we argue for the sake of 
argument and accuse for the sake of advantage, an environment in which the 
adversarial process has become not a means to an end but an end in itself.
 In this atmosphere, the adversarial system leads not to accomplishment but to 
entropy, not to policy but to paralysis.  Surely this is not the example of democracy 
we wish to demonstrate to the newly free countries of eastern Europe, nor can it be 
the system of government we would consciously choose for ourselves.
 I believe we have to start thinking about things a little differently in this 
country.  While holding fast to our own principles, we must have a decent respect 
for differing points of view.
 We must understand that after the time of testing comes the time for uniting. 
We must recognize that it is the resolution of conflict—rather than the perpetuation 
of conflict—that makes the difference between successful self-government and civil 
warfare.
 I’ve been saying most of these things for about twenty years now, on both ends 
of Pennsylvania Avenue, and I’m under no illusion that anyone will pay any more 
attention now than when I stood at the center of power.
 But all of my experience tells me I’m right, and as you continue your study 
of the presidency, I hope you agree that my simple plea for greater accountability, 
proximity and civility in our politics is an idea whose time has come at last, and 
none too soon.
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Remarks at the 
U. S. Capitol Historical Society’s 
Capitol Cornerstone Dinner (1993)1
Howard H. Baker, Jr.
 Brian Lamb,2 thank you so very much—and ladies and gentlemen, what a 
pleasure to be here—and Brian what a marvelous way to say that you did not like my 
picture.  Congressman Brown, Senator Byrd, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, 
Members of Congress, and good friends:
 It is an awesome thing to be here tonight and have this opportunity to speak 
to you on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the laying of the cornerstone of 
the Capitol.  But it is equally awesome to do so in the presence of George White, 
the Architect of the Capitol, and Bob Byrd, who is the absolute master not only of 
the history of the Senate but of this institution, the Congress, and no doubt of this 
building, as well.  But, my friends, I will do my very best.
 When I first arrived in Washington as a Member of the United States Senate 
in January of 1967 and as a very junior Senator from Tennessee, and when anybody 
paid attention to me, as Brian said, usually did so as Ev Dirksen’s son-in-law, rather 
than as a Senator, I remember distinctly traveling from what is now the Russell 
Building to the Capitol through the subway, up the elevators, and approached the 
Senate Chamber, and was promptly stopped by a Doorkeeper who thought I had 
no right to enter.  Well, two things come to mind.  First, I was then a young man, a 
condition from which I have now recovered.  And second, to recall vividly that I said 
to the Doorkeeper:  “Son, if you had any idea how hard I worked to get here, you’d 
have no notion that you could stop me now.”
 So, I took my place, received the Oath of Office from the Vice President of the 
United States, and began eighteen years of service in the United States Senate.  I 
will always treasure that experience.  It was, indeed, the high point of my public 
career.  As Brian pointed out in his little vignette of my life, I have also had the 
opportunity to do other things, including being Chief of Staff to the President 
of the United States.  But, my friends, nothing—nothing ever comes close to the 
opportunity to serve in the Congress of the United States.  It is the highest estate 
that a public servant can attain and the greatest service that a private citizen can 
give to this republic. And I am awed with the opportunity to stand here and help 
1 139 Cong. Rec. 30,273-74.  These remarks were delivered by former Senator Baker at the Capitol 
Cornerstone Dinner, sponsored by the U. S. Capitol Historical Society, in Washington, D. C,. on Sept. 17, 1993.
2 Brian Lamb was the founder of the Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network(C-SPAN), the primary purpose 
of which was to broadcast the proceedings of the Congress, an innovation long supported by Senator Baker. 
C-SPAN televised  the first live coverage of the debates on the floor of the U. S. House of Representatives in March 
1979.  Lamb subsequently hosted a variety of C-SPAN programs, including Washington Journal and Booknotes. 
See Paul Bedard, Brian Lamb:  C-SPAN Now Reaches 100 Million Homes, U.S. News & World Rep., June 22, 
2010; Thomas Heath, Value Added:  A 46-Year Career Built on Letting Viewers Make Up Their Own Minds, Wash. 
Post, Sept. 18, 2011.
you celebrate not only that tradition, but this building which has housed so much 
history and which is the home of that tradition, as well.
 I remember, if you will let me wander for a few minutes, and then I will get on 
to the few remarks about the history of the Capitol —I remember once when I was 
Majority Leader of the United States Senate and my good friend Bob Byrd was 
then Minority Leader, that he and I agreed that I would keep the offices that the 
Republican Leader had occupied for so long, which were occupied by my late father-
in-law and looked down the Mall toward the Washington Monument and beyond 
that to the Lincoln Memorial and so beyond that to the rows of crosses at the Lee 
Mansion in Arlington Cemetery.  And it happened on that particular occasion that 
President Reagan was in my office awaiting some sort of official function (I’ve long 
since forgotten what it was), but the sun was setting gently behind this majestic 
scene, and I looked out the window with Reagan by my side and I said:  “Mr. 
President, this is the best view in Washington.”  He said, “No, Howard, this is the 
second best view in Washington.”
 But you see, my friends, Ronald Reagan was wrong.  This is the seat of the 
republic.  This is the people’s branch.  And this is the locale of the strength and 
the wisdom of self-governance in this nation—this building which houses the 
people’s branch.  And what a magnificent opportunity for all of us to celebrate the 
beginnings of this structure—not the beginnings of the republic, and certainly not 
the beginnings of the concept of representative government—but this place where 
the American brand was put on that.  Where we demonstrated our unique talent as 
Americans for self-government.  Where we created an image that is now the envy 
of the entire world in terms of the elaboration and extension of individual rights. 
Where we created a nation from this place that is without peer in the annals of 
all the history of civilization.  Where we suffered the divisive issues.  Where we 
withstood the challenges of war.  Where we extended the blessings of liberty and 
opportunity to the downtrodden.  Where we provided for the freedom of every 
individual.  Where we breathed life into the charter documents of the republic. 
That is what this place is.  It is the home of America.  It is the center of the nation, 
it is the height of the ambition of humanity, thus far in the history of civilization.
 My friends, I stand here in the presence of these secular saints, and others 
who line the corridors to the Senate Chamber and to the Chamber of the House 
of Representatives, and luxuriate in the contributions that they made to this 
evolutionary dream, and acknowledge fully and freely that we are the fortunate 
legatees of their wisdom and of their dedication and sacrifice.  That, too, is what 
this building is all about.
 So, when I had an opportunity to visit with George White, the distinguished 
Architect of the Capitol, and ask him, as I did a little while ago, “George, have you 
really found the cornerstone of the Capitol?” and he gave me a long answer, as you 
would expect a thoroughly professional and distinguished architect to do—which 
I will not, now repeat, except to say I declare that we found the cornerstone of the 
Capitol.  And it may not be a piece of sandstone, therein partially buried under the 
earth.  The cornerstone of this building, my friends, is the institution that it houses. 
And that truly is what we celebrate now on this 200th anniversary occasion.
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 Now let me tell you a few other reminiscences about this place as I knew it. 
First of all, forgive the immodesty, if it is immodest that I exhibit in saying that I 
feel a personal kinship to this place not only because of my service here, but because 
my father before me served in this place, in the House of Representatives, as did 
my mother.  My wife’s father served here for many years and became before me the 
Republican Leader of the Senate.  So, in many ways, I am a product of this place, 
and from earliest childhood I was imbued with the spirit of the Congress, the spirit 
of the republic, and the importance of this place.
 So, it was a special, a very special time in my life, when I had the opportunity 
to serve, and a very special time when I was elected Minority Leader of the United 
States Senate and first occupied S-230 in the Senate Wing of the Capitol.  Some of 
you know perhaps, and I am fond of saying, and it is true that S-230 served many 
purposes.  It is, I believe, the first space that was occupied when this building was 
under construction, when the Congress came down from Philadelphia.  It was then 
briefly the Library of Congress.  By the way, there were only three-thousand volumes 
in the Library of Congress, and the bookcases were designed by Latrobe, and the 
original water color drawings still exist of those bookcases.  S-230 is the room to 
which the British repaired in August of 1814 to set fire to this structure.  They took 
those books off the wall and made a bonfire and destroyed the building.  Bob Byrd 
will be sympathetic when I say that when I was Leader, there were occasions when 
I was tempted to do the same.
 I also like to tell the story, which is not true, in my moments of frustration 
(that this one is not true, the other one was true, but that’s not bad on average 
for a politician)—but I like to tell the story in moments of frustration that when 
I was cleaning out my little private corner of the office—S-230 that historic 
place—behind a baseboard, I found a letter from Thomas Jefferson to one of his 
brothers.  And it said: “Dear George, I’ve stood about all this democracy stuff that 
I can handle.”  And I’ll bet he felt that way sometimes because you see, my friends, 
this is the place where we thrash out the controversy, where we attenuate the gross 
instincts of humanity.  This is the place where we formulate the public policy of the 
greatest nation on earth.  But it is not easy.  And don’t let anybody ever tell you that 
people here are a people of privilege.  Don’t let anybody tell you that Congressmen 
and women are not hard working.  They are the hardest working people I ever 
knew in my life.  Don’t anybody ever let ’em tell you that Members of Congress are 
without honor.  They are, by and large, the greatest, finest people I ever knew.
 Will Rogers is represented, if not in this room, someplace in this building; and 
as you remember, he was a great philosopher from Oklahoma and also a reporter 
for the Claremore paper.  And they tell the story on Will, that after he’d been there 
awhile, he went back to Ardmore, Oklahoma, and he was walking down the street, 
and somebody said: “Will, I want to know, is it true, since you’ve been there awhile, 
is Congress really made up of thieves and rascals?”  Said Will, “Of course, it’s true, 
but it’s a good cross section of its constituency.”
 But, my friends, it is not true.  The Congress of the United States is the 
essence of this nation.  The Congress of the United States is, indeed, the people’s 
branch.  The Congress of the United States is the place from which the grandeur 
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of this nation has emanated for more than 200 years.  So, it’s altogether fitting 
and appropriate, my friends, that we acknowledge this place as the symbolic center 
of the union.  We acknowledge those who have gone before us; we celebrate the 
grandeur of this building; we revel and delight in 200 years of our history so far; 
and we look forward with calm assurance to a time of even greater accomplishment 
and achievement for this nation in the centuries ahead.
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On Herding Cats (1998)1
Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Introduction of Senator Baker by Senator Trent Lott2
 
 My colleagues, thank you all for being here this afternoon.  Welcome, Senator 
Baker and Senator Kassebaum.3
 Though we come together this evening in this stately and formal Old Senate 
Chamber, our convocation has the light spirit of a family reunion.  It was a thrill 
for me to see the way our colleagues reacted to Senator Baker on both sides of the 
aisle.  Even some that could not be here tonight made a special point of coming by 
to speak with Senator Baker.
 Tonight we welcome, as the second speaker in our Leader’s Lecture series, a 
greatly esteemed member of our Senate family.  We are hoping this will be something 
that we can continue throughout this year and into next year, with Senator Byrd4 
being our invited speaker in September.
 I am delighted that the American public has joined us this evening through 
television.  They will hear this outstanding gentleman who will give us, I am sure, 
a great deal of his usual wisdom—and much wit.  I hope they will also sense the 
enormous affection for our speaker tonight, which is almost palpable in this room.
 I wish they could also see the display of photographs in the corridor outside 
this Chamber, for our speaker is, as we here all know, an accomplished shutterbug. 
His skill in capturing with his camera the historic occasions of which he was a 
participant makes clear that he did not have to pursue politics as a profession.  The 
man actually had talent.
 But public service was in his blood.  It was the legacy of his parents, both of 
whom served in the House of Representatives.  It was, as well, the legacy of his 
father-in-law, Everett McKinley Dirksen of Illinois, the Republican Leader in this 
body from 1959 to 1969.
1 Delivered as the second address in the United States Senate’s Leader’s Lecture Series, 1998-2002, in the Old 
Senate Chamber of the United States Capitol on July 14, 1998.  The texts are those that appear on the Web site for 
the United States Senate, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/ history/common/generic/Leaders_Lecture_
Series_Baker.htm, and are reproduced through the courtesy of the United States Senate, the Senate Historical 
Office, and the current Historian of the Senate, Dr. Donald A. Ritchie.  Additional information concerning the 
Leader’s Lecture Series, including video versions and transcripts of each of the speakers in the series, is available at 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/ f_two_sections_with_teasers/leader_lecture_series.htm.
2 Senator Trent Lott (R. Miss.) represented Mississippi in the United States Senate, 1989-2007, and served as 
Senate Majority Leader, 1996-2001, and as Senate Minority Leader, 2001-2003.  Biographical Directory of 
the United States Congress, 1774-Present, available at http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.
asp.
3  Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R. Kan.) represented Kansas in the United States Senate, 1978-1997.  She is 
the wife of Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.  Id.
4 Senator Robert C. Byrd (D. W. Va.) represented West Virginia in the United States Senate, 1959-2010, 
and served as Senate Majority Leader, 1977-1980 and 1987-1988, as Senate Minority Leader, 1981-1986, and as 
President pro tempore of the United States Senate, 1989-1995.  Id.
 We were just visiting across the hall in the Republican Leader suite of offices 
talking about the history of that room and how the British started the fire that 
burned the Capitol in that very room, and the fact that Senator Dirksen had his 
desk right there where I have a staff desk right now.  There is a lot of history in that 
suite of rooms where Senator Baker served.
 His official biography lists honors and accolades, positions won and positions 
awarded.  But those details do not really reveal the most important aspects of his 
career.
 How, for example, he became the first popularly elected Republican Senator 
from Tennessee with bipartisan support, a pattern that continued throughout his 
years in Congress.  I was a student at the time at the University of Mississippi Law 
School.  I had seen Republicans before in my life, but it was the first one I had ever 
seen win an election.  Obviously, it had an impact on me.  Or how he handled the 
constitutional crisis of 1974, and putting the Nation’s good above all else, nudged 
it toward a resolution.  I should add that my own freshman service on the House 
Judiciary Committee at that time was one of the most difficult times I have ever 
experienced, at least in my political life, and I can appreciate, therefore, all the more 
how really difficult that task was for Senator Baker at the time.
 There is nothing in any political science textbook that explains the unique way 
that he led the Senate, but those who were part of it at the time remember.  I have 
had occasion to talk with my senior colleague from Mississippi, Senator Cochran,5 
about some of the unique ways Senator Baker led the Senate.  They remember his 
cool and his patience, even under personal attack.
 They remember how, seemingly nonchalant, he would let a policy battle rage 
for days on the Senate floor, with each Senator exercising fully their right to debate. 
And then, when the voices calmed and the tempers died down, there would be an 
informal gathering in his office.  After a while, I am told, the anxious staffers outside 
would hear laughter, probably the result of an anecdote aptly timed to break the ice 
and bring about a civil consensus.
 I can relate to that process. In fact, one day last year, when some of my best 
friends were faulting a vote of mine, they referred to me as having acquired 
“Bakeritis.”  The man after whom that condition was named called to ask me how 
I was feeling with my new affliction.  I had just one question for him:  Is “Bakeritis” 
fatal?
 He assured me it was not, and apparently it is not.  Indeed, some of the speaker’s 
most remarkable accomplishments came after he ended his congressional career. 
Two in particular come to mind tonight.
 The first was his extraordinary service as Chief of Staff to President Reagan. 
Let us be candid.  Most Senators would view that position as a tremendous step 
down, to put it mildly, from the office of Senate majority leader.  But our speaker 
saw things in a different light.  His President needed him.  And to be blunt, his 
country needed him in that position at that particular time.  Some things were 
coming apart, and he was the right person, and perhaps the only person, to pull 
them back together again.
5  Senator Thad Cochran  (R. Miss) has represented Mississippi in the United States Senate since 1978.  Id.
196 BAKER CENTER JOURNAL OF APPLIED PUBLIC POLICY
 His second remarkable accomplishment after leaving the Senate was to win the 
heart and take the hand of someone who had long since won all our hearts, Senator 
Nancy Kassebaum Baker.
 Now, cynics may think that there is no real romance at all in official Washington. 
There is, indeed, but you have to know where to find it.  Few would fault that it 
would be in the Senate of the United States.
 You have to know where to find real leadership, too, the kind that subordinates 
ambition to achievement, and ego to the greater good.  In 1980, our speaker ran for 
the Presidency, supported by almost all of his Republican colleagues.  But it was 
not meant to be.  A lesser individual might have nursed resentment against the man 
who defeated him.  Instead, this man carried the banner of his triumphal rival, led 
his forces here in the Senate, and pulled off the Reagan Revolution of 1981.
 That took more than skill.  It took class.  It took a lifetime of dedication to 
something more important than party or personal advancement.  It took Howard 
Baker, and I am honored to present him to you tonight.
Address by Senator Baker
 Thank you so much.  I am grateful.  What a welcome.  What a pleasure it is for 
me to be back here in this historic place and to be among you, my friends, and in 
many cases former colleagues.  I am overwhelmed with the absolutely outrageous 
introduction Senator Lott has produced for me.  It was wonderful to have a chance 
to visit with him and with most of you before these remarks began.  I would like to 
do more of that, and perhaps we can after this is finished.  But first, I would like to 
make these remarks in response to the leadership’s request.
 I will express my thoughts on Senate leadership.  Perhaps I should start by 
telling you that the first time I walked into the gallery of the United States Senate, 
it was almost sixty years ago.  My great aunt Mattie Keene was then the personal 
secretary to the late Senator K. D. McKellar of Tennessee,6 and I came here to 
visit her in July of 1939 as a 13-year-old boy.  And being the secretary to Senator 
McKellar, she was able to procure gallery passes, and I visited the hall of the House 
of Representatives and the Senate.
 The Senate had only the most primitive air conditioning in those days.  As a 
matter of fact, it was principally cooled by a system of louvers, vents and skylights 
that dated back to 1859, when the Senate vacated this Chamber and moved down 
the hall to its present home.
 But in all fairness, the system didn’t work very well against Washington’s heat 
and humidity.  As a consequence, Congress was not a year-round institution in 
those days.
 Many of you who know me are now tempted to think that I am going to devote 
the balance of these remarks to a dissertation on the citizen legislature—a Congress 
that did its work and went home, rather than a perpetual Congress hermetically 
sealed in the capital city.  But I assure you that will not be my lecture tonight. 
Besides, I have heard it myself so many times, I am tired of it.  In that summer of 
6 Senator Kenneth D. McKellar (D. Tenn.) represented Tennessee in the U.S. Senate, 1917-1953.  Id.
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1939, in any event, nature and technology offered little choice.
 On that same trip in 1939, I traveled even further north—to New York, in the 
company of the same Aunt Mattie—to attend the New York World’s Fair.  And there 
I had my first encounter with a novel technology that would have more profound 
consequences than air conditioning, and it was television.  It was the same K. D. 
McKellar, my Aunt Mattie’s boss who, a mere 3 years later, would help President 
[Franklin D.] Roosevelt launch the Manhattan Project that would shortly usher in 
the nuclear age.
 By the way, Senator McKellar was then chairman of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee, and when President Roosevelt summoned him to the White House to 
ask him if he could hide a billion dollars for his super top-secret national defense 
project, Senator McKellar said, “Well, Mr. President, of course, I can—and where 
in Tennessee are we going to build this plant?”
 Perhaps things don’t change as much as we think.
 I recite all of this personal history not to remind you how old I am, but to 
remark on how young our country is, how true it is in America that, as William 
Faulkner wrote, “The past isn’t dead.  It isn’t even the past.”
 The same ventilation system that Senator Jefferson Davis of Mississippi 
presided over the installation of in the Senate Chamber in 1859—which, by the 
way, was just before he left the Senate to become President of the Confederacy—
was still in use when I first came here as a boy, when television and nuclear power 
were in their infancy.
 My friends, we enter rooms that Clay and Webster and Calhoun seem only 
recently to have departed.  We can almost smell the smoke of the fire the British 
kindled in what is now Senator Lott’s office, burning down this building in August 
of 1814.  Incidentally, if you smell any smoke now, I must confess that when my 
late father-in-law, Everett Dirksen, was in office, he told me that the fireplaces in 
the leader’s offices didn’t work because they were sealed when the air conditioning 
was put in.  So when I was elected Republican leader, I asked the Architect of 
the Capitol what it would take to make these fireplaces work, and the architect 
said, “Well, a match, perhaps”—which was one of the few occasions when I found 
Senator Dirksen to be entirely wrong.
 My dear friend, Jennings Randolph of West Virginia,7 and my good friend Ed 
Muskie of Maine,8 with whom I helped write so much of the environmental and 
public works legislation of the 1970s, have both passed away recently.  Jennings 
Randolph came to Washington with Franklin Roosevelt, taking his oath of office 
in 1933.  And he was still here when Ronald Reagan arrived in 1981.  He was a 
walking history lesson who embodied—and gladly imparted—a half century of 
American history.
7 Senator Jennings Randolph (D. W. Va.) served in the United States House of Representatives, 1933-1947, 
and in the United States Senate, 1958-1985.  Id.
8 Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D. Me.) represented Maine in the United States Senate, 1959-1980).  Id.
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What Makes the Senate Work
 You may be wondering by now what all these ruminations have to do with 
the subject of Senate leadership.  The answer is this:  What makes the Senate 
work today is the same thing that made it work in the days of Clay, Webster, and 
Calhoun, in whose temple we gather this evening.
 It isn’t just the principled courage, creative compromise, and persuasive 
eloquence that these men brought to the leadership of the Senate—important as 
these qualities were in restoring the political prestige and Constitutional importance 
of the Senate itself in the first half of the 19th century. By the way, it is interesting 
to me that, at that time, an alarming number of our predecessors in the office of the 
Senate found the House of Representatives more attractive and more promising 
and left the Senate to find their careers over there.
 It isn’t simply an understanding of the unique role and rules of the Senate, 
important as that understanding is.  It isn’t even a devotion to the good of the 
country, which has inspired every Senator since 1789.
 What really makes the Senate work—as our heroes knew profoundly—is an 
understanding of human nature, an appreciation of the hearts as well as the minds, 
the frailties as well as the strengths, of one’s colleagues and one’s constituents.
 My friends, listen to Calhoun himself, speaking of his great rival Clay.  He said, 
“I don’t like Henry Clay.  He is a bad man, an imposter, a creator of wicked schemes. 
I wouldn’t speak to him.  But by God, I love him.”
 It is almost impossible to explain that statement to most people, but most 
Senators understand it instinctively and perfectly.
 Here, in those twenty-eight words, is the secret of leading the United States 
Senate.  Here, in the jangle of insults redeemed at the end by the most profound 
appreciation and respect, is the genius and the glory of this institution.
 Very often in the course of my eighteen years in the Senate, and especially in 
the last eight years as Republican Leader and then Majority Leader, I found myself 
engaged in fire-breathing, passionate debate with my fellow Senators over the great 
issues of the times:  civil rights, Vietnam, environmental protection, Watergate, 
the Panama Canal, tax cuts, defense spending, the Middle East, relations with the 
Soviet Union, and dozens more.
 But no sooner had the final word been spoken and the last vote taken than 
I would usually walk to the desk of my most recent antagonist, extend a hand of 
friendship, and solicit his [support] on the next issue for the following day.
 People may think we’re crazy when we do that.  Or perhaps they think our 
debates are fraudulent to begin with, if we can put our passion aside so quickly and 
embrace our adversaries so readily.  But we aren’t crazy and we aren’t frauds.  This 
ritual is as natural as breathing here in the Senate, and it is as important as anything 
that happens in Washington or in the country we serve, for that matter.
 It signifies that, as Lincoln said, “We are not enemies but friends.  We must 
not be enemies.”  It pulls us back from the brink of rhetorical, intellectual, and even 
physical violence that, thank God, has only rarely disturbed the peace of the Senate.
SPECIAL ISSUE APPENDIX 199
 It is what makes us America and not Bosnia.  It is what makes us the most 
stable government on Earth, and not another civil war waiting to happen.
 We are doing the business of the American people.  We do it every day.  We 
have to do it with the same people every day.  And if we cannot be civil to one 
another, and if we stop dealing with those with whom we disagree, or that we don’t 
like, we would soon stop functioning altogether.
 Sometimes we have stopped functioning, and once we did, indeed, have a civil 
war.  By the way, once, Representative Preston Brooks of South Carolina, who was 
born in Strom Thurmond’s hometown of Edgefield, came into this Chamber and 
attacked Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts with a cane.  It is at those times 
we have learned the hard way how important it is to work together, to see beyond 
the human frailties, the petty jealousies, even the occasionally craven motive, the fall 
from grace that every mortal experiences in life.
 Calhoun didn’t like Clay.  He didn’t share his politics.  He didn’t approve of his 
methods.  But he loved Clay because Clay was like him, an accomplished politician, 
a man in the arena, a master of his trade, serving his convictions and his constituency 
just as Calhoun was doing.
 Calhoun and Clay worked together because they knew they had to.  The 
business of their young nation was too important—and their roles in that business 
was too central—to allow them the luxury of petulance.
 I read recently that our late friend and colleague Barry Goldwater9 had proposed 
to his good friend, then Senator John Kennedy, that the two of them make joint 
campaign appearances in the 1964 Presidential campaign, debating issues one-on-
one, without intervention from the press, their handlers, or anyone else.
 Barry Goldwater and John Kennedy would have had trouble agreeing on 
the weather, but they did agree that Presidential campaigns were important, that 
the issues were important, and that the public’s understanding of their respective 
positions on those issues was important.
 That common commitment to the importance of public life was enough to 
bridge an ideological and partisan chasm that was both deep and wide.  And that 
friendship, born here in the Senate where they were both freshmen together in 
1953, would have served this Nation well, whoever might have won that election in 
1964.
 Barry Goldwater and I were personal friends, as well as professional colleagues 
and members of the same political team.  Even so, I could not automatically count 
on Barry’s support for anything.  Once, when I really needed his vote and leaned on 
him perhaps a little too hard, he said to his Majority Leader, “Howard, you have one 
vote, and I have one vote, and we’ll just see how this thing turns out.”
 It was at that moment that I formulated my theory that being leader of the 
Senate was like herding cats.  It is trying to make ninety-nine independent souls act 
in concert under rules that encourage polite anarchy and embolden people who find 
majority rule a dubious proposition at best.
9 Senator Barry M. Goldwater (R. Ariz.) served in the United States Senate, 1953-1965 and 1969-1987, and 
was the Republican Party’s nominee for President of the United States in 1964.  Id.
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 Perhaps this is why there was no such thing as a Majority Leader in the Senate’s 
first century and a quarter—and why it is only a traditional, rather than a statutory 
or constitutional, office still today.
 Indeed, the only Senator with a constitutional office is the President pro 
tempore, who stands third in line of succession to the Presidency of the United 
States.  Our friend Strom Thurmond10 has served ably in that constitutional role 
for most of the last 17 years, and I have no doubt that he will serve 17 more.
 May I say, in Strom’s case, I am reminded of an invitation I recently received to 
attend the dedication of a time capsule in Rugby, Tennessee, to be opened in 100 
years.  Unfortunately, I could not attend because of a scheduling conflict, so I wrote 
them that I was sorry I could not be there for the burying of the time capsule, but I 
assured them that I would try to be there when they dig it up.
A Baker’s Dozen
 My friends, these are different times than when Calhoun was Andrew Jackson’s 
Vice President.  These are different times than when Lyndon Johnson was Majority 
Leader in the 1950s and could wield his power to enforce party discipline with cash 
and committee assignments, as well as the famous “Johnson treatment.”
 Today, every Senator is an independent contractor, beholden to no one 
for fundraising, for media coverage, for policy analysis, for political standing, or 
anything else.  I herded cats.  Trent Lott and Tom Daschle11 have to tame tigers. 
And the wonder is not that the Senate, so configured, does so little, but that it 
accomplishes so much.
 That it does is a tribute to their talented leadership.  They can herd cats.  They 
can tame tigers.  They can demonstrate the patience of Job, the wisdom of Solomon, 
the poise of Cary Grant, and the sincerity of Jimmy Stewart—all of which are 
essential to success in the difficult roles they play.
 But for whatever help it may be to these and future leaders, let me now offer a 
few rules for Senate leadership.  As it happens, they are an even Baker’s Dozen:
 1. Understand its limits.  The leader of the Senate relies on two prerogatives, 
neither of which is constitutionally or statutorily guaranteed.  They are the 
right of prior recognition under the precedent of the Senate and the conceded 
right to schedule the Senate’s business. These, together with the reliability of his 
commitment and whatever power of personal persuasion one brings to the job, are 
all the tools a Senate leader has.
 2. Have a genuine and decent respect for differing points of view.  Remember 
that every Senator is an individual, with individual needs, ambitions, and political 
conditions.  None was sent here to march in lockstep with his or her colleagues 
10 Senator J. Strom Thurmond (D., R. S. Car.) served in the United States Senate, 1954-2003, and served as 
President pro tempore of the Senate, 1981-1987 and 1995-2001, and as President pro tempore emeritus, 2001-2003. 
Id.
11 Senator Thomas A. Daschle (D. S. Dak.) represented South Dakota in the United States Senate, 1987-
2005, and served as Senate Minority Leader, 1995-2001 and 2003-2005) and as Senate Majority Leader, 2001-
2003.  Id.
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and none will.  But also remember that even members of the opposition party 
are susceptible to persuasion and redemption on a surprising number of issues. 
Understanding these shifting sands is the beginning of wisdom for Senate leaders.
 3. Consult as often as possible with as many Senators as possible, on as 
many issues as possible.  This consultation should encompass not only committee 
chairmen, but as many members of one’s party conference as possible in matters of 
legislation and legislative scheduling.
 4. Remember that Senators are people with families.  Schedule the Senate as 
humanely as possible, with as few all-night sessions and as much accommodation 
as you can manage.  I confess with great sin in that category, but it is good advice for 
the future.
 5. Choose a good staff.  In the complexity of today’s world, it is impossible for 
a Member to gather and digest all the information that is necessary for him or her 
to make an informed and prudent decision on major issues.  Listen to your staff, but 
don’t let them forget who works for whom.
 6. Listen more often than you speak.  Once again, as my late father-in-law, 
Everett Dirksen, once admonished me in my first year in this body, “occasionally 
allow yourself the luxury of an unexpressed thought.”
 7. Count carefully and often.  The essential training of a Senate majority 
leader perhaps ends in the third grade, when he learns to count reliably.  But 51 
today may be 49 tomorrow, so keep on counting.
 8. Work with the President, whoever he or she may be, whenever possible. 
When I became Majority Leader after the elections of 1980, I had to decide whether 
I would try to set a separate agenda for the Senate, with our brand new Republican 
majority, or try to see how our new President, with a Republican Senate, could work 
together as a team to enact our programs.  I chose the latter course, and I believe 
history has proved me right.  Would I have done the same with a President of the 
opposition party?  Lyndon Johnson did with President Eisenhower, and history 
proved him right as well.
 9. Work with the House.  It is a coequal branch of government, and nothing a 
Senator does—except in ratifications and confirmations—is final unless the House 
concurs.  Both my father and my step-mother served in the House, and I appreciate 
its special role as the sounding board of American politics.  John Rhodes12 and I 
established a Joint Leadership Office in 1977, and it worked very well. I commend 
the arrangement to others.
 10. No surprises.  Bob Byrd and I decided more than twenty years ago that, 
while we were bound to disagree on many things, one thing we would always 
agree on was the need to keep each other fully informed.  It was an agreement we 
never broke—not once—in the eight years we served together as Republican and 
Democratic leaders in the Senate.
12 Representative John J. Rhodes (R. Ariz.) served in the United States House of Representatives, 1953-1983, 
and as House Minority Leader during the 93d Congress through the 96th Congress.  Id.
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 11. Tell the truth, whether you have to or not.  Remember that your word is 
your only currency; devalue it, and your effectiveness as a Senate leader is over.  And 
always get the bad news out first.
 12. Be patient. The Senate was conceived by America’s founders as “the saucer 
into which the nation’s passions are poured to cool.” Let Senators have their say. 
Bide your time— I worked for eighteen years to get television in the Senate, and the 
first camera was not turned on until after I left.  But patience and persistence have 
their shining reward.  It is better to let a few important things be your legacy than 
to boast of a thousand bills that have no lasting significance.
 13. Be civil, and encourage others to do likewise.  Many of you have heard 
me speak of the need for greater civility in our political discourse.  My friends, I 
have been making that speech since late into the 1960s, when America turned into 
an armed battleground over the issues of civil rights and Vietnam.  Having seen 
political passion erupt into physical violence, I do not share the view of those who 
say that politics today are meaner or more debased than ever.  But in this season of 
prosperity and peace—which is so rare in our national experience—it ill behooves 
America’s leaders to invent disputes for the sake of political advantage, or to inveigh 
carelessly against the motives and morals of one’s political adversaries.  America 
expects better of its leaders than this, and it deserves better.
 I continue in my long-held faith that politics is an honorable profession.  I 
continue to believe that only through the political process can we deal effectively 
with the full range of the demands and dissents of the American people.  I continue 
to believe that here in the United States Senate, especially, our country can expect 
to see the rule of the majority co-exist peacefully and constructively with the rights 
of the minority, which is an interesting concept.
 It doesn’t take Clays and Websters and Calhouns to make the Senate work. 
Doles and Mitchells did it.  Mansfields and Scotts did it.  Johnsons and Dirksens 
did it.  Byrds and Bakers did it.  Lotts and Daschles do it now and do it well.  The 
founders didn’t require a nation of supermen to make this government and this 
country work, but only honorable men and women laboring honestly and diligently 
and creatively in their public and private capacities.
 It was the greatest honor of my life to serve here and to lead here.  I learned 
much about this institution, about this country, about human nature, and about 
myself in the eighteen years that it was my pleasure to serve the people of the State 
of Tennessee.
 My friends, I enjoyed some days more than others.  I succeeded some days 
more than others.  I was more civil some days than others.  But the Senate, for all its 
frustrations and foibles and failings, is indeed the world’s greatest deliberative body. 
And, by God, I love it.
 Thank you very much.
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Remarks during the Swearing in of
Howard H. Baker, Jr. 
as U. S. Ambassador to Japan (2001)1
President George W. Bush
The Ambassador to Japan, Howard H. Baker, Jr.
 
 The President:  Senator Baker, you’ve drawn quite a crowd here to the 
White House.  (Laughter.)  Mr. Vice President, Mr. Secretary, CIA Director 
George Tenet, I believe is here.  Justice O’Connor is here, thank you so much for 
coming.  The Ambassador from Japan is here, thank you very much for being here, 
Mr. Ambassador, and your lovely wife.
 Madeleine Albright,2 I believe is here—Madame Secretary.  Larry Eagleburger3 
is here.  Elizabeth Dole,4 I believe is here.  Senator.  Elizabeth, thank you very much. 
The former Ambassadors to the country of Japan are on the stage with us, they have 
been introduced.  Members of the United States Senate are here.  Members of the 
Tennessee congressional delegation are here.
 Thank you all for coming, and welcome.  Today, we call upon one of America’s 
most valued statesmen to help be the keeper of one of America’s most valued 
friendships.  Howard Baker has held many titles during the course of his long 
and distinguished career.  They include sailor, senator, Minority Leader, Majority 
Leader, and White House Chief of Staff.
 In a few moments, he’ll add “ambassador” to that list.  And, once again, America 
is very grateful.  (Applause.)
 All the former ambassadors here are living examples of the very highest 
standards of diplomatic excellence.  And between them, Mike Mansfield,5 Walter 
1 Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, June 25, 2001, available at http://georgew bush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010626-9.html.  The swearing-in ceremony took place in the East Room 
of the White House.  Id.  Baker was sworn in by Secretary of State Colin Powell.
2 Madeleine K. Albright, U. S. Secretary of State, 1997-2001.  Biographies of the Secretaries of State: 
Madeleine Korbel Albright, Office of the Historian, U. S. Department of State, available at http://history.state.
gov/departmenthistory/people/albright-madeleine-korbel.
3 Lawrence S. Eagleburger, U. S. Secretary of State, 1992-1993.  Biographies of the Secretaries of State: 
Lawrence Sidney Eagleburger, Office of the Historian, U. S. Department of State, available at http://history.state.
gov/departmenthistory/people/eagleburger-lawrence-sidney.
4 Senator Elizabeth H. Dole (R. N. Car.) represented North Carolina in the United States Senate, 2003-
2009.  Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-Present, available at http://
bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=D000601.
5 Michael J. Mansfield represented Montana in the United States Senate, 1953-1977, and in the U. S. House of 
Representatives, 1943-1953, and served as Senate Majority Leader, 1961-1977, and as United States Ambassador 
to Japan, 1977-1988.  Id. at bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/ biodisplay.pl?index=M000113.
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Mondale,6 Tom Foley,7 and Howard Baker have accumulated over a hundred years 
of elected office.  (Laughter.)  That’s a lot of balloon drops.  (Laughter.)
 Thirty-four of those years are accounted for by Mike Mansfield alone.  The 
senator began the tradition of high-level political figures serving as our Ambassador 
to Japan.  He held that post for more than 11 years, longer than anyone else. 
Japanese press calls these figures “o-mono”—the big guys.  (Laughter.)  Well, we’re 
all very honored to have the original big guy with us.
 And by the way, Senator Thurmond,8 he informed me—with quite clear 
language—that he is four months younger than you are.  (Laughter.)
 We send the very best people to Japan because the United States has no more 
important partner in the world than Japan.  Our alliance is rooted in the vital 
strategic and economic interests that we share.  It is the cornerstone of peace and 
prosperity in Asia.  And today this partnership is helping us tackle global problems, 
as well.
 I’m looking forward to welcoming the Prime Minister this weekend at Camp 
David.  Together, we will explore ways we can continue to strengthen our security 
relationship.  We will talk about the Prime Minister’s agenda for reforming and 
revitalizing the Japanese economy.  We’ll discuss how our countries can work 
together on realistic and effective responses to global problems such as AIDS in 
Africa and climate change.
 I will also tell the Prime Minister that America’s thirty-eighth Ambassador to 
Japan is a man of extraordinary ability, grace, and good humor.  In every post he has 
held, Howard Baker has brought uncommon intelligence and an uncanny ability to 
calm the ship of state, even in days of crisis.
 He comes from good stock.  His grandmother, Lillie “Mother Ladd” Mauser9—
(laughter)—was Tennessee’s first woman sheriff.  (Laughter.)  His father and his 
step-mother both served in the House.  He married into good stock, as well.  He 
counts Senator Everett Dirksen and the grand old man of the Grand Old Party, 
Alf Landon,10 as fathers-in-law.  And what the Prime Minister is going to find out, 
he took an extraordinary woman as a bride, in Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker. 
(Applause.)
6 Walter F. Mondale represented Minnesota in the United States Senate, 1964-1976, and served as Vice 
President of the United States, 1977-1981, and as United States Ambassador to Japan, 1993-1996.  Mondale 
was the Democratic presidential nominee in 1984.  Id. at http://bioguide.congress.gov/ scripts/biodisplay.
pl?index=M000851.
7 Thomas S. Foley represented the State of Washington in the U. S. House of Representatives, 1965-1995, 
and served as  Speaker of the House, 1989-1995, and as United States Ambassador to Japan, 1997-2001.  Id. at 
bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=F000239.
8 Senator J. Strom Thurmond (1902-2003) was the oldest person ever to serve in the United States Senate. 
Id. at http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=T000254.  He represented South Carolina in the 
United States Senate, 1954-2003.  Id.
9 For Lillie Ladd Mauser, see J. Lee Annis, Jr., Howard Baker:  Conciliator in an Age of Crisis, 2d 
ed. 4, 262-63 n.9 (2007).
10 Alfred M. Landon (1887-1987) served as governor of Kansas, 1933-1937, and was the nominee of the 
Republican Party for President of the United States in 1936.  His daughter, Nancy Landon Kassebaum, represented 
Kansas in the United States Senate, 1978-1996.  Alfred M. Landon,  Kansas Historical Society, available at http://
www.kshs.org/kansapedia/alfred-m-landon/12126.  Nancy Landon Kassebaum married Senator Baker in 1996.
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 In the Senate, Howard Baker had a list of rules for being an effective senator. 
He called it the Baker’s Dozen.  The list included:  listen more often than you 
speak; be patient; tell the truth, whether you have to or not; and, finally, be civil and 
encourage others to do the same.
 Well, these rules help explain why Howard Baker has made such a mark on 
American history.  They are why he’s going to keep making his mark for the years to 
come.  Congratulations.
 Ambassador Baker:  Thank you, sir.  (Applause.)
 (Ambassador-designate Baker was sworn in.)  (Applause.)
 Ambassador Baker:  Mr. President, Secretary Powell,11 Ambassadors, 
my former colleagues in the Senate, in the House of Representatives, ladies and 
gentlemen, this is truly an overwhelming experience, and I am grateful.  I am happy 
to be here, Mr. President, to speak for this country and to speak for you in Japan.
 I have conferred with you, with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 
State, the Vice President, many others in your Cabinet and this government, [and] 
many in the Congress.  I understand my responsibility, and I will discharge it.
 I understand, as well, that there is a special, unique relationship that exists 
between the United States and Japan.  It is remarkable, indeed, that given our history 
and relationship, that Japan and the United States would develop this strong bond, 
this mutuality of respect, this shared common view of the necessity for peace in the 
world.
 My friend, Mike Mansfield, and one of my predecessors in this office, was fond 
of saying the bilateral relationship between the United States and Japan is the most 
important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none.  And I always wondered, 
Mr. Ambassador, how “bar none” got translated into Japanese.  (Laughter.)
 But Mike Mansfield, I agree with you, it is indeed the most important bilateral 
relationship, at least in my life and in my career, and it will continue to be.  It is the 
cornerstone of our policy, not only in Japan but in Asia, as well, and throughout the 
world.
 Mr. President, I am grateful to you for giving us this opportunity.  I am grateful 
to you, Secretary Powell, for giving me the chance to serve with you once again.  I 
am glad for all of those who helped us navigate the rocks and shoals of confirmation, 
of filling out 86 pages of forms—(laughter)—of transiting the requirements of 
the Office of Government Ethics—(laughter)—of the survival of our marriage—
(laughter).  More than once, Nancy would point out to me or I would point out to 
her, this too will pass.  (Laughter.)
 But, my friends, I could not do this without Nancy at my side, and together 
we will be a partnership to speak for this nation, to make our contribution to 
that relationship and to the peace of the world.  Mr. President, I thank you, sir. 
(Applause.) 
11 Colin L. Powell, U  S. Secretary of State, 2001-2005.  Biographies of the Secretaries of State:  Colin L. Powell, 
Office of the Historian, U. S. Department of State, available at http://history.state.gov/ departmenthistory/
people/powell-colin-luther.
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